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•ABSTRACT
Jan Hiemstra of Barlow Rand, as quoted by Kate Jowell in 1989, had
passed the following convnent on the industrial council system in
South Africa:
"The Industrial Council system has survived the first post-Wiehahn
decade. I don't think it will see out the second decade."
The main purpose of this study was to explore the val idity of the
above comment and establish a future prognosis of the industrial
council structure as a collective bargaining forum in South
Africa's formal 1abour relations system.
In the c.ourse of the study, which was primarily of a conceptual
nature, other aspects of industrial councils were al so addressed,
such as their theoretical, legal and historical frameworks; with
consideration of two operational examples; the presentation of
views on contemporary issues affecting industrial councils; and
reconmendations for their future Viability.
The methodology adopted was that of the di ssemination of
1iterature on the subject, a sel f-completion survey questionnaire
which was submitted to industrial councils and part i es thereto, as
well as certain authorities on the subject, supplemented by
persona1 interv iews.
The respondents to the survey questionnaire concluded positively,
with a few exceptions, that the industrial council system would
survive the second post·Wiehahn decade, provided that individual
industrial council s responded to the changing needs of society,
and the industries and employer/employee populations that they
serve.
It was cautioned too that due to the relatively small sample
obtained in the survey component of the study, the survey
responses should be generalised with circumspect ion , although the
results none the1ess brought forward important issues for
consideration by industrial councils.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Jowell (1989, pp. 16· 17) tn a paper entttled "Industr ial
Councils Rev t s t ted ", which postttons South Afrtca's statutory
collective bargatntng system at the conrnencement of the second
post-Wiehahn decade, quotes thts concluding conment, followed with
her own final observat ton:
"For Jan Hiemstra, a Barlow Rand labour specialtst the posttion is
reasonably clear.
'The Industrial Council has survived the first post·Wiehahn
decade. I don't th i nk it wi 11 see out the second decade.'
He may well be rtght, in literal theory. The capacHy of our
society to surprtse us with its ironies may yet prove him wrong,
in practice. The parties to industrial relations are nothing if
not creat tve and adaptable. It
The purpose of this study 15 to explore the validity of Hiemstra's
coment and establ ish a future prognosis of the industrial council
structure in South Africa's formal labour relations system. This
objective is supported by the considerable debate and concern that
has been expressed of late about the present funct i oning and the
future of industrial council s , which are regarded as the
cornerstone of this country's formal labour relations system, with
the broader purpose of maintaining constructive labour
relationships at both macro and industry levels.
It is contended that the demise of industrial council s is not nigh
and that Jowell' slatter observat ion might well prove to be more
relevant in the longer term.
In developing this theme, the following aspects pertaining to
industrial council s are addressed:
- The theoret i ca1 and 1ega1 framework of the South Afri can
industrial council system, including an overview of its historical
evolution and the coverage of specific detail on the operation of
industrial councils and the parties to this institution, who
assist in moulding its particular character in the collective
bargaining sphere. Brief comparison is also made against similar
collective bargaining institutions internationally.
- Operational examples of industrial councils, whereby two
industrial councils and their functioning are discussed in broad
terms to exemplify the processes and issues involved. Two of the
larger industrial councils were selected for this purpose, namely
the industrial councils for the Building Industry (Transvaal) and
the Metal Industry, the latter having the fuller title of the
National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and
Metallurgical Industry.
- The recording and discussion of views on contemporary issues and
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future perspecttves concerning the industrial council system. with
the generation of tentative reconrnendations that could impact on
the future of industrial counci l s and the system that they
support.
- In addition. an attempt is made to consol idate research outcomes
and 1iterature to date on the industrial council system in the
presentat ion of th is materia1.
- Furthermore. cognisance was taken of Allan's (1987. p. 14)
observation that most research on industrial council s up to 1987
had been of a descriptive rather than an empirical nature. A
further object ive is therefore to apply an integrated study
approach.
The methodology adopted was that of the study of available
literature on the subject. a self-completion survey questionnaire
that was submitted to industrial councils and parties thereto as
we11 as certa in authorit ies on the subject. supplemented by
persona1 interv iews where these could be obtai ned.
It should be noted too that throughout this document the terms
'labour relations' and 'industrial relations' will be applied
i nterchangeab1s.
-2-
2. ill RQlE Qf INDUSTRIAL COUNt ILS .rn .IHt fORMAL LABOUR RELATIONS
illlli!
Prior to considering the specific role of Industrial councils in
the South African labour relations system, a brief orientation on
the nature and functions of industrial councils is appropriate, as
well as their broader role in the collective bargaining process.
Firstly, the nature and functions of industrial councils can be
summarised as follows based on the synopsis provided by Jankelsson
(1975, pp. 1 - 3):
- An industrial council is a body composed of an equal number of
respresentatives of one or more trade unions and one or more
employers' organisations or individual employers, and is
established on a voluntary basis for the purpose of
self-government in a particular industry.
- The formation of an industrial council is in the nature of an
agreement between employers and employees to accept the
const itution drawn up by them for the government of the council.
Provided that the requirements of the Labour Rel at ions Act No 28
of 1956 (LRA) are compl ied wi th, the council becomes registered
for the particular industry concerned in the area defined by its
constitution. In the latter regard it is imperative that the
parties to the council are sufficiently representative of the
industry within the area appl ied for. When the council has been
registered, it has the powers and duties (functions) conferred or
imposed upon it by the LRA, and, at this stage the constitution
takes effect.
- The primary duty of an industrial council, as laid down by the
LRA, is to maintain industrial peace between all employers and
employees over whom it exercises jurisdiction. In fulfilment of
this duty, it must endeavour, by the negotiation of agreements or
otherwise, to prevent disputes from arising, to settle disputes
that have arisen, and to bring about the regulation or settlement
of matters of mutual interest to employers and employees.
- Agreements negotiated by industrial councils may include
provisions dealing with any number of matters specifically
mentioned in the lRA, as well as additional matters of mutual
interest to employers and employees. Typically, industrial
council agreements provide for wages, hours of work, overtime
payments, holiday bonuses, leave pay, fringe benefi ts and other
matters affecting the remuneration and conditions of employment of
all or certain classes of employees.
- When an agreement has been negotiated by the part ies to an
industrial council, it is submitted to the Department of Manpower
and then gazetted by the Hi nis ter of Hanpower, whereupon it takes
the form of delegated legislation and becomes binding on all
employers and employees who fall within the jurisdiction of the
council. Contravention of the provisions of an industrial council
agreement is a criminal offence.
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- In cases where the parties to an industrial council agreement
are cons idered to be representat i ve of the industry concerned, the
Minister may, upon application by the parties, extend the
agreement to become binding upon non-parties.
- An industrial council Is financed from levies on employers and
employees. These funds are used to employ full time secretarial
and administrative staff who assist the council and agents who see
to 1t that the terms and conditions of agreements are being
adhered to.
A useful and somewhat more compact description of an industrial
council. which emphasises the important voluntary nature of the
relationship, is provided by Jowell (1984, p. 35):
"It is primarily a bargaining forum where organi sed labour and
organised management may choose to meet to discuss issues of
significance to them and to resol ve di sputes over these issues by
negotiation and mediation."
Secondly, in respect of coll ect ive bargaini ng concepts, the
hol Isttc and comprehensive description of the collective
bargaining process as provided by Bendix (1989, pp. 77 - 78) is
appropriate here, which reads as follows:
"... a process, necessitated by a conflict of needs, interests,
goals, values, perceptions. and ideologies, but resting on a basic
cOrmlonalityof interest, whereby employee/employee collectives and
employer/employer collectives, by the conduct of continued
negottat ion and the applicat ion of pressure and counterpressure,
attempt to achieve some balance between the fulfilment of the
needs, goal sand interests of management on the one hand and
employees on the other - the extent to which either party achieves
its objectives depending on its source and use of power, the power
balance between them, the organisational and strategic
effectiveness of each party, the type of bargaining structure and
on prevalent economic soclc-pcl t t tcal and other conditions."
Key and of particular relevance here is the effectiveness of the
type of bargaining structure and its facilitating influence on the
promotion of collective bargaining and the achievement of the
objectives of the bargaining parties. The importance of the
bargaining structure and related institutions in the collective
bargaining process, of which the industrial council is a major one
in this country, is therefore highlighted.
The more specific role of industrial councils as bargaining (as
well as the potential bargaining outcome of dispute resolution)
structures in the South African 1abour relations system are best
demonstrated by a bri ef discuss i on of the dual is tic formal and
informal labour rel attons systems that exist locally. As the
formal labour relations system is that which is entrenched in the
offichl labour legislation of the country, some discussion is
also required beforehand firstly on the role of the State as
legislator and secondly the matn labour statutes that govern the
-4-
•labour relationship in South Africa.
These discussions will be preceded by a background perspective on
bargaining structures. as this is important In understanding the
general role of industrial councils in the collect ive bargaining
process.
2.1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STRUCTURES
The most important considerations pertaining to industrial
councils as collective bargaining structures are contained in
Bendix's (1989. pp. 93· 100) treatment on this subject, as
suenartsed below:
2.1.1 Bargaining Structure Concepts
The term 'bargaining structure' also encompasses the concepts of
bargaining units and bargaining levels.
A bargaining unit is composed of the employees who will be covered
by an agreement. including also employers. if bargaining takes
place wi th more than one employer. The compos i t ion of a
bargaining uni t wi11 therefore determine on behal f of whom and
with whom bargaining will take place. as well as whether
bargaining will be conducted with one union only or with a number
of unions. At industrial council level the bargaining unit is
generally understood as the 'scope' or 'coverage' of the counctl.
The bargaining level at which bargaining and negotiations takes
place will be dictated by the composition of the bargaining unit.
namely at plant/enterprise level, or with the head office of an
organisation, or with a number of employers in an industry or
area, orwtth employers from different industries. This is more
or 1ess an example too of the cont inuum of decen t ra lised to
centralised levels of collective bargaining.
Centraltsed bargaining is the term ascribed to bargaining at
industry, national or international level according to Ramsden
(l987, p. v), and decentrallsed bargaining that which occurs at
the local level, encompassing both plant and company level
bargaining. The terms centralised and industry level bargaining
are generally however used interchangeably.
Bargaining levels are of particular importance in the South
African industrial council debate, as discussed at more length in
later sections. Of relevance at this point is the reference made
by Ramsden (1987, p , 13) that both management and union parties
wish to bargain at the level of maximum advantage, namely that
level at which they believe they have the greatest power to
influence the course of negotiations. Where resultant perceptions
by parties of the most appropriate bargaining levels differ,
conflict on appropriate bargaining levels can be brought in as an
additional Issue in collective bargaining, as has been the trend
in South Africa in the last decade.
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There are consequently many types of bargaining structures and the
kind of structure established will vary from company to company,
industry to industry and from one labour relations system to
another.
Within the South African context, industrial councils would be
categorised at the centralised bargaining level, and those
comments relating to this bargaining level would be regarded as
a1so appropriate to the industrial council system.
2.1.2 Importance 2f 1M Bargaining Structure
The type of bargaining structure established will determine the
following:
- Which employees are to be covered by an agreement and thus also
who will rece i ve protect Ion from an agreement if it becomes
enforceable by statute.
- The trade union influence and relative power of parties in
negotiations in an organisation or industry.
- The degree of employee participation in decisionmaking at plant
1evel .
- The diversity and homogenity of interests to be represented and
the amount of interunion and intermanagement conflict which will
occur in the bargaining relationship.
- The divers i ty and homogenity of bargaining cutconas •
- Whether strike action will be either geographically limited or
widespread.
2.1.3 variables Influencing lli~~ Structure Established
As the bargaining process is mostly a union-initiated process,
trade unions will attempt to bargain at that level at which they
will wield the most power. Trade unions' preference for a certain
bargaining level at a certain time or in a particular industry
will be dictated by several interrelated ci rcumstances or
variables. These are noted as being the following, which have
important implications for trade unions' propensity to bargain at
either centralised or decentralised level, that is at industrial
counc i1 or enterpr i se 1eve1:
- Union Representivity: A union will prefer to bargain at plant or
industry level, depending on where it has the most employee/member
representation.
- Union Organisation and Policy: Differing union structures or
pol ictes will demonstrate preference for either highly centralhed
bargaining if that 15 where the organisation's power is
concentrated, or decentralhed at plant level if member/shop
steward participation in negotiations is emphasised.
-6-
as wages,
central ised
and worker
,
- Union Strategy: This may change from time to time, whereby the
union will assess where it can wield the most power and influence,
whether for example strikes staged at plant, company or industry
level will strategically be the most effective.
- Scope of Union Registration or Recognition: The type of employee
which a union, by its registration or the process of recognition,
is entitled to represent, will determine the bargaining unit it
can establish.
- Inter-Union Competition: Highly competitive unions may refuse to
establish a joint bargaining unit, obliging for example an
employer to engage In separate negotiations with a number of
unions and therefore favouring decentrallsed bargaining levels and
structures.
- Member Preference: Trade union members may express a preference
for certain bargaining units and levels.
- Management Organisation and Policy: This relates to company
structure and the 1eve1 at which decisionmaklng takes place within
the organisation, for example should management be decentraltsed,
the union may opt for plant level bargaining, whereas central ised
bargaining would be preferred if major decisions can only be taken
by top management. likewise, unions organising the employees of
large corporations may choose to bargain on behalf of all
corporate employees in one bargaining unit.
- Economic Factors: This relates to the nature of the product and
the labour market, with central ised bargaining for the whole
industry preferred where strong employer competition in the same
product line can adversely affect wages at p1 ant 1eve1. Craft
unions may a1 so prefer central i sed bargaining when the objective
is to control the supply of labour in an industry.
- Type of Bargaining Issue: Certain issues, such
benefits and training, lend themselves more to
bargaining, whereas others such as procedural issues
participation may be beUer decided at plant level.
- Government Pol icy and Legisl at ion: A government may impose a
bargaining structure on partici pants by legis1 at ion or- create a
preference for a certain type of bargaining forum by making
agreements concluded in that forum 1ega lly enforceable.
- Employer Organisation and Policy: Not only unions, but also
employers, mayan occasion take the initiative in establishing
bargaining structures, or at least have some say in the type of
structure. The employer considerations in establ ishlng a
bargaining structure are very similar to those for unions, except
that particularly in respect of strategy and bargaining power, the
reverse argument would apply for employers.
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2.1.4 I.w 2f Bargaining Structyre
Reference is made to Kochan's classification of four types of
bargaining 'units' or levels, with advantages and disadvantages of
each provided. Briefly, these types are as follows:
- Narrow Decentralised Unit: This is established when a union
represents the interests of only one group of workers at a
particular plant, or where various unions, each constituting a
different bargaining unit, represent the interests of different
groups of workers at that plant. Management wou 1d potentIally
have the upper hand In thl s arrangement, intra-organisatlona1
conflict is minimised and corrrnonallty of Interest and worker
participation maximised.
- Broad Oecentral i sed Unit: When all the unions or a number of
unions at a particular plant combine to form one bargaining unit,
and bargain as a team or In coalition bargaining, whereby each
union will retain its Independence and may negotiate special
conditions for its members, or alternatively withdraw from an
agreement.
- Narrow 'Central i sed Unit: When one union or a number of unions
representing a particular sector or interest at a company, plant
or industry, or in different industries, bargain centrally with
the employer(s) concerned, such as at industrial council level.
The benefits for both sides are that the barga i ning process is
depersonaIIsed and where all emp1oyers In an industry are
involved, the wages of that group of workers are taken out of
competition. Also for the unions there is the additional benefit
of reaching the real decisionmakers In management, as well as
achieving the increased prominence of their unions.
- Broad Central i sed Uni t: This is established when one union or a
number of unions representing diverse interests bargain with a
number of employers at industry level. This is a very complex
structure, with the main advantage for both sides being the
uniformity of wage levels and benefits achieved by a centralised
agreement. This kind of centralised forum for a range of
interests would apply to very large industrial councils such as
the national industrial council for the Metal industry, and in
industries where a wide spectrum of unions are represented that
have divergent ideological leanings.
The latter two type of bargaining units or structures are what
would commonly apply to Industrial councils. However, very often
employers and unions opt for a two tier system of bargaining,
where minimum conditions of service and benefits are negotiated at
central level and more specific or improved conditions and
procedures are establ tshed through plant level negot tat ions. This
has been the trend in South Africa in the 1980's and has
contributed to the issue of appropriate bargaining levels.
The advantages and disadvantages of centralised and decentrallsed
bargaining, which would also indicate the advantages and
disadvantages of a centralised bargaining forum such as an
-8-
•industrial council, are not covered here but will be consolidated
in Section 8 in the discussion on the Industrial council survey
results.
2.2 ill BQll Qf ill illlf M LEG I SLATOR .lH LABOUR RELATIONS
State intervention in the labour relationship between employers
and employees, both individual and collective, through legislation
and other mechan isms, wi 11 depend very much on the 1abour
relat ions approach and system subscribed to by a particular
society and its government.
The labour relations approach subscribed to in South Africa is
termed the p1ura1ist lc approach which recognises the
interdependence and legitimacy of the conflicting interests of the
main actors in the labour relationship, namely employers and
employees, with collective bargaining sanctioned as the prime
means whereby this conflict is institutionalised and contained so
that it does not reach disruptive proportions.
The State, through its instrument the government, is seen as part
of the tripartite pluralistic interaction by De Witt (1987, p.
4), in performing the assumed neutral role of central facilitating
and regulatory body to this relationship in conjunction with
employees and employers. The State's prime impact on the labour
relationship is further described by Bendix (1989, p , 71) as in
the performance of its roles of employer, legislator, conciliator
and regulator.
The legislative role of the State is singled out here in terms of
the establishment and enforcement of statutory collective
bargaining and dispute resolution machinery in South Africa, of
which the industrial council is central to this formal legislated
system.
The role of the law in society in general and labour relations in
particular should also be put in perspective and its function
appreciated. De Witt (1989, p. 1) provtdes an encompassing
definition of the 1aw in society as "... a set of rul es governing
human conduct and enforced by the State when necessary in order to
ensure a just and orderly socf ety", with the State as the most
powerful body in society fulfilling this central role by
constituting the final guarantee that the rules governing a
particular society will be enforced when it becomes necessary,
hence the law being intimately linked with the power of the State.
The legalistic definition of labour law that follows from this
general description of the law and containing those elements
unique to the labour relationship and the regulation of the power
balance betweeen the major part 1c1pants, is proposed by De Wi tt
(Note 2) as being:
·Labour law is a
State, regulat 1ng
set of rules, backed up by the power of the
individual and collective relationships In
·9·
,,
respect of subordinate labour between employers and employees, on
the one hand. and their organisations on the other and between
these groups and the State.·
The major laws or statutes enacted by South African Parliament and
administered by the Department of Manpower, which have a bearing
on labour relat ions and can be regarded as labour 1aw, were the
following as at the end of 1989 according to the Department of
Manpower (1990. p, 4):
- The Workmen's Compensation Act No 30 of 1941
- The labour Rel at ions Act No 28 of 1956
- The Wage Act No 5 of 1957
- The Unemployment Insurance Act No 30 of 1966
- The Manpower Tra i ning Act No 56 of 1981
- The Guidance and Placement Act No 62 of 1981
- The Machinery and Occupat tona1 Safety Act No 6 of 1983
- The Basic Condit ions of Employment Act No 3 of 1983
De Witt (1987. pp. 31 • 32) al so includes other statutes that
impact on labour relations but are not administered by the
Department of Manpower. as being The Black Transport Services Act
No 53 of 1957 and The Mines and Works Act No 27 of 1956.
The labour Relations Chief Directorate of the Department of
Manpower (DMP) (1990. p. 24) perceives its main task as the
promotion of sound labour relations in South Africa in accordance
with Government policy, with legislation as an important
instrument in effecting sound labour relations. Three of the
above Acts are administered by the labour Relations Chief
Directorate, namely the labour Relations Act (lRA), The Basic
Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA) and The Wage Act. whilst the
other Acts are administered by other divisions of the DMP.
The Chief Directorate: labour Relations of the DMP (1989, pp. 33
- 34) describes the general objects of these Acts as follows,
which also demonstrates their interrelationship and supplementary
roles within the South African labour relations system:
- For the lRA these are the registration and orderly
administration of trade unions, employers' organi sations and
industrial council s , the prevention and settlement of disputes
between employers and employees, and the regulation of conditions
of employment by arbitration, mediation, agreements and orders.
- The BCOEA's purpose is to regulate the conditions of employment
of workers whose condit ions of employment are not regulated by
industrial council agreements or wage determinations.
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,- The Wage Act's objects are the establ ishment of the Wage Board
and the determination of conditions of employment, and other
incidental matters, in respect of non-organised workers.
The Chief Directorate further points out (1989, p, 34) that these
Acts are aimed at the deregulation and promotion of private
initiative in terms of the Government's overall labour relations
policy, and cautions too (1990, p, 26) that they are not
appl icable to certain workers such as those employed in
agriculture and domestic service, nor as far as the dispute
settling machinery of the LRA is concerned, to employees of the
State. Thus, meaning that they do not regulate a very large
sector of the economically active population of South Africa. The
implications of these exclusions are important in that these
persons would fall outside the formal labour relations system and
concern would consequently be directed on how the labour
relationship would be conducted and regulated in these major
excluded sectors.
This exclusion of certain employees from the coverage of these
major pieces of labour legislation is of particular importance to
the formal labour relations system, as these workers would not be
governed by the legislation and institutions created by the
system, such as industrial councils.
The official government policy on labour relations furthermore
illustrates its particular interventionistic role in the nation's
labour relations system, which can be described as that of
institutionalised voluntarism and self-government at industry
level, which forms the basis of the industrial council system and
the voluntary principles supporting their formation. The Chief
Directorate: labour Relations of the DHP (1990, p. 24) provtdes
these objectives as being the following:
- It is the policy of the Department of Manpower to leave the
regulation of relat ions between employers and employees as far as
possible to the parties themselves.
- legislation is passed only for the purpose of maintaining proper
order and is regarded as necessary owing to constant tens ion in
employer/employee relations that is caused by the apparent clash
of interests of the respective part ies.
- To achieve and maintain proper order, it is of paramount
importance that th is legislation should not disturb the balance
between employers and employees, should therefore ass i st employers
and employees in regulating the working relationship between them,
leading to the Department's policy to consult employers and
employees as far as poss ible whenever changes are proposed in the
laws administered by it.
- In order to maintain its impartiality and objectivity as far as
possible, the Department does not act as legal advi ser or labour
relations consultant to employers, employees or their
organisations, but may be of service in the interpretation of
labour legislation or related matters on request to any of the
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•part les concerned so that uncerta i nt tes can be removed.
- Efforts are made to keep In contact with the part i es that have
an Interest in the ma Intenance of 1abour peace so that the
legislation administered by the labour Relations Chief Directorate
of the Department of Manpower can be constantly evaluated and
adapted.
The labour statute providing for the formal labour relations
system and the establishment and operation of industrial councils
is therefore the lRA. Of note is that although the formation of
industrial council s in terms of the LRA Is voluntary between the
parties concerned, based on the principle of self-government In
industry, once established, their operation and conduct is
governed by the dictates of this legislation. Although the
provisions of the lRA pertaining to industrial councils will be
discussed In more depth further on in this document, a general
overview of the lRA will be provided at this point, with the
specifics relating to the industrial counctl system deferred to
the said further sections.
2•3 ill 1.AB.O!!B BELAT IONS AU tiQ z.a Qf lill
The evolution of this Act and South African collective labour
legislation pre-19BB, as applicable to Industrial councils, is
treated In relevant detatl in Section 3. The current legislated
status of thl s Act and recent developments In labour 1egl slat ion
will be considered in this section, and will therefore serve as a
continuation to the former historical perspective.
The general objects of the LRA as perceived by the DMP were
provided in the previous section, with the full long title of the
lRA after the passing of the Labour Relations Amendment Act No 83
of 1988 (LRAA) , bei ng provided as follows as conta i ned in the
official statute of the labour Relations Act No 2B of 1956 (1988,
p , 1) :
"To consolidate and amend the law relating to the registration and
regulation of trade unions and employers' organi sat ions, the
prevention and settlement of disputes between employers and
employees, and the regulation of terms and conditions of
employment by agreement and arbitration; to provide for the
establishment of a National Manpower Commission and to define its
functions; to provide for the establishment of an industrial court
and to define its functions; to provide for the establ ishment of a
labour appeal court and to define its functions; to provide for
the control of labour brokers and the reglstrat ion of labour
brokers' offices; and to provide for incidental matters.·
Although the LRA appl ies to every undertaking, industry, trade or
occupation, the following persons are excluded from its provisions
as extracted from Section 2 (2) of the lRA (1988, p. 9):
"This Act does not apply to persons in respect of their employment
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in farming operations or in domestic service in private
households, nor to officers of Parl tament In respect of thel r
employment as such, nor, subject to the provisions of subsections
(3) and (9), to persons employed by the State in respect of their
emp1oyment as such, nor to any employee of any 1oca 1 authorl ty
des ignated by such authorl ty In terms of any 1aw as chief
administrative officer of the local authority, in so far as It
concerns the determination of remuneration and other service
benefits provided for in the Remunerat ion of Town Cl erks Act, 1984
(Act No 115 of 1984), nor to the performance of work In a
charitable institution for which persons performing it receive no
remuneration, nor to persons who teach, educate or train other
persons at any university, technlkon, college, school or other
educational Institution maintained wholly or partly from public
funds."
To these exclusions may be added precedents of the Industrial
Court that are not regarded as legally binding rules but as
guidelines in interpretation of the law. For example, in the case
of the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union vs Sopelong CC (1988)9
ILJ 852 the National Manpower Commission (1989, p, 18) reported
that the. Industrial Court ruled that persons employed on oil rigs
outs Ide South Afri can terrttoria1 waters are not governed by the
lRA. Backer and Weston (1987, p. 4) also mention that whtlst
publ tc servants are allowed to join trade unions in terms of the
lRA, they are not permitted to strike or uttllse any of the labour
re la t ions mach i nery determi ned by the lRA. The lRAA a1so deleted
the previous reference in this Section of the LRA that university
students doing practical work in a firm as part of their
university training are excluded, therefore their inclusion within
the scope of the LRA must now be assumed.
Reference has already been made regarding the impl icatlons of
these exclusions whereby a large portion of the country's
economically active population are not covered by the regulations
and statutes administered by the labour Relations Chief
Directorate of the DMP, as well as concern expressed about the
factlttation and regulation of collective bargaining, protection
of employee rights and dispute resolution outside the formal
labour relations system. For example, disputes outside the lRA
provisions would normally take the form of civil litigation based
on cOlll1lon law principles. Backer (Note 5) reports on progress
being made In the agricultural sector to promote improved labour
relations and the protection of employee rights and security
outside the legislated labour relationship.
However, during 1990, In the submissions on the proposed new
labour legislation due for promulgation in 1991, proposals had
been submitted for the inclusion of agri·industrial workers within
the scope of the LRA. It Is reported ("lRA clauses", 1990, p, 4)
that problems have been experienced with In particular a succinct
defi ntt ion of these workers and other issues re 1a ti ng to the
extension of the lRA to fannworkers. The inclusion of
agri - Indus trl a1 workers In terms of the amended LRA has
subsequently been postponed pending a report from the National
Manpower Commission (NMC) due by end April 1991 on the possible
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appl ication of the lRA to farm workers.
Attention has sped fical1y been focussed on those categories of
persons excluded from the coverage of the lRA, as they would not
be eligible for coverage under an industrial council agreement nor
have access to the various facilities and dispute resolution
mechan isms provided by such counc t l s ,
The labour Relations Amendment Act No 83 of 1988 (LRAA) came into
operation on 1 September 1988, with the following major amendments
being incorporated in the main Act as sUlIII\arised by the DMP (1989,
pp. 34 - 35) and supplemented with the coements contained in the
annual reports for 1988 of the National Manpower Conmission (1989,
pp. 19 - 21) and the Institute for Industrial Rel at ions (1988,
pp. 1 - 7):
- The establ1 shment of a labour Appeal Court that will function at
the same level as the Supreme Court.
- The provision that appeals against certain decisions of the
Industria1 Court can be made to the Labour Appeal Court and for
dec is ions of the labour Appeal Court to be taken on appeal to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
- A more simplified procedure for the establishment of
concil iation boards, which wi 11 be establ ished as of right if
certain minimum requirements are complied with and will exclude
the previous administrative decision of the Minister of Manpower.
- The provision of a dispute settlement procedure, which is
similar to the new procedure for the establishment of conciliation
boards, for industrial councils that have not introduced their own
procedures.
- The Industrial Court's functions have been streaml ined further
and it will be able to make orders as to costs.
- The Industrial Court will also be able to provtde urgent interim
legal assistance/rel ief similar to interdicts which will operate
until status quo relief is granted, with the previous 'court of
1aw' functions dispensed with.
- The provision of a more expedit tcus procedure regarding the
publication of decisions of the Industrial Court and the labour
Appeal Court.
- The more detailed definition of an unfair labour practice, which
includes dismissal procedures, discrimination, sympathy and repeat
strikes, illegal strikes, boycott action and interference with the
right to associate and to negotiate.
- In-house agreements such as recognition agreements,
disciplinary, retrenchment and dispute agreements as distinct from
industrial council or conciliation board agreements, may be
enforceable in terms of the Act for unfair labour practice
purposes if certain other provisions have been compl ied with.
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The enhancement of the dispute resolution functions of industrial
councils is noted in these LRAA amendments, as well as recognition
and Indirect endorsement of decentrallsed bargaining agreements by
providing provisions for their enforceability In terms of the LRA.
Since the release of the first draft of the LRAA in December 1986
until Its enactment In September 1988, much contention and
criticism has surrounded It, involving a national three day
protest stayaway by the trade union movement on 6, 7 and 8 June
1988. The Institute for Industrial Relations (I1R) (1988, pp. 63
- 67) provides a comprehensive record of the events and reactions
surrounding the passage of the lRAA, which wi 11 not be discussed
in further deta t1 here.
What does deserve mention are the main criticisms levied against
the amended legislation as contained In the joint employer
organisation and trade union federation proposals to Government
submitted In August 1988. These proposals were drawn up by the
South African Employers' Consultative Committee on labour Affairs
(SACCOlA), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and
the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), and become known as
the SCN Accord as it progressed through various stages. The
original submission requested that the follOWing cl auses in the
Act not be promulgated:
- Aspects of the definition of unfair labour practices.
- The grounds for union registration in terms of race.
- Dispute resolution procedures, particularly concerning the time
period involved before striking and definition of when a dispute
is deemed to have occurred.
- The secrecy provisions pertaining to publication of Industrial
Court judgements.
- Civil indemnity and the assumed responsibility of the union for
its members.
The lRAA was however still passed in full, but with indications
form the then Minister of Manpower that the lRA would be amended
again if it did not meet current needs, as confirmed In an
observation in the annual report for 1988 of the DHP (1989, p.
35) that, despite an inadequate period having passed to assess Its
effect properly, •••• Minor practical problems concerning certain
provisions were, however, experienced. These, and possibly other
problems that may be experienced in the future, could be
considered In due course with a view to amending the Act, if
necessary. •
Any changes to the lRA that either directly or indirectly Impact
on the industrial council system should accordingly be taken
cogn isance of and mon itored with in teres t ,
There has Indeed been a flurry of activity since then surrounding
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,the lRA, wi th dra ft amendments to the lRA hav Ing been subml tted
during 1990 and the consolidation of labour legislation in South
Africa also simultaneously receiving attention. In terms of the
most recent developments regarding amendments to the LRA, the
s Huat Ion has now progressed that a Standing Conmittee of the
Natlonal Manpower Conrni sslon is cons idering presentat ions from
interested parties on the new draft labour legislation, which has
incorporated many of the SNC Accord features. This Stand Ing
Conrnlttee was const ituted from members of the Joint ConrnHtee on
Education and Manpower, and was especially convened for the
preparation of this 1egislatlon.
Slabbert (Note 23) of the Department of Manpower is confident that
the new legislation will be tabled in Parliament in 1991, as It
was Impractical and premature to implement it sooner in 1990.
He summarl sed the proposed changes as follows:
- The dispute referral period to be changed from 30 to 180 days
(which Is already being applied informally).
- The description of a deadlock to be clarified in both the
English and Afri kaans versions of the lRA.
- The unfair labour practice description to revert back to the
pre-1988 definition in the lRA.
- S44C of the lRA on reglstrat ion and object ions against new
registratlons to be c1arifled.
- 48 Hours notice to be given of interdicts.
- The inclusion of te1efaxes as being acceptable proof of delivery
of documents.
- Only unregistered trade unions and employer organi sat ions to be
required to produce certificates of compliance.
- S79(2) on indemnities In the event of strike action to be
clarl f ted.
A second draft of a pro forma conso1 idated lRA as prepared by the
Technical Standing Conrnittee of the NMC was submi tted to the
Minister of Manpower during the latter half of 1990. Landman
(1990, p.l) stresses that the mandate to the NMC and the Technical
Conrnlttee was to con sol idate the lRA of 1956, with consequently
many of the provisions of the Act having been retained, whilst
certain others would receive further attentlon. As thi s draft Is
not yet for public consumption, it will not be conmented upon.
Therefore at the time of finalising this document the lRA has not
officially been amended yet since the 1988 amendments.
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2.4 I!iE FORHAL LABOUR RELATIONS SYSTEM
Backer and Weston (1987, p. 4) describe the formal labour
relations system as governing industry-level or centralised
bargaining, which exists parallel to the non-formal system
relating to plant-level or decentraltsed bargaining. The formal
system is also governed directly by the provisions of the lRA,
whilst the non-formal system is only governed indirectly by this
Act.
Within the collective bargaining subsystem of the formal labour
relations system, employers and their organisations may
voluntarily form industrial councils with representatives of an
equal number of registered trade unions, applicable to either a
particular undertaking, industry, trade or occupation and for a
particular area. Registration in terms of the Labour Relations
Act No. 28 of 1956 (lRA) of both the employer and employee
parties is however a prerequisite for membership to such an
industrial council.
The most important role of an industrial council in this formal
sys tem as cited by the Department of Manpower and quoted by Backer
and Weston (1987, p. 5) is to endeavour to prevent labour
disputes between employers and employees and to set t 1e disputes
that have arisen, which is primarily achieved through the
negotiation of wages and conditions of service. Agreements
reached by industrial councils are made legally binding and
normally include provisions relating to hours of work, basic wage
rates, overtime payments, leave, benefits, tra i ni ng and other
working conditions. Industrial council functions and agreements
will be expanded on 1ater in thi s document.
The formal labour relations system, both within and outside
collective bargaining, as based on the structures created by the
LRA, is diagrarmlatically presented in Figure 2.4.1.
OUTSIDE
COLLECTIYE
BARGAINING
WITHIN COllECTIVE BARGAINING
:STRIKE oR":
I LOCKOUT I
- - -(];:':::~-=ST=R=IA=L=C=O=JU~~C:::;:I~l~l :fO~~lLl~1IQN_ ~O~~Ol
UNREG UNIONS! REG UN IONS' REG EMPLOYER ORGS
~~~~~~~S'
FIGURE 2.4.1 lli formal .lihM relations .u1.WI1n South Africa
(from Backer and Weston, 1987, p. 5)
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The labour relations subsystem regarded as existing outside the
collective bargaining scope of the formal labour relations system
applies in particular where no industrial council can be formed or
is desired by the parties concerned.
In this subsystem collective bargaining is not statutortly
provided for, except where employer organisations can unilaterally
make presentat ions to the Mi nis ter of Manpower in terms of the
Wage Act, 1957, on wages and conditions of service that can be
declared binding on all employees and employers within that
industry or occupation under Section 51A orders.
With the incorporat i on of the Labour Relations Amendment Act No 83
of 1988 (LRAA) amendments, the Labour Appeal Court should now be
added to Figure 2.4.1 as a body above the Industrial Court in the
dispute resolution process of the formal labour relations system.
Stapelberg (Note 1) provides another classification of the
offichl labour relations system, distinguishing between the
unorqantsed and organised labour relations systems. The
unorganised system is considered as covering the conct l tatton
board structure and Sect ion 51A wage determinat i on orders of the
unorganised industry, whtlst the organised system 1inks into the
industrial council system, as exemplified in Figure 2.4.2.
MINISTER OF MANPOWER
DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER
INDIVIDUAL INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOyERS..... ... .:»:" , EMPLOYEES
\
-_-: :::LABOUR RE~ATlONS ACT<'::~'" /
- I -EMPLOYERS ORGAN ISAT IONS: TRAOE UN IONS
----- : -----INOUSTRIAL COUNCIL
FIGURE 2.4.2 lli organised labour relations sYstem in South Aft:.1il
(from Stapelberg, Note 1)
It is also pointed out that the organised industry in the above
model is not only governed by the provisions of the LRA, but also
by the other labour statutes and institutions. Similarly, the
unorganised industry is also influenced and governed by the
provisions of these other labour statutes.
2.5 IH.E INFORMAL LABOUR RELATIONS SYSTEM
The informal system that supports plant level or decentralised
bargaining involving the conclusion of recognition agreements
between individual employers and trade unions, is not advocated In
the labour statutes, although limtted condonation 15 given by way
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of the prescriptions in the LRA covering the enforceability of
certain agreements concluded outside the formal industrial council
system, with non-compl iance with such agreements constituting a
potential unfair labour practice.
Further discussion on the informal labour relations system Is not
warranted at this stage, but is revisited In later sections mainly
in terms of its interaction with the formal system and sources of
potential conflict between the two.
2.6 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FUNCTIONS Of INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
The overall functions or duties of industrial councils in terms of
Sect ion 23 (l) of the LRA (1988) are described as to •... within
the undertaking, industry, trade or occupation, and in the area,
in respect of which it has been registered, endeavour, by the
negoti at Ion of agreements or otherwi se, to prevent disputes from
arising, and to settle disputes that have ari sen or may arise
between employers and employers' organisat ions and employees or
trade unions and take such steps as it may think expedient to
bring about the regulation or settlement of matters of mutual
interest to employers or employers' organisations and employees or
trade unions".
These activit ies are therefore in support of the overall
objeatlves of the LRA, namely to maintain Industrial peace, in
this instance between the employers and employees over which
industrial councils have jurisdiction.
Two unique features of the industrial council system that function
to preserve industrial peace according to Jankelsson (1975, p.
126) are firstly that industrial council agreements, when
negotiated, are delegated legislation with failure of compliance
being a criminal offence. Secondly the collective labour
legislation (now the LRA, then the Industrial Concil iation Act)
expressly prohibits strike and lock out action during the currency
of an industrial council agreement if it covers the issues that
are under dispute.
An industrial council has therefore two prime functions, namely a
collective bargaining function and a dispute-settlement function.
Due to the emphasis placed on industrial peace preservation and
the prevention and settlement of disputes by industrial councils,
speci fie attent ion will be devoted to these dispute prevent ion and
resolution activities in this section.
The official priority of industrial councils according to James
(Note 3) is nevertheless still their collective bargaining
functions, with wages being the predominant source of disputes at
the Industrial counc t l level barga ining forum.
The collective bargaining functions of Industrial councils are
best exemplified by the process and conclusion of industrial
council agreements, which cover important substant ive issues such
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as wages and condit ions of serv ice. Reference is made to these
matters In Section 5 on Industrial Council Agreements and will
accordIngly not be covered here.
What is significant is that such industrial counci 1 agreements
arrived at through the process of collectlve bargaining, rarely
result in industri a1 act ion, with agreement being reached in most
instances, as commented upon by Bendix (1989, p. 432).
Jankelsson (1975, p. 128) also contends with respect to
industrial action, that the relative industrial peace that was
maintained in the past in the country bears testimony to the
success of the industrial council system and its collective
bargaining processes. He however speculates on whether the system
will continue to be successful in the 1980' s and onwards in terms
of its peace maintenance role, an issue that wi11 also be
addressed in this document.
Should comparat i ve data be ava i labl e aga inst other types of
collective bargaining agreements, such as recognition agreements,
it would be interesting to compare the negotiation 'success' ratio
of industrial council centralised bargaining agreements against
their decentral ised counterparts. It is suggested that the formal
centralised forum could be more successful in reaching agreement,
rather than the plant level bargaining institution, which would
appear to be more vulnerable to conflict and industrial action.
2.7 01 SPUTE RESOLUT ION FUNCTIONS Qf INDUSTRIAL COUNC ILS
The constitution of an industrial council must make provision for
the handling of all disputes within the industry in the area for
which the council is registered, based on the the provisions of
the dispute resolution procedures and mechanisms contained in the
prevailing labour legislation as pertaining to industrial
councils.
•
Figure 2.7 provides a diagral1ltlatic portrayal
resolution procedures contained in the amended
formal structures such as industrial councils
process.
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It will be noted that the dispute resolution mechanisms of
mediation and voluntary arbitration have been omitted from this
diagram with only the mandatory elements as detailed in the LRA
presented.
Before the role of industrial councils in dispute resolution as
categorised under the organised labour relations subsystem is
discussed in more detail, an overview of labour disputes in labour
relations systems in general and types of industrial action that
can be instituted when disputes are not satisfactorily resolved,
is required to place this role in perspective.
2.7.1 J.ABQJ.lB DISPUTES Arm INDUSTRIAL AtlliH
Although the LRA does not provide an adequate definition of a
labour dispute, Bendix (1989, p. 201 - 202) offers a useful
description of a labour dispute being -... a continued
disagreement between employers and employees or their unions as
regards any matter of cOlllllon interest, any work-related factor
affecting thei r re1at ionship or any processes and structures
established to maintain such rel at tonshtp."
Therefore disputes may arise from fa 11 ure between employers and
emp1oyees or the i r co 11 ect has to agree to the es tablishment of a
relat ionship (the recognition issue), disagreement regarding
procedures to be adopted (such as retrenchment procedures),
fatlure to agree on terms and conditions of employment (the lIlost
common trigger for strike action by unions), failure to abide by
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•the terms of an agreement (now construed too as an unfair labour
practice in South African labour legislation), negation of the
rights of either side, poor treatment of one party by the other
party (also within the scope of the unfair labour practice), or
any other action or occurrence which would negatively influence
the relationship (well within the scope of the current general
definition of the unfair labour practice).
The main characteristic of a labour dispute is that it should be
as a result of a continued disagreement and not merely the raising
of a particular demand or grievance, with the dt spute only being
declared after no final agreement can be reached between the two
parties. Sometimes disputes may be declared without any prior
negotiation haVing occurred, but in general they are declared only
after attempts at negotiation have failed. Negotiation may
however st ill follow upon the di spute and cont inue dur i ng whatever
act ion is taken to resolve the issue, whether through industrial
action, legal action, or the use of the agreed or legislated
dispute settlement machinery.
What is important and should be accepted is that di sputes and
their settlement, as well as the institution of industrial action,
form an integral part of any industrial relat ions system, as
stressed by Bendix (1989, p. 225) and may well prove to be
unavoidable despite the ideal of achieving and maintaining
industrial peace, unless the inherent conflict between capital and
labour can be eradicated completely.
Yet, dispute settlement is undertaken essentially according to
Bendix (1989, p. 204) because of the commonality of interest that
exists between the parties, in full knowledge that the
relationship would terminate if no settlement is reached, which
serves as a powerful motivation on either side to engage in
conciliatory activity rather than exert the ultimate power of
industrial action. However, industrial action may also merely be
utilised as bargaining strategy to exert pressure towards a
favourable settlement whilst negotiations towards the resolution
of a dispute continue, and may not necessarily signify that the
irrevocable breakdown of the relationship has occurred.
Recognition or pl ant-level agreements between employers and
representative trade unions reached in the non-formal labour
relations system normally also provide for an internal dispute
procedure to be appl ied before the official dispute resolution
machinery provtded by the State or legal action is resorted to,
such as recourse to an industrial council or conciliation board
where no industrial council applies. Specifically, the industrial
court in building up case law surrounding the unfair labour
practice (UlP), especially relating to industrial action, albeit
legal or illegal in terms of the lRA provisions, is increasingly
seeking for assurances that all internal and external attempts at
concil iation have been made prior to ruling on the fairness or
unfairness of industrial action and its repercussions.
In terms of the lRA (1988) a dispute is not defined per sa in
Section 1 under Definitions, but references are made in the body
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of the LRA to occurrences when disputes ari se in the 1abour
relationship as well as the appropriate dispute resolution
mechanisms and procedures to be adopted. These references appear
in the followi ng sect ions of the lRA (1988, pp. provided with
sect ions):
- Sect ion 21 (1) (f) : Consti tut i on of Industrial Counc I l s (p.
40) •
- Section 23 Duties of Industrial Councils (p. 41).
- Section 27A (1) - (3): Settlement of Disputes by Industrial
Councils (pp. 46 - 47).
- Section 35 (1) - (3): Establishment of a Conclliat1on Board
(pp. 52 - 53).
- Section 42 (1) Report by and discharge of a Concll I at ton Board
(p, 55).
- Section 43 (1) - (2) : Power of court to order reinstatement of
employee~ or restoration of terms and conditions of employment or
abstention from unfa ir labour pract ices (pp. 55 - 56).
- Section 44 (1) - (5) : Mediation (pp. 57 - 58).
- Section 45 (1) - (15) : Voluntary Arbitration (pp , 58 - 60).
- Sect ion 46 (1) - (g) : Compulsory Arbitration (pp. 60 - 63).
- Section 69 : Publ teat ton by Minister of report, agreement or
terms of settlement' (p. 92).
- Section 76 (2): Demarcation between undertakings, trades and
occupations (p. 98).
Sect ions 17 on the establishment and functions of the Industrial
Court, 17A on the establishment of the labour Appeal Court, 17B on
the powers and func t ions of the labour Appeal Court and 17C on
appeals against decisions of the labour Appeal Court in the lRA
(1988, pp. 29 - 36) are not referred to specifically as being
solely applicable to dispute resolution, but nevertheles play an
important role in th is area.
The main change rel at1ng to disputes introduced by the lRAA in
1988 relates to the wording of 'dispute' in Section 43 (1) which
now reads: "ln this section the term 'dispute' means a dispute
concerning an alleged unfair labour practtce", where it had
previously held the following definition according to Glles (1988,
p. 48) :
-(1) In this section, the term 'dispute' means a dispute
concerning
(a) the suspension or termination of the employment of an
emp1oyee or employees or the decis ion or proposa1 of an employer
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to suspend or terminate the employment of an employee or
emp1oyees,
(b) a change or proposed change in the terms or conditions
of employment of an employee or employees, except to give effect
to any relevant law or wage regulat 1ng measure, or
(c) an alleged unfair labour practice."
The wordings under (a) and (b) would seem to have been
1ncorporated under the new deft nit ion of an UlP wh 1ch now paves
the way for a mu 1t ttude of disputes as out11 ned in the new
definition of the UlP and corrrnented on by the IIR (1988, p. 6).
The IIR also notes that the alleged dispute or UlP does not have
to be proven unfa i r for rellef under Section 43 to be granted, but
has merely to be alleged to be unfair.
Due to the increas i ng importance of the unfair 1abour practice in
1abour disputes and the speciftc treatment provided for the
resolution of the UlP in the dispute resolution mechanisms of the
LRA, with obvious relevance to these functions of industrial
councils, some elaboration is useful on the evolution of the UlP
in recent times and its current sta tus.
The UlP was previously defined as the following as contained in
the combined vers i on of the old and new lRA prepared by G11 es
( 1988, p. 8) :
"'unfair labour practice' ~eans
(a) any labour practice or any change in any labour practice,
other than a str i ke or a lock-out, which has or may have the
effect that·
(i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly
affected or that his or their employment opportunities, work
security or physical, economic, moral or social welfare is or may
be prejudiced or jeopardised thereby;
(it) the business of any employer or class of employers is or
may be unfairly affected or disrupted thereby:
(it i) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby:
(iv) the relationship between employer and employee is or may
be detrimentally affected thereby;
(b) any other labour practice or any other change ina labour
pract ice which has or may have an effect which iss imi 1ar or
related to any effect mentioned in part (a)."
The new extended vers ion of the UlP as deta11 ed in Sect ion 1 of
the lRA (1988, pp. 5 • 7) corrmences with the preamble of an
unfair labour practice as .... any act or omission which in an
unfair manner infringes or impairs the labour relations between an
employer and an employee· and includes the following 16 items as
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sunmarf sed by the IIR (1988, pp. 1 - 3):
Termination of service on grounds of disciplinary action if a
valid and fair reason had not been provided and a fair procedure
had not been followed; terminat ion of service on grounds other
than disciplinary action will firstly not be unfair if it is in
accordance wi th any agreement, wage regulation measure or
employment contract, but will be unfair if sufficient prior notice
of and consultation on the termination had not been implemented,
and fair select ion criteria not appl ted in the event of
termination due to retrenchment; the unilateral suspension of
employees on unfair grounds; the unilateral change of terms of
employment by an employer unless as a result of a change in the
1aw or a wage regu lat ing measure; the use of uncon s t i tut iona1,
mi sleading or unfa i r methods of recruitment of members by both
trade unions and employer organisations; non-compl tance wIth any
part of the LRA; tnt tmtdatlcn: boycotts of products and servIces
by trade unIons; unfair discrimination against any employee solely
on the grounds of race, sex or creed unless in compl i ance with a
law or a wage regulation measure; interference in the right of
employees to assoc i ate or not to associate and the employer's
right to negotiate with employees who are not uniontsed; the
non-compliance with agreements; secondary industrial action where
an employer Is not directly involved in a dispute which had given
rise to the action; the repetition of industrial activity which
arose from the same dispute that caused similar action during the
previous twelve months; illegal industrial activity in terms of
Section 65 of the lRA; 'any other practice' which is a sumarlsed
version of the previous definition of the ULP; and dismtssalor
other prejudicial treatment of an employee on the grounds of
compulsory military service.
Those unfair labour practice items that could pertain to
industrial councils and their legally enforceable agreements,
apart from those ULPs initiating disputes that would be referred
to industrial councils for resolution, would be the following:
The unilateral change of terms of employment by an employer unless
as a result of a change in the law or a wage regulat i ng measure;
non-compliance with any part of the LRA; unfair di scrimination
against any employee solely on the grounds of race, sex or creed
unless in compl iance with a law or a wage regulation measure; and
the non-compliance with agreements.
The above attempts to codify the UlP met with both approval from
certain quarters, who are of the opinion that greater clarity and
more guidelines on the ULP have now been provtded, and criticism
from others, such as HCheadle, a labour lawyer representing
COSATU, who as quoted by the IIR (1988, p. 665) states that: -The
development of our law of unfair labour practice should be left to
the Industrial Court. (Codification) introduces rigidity where
there would be flexibtl tty.-
The outcome of the further deltberat ions and submtsstons on the
ULP in terms of the SHe Accord and others, has been that the draft
amendments to the LRA to be tabled in 1991, inludes a
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recoemendat ion that the pre-1988 and more general definition of
the lRA be reverted to.
It is Inferred that different types of disputes require different
type of treatment, such as the UlP. Two major types of disputes
can occur in the 1abour relationship, one of right and the other
of interest.
A dispute of right is described by Bendix (1989, p. 202) as
arising from that which a party is entitled to by law, by
contract, by agreement or by established pract ice and can only
effectively be resolved by judicial adjudication or arbitration,
for once a right has been established its transgression
const itutes a c1vil or criminal offence.
Disputes of right would centre around issues such as: The fallure
to abide by a contract of employment, to implement legally
determined conditions and procedures, to implement the terms of a
1egally enforceable agreement, the transgression 0 f any other
legal determination or common law, and the unilateral change in
accepted or customary practices, etcetera. Unfair labour
practices would fall within this ambit, hence the particular type
of dispute resolution machinery instituted to handle this kind of
dispute.
A dispute of interest is furthermore described as existing when no
agreement on demands or grievances can be achieved, with an
interest defined as that to which a party is not yet entitled but
to which he would like to become entitled and which leads to the
demand or grievance arising when the other party cannot be
persuaded to grant the concess ions sought. Shou1d agreement be
reached, the interest will become a right if it is incorporated
into a contract of employment or a legally enforceable collective
agreement, such as an industrial council agreement, with any
di spute arising out of it thereafter becoming a di spute of right.
Whilst the achievement of these rights are obtained through
negotiation and collective bargaining, the resolution of disputes
arising from these rights cannot ultimately be resolved by
negotiation, but through recourse to the legal system, as
discussed in the previous paragraph.
Because the primary conflict arising between employer and employee
relates to a conflict of interest, the latter forms the main basis
for disputes arising in the labour relationship, as evidenced in
the main strike triggers, and which cannot normally be settled by
legal determination. Hence, other mechanisms need to be
established outside the legal system to process disputes of
interest. Conciliation, mediation and arbitration are regarded by
Bendix (1989, p. 203) as the most effective supplementary means
of settllng labour disputes, especially of interest, in all
developed industrial relations systems, which as noted have also
been included in the structures provided in the lRA, and where
industrial councils also fulfil a particular role.
The major methods of dispute settlement outside the formal legal
system, as already mentioned, are conciliation, mediation and
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arbitration. Bendix (1989, p. 203) describes conciliation in
brief as entail ing the bringing together of the parties who are in
di spute into a new forum, where they are encouraged to continue
negotiation and to attempt settlement. In mediation a third party
acts as go-between to the parties and, by supplying new
perspectives and arguments, also attempts to achieve a settlement.
In contrast, during arbitration, the third party assumes the role
of adjudicator and imposes what he regards as a fair settlement on
the di sputing part i es, either with their prior agreement to accept
the decision arrived at in the event of voluntary arbitration, or
without this consent in the case of compulsory or statutory
arbitration.
An unresolved dispute can lead to industrial action being taken by
either party. Industrial action may also not only occur as an
outcome of the collective bargaining process, but may be utilised
during this process to influence negotiations.
Bendix (1989, p , 213) perceives the purpose of industrial
sanct ions or act ion as to express disagreement with the goals,
intent ions or act ions of the other party, or to persuade the
latter to relinguish its position and to move closer to that of
the party imposing the sanction. Sanctions or industrial action
may be imposed either individually or collectively and the threat
or use of collective sanctions in particular is an accepted
pressure tactic employed in the negotiation situation, especially
involving the resolution of labour disputes.
The different forms of industrial action adopted by either party
will not be covered in detatl here, except for mention of examples
of the main types of industrial action. An employer normally
imposes individual sanction when an employee is disciplined or
dismissed and collective sanction when employees are dismissed en
masse or locked out. Employees in turn may impose individual
sanction by repeated absenteeism or resignations and collective
sanction through strike action, go-slow, work-to-rule, overtime
bans, product boycotts and community or international pressure.
Of importance to industrial councils is that industrial action
resulting from disputes on issues that are covered by a current
industrial council agreement are regarded as tllegal in terms of
the lRA.
2.7.2 DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS Of ill WQ1lB RELATIONS lli
Following on from the clarification of and elucidation upon
relevant concepts and terminology, the specific dispute resolution
functions of industrial councils as provided for in the LRA will
be discussed.
The dispute resolution functions and operation of
councils as summarised from Sections 23, 27A, 35, 43,
46 of the lRA (1988) are as follows:
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44, 45 and
- The constltut ion of the Industrial councl1 wi 11 provide for a
procedure whereby di sputes In the undertaking, industry, trade or
occupation and area in respect of which the council is registered,
will be resolved.
- Unless the agreement of the part les to the counc il provides
otherwise, a dispute eXisting where an Industrial councl1 has
jurisdiction In respect of the matter in dispute, may be referred
by any party to the counc 11, whereby It shall endeavour to sett1e
the dispute. It is presumed from the foregoing that the council
may promulgate an agreement that It will only process disputes
involving parties to the Industrial council or persons represented
by these parties. Disputes of non-parties would therefore have to
be channelled through conciliation boards under these
circumstances.
- A trade union or employers' organisation referring a dispute to
the council must produce a certificate stating that in taking the
steps leading to the dispute and referring it to the councl1, all
the relevant provisions of the constitution of the union or
organisation have been observed.
- No dispute in respect of which an agreement of less than twelve
months exists, may be processed by a councl1.
- Evidence must also be produced by the referri ng party that a
copy of the reference to the council has been sent by registered
post or hand to the other party/parties to the dispute.
- The reference of the dispute must be made within 21 days after
the deadlock on the dispute has been declared, whereby one party
has notl fied every other party by registered post or hand that
deadlock has been reached.
- The dispute may also not be referred to the counc i1 after 90
days from the date on which the dispute (and not the deadlock was
declared) was first alleged to have arisen, although the council
may condone a late reference under certain circumstances.
- The councl1 shall endeavour to settle the dispute referred to it
within 30 days from the date of referral or within a further
period(s) that it may deem fit.
- The Secretary of the council shall within 14 days of the expiry
of the foregoing period report to the Dlrector·General of Manpower
whether the dispute has been settled or not, who may publish the
outcome reached.
This dispute resolut ion procedure of the industrial council may
thus be utilised if a deadlock has been reached on a dispute of
any nature, including an UlP, within the jurisdiction of the
industrial council, and which is not prcvtded for by a wage
regulating measure (agreement) binding on the parties that has
been in operation for less than twelve months.
The procedure may be utilised by the following parties who fall
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industrial council level lIay be inHlated by
industrial council. as well IS the Minister of
under the Jurisdiction of In industrial council:
- By one or more trade unions, one or more employees. or one or
more trlde unions and one or more employees; and one or more
employers' organisations, one or more employers, or one or more
employers' organisations Ind one or more employers.
- Registered trade unions and employers' organisations may be
partles to the dispute, as well as unregistered trade unions and
employers' organisations thlt comply with certain requirements of
the LRA and fall under the Jurisdiction of the Industrial council.
- An Individual employee or several Individuals may also apply for
an Industrial council dispute settlement If assisted by an
el iglble trade union or employers' organlutlon.
Mediation and arbitration may also be utilised by Industrial
councils to assist in the process of dispute settlement. The
procedures to be followed In terms of the LRA when these dispute
reso1utIon methods are used are as surrmarised below accord Ing to
the relevant sect ions In the LRA. Private mediation and
arbltratlon may al so be Incurred outside the provisions of the
lRA, but for the purposes of this discussion only the legislattve
guidelines are reviewed, as It would be assumed that industrial
councils would follow the legal directives and not normally embark
on private medlat ion and arbitration.
Sections 44 and 69 relating to Mediation cover the following
pertaining to industrial councils:
- A mediator is appointed either in consultatton with or by the
Minister of Manpower in terms of the LRA to attend and assist at
industrial counctl meetings at which a dispute is being considered
in order to expedite the resolution of the dispute, but with no
vot ing rights at these meetings.
- Fees for such mediation under the auspices of the LRA shall be
paid by the State.
- An industrial counc tl may apply to the Minister of Manpower for
the appointment of any mediator in respect of any dispute which is
being considered by it. The Minister in turn may also appoint a
mediator after consul tit ion '11th the council or board if he Is of
the opinion that mediation will ISsist in the dispute.
- The appointed mediator shall confer with the Industrial council
or concillatton board, conduct such enquiries and investigations
as he may deem necessary and endeavour to bring about a settlement
of the dispute and make a report to the Minister IS a result of
this medhtlon, which lDay be published by the Hlnister.
- Mediatton at
part Its to In
Manpower.
- Mediatton may be utilised when an Industrial council Is unable!
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to resolve a dispute. particularly with a dispute of interest. An
UlP. being a dispute of right, would probably not go this route,
although it is not stated as such in the lRA. Mediation is
nevertheless a voluntary option and not mandatory in terms of the
lRA.
Section 45 on Voluntary Arbitration provides for the following:
- Third party adjudication or arbitration on a dispute may involve
the voluntary appointment by the parties to the dispute of either
a single arbltrator , or an even number of arbi trators and an
umpire, or referral to the industrial court for arbitration in
order to settle a d t spute.
- Part ies to the dispute may be represented by one or more 1ega1
practitioners or by representatives of registered trade unions or
employers' organisat ions which are not party to the dispute,
provided consent therefor is obtained before the commencement of
the proceedings.
- An arbitrat ion award may be enforceabl e in the same manner as an
industrial council agreement and published accordingly in the
Government Gazette.
- An indus tri a1 counc t l may dec ide that a dispute cons i dered by it
be referred to arbitration and shall appoint either one or an even
number of arbitrators, including assessors, or refer the dispute
to the industrial court for settlement.
- The Secretary of the industrial council shall advise the
Director-General of Manpower of the name(s) of the person(s)
appointed. However. if no appointment of an arbi trator(s) has
been made within 14 days of the decision being reached or such
time as the Director-General may fix, the arbitration shall be
conducted by the industrial court.
- The arbitrator(s), umpire or industrial court shall supply a
copy of the award or any other report in connect ion therewith to
the Minister and the parties concerned.
- An industrial council as well as the parties to the dispute
being considered by it, may make use of voluntary arbitration in
terms of the lRA.
- It may be utilised when an industrial council is unable to
resolve a dispute, normally with a dispute of right such as
involving an UlP.
Sections 46, 47 and 49 relating to Compulsory Arbitration cover:
- Compulsory arbitration by a third party or parties, which
includes the industrial court, applies when final settlement to a
dispute needs to be achieved, especially in relation to parties
involved in essential services as defined in the lRA; as well as
the resolution of unresolved disputes involving specifically UlP's
from industrial councils (and conciliation boards too where no
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industrial council applies), but which may be considered by the
industrial court only.
- Any arbitration award made shall be final and binding upon the
employers and employees who, and the trade unions and employers'
organisations, which are parties to the dispute, and upon the
employees and employers who are members of those unions and
organisations.
- When a dispute considered by an industrial council affecting
employers and employees in essential services has not been
resolved within 30 days of its referral to the council, or such
period as f lxed by the Director-General, the industrial counctl
should report to the Director-General and the dispute shall be
referred to compul sory arbitration. If no appointment of an
arbitrator(s) has been made within 14 days of the decision being
reached or such time as the Di rector-Genera1 may deem ft t, the
arbitration shall be conducted by the industrial court.
- In the event of an ULP dispute not resolved by an industrial
council in the designated periods, the Secretary of the industrial
council should not later than 14 days after these peri ods have
elapsed, refer the dispute to the industrial court for
determination, unless all the parties to the dispute agree that it
shall not be referred to the court.
- A dtspute re 1at i ng to an UlP by potent ta1 part i es to an
industrial council dispute, that is fall ing within thejurisdiction of an industrial council, may also agree to report to
the Director-General that they are satisfied that neither they nor
the industrial council will be able to settle the particular ULP
dispute, involving direct referral of the dispute to the
industrial court for adjudication.
- The industrial court may determine the disputes referred to it
for arbitration and can include the ordering of reinstatement or
compensation, including the allocation of costs which will
normally be divided equally between the employee and employer
parties.
- However, the industrial council will bear the full costs of
arbitrat ion by the industrial court if the di spute was an ULP
dispute being considered by the council.
- Compulsory arbHra t ion must be ut t l Ised (therefore it is not an
optional dispute resolution method) when parties to an industrial
council are in dispute over an UlP.
- It is also mandatory in the event of any dispute involving
employers or employers' organisations who are or represent a local
authority, and others who are not a local authori ty but fall
within the area of a local authority and provide 1ight, power,
water, sanitation, passenger transportation or a fire
extinguishing service or are included by Government Gazette under
this category and operate in the supply, distribution, processing,
canning or preserving of any perishable foodstuffs, or the supply
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or distribution of petrol or other fuels to any of the other
foregoing employers, including employees employed by them and
registered trade unions of which they are members. Thus,
employers and employees falling within the scope of 'essential
services' and their respective organisations and industrial
councils to which they are party.
- Compul sory arbitrat ion Is therefore util ised by an industrial
council dealing with an unresolved dispute for parties involved in
essential services, as well as for all unresolved disputes
relating to an UlP. Parties to an industrial council may also
elect to go directly into compulsory arbitration for an UlP
dispute should they feel that the industria) council would be
unable to resolve it.
Finally, to conclude this discussion on the legislated dispute
resolution functions of industrial councils, the role that
industrial councils play in access to the industrial court, as
well as those funct ions of the industrial court that impact on
industrial councils, are also important. Sections 17 and 43 of
the lRA provide the following on the industrial court:
- The industrial court is a specialist labour court with specific
functions as assigned by the lRA, with jurisdiction in all the
provinces of the Republ Ic. Any decision, award, order or
determination of the industrial court may be executed as if It is
a decision, award, order or a determination made by the Supreme
Court.
- Those functions of the industrial court that deal specificially
with dispute resolution and industrial councils are the following:
a) To grant urgent interim relief until a temporary reinstatement
order is made by the court Invo1vi ng an UlP in terms 0 f S43 (4).
b) To decide any appeal lodged with it in terms of S21A regarding
admission of parties to industrial councils and S51 regarding
exemptions and the exclusion of certain areas for concil lation
board and industrial council agreements or awards.
c) To consider and give a decision on any application made to it
for a temporary reinstatement order under S43 in respect of a
dispute InvolVing an UlP.
d) To conduct arbitrations referred to it.
e) To make final determinations in terms of 546(9) regarding UlP
disputes.
f) To determine any question referred to It In terms of S76 on
demarcation between undertakings, industries, trades and
occupat Ions.
g) To deal with any other matter which It Is required or permitted
to deal with under the Act.
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and representat ions, the court
being ordered yet, and no costs
'unreasonableness or frivolity'
Certain of these functions and industrial councils' role in the
procedure to access the industrial court, have already been
addressed under the discussion of compulsory arbitrat ion, namely
(d) and (e). The process involving the court's urgent interim
rel ief and temporary reinstatement or status quo order activities
is briefly as fo 11 ows:
- The procedure for urgent interim relief under SI7 (II) (a) is
similar to that for the temporary reinstatement order. Costs may
be ordered to the requirements of the law and fairness, which for
SI7 (11) (a) applications may also be made against a trade union
or employers' organisation acting on behalf of or assisting any
person.
- Temporary reinstatement orders under 543 relate to the power of
the court to order reinstatement of employees or restoration of
terms and conditions of employment or abstention from unfair
labour practices, covering only disputes on UlP's in the new
legislation.
- For a temporary reinstatement order to be considered by the
court, the dispute must first either have been referred to an
industrial council having jurisdiction in respect of the dispute
or an application for a concil iation board should have been
submitted where no industrial council has jurisdiction.
- Parties may within ten days of the reference to the industrial
council apply for a temporary rei nstatement or abstent i on order by
means of an affidavi t.
- Proof should be submitted too that the copy of the appl tcatton
has been sent by regi stered post or hand to the Secretary of the
industrial council. Certain communications and documentation
requirements with time deadlines take place after this, which will
not be elaborated on here (see 543 (3) (b) of the lRA).
- No order will be made if the appl teat ten was not made within 30
days of the date on which the notice was given of the ULP or the
date on which the alleged UlP was introduced.
- After considering all the facts
may make an order wi th no damages
ordered unless on the grounds of
on the part of a party.
- The order may be made retrospect i ve to a date not earl ier than
that on which the alleged ULP was introduced.
- The order will also remain untIl the dispute has been seU1ed by
the industrial council or conciliation board concerned, or if
referred to arbitrat ion or the industrial court, by an award or
determination, or even if not settled, but not longer than 90 days
from the date of commencement, or extended by periods not
exceeding 90 days at a time.
- Employees, employers, trade unions and employer organisations,
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on the role
quote the
either registered or complyIng with the requirements of the LRA if
not registered, that fall under the jurisdiction of an industrial
council, may ut t l i se the facil i ty to apply for either urgent
interim relIef or a temporary reinstatement order.
- Urgent interim rel tef from the industrial court may be appl led
for in the event of an ULP or other practice/dispute that can be
proven to warrant such relIef unt i 1 a temporary status quo order
is granted.
- Temporary reinstatement may be applied for in the event of an
UlP referred to an industrial council for resolution.
Mention is also warranted of the labour Appeal Court (refer S17A
of the LRA) which was introduced with the LRAA in 1988, as a
specialist labour court of the same status as the Supreme Court,
consisting of a judge of the Supreme Court and two appointed
assessors. The main functions of the labour Appea1 Court are to
decide on questions of law referred by the industrial court and to
decide on any appeal referred to it in respect of a determination
or award made regarding a dispute or any order to costs by the
industrial court.
Considerable attention has been devoted to this section on the
dispute resolution functions of industrial councils, as this is an
area in which industrial councils can play a vital and cost
effective role, whereby disputes are settled as efficiently and as
close to the source as possible, before expensive and lengthy
recourse to the courts are made.
Bendix (1989, p, 464) also comments very favourably
of industrial councils in dispute settlement, to
following extract:
"Those industrial councils which have correctly interpreted their
rol e as that of conc 11 iatory agents, have played an important part
in the settlement of labour disputes. Hore progressive councils
have appointed special dispute-settlement corrmittees to deal with
disputes referred to the council, while in others secretaries and
agents with the necessary training in labour relations have, by
effective mediation, prevented an escalation of conflict.·
Further corrmentary
industrial councils
resolution procedures
commi t tees.
on the dispute resolution functions of
relate to the formalisation of dispute
and the establishment of dedicated dispute
Firstly, the lRA provides for the establishment of dispute
resolution procedures in the constitutions of industrial councils.
Of interest in Horn's (1988, p. 46) research on the dispute
resolution effectiveness of industrial ceuncfls , is that none of
the seven industrial councils surveyed had detailed procedures for
dispute handling contained in their constitutIons or agreements.
Of these seven, three were regarded as being the most successful
industrial councils by authorities in the fIeld in respect of
their dIspute resolution activities.
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Secondly, the majority of the seven councils surveyed however had
commi ttees wh ich were respons ib1e in one way or another for
dealing with disputes. The establishment of dedicated dispute
committees by industrial councils to handle their dispute
resolution functions was In fact recoeeended by the Director
Genera1 of Manpower in 1982 as reported by Jowe11 (1984, p. 40) .
The establishment of such structures was advocated so that
disputes are not left unattended or unsettled in anticipation of
full council meetings which may take place only once a month.
Special cOJmlittees which could meet at short not ice are regarded
as being desirable if not essential under these circumstances.
Thus, it would appear that the prerequisite for successful dispute
resolution by industrial councils does not necessarily depend on
the existence of formal ised dispute resolution procedures, but on
structures that can speedily and effectively handle disputes as
and when they occur.
Although all industrial councils do not have formalised or
negotiated dispute settlement frameworks, as exempli f1 ed in the
foregoing, Horn (1988, p. 75) nevertheless submits this as an
important recommendation for industrial councils to effectively
settle industrial disputes. Clarke, as referred to by Horn (1988,
p, 81) maintains in this context that any dispute arising between
management and employees can in principle be dealt with in four
ways, namely:
- legislation
- ordinary or special court of law or tribunal
- third-party conc t l f at toru or
- procedures instituted by employers' associations and unions to
formalise their relationship and to deal with questions arising
out of it.
These four routes are classified into either legal/quasi-legal or
vol untary procedures. Voluntary procedures, ei ther facil itating
or complementing the legal requirements, are regarded as having
the follOWing advantages:
- Their objectives are to produce settlements acceptable to both
part ies.
- They have a degree of flexibility.
- They can be moulded to suit the particular issue at hand.
- They are not bound by precedent to the same extent as legal ist Ic
procedures.
- As the authors of these voluntary procedures, the part ies have a
vested Interest in making them work.
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- It is beneficial to parties to be able to settle a dispute at
the voluntary 1evel in terms of time, cost and the acceptabll1ty
of the solut ion, avoiding referral to a potent ially more
overloaded and costly forum such as the industrial court.
Aside from the advisabllity of negotiated voluntary dispute
resolution procedures and structures being adopted by industrial
councils, Horn (1988, p. 82) also stresses the voluntary nature
per se of dispute resolution at industrial council level.
Although industrial counclls cannot statutorily be bypassed in the
offictal dispute resolution processes, there is yet no mandatory
obl igation to resolve disputes at this level.
It would have been useful too to have been abl e to extract and
conrnent on the numbers involved and trends in the di sputes that
are attended to by industrial councils. Although all industrial
counc 11 s are requ i red to submits ta tis ti cs annua11y to the
Department of Manpower on disputes cons idered by them, these are
unfortunately not released and could therefore not be obtained for
analysis, with the exception of that contained in the official
annual report of the Department of Manpower (1990, p. 28). The
latter report states that 3 752 di sputes were referred to
industrial councils during 1989, of which 1 503 were settled at
council level, with the remainder referred to the industrial court
for determination, or to arbitration or mediation, or they were
settled mutually by the disputing parties or eventually ended in
deadlock.
Horn (1988, p, 34), however caut ions that these sta tis tics are
reported as not normally being regarded as very accurate or
rel iable, nor would they necessari ly reflect the true picture in
terms of dispute prevention (as opposed to settlement) act1vities
of industrial council s ,
2.8 [[H[B FUNCTIONS AtiO SERVICES Q£ INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
2.8.1.sillAL RESPONSIBILITY.i. ASYNTHESIS AI INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL
lllli
The foregoing could be regarded as the tradit tonal collective
barga1ning-related functions of 1ndustrial councils , as developed
by labour legislation and practice. There is however an area, of
which the CUdgels have already been taken up by both employer and
employee bodies, that which adopted and merged at industrial
council level coul d have a profound impact on South African
society in general and labour relations 1n particular.
Reference is made here to the emerging field of social
responsibllity, which has ind1vidually been embraced by employers,
followed by their organisations. Trade untons and their
federations have also devoted attention to this area, although
with different emphases and less resources at their disposal. It
is a field too which in a country such as South Africa, abounding
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•with inequalities in both the social and economic sphere, is of
considerable relevance and concern. The events emanating from 2
February 1990 have further underwri tten the urgent need to address
the social and economic upl i ftment of all the hitherto
disadvantaged communities in South Africa in order to prepare for
the new society and di spensation that awaits the country.
The writer is of the opinion that the industrial council would be
an opportunity where greater cohesion of social responsibility
mission of both parties could be obtained and resources and
efforts be directed in an efficient and cost effective manner to
achieve social responsibility objectives in the broader
operat lena1 sphere.
This social respons i bil ity role could indeed enhance the viabil ity
and reason for being of industrial councils and the system in
general. Whereas the existence of extended benefit funds of
industrial counci 1s serving and covering the industry's employees
have proven to be a major motivator for the continuation of
industrial council s (and often emerged as a more important
function than actual collective bargaining), industry-based social
responsibility programmes jointly launched and managed by the
parties to a counci 1, could have a similar binding effect.
Commona1i ty of interest, contrasted against the inherent confl tct
within the labour relationship, is espoused by the pluralistic
approach to industrial relations, and serves as the fundamental
philosophy of the South African labour relations system. The
common interest in the future welfare and survival of the
individual enterprise and the economy and nation as a whole, would
serve as the prime instigation for management and 1abour to engage
in collective bargaining and maintain industrial peace, and in
principle subordinating divergent sectoral goals towards the
maintenance and promotion of organisational and socio-economic
advancement and prosperity.
Trade unions, as explored in more depth in Section 4.2.2 and
highlighted further in this section, have a predominance of
object ives and concerns that rel ate to those areas that could be
classified within the realm of social responsibility. By virtue
of their origins, cultural and membership bases, Black trade
unions are particul arly committed to social and community based
programmes and services to their members. Shared social
responsibility could therefore be an effective meeting place and
major area of common interest for employer and employee bodies.
Thereby the concept of common 1nterest could be further enhanced
and conflict defused, lessened or contained 1n the other facets of
collective and societal bargain1ng.
This 1mportant future consideration will be focussed on again in
the concluding sect i on of this document.
Some discussion on social responsibility
employer and employee parties to industrial
warranted. As employers and their
t radtt tcnal ly been under most pressure
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orientations of both
counc 11 s 1s therefore
organisat 1ons have
to 1nst 1tute social
responsibility or related type of prograllllles, the specific soctal
responsibility role of employer organisations will firstly be
addressed, In some depth, to provide a broader perspect lve on the
contribution that industrtal councils can make in this context.
2.8.2 I!!E SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY RQll QE EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS
The role of the employer organisation Is not restricted to the
limited role of collective bargaining with counterpart employee
organisations, as will be confirmed In the discussion on the
functions of employer organisations as parties to industrtal
councils in Section 4.2.1. Like the trade union movement, which
has adopted object i ves on behal f of its membership relating to
their environment and conditions outside the workplace, as well as
to sattsfy Individual member aspirations, employer organisations
have followed suit on behalf of their membership, albeit at a
slower pace.
The impetus for the development and implementati on of social
responsibility proqranmes by South African employers Initially
came from the multinational organisations with subsidiaries In
this country. Although a spirit of social consciousness was a
consideration, the prime motivation was to justify their
operations in this controversial part, of Africa to their
shareholders and respective home cOll1l1unlt tes.
A discussion on the various codes of conduct pursued by
multinationals operating (or more aptly in current terms,
operated) in this country will not be covered here, but suffice It
to say that the majori ty of these progranmes are devoted to the
advancement of persons of colour, with the provision of equal
treatment and benefits within their respective organisations.
Certain codes such as the Statement of Principles (prevtously
known as the Sull ivan Principles), also place considerable
emphas is on projects within the external cOllllluni ty, many of which
have no direct relationship to the organisation's or its
employees' needs, including actiVity in the political arena.
Major South African companies have also vol untarily pursued
similar type of goals, with external projects focussing on
education, housing, cOrmlunity upliftment and other areas that are
of importance to their own missions and the wellbeing of their
employees. A sample of reasons why employers become involved in
sochl responsibility prograllllles on a voluntary basis (that Is,
other than when imposed by an overseas parent company) are as
follows (·Corporate Sochl Responsibility·, 1989, p. 7):
- Contribution to the building of a post-apartheid soc iety and an
environment In which business In general can thrive in the future.
- Good citizenship.
- Ensurance of the
especially relating
Individual organisation's future survival,
to the education and productivity of its
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workforce.
Two emphases in social responsibility are also distinguished,
namely internal social responsibil ity which is directed towards
accommodating the interests, expectations and satisfaction of the
organisation's own employees; and external social responsibility,
which is directed towards accomodatf nq the needs and expectations
of the surrounding community and society as a whole.
Salamon (1987, pp. 199 200) also highlights social
responsibility, that is consideration of the values, expectations
and interests of the external society, as being a constraint and
choice that should influence management's decisionmaking and
actions in industrial relations. Therefore, whil st internal
social responsibili ty has been the focus of industrial relations
for some time, external social responsibil ity is gaining
prominence.
External social responsibility can furthermore be differentiated
between primary and secondary social respons Ib t l ity foci L
Primary social responsibility activities in the South African
scenario include housing improvement and provision, literacy
training, bridging educational and business orientation
programmes, bursaries, health facilities, Free Settlement Areas
promotion, etcetera. Secondary social responsibility activity
relating to legislation, social and political reform are evidenced
mainly at the 1egal and social levels when controversial
legislation is challenged. As far as reform efforts of the latter
nature are concerned, th'ere has in particular been a growing
interest in the role that South African business has come to play
as catalyst in this process.
It could therefore be stated that involvement in projects in the
community external to the operating environment, of which the
organisation or employer is in any event an integral part,
demonstrates good business practice and will gradually become the
norm in South African society. This does not preclude the
principle of chari ty beginning at home, namely internal social
responsibility, whereby the quality of own employees' lives
deserves prime attention, in the form of minimum basic earnings
above accepted 1iving levels, health, housing and transportation
ass istance and education improvement for them and their
dependants.
Employers' organisations through their collective resources and as
representatives of these interests of their members in addition to
industrial relations, consequently have a potentially important
role to fulfil in the sphere of corporate social resonsibility.
These activities also feed back into the labour relationship by
enhancing positive attitudes between the various parties and
emp1oyee conmun it i es, thereby furthering the promott on of
industrial peace.
The preservation of industrial peace is the prime underlying
objective of industrial councils, thus there are potent reasons
why industrial councils should expand their functions to include
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the area of social responsibility.
The new dimension in the tasks of employer organisations and
international trends in this respect wherein employer
organisations have evaluated their purposes to current practices
and situations, is exempltfted as below by Oechslin (1982, pp.
504 - 517) for several countries from which South Africa takes it
lead in industrial relations practices. These new tasks of
employer organisattons to illustrate their social responsibiltty
vis a vis the nat i on as a whol e and its development should be
considered against the vital potential role that industrial
councils as centralised forums can play in this regard.
- Assistance to individual enterprises in adapting to change, such
as increased safety and health hazards resulting from new
technologies.
- Assistance in implementing new forms of work organisation such
as employee participation, to meet the aspirations of workers for
more responsibility and involvement in the definition and
performance of thei r tasks.
- Combined with the foregoing, the training function extended to
include the training of member company managements in human
management and other managerial skills, particularly in developing
countries that experience skills shortages in this area.
- Training of employees in and for the particular industry such as
apprenticeship schemes, as well as support of general training and
education projects to serve the conrnunity at large.
- Participation in national planning activities, especially in the
developing countries.
Employer organisation problems such as lack of unity, cohesion and
insufficient human and financial resources as noted by Salamon
(1987, pp. 211 - 212), can detract from the efficiency of such
organisations and reduce their impact on broader societal issues.
However, concerted and directed act ivtties in consul tat ion and
with the ass i stance of employee bodies and cOlllllun1ty
representatives at a central forum such as an industrial council
could alleviate these stresses and enhance the image of the
industrial council (and employer organisations) amongst the
employee, and possibly too, trade union community.
2.8.3 Il!E SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BQ.I..E Qf I.BAQE UNIONS
Social responsibility activities, both of an internal and external
nature in terms of the classification discussed, can be regarded
as innate functions of the trade union movement. A fairly
detailed overview of trade union objectives and functions are
provided in Section 4.2.2, and therefore wt1l not be repealed
here.
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its members,
hearing and
Backer and Weston (1987. pp. 4 - 5) however provide a further
taxonomy of trade union funct ions which. although they contain
components of the generic funct ions discussed in Sect ton 4.2.2,
class tfy trade un1on funct tons under primary and secondary
funct tons. These two chsses of funct ions have part icular
relevance to the South African situation, wtth the observation
that the local trade union movement In generAl has not made great
advances yet In the area of secondary benefl ts or funct ions.
The primary functions of trade unions are 11 sted as follows:
- To represent members by negotiating with employers In the
workers' Interests on remuneration. service conditions. benefits
and working conditions.
- To bring workers' grievances to the attent Ion of management and
assisting In reso lv tnq them.
• To cont Inua 11 y mon iter wage and service cond i t ion agreements
which have been entered into with managements. for example
Industrial council or conciliation board agreements. wage
determinations. wage and recognition agreements.
• To ensure secur t ty of employment and Income for
wi th shop steward involvement in disciplinary
retrenchment procedures.
• To serve as a mouthpiece for workers' needs and aspirations.
• To improve the physical working environment through efforts to
improve safety.
• To participate in management decisions, and to be consulted on
issues which are not normally negotiated by management and the
union.
• To have trade union federations serve on statutory bodies like
the National Training Board and National Manpower COllllllsslon.
etceten.
- To attempt to influence the government to change legislation
through the Trade Un ion Congresses.
• To call workers out on strike IS a last resort in deal ing with
differences .
Secondary functions are regarded as:
• To provide social services such
funeral and pregnancy. as well
interest loans, etcetera.
u benefits for illness. death,
u cost savings schemes, low
• To contribute towards improved cotmluni ty services.
This functional classification does not correspond entirely with
the concepts of soc tal responsibility discussed previously. The
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difference Is one of perception and emphasis. Whereas trade
unions may regard certain activities IS being part of their basic
mission, employers may regard these IS being external to normal
operational objectives or social responsibility-related. That
which is regarded as social responsibility is therefore very much
in the eye of the be 1iever.
Nevertheless, there are certain act hit ies and funct ions of both
parties that are of common Interest, that perhln to the community
and society in general and would be regarded as social
responsibility roles.
2.8.4 BENEFIT rutiQ ADMINISTRATION MiD QIllEB SERVICES
Table 2.8.4 provides an indication of the extent of involvement of
industrial councils in benefit fund administration for their
constituents. This is an important function of industrial
councils in that it ensures continuity of benefit cover,
rat tonal isation and economies of scale which in part icul ar benefit
smaller organisations and employee mobil tty within an industry.
TABLE 2.8.4
Revenue iMJ..e.yjU 2.f f1Ln.d1 gf industrial cQunctls~ .:00
(from Central Statistical Service. 1989)
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
BENEF IT FUNDS VALUE ACCUM
YEAR TOTAL PENS/PROY MEDICAL OTHER BENEFIT FUNDS
NO 'NO NO NO R ~
TOTAL ACCUH
GENERAL FUNDS
R ,
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1983 100
1984 98 -2
1985 98 0
1986 177 +81
1987 179 +1
1988 294 +64
Not available
52 11 35
54 10 34
71 70 36
68 71 40
46 69 179
1952845043 - 19468237
411294625 -79 40448270 +108
674995788 +64 72140841 +78
Not available
720349797 +7 69124722 -4
869252671 +21 60674405 ·12
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
tim: Percentages represent percentage changes from one period to
the next.
The importance of such benefit schemes can perhaps be reflected in
the dramattc 194~ growth in the total number of industrial council
benefit schemes from 1983 to 1988. After the significant
reduction in total ICcumuhted benefit funds from 1983 to 1984,
suspected due to a large drain on funds at the time. there has
been as study increue since then. Other general funds,
presumably tra intng and insurance type funds. are currently
experiencing a negat ive growth. probably due to greater
ut 11 isatton of these funds by the beneficiaries as a result of
industry demands and the downturn in the econOGlY.
The Labour Relit ions Chief Directorate of the ~p (1990. p. 28)
·42·
reports that In 1989 (the relevant figures were not available yet
to complete Table 2.8.4), 971 156 workers participated in pension
and provident funds provided for in industrial council agreements
and 450 608 workers were members of funds provid i ng medical
benefits, therefore a total of 1 421 764 employees covered by
these type of industry schemes. Other funds establ i shed insured
workers against for example the loss of their tool s as a result of
theft and loss of wages owing to short time, Inclement weather or
insolvency. Industrial councils are regarded by the DHP as
playing a very important role in this respect in the country's
economy, for If these funds had not been established, the Treasury
would eventually have had to bear a considerable additional
burden.
Jankelsson (1975, p. 28) adds that especially in a country such
as South Africa which is not a welfare state and where eligibility
for social security is based on a means test, Industrial councils
through their coverage of a 1arge number of employees ina variety
of industries, have been regarded as Ideal vehicles for the
establishment of social security schemes such as medical aid and
sick benefit funds, pension and prov ident funds, etc.
Regarding the evolution of Industrial council benefit schemes,
Jankelsson (1975, p . 131) further reports that whereas in the
past a high proportion of Whites, Coloureds and Asians were
covered by Industrial council social security schemes, a low
proportion of Bl acks , except in the case of provident funds, were
covered by these schemes. The posit ion however changed due to the
expansion of industrial unions which attempt to represent all
workers, as well as the rising level of skills and income of the
lower level employees to whom participation in such schemes became
more affordable. Unfortunately a breakdown of racial coverage of
the various industrial council benefit schemes was not available
to chart developments in this regard.
Of Importance too are the various training schemes that many
industrial councils have been instrumental In Introducing in order
to address the skill ed labour shortage In the country (reference
has already been made to the key industry training and general
educational upl iftment role that industrial councils can perform
in the preceding section on the social responsibil ity role of
industrial councils).
Three types of training schemes or funds managed by industrial
councils are differentiated between by Jankelsson (1975, pp. 132
- 133), namely:
- Funds to which employers contribute, based on the number of
employees employed, which normally provide for bursaries,
sponsorship of training, and the funding of studies.
- Funds to which employers also contribute, but where incentives
are provided to employers to educate and train their employees by
way of grants or subs idies for each employee tra ined. (Presumably
the balance of funding is made up by the Industrial councils
themselves).
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- The establishment of training colleges to which employers
contribute too, such as in the Clothing Industrial Council for the
Transvaa1.
In the past these training schemes were confined to the training
of Whites. Coloureds and Asians only, with Blacks' participation
increasing since the 1980's.
Amongst other services offered by industrial council s to their
constituents are complaints, grievances and disciplinary advice
services (which are not necessarily categorised under their
dispute resolution services). The complaints and grievances
services are primarily utilised by individual employees in respect
of employer non-compliance with the provisions of agreements.
l1 kewise individual employers could also utilise these services as
well as the disciplinary advice services. COlllllents from several
industrial counc t l secretariats are that these type of services
are generally very well patronised, and in some cases make up the
major portion of the council's activities, with full time staff
dedicated for this purpose.
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3. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIYE Qti INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS lli SOUTH AFRICA
The historical evolution of Individual Industrial councils is not
readily available, as confirmed by James (Note 3). Such detatl is
normally retained by industrial counctls and wtll therefore not be
covered In spec i f1cshere.
In this section a general historical overview will firstly be
presented on the industrial council system as a whole. followed by
a more detatled analysis of the historical development of the
South African labour relations system as It affected industrial
councils, plus a presentation on statistical data and cOlTll1entary
on trends In participation in the industrial council system and
utilisation of the formal labour relations system to date, and
concluding with an analysts of industrial court judgements since
the inception of this court pertaining to Industrial councils to
illustrate legal interpretations and precedents that have
developed around the system.
3.1 GENERAL HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Jankelsson (1975, p , 97) and others refer to the birth of the
industrial council movement in South Africa on 19 November 1919
when the South African Typographical Union entered into an
agreement with the Federation of Master Printers and the Newspaper
Press Union to establish this first industrial council, the
Natlonal Industrial Council for the Printing and Newspaper
Industry. This council was established outside any existent
legislative framework or provisions. (Of note is that this very
first council, after having been active in the country's
collective bargaining scenario for almost 70 years, was disbanded
in 1989. A discussion on the dissolution of this council and
others is prov ided in Section 9).
The move to set up such a national industrial council was prompted
by the establi shment of the counterpart British Joi nt Industrial
Council for Printing along the 1ines suggested by the British
Whitley COlllllittee Report (for more detatls of the British system,
refer to Sect ion 6). The industrial council system, as
promulgated in the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 (ICA), was
modelled along the lines of the Printing Industrial Counctl and
therefore the Bri t ish system. An important departure however from
the British Whi tley system was the provision In the ICA whereby
legal status was given to Industrial council agreements.
Bendix (1989, p. 290) describes the primary purpose of the
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 (ICA), instigated by the Rand
Rebellion of 1922, and the forerunner of the current legislation
governing labour relations, as to prevent industrial unrest, by
providing the machinery for collective bargaining and for
concil tat len, should a dispute arise. The ICA laid the
foundations for trade unions and employers' associations that were
established on a voluntary basis, for registration under the Act
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and to together establ ish and register industrial councils.
According to Jankel sson (1975, p. 98) although the ICA came
officially into operation on 18 April 1924, the first industrial
council was only registered on 12 February 1925, namely the
National Industrial Council for the Printing and Newspaper
Industry. This industrial council had applied for registration
when the ICA came into operation but had experienced delays
occasioned by certain technical i t tes which had to be complied
with. The first national agreement negotiated by the parties to
this council, and also the first under the industrial council
system, was gazetted on 13 Harch 1925. The second industrial
council to be registered under the ICA on 19 Hay 1925 was for the
Building Industry (then a national industrial council) with a
nat ional agreement gazetted on 22 May 1925.
These industrial councils became the recognised bargaining bodies
and agreements reached by them were, if gazetted, legally
enforceable. As they provided for associations of employers to
bargain with one or more union, bargaining was incl ined to be of a
more centralised nature, a trend which continued and intensified
during the subsequent 50 years, according to Bendix (1989, p.
290) •
Furthermore, although the use of this system was regarded as
voluntary, the government sanction attached to it, granted an
amount of legit imacy to those parties who bargained on industrial
councils. The legal enforcement of industrial council agreements
and the fact that legal strike action could be resorted to if the
statutory machi nery was used, made the system acceptable to both
employer and employee parties who at the time were permitted to
make use of it.
Bendix (1989, p, 291) completes thi s overview on the development
of the industrial council system, by stating that these
developments resulted in the industrial council system or, where
no counc il ex isted, the negot tat i on of disputes on conc il iat ion
boards, becoming the accepted and officially sanctioned system for
the conduct of the labour relationship in South Africa. She
further adds that ironically the Mining industry, which provided
the major impetus for the new legislation, as never having
establ ished an industrial council and preferring to bargain in its
own, i ndependen t bodies •
The Mining industry notwithstanding, the old ICA provided a very
sound bas is for the more orderly conduct of the labour
re lat ionshi p, although unions represent ing Black males could not
register under the ICA and therefore not become parties to join
industrial councils. The specific exclusion of Black males
resulted from the latter day definition of an employee excluding
'pass-bearing natives', and as Black females were at that time not
obl iged to carry passes, they and certain Black males in the Cape
were included under the legislation. Bendix (1989, p. 291)
points out in conclusion that it is significant that, in 1923,
when the ICA was being developed, - that Is 25 years before the
apartheid policy was legally entrenched by the Nat ional1st Party·
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the principle of segregation had al ready been embedded in the
official labour relations system. Yet it was this system and the
legislation that supported It, that made the first advances in the
late seventies in breaking through the outer layers of the
apartheid regime, serving as a testing ground and forerunner to
reform In the broader society.
The reforms in the official industrial relations system brought
about by the Wiehahn Commission in the late seventies and the
resultant 1979 Industrial Concil t at Ion Amendment Act, also led to
the establishment of a two tier bargaining system in the following
decade, whereas previously collective bargaining in this country
had occurred mainly at industrial council or central t sed level.
This second bargaining tier of plant level bargaining was
primarily introduced by the emerging Black trade union movement,
which upon finally receiving official sanction and recognition of
Black employees of 'employee' status under the new legislation
partially in 1979 and fully in 1981, and sceptical of a system
that had officially shunned them for so many years, preferred to
exerci se their newly 1egit imi sed power at plant 1evel, where they
perceived that their strongest power and bargaining base lay.
Consequently, in current times industrial council agreements are
still being concluded at industry, regional or area level
according to Bendix (1989, p. 308), whilst there has also been a
prol i ferat ion of recognition agreements between individual
employers and unions representing mainly Black employees at plant
level. This dualistic or two tier bargaining system is further
ill ustrated In that the same group of employers may now be covered
by two agreements, namely an industrial council and a plant level
recognition agreement. Trade unions that have joined industrial
councils have also continued to bargain at plant level and have
insisted that shop stewards be allowed to participate in
industrial council negotiations. Other parties, such as in the
Mining Industry, have establ ished centralised forums outside of
the industrial council system. Hence, the bargaining system is at
present regarded by Bendix (1989, p, 308) as being in a state of
fl UX, wi th the eventual system depending greatly on further and
future developments in the labour and socio-political arena.
The implications and problems of multilevel collective bargaining
have already been alluded to in preceding sections and will be
investigated in more depth In following sections as it impacts on
the current and future operation of industrial councils, with
their central role perceived by many as dimlni shed due to the
increased incidence of decentral i sed or plant level bargaining.
The more contemporary issues and developments in the industrial
council system are addressed in Section 9.
3.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Qf IliE~ AFRICAN LABOUR RELATIONS
SYSTEM
Jankelsson (l975, pp, 6 - 93) provides a comprehensive exposition
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of labour organisation and developments in the labour relations
system in South Africa from 1880 to 1975, which will be utilised
extensively in surrrnarising the developments affecting industrial
councils up till 1975.
Mention is firstly necessary of the developments in labour
organisation prior to and including the formalisation of major
labour legislation in 1924, namely from 1880 to 1924, to assist
understanding of the structures of the fi rst Industrial
Concil tat ton Act (ICA), promulgated in 1924, and the rationale
behind the introduction of the industrial council system. These
were:
- The major White-dominated issues of these early years, and the
accompanying confl icts which led to the 1924 legislation and
culminated in the Rand Rebellion of 1922, were highlighted as
being the demand for reasonable wages, union recognition and the
preservation of the colour bar.
- The first Industrial Conciliation Bill was introduced in
Parliament in 1923 by F S Malan, the then Minister of Mines.
Malan's following comment on the philosophy behind this Bill as
quoted by Jankelsson (1975, p. 19) was made before the passing of
the Industrial Conciliation Act, No 11 of 1924 (ICA) on 8 April
1924:
"The main object of this Bill is to provide voluntary machinery -
voluntary - for allowing each industry to settle its disputes in
its own way. It is a method of providing sel f-hel p to these
industries. "
This philospohy of voluntary participation in the structures of
the formal labour relations system such as industrial councils has
been retained in the subsequent labour legislation. A departure
from the voluntary principle of the ICA and inherent contradiction
is however pointed out by Jankelsson (1975, p. 28) in respect of
the extension of agreements and awards to non-parties. This
provision was included in the event of the objects of an agreement
being defeated by the implementation of for example lower wages by
non-part ies to agreements.
As ide from providing for the es tab1t shment and operat ion of
industria1 counc 11 s , a further major and far-reach i ng feature of
the ICA was the exclusion still of Africans (Blacks) from the
definition of an employee, which served to widen and entrench the
discriminatory provt s ions conta ined in precedl ng labour
legislation. Another feature of the ICA was also its principal
focus on skilled 1abour categories. To quote Sect Ion 24 of the
ICA as provtded by Jankelsson (1975, p. 27) on the excl usion of
Blacks as employees:
·'Employee'means any person engaged by an employer to perform,
for hire or reward, manual, clerical or supervision work in any
undertaking, industry, trade or occupation to which this Act
applies, but shall not include a person whose contract of service
or labour is regulated by any Native Pass laws and Regulations, or
-48-
by Act No. IS of 1911 or any amendments thereof or any
regulations made thereunder or by law No. 25 of 1891 of Natal or
by any amendment thereof, or any regulations made thereunder, or
by Act No. 40 of 1894 of Natal or any amendment thereof.·
- The main outcomes of the ICA were to give legal recognition to
the trade union movement, provide employers and employees with the
machinery for collective bargaining and self-government in
industry (that is, industrial councils), and give legal status to
industrial council agreements.
- The provisions of the ICA that related speci fically to
industrial councils as sunvnarised by Jankelsson (1975, pp. 24·
27) were:
a) The establishment and registration of industrial councils by
emp1oyers or employers I organ i sa t ions, on the one hand, and
registered trade unions or groups of registered trade unions, on
the other hand, for the purpose of the prevent ion and set t 1ement
of industrial disputes and for the consideration and regulation of
matters of material interest to the parties.
b) If the Mini ster (of then labour) was sat i sfied that the
agreement for the establishment of an industrial council, its
constitution and rules, and other matters were in accordance with
the requirements of the ICA; and that the industrial council was
sufficiently representative of the particular industry, he was
then' empowered to register the constitution and rules for the
part tcular area menti oned.
c) The rules of a registered industrial council were to provide
for the appointment of an equal number of representatives of
employers and employees, the method of such appointment, the
regulations governing the meetings of the industrial council, the
method and procedure for dealing wi th disputes comi ng under the
consideration of the council, and any other matters of mutual
interest to the part i es.
d) The appointment of mediators, arbitrators and umpires in
respect of disputes being considered by industrial councils.
e) The prohibition of a strike or lock out until the matter at
issue had been investigated by an industrial council, where
applicable.
f) The declaration by the Minister of industrial council
agreements as being binding upon the parties thereto and upon the
employers and employees represented on the councils, by means of a
not ice In the government gazette.
g) The extension of industrial council agreements upon application
to the Minister to other employers and employees within any area
in a particular industry, provided that the applicants were
considered to be sufficiently representative of that industry,
which extension was then published in the government gazette and
thereby amended the indus tri a1 counc11 agreement.
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h) Any person who fa i l ed to comply with any published i ndustrla1
council agreement or award which was binding on him would be
guilty of an offence, and liable, on conviction, to a fine.
t ) The appointment of a Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers'
Organisations and the compulsory registration of trade unions and
employers' organisations. Such registration had to take place
within three months of the conrnencement of the leA or the
formation of new bodies thereafter, and was made conditional on
there being In existence no other union or organisation already
cons idered to be representati ve of the interests concerned. Th is
meant furthermore that only registered trade unions and employers'
organisations could participate in industrial councils.
An early and enl ightenlng conrnent on the operation of the ICA and
the Industrial council system in 'civilising' the collective
bargaining process was made in 1926 by Gltsham and Trembath as
recorded by Jankelsson (1975, pp. 30 - 31):
"On the whole, the Act seems to be working smoothly, and where
both sides are well organised, as in the Printing Industry, the
results obtained are a step In advance of the old haphazard way of
agreement and stri fe among industrial emloyers and the Unions
representing the workers. The struggle by the workers for better
conditions has not been eliminated by the Industrial Council
method, but it has become less barbarous. This may not suit the
sturdy class warri ors of both s ides, but they can perhaps turn
their efforts to more fruitful channels."
Major subsequent developments from 1925 to 1975 in the South
African labour relations system and supporting legislation, that
is after the inception of the ICA, thatelther directly or
indirectly affected industrial councils and their operation in
thi s pre·Whlehahn era, are summari sed below:
_ The Wage Act was promulgated in 1925 and was designed to
regulate unskill ed and poorly organised labour who could not
participate in collective bargaining, as a supplementary measure
to the ICA. These two Acts together made possible the regulation
of the entire wage system of the then Union of South Africa,
empowering the Minister of labour to give force of law to
recommendations of the Wage Board and to agreements of industrial
councils. The Black worker was at this point still excluded from
the collective bargaining machinery of the ICA and even though the
Wage Act permitted an application for an investigation from any
unorganlsed body of Blacks who would show that they were
authorised to make that applicat ion, they were di scriminated
against by the operation of the 'civilised wage' clause, which
required that wage scales be reconmended upon which men could
maintain themselves in accordance with 'civilised habits of life'.
As a very high proport ion of unskill ed labour was performed by
Blacks who were regarded as not In possession of civil ised habits
of life, the Wage Board was compelled in all Industries In which
its reference applied to Black workers, to Inform the Minister
that it could not reconmend a civilised wage.
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- The growth in trade unionism was st imulated by the ICA, with at
the end of 1926 the trade union movement having a total membership
of 116 231 as compared to 86 865 at the end of 1923. This growth
in membership was regarded as directly linked to the industrial
council system which required a high degree of organisation on the
part of both employers and, more particularly, trade unions, for
its effective operation. In turn, as labour became more
organised, so did the industrial council system foster and grow,
with employers favouring the system since it enabled negotiations
to take place with employees before any strike action could be
implemented. By June 1927, 27 industrial councils were in
operation, with four of them organised on a national basis. The
Wage Act was also considered to have stimulated the formation of
industrial councils since employers preferred the self-governing
alternative of thi s voluntary system under the ICA to the
intervention of the State via the Wage Board.
- The exclusion of the majority of Black workers in terms of the
ICA's definition of an 'employee', led to the insertion of the
provision in the amending Act, No 24 of 1930, to the effect that
the Minister was empowered to apply any, or all, the clauses of
any wage regulating agreement to the excluded workers in the
industry to which the agreementapplled. Thus, whilst the
provisions of any wage regulating agreement, including industrial
council agreements, could be extended to Black workers, they were
however still precluded from participating in the negotiation of
such agreements.
- The Industrial legislation Commission of 1935 was appointed and
its report highlighted the inferior status of the Black worker and
the need for a change in the situation. With regard to industrial
councils and trade unions, the Commission reported in its evidence
that in many instances representatives of industrial councils and
trade unions had admitted that they were not catering for the
interests and needs of the less-privileged labour groups and that
they were, therefore, creating a situation where outside
interference wi th the self·government of industry may become
imperative. The COl1l11ission however foresaw many difficulties in
permitting Black and White employees to be represented on the same
industrial council s. It neverthel ess recognised the need for some
form of representat i on for Black workers and suggested that two
Government Officers, one from the Department of labour and one
from the Department of Native Affairs, attend industrial council
negotiations and submit a report to the Minister in respect of
those agreements where an extension under Section 9 (4) to cover
Black workers was applied for.
- From the period 1926 to 1936 trade union membership grew
steadily, reaching a level of 189 003, compared to 116 231 tn
1926, with over 50% of trade unions having been founded since the
promulgation of the ICA tn 1924. As the result of the increased
trade union activity, the tndustrial council system also expanded
with 46 tndustrial counctls tn extstence at the end of 1935,
covert n9 4 815 employers and 46 072 employees, wh ich represented
7~ of employment in mining, construction and private industry.
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Many of the industrial council agreements had been extended to
cover Black workers. Industrial councils started to develop too
on an industry rather than a craft basis (as recommended too by
the Industrial legislation Commission of 1935), leading to
problems of demarcation of areas of jurisdiction developing and
friction between industrial council s ,
- As a result of the reconvnendations of the Industrial legislation
Commission, both the ICA and the Wage Act of 1925 were repealed
and replaced respectively by the Industrial Concil iat ion Act, No
36 of 1937, and the Wage Act, No 44 of 1937. The most important
changes relating to industrial councils and their parties were:
a) Section 23 which defined the duties of industrial councils,
namely to maintain industrial peace and to bring about the
regulation and settlement of matters of mutual interest to the
parties concerned.
b) Section 24(1) which listed the matters which may be dealt with
by industrial counc i l agreements, making all owance for the
establ ishment of pension, medical, sick, provf dent and other
funds, and also enhancing the powers of industrial councils.
c) Section 24(2) provlded that no differentiation or
discrimination on the basis of race and colour could be made in
industrial council agreements.
d) Section 25 provided for the delegation of functions by an
industrial council to an executive of other committee.
e) Section 27 listed the regulations in relation to industrial
council meetings, in particular Section 27(9) which authorised an
inspector to attend any meeting of an industrial council and to
take part in the proceedings whenever the interests of persons
engaged or employed in the industry concerned, who were not
members of any parties on the council, was under discussion. This
was in terms of the Industrial Legislation Commission's
recommendations wi th respect to the extension of agreements to
non-parties.
f) Section 48 dealing with the putting into force of agreements
and Section 48(5) which empowered the Minister to extend the
period of operation of an industrial council agreement whilst
negotiation of a new agreement was still in process after the
expi ry of the earl i er agreement.
g) Section 51 empowered the Minister to exclude 'Native Areas'
from the scope of an agreement or award, in the interest of those
employers operating in such areas.
h) Section 67 required that information relating to the internal
operation of an industrial council or conctlhtion board be kept
secret with disclosure of such information being a criminal
offence.
i) Section 76 giving the Minister power to determine demarcation
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di sputes after hearing representations from those parties
concerned in the dispute.
One of the principal new features of both the new leA and Wage Act
was the provision that every employer upon whom a wage regulating
measure was binding, had to register with the Department of labour
in order to obtain a certificate of registration, with no
certificate being issued to any person/employer who had not
comp1ted with an order of court with regard to the payment of
arrear wages.
- These new measures succeeded in improving wages and working
conditions and further stimulated the growth of the industrial
council system so that at the end of 1940 there were 60 industrial
councils in existence with 45 agreements covering 7 872 employers
and 91 897 employees in force, representing 12~ of employment in
mining, construction and private industry. Many councils also
took advantage of the provisions in the ICA to extend agreements
both to non-part ies and Blacks, thereby improv ing wages and
working conditions for the unskilled worker. Concomitantly, trade
union activity during the period 1936 to 1940 also increased
cons tderably on account of the realisation that more effective
organisation gave unions better bargaining power in the
negotiation of industrial council agreements. Registered trade
union membership increased from 149 893 in 1936 to 233 780 in
1940, while the number of unions increased from 111 to 150 over
the same period.
- War Measures Nos 9 and 145 of 1942 were introduced by the
government duri ng the war years in an effort to prevent work
stoppages in essential industries, giving the Minister of labour
power to intervene in industrial disputes that were 1ikely to
affect the war effort, by appointing arbitrators, with strikes or
lock outs occurring after arbitration awards had been made, as
being rendered ill ega1.
- Two court cases during this period tested the exclusion of all
Black workers, both male and female, from the definition of
'employee' in the ICA. The outcome in the one decis i on was that
Black women workers in factories had to be regarded as 'employees'
and in the other decision it was acknowledged that not all Black
workers were excluded from the term 'employee' in the ICA.
- An Industrial Conciliation (Natives) Bill in respect of separate
labour legislation for Black workers was gazetted in 1947 but was
never introduced in Parliament due to strong criticism by both
trade unions and employers.
- In 1948 the Wh ite electorate of South Africa voted the
Nationalist Party in, narrowly defeating the United Party, thereby
entrenching the defence of White supremacy, and immed iately set
about the task of revising the country's labour laws in accordance
wi th the policy of apartheid. Of importance is an extract from a
speech by Schoeman, later Hinister of Labour, in the House of
Assembly on 19 Harch 1942 relat ing to the draft const i tut ion of a
future Nationalist Government, as cited by Jankelsson (1975, p.
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53) and demons trat i ng a potent ia1 major departure from previous
basic philosophy on labour legislation:
MFirst we contend that wage control and wage fixation should be
entirely in the hands of the State. Secondly, and this is the
most Important principle, self-government In industry must be
eliminated... Self-government in industry and collective
bargaining are things of the past... the time has arrived that in
the interests of the State, in the interests of employers and
employees, self-government in industry and collective bargaining
should be eliminated from our economic life ....
- The Industrial Legislation Commission of Enquiry into the field
of Labour and Race Relations In industry, generally known as the
Botha Commlss ion accord Ing to Bend 1x (1989, p, 295), was
subsequently appointed by the new government on 1 October 1948, to
report spect f1 ca11 y on the fo 11 owi ng, as recorded by Janke15son
(1975, p. 54):
a) Whether the existing wage regulations operated effectively for
all races, or whether some means of coordinating such legislation
was needed. One of the points to be considered was the question
of sectional collective bargaining under the industrial council
system, and its relationship to the attainment of maximum economic
wel fare. .
b) The desirability of retaining 'closed shop' clauses in
tndustrf al council agreements.
c) The desirabil ity of having separate trade unions for different
races, and whether or not Blacks should be i ncl uded in the
collective bargaining machinery of the Industrial Conciliation
Act.
- The findings and recommendations of the Botha Commission
relating to industrial councils were as follows:
a) There was an urgent need for coordination of wages and other
condit ions of employment and that a coordinating body should be
established and entrusted with this function, to be named the
National Labour Board.
b) That all new agreements concluded In terms of the ICA in
respect of industrial councils and conciliation boards be
submitted to the National Labour Board for scrutiny prior to
ratification by the Minister.
c) That closed shop clauses be retained in Industrial council
agreements prov ided that parties agreed thereto and pro teet ion was
provided against abuse.
d) Regarding Black workers and Black trade unions, the Commission
summarised the position as at 31 Harch 1950 whereby there were at
least 52 Black trade unions In exi stence with a total paid up
membership of 34 551 (the registered membership was considerably
higher). In addition, there were 12 mixed trade unions, of which
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the Black paid up membership totalled approximately 3 700.
A major res1stance was exper1 enced by the Commlss 1on in respect of
the inclusion of Blacks within the definition of 'employee' and it
comnented that due to racial prejudice the inclusion of Blacks in
particular to industrial councils would cause the dissolution of a
number of them and prevent the formation of new industrial
councils, thus defeat ing the objects of the ICA. They therefore
concluded that they would be unable to recoemend the adoption of a
proposal that there should be no racial discrimination in
industrtal legislation.
- Other measures that were recommended by the Botha Convnission and
referred to the recognition, control and gUidance of Black trade
unions, were that:
a) Entirely separate collective bargaining machinery should not be
introduced and that the mechanism utilised should be in the form
of a conc11lation board consisting of equal numbers of Black
emp1oyee represent at i ves and employer representa t i ves, and cha1red
by a senior government official.
b) Black trade unions should be controlled by the Department of
labour In consultat i on with the Nattve Affairs Department, through
the agency of 'Native Trade Union Officers'.
c) Recognition would be In two stages, firstly through
'certification' during a probationary period and thereafter full
recognition which would authorise Black trade unions to
participate in collective bargaining with employers through the
special aforementioned conciliation boards.
d) Strikes and lock outs should not be permitted except in certain
defined circumstances.
e) Any agreement arrived at by such a conciliation board should be
referred to the National labour Board to be dealt with in the same
way as other wage regul at Ing measures and, If accepted, should be
publ tshed by the Hinf star, whereupon it should become binding on
the parties concerned.
f) Finally, that works councils of the type suggested by the
Whitley Conmittee in Great Britain should be established as a
means of improving relations between employers and their workers.
The use of works counci ls was however not recolll11ended as a
subst ttute for trade unionism.
The Conmlsslon's report met with strong criticism, especially with
regard to government intervention in the collective bargaining
process, although the reco"",endat ions to grant Black trade unions
legal recognition and allow them to participate, albeit on a
limited basis, in the collective bargaining process under the ICA
was acknowledged as a step In the right direction.
- In 1953 the Pass laws were amended to Include Bl ack women. The
effect of this was that those Black women who had prev tous ly held
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legal status under the ICA were now denied this status and were
forced to resign from the registered trade unions of which they
were members.
- With the promulgation of the Bantu Labour (Settlement of
Disputes) Act of 1953 separate industrial concil iation machinery
for Black workers was estab1 i shed, based on the government's
decision not to recognise Black trade unions, contrary to the
recommendations of the Botha Commission. This Act; alongside with
the above amendments to the Pass Laws, also closed the loophole in
the ICA which allowed Black women and those Black workers who
bypassed recruitment agencies to join registered trade unions
(that Is, non pass-carrying Blacks). The result, according to
Ramsden (1987, p, 19) was that all Blacks were then unequivocally
excluded from the definition of 'employee' and were prevented from
joining registered trade unions or industrial councils.
- The purpose of thi s Act was to provide for the prevention and
settlement of 'Native' (Black) labour disputes and for the
regulation of conditions of employment of Blacks, under the
auspices of the Whi te membership only Central Bantu Labour Board,
through Regional Bantu Labour Committees consisting of appointed
Black members, and culminating in the provision for the election
of works committees at plant level in establishments employing not
less than 20 Blacks. The Act specifically also prohibited strikes
by, or lock outs of, Black employees, the Instigation of such
strikes or lock outs, and sympathetic strikes or lock outs.
Certain provisions were furthermore made In the Act with regard to
participation in negotiations of industrial council agreements
where B1 ack wages were concerned, whereby the Central Bantu Labour
Board was to be informed whenever an industrial council proposed
to meet to discuss, inter alia, conditions of employment affecting
Blacks. It finally amended the ICA of 1937 too by redefining the
term 'employee' to exclude all Bl acks, as ment i oned above, and
also made provision for statutory job reservation.
The Government had therefore di sregarded the recommendat ions of
the Botha Conrnission concerning the participation of the Black
worker In the collective bargaining process and moreover sought to
offer the works committee system as a substitute to trade unions
for Black workers, whereas the Commission had suggested this as an
addition and not alternative to the existing collective bargaining
machinery, and applicable to workers of all races and not Blacks
only.
- After several prel iminary stages, amendments and unsuccessful
trade union opposition, the Industrial Conciliation Act, No 28 of
1956 was promulgated on 11 May 1956, after further consideration
of the Botha Commission's recommendations and consultation with
organised industry and trade unions.
The long title of the Act stated that It Is an Act "to consolidate
and amend the law relating to the registration and regulation of
trade unions and employers' associations, the prevention and
settlement of disputes between employers and employees, the
regulation of terms and conditions of employment by agreement and
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arbitration and the control of private registry offices; to
provide for the establishment of an industrial tribunal; to
provide for safeguards against inter-racial competition; and to
provide for other incidental matters."
It retained the basic principles of the 1937 Act. with the
following major changes that directly or indirectly affected
industrial councils:
a) Several provisions regarding the racial registration of trade
unions, such as, with certain minor qualifications, the
prohibition of mixed trade unions for Whites and Coloureds.
b) The establi shment of an industrial tribunal, vested with wide
powers, to inter alia, settle demarcation disputes between
industries, make recommendaitons regarding safeguards against
i nter-rachl competit ion, and to undertake both compul sory and
voluntary arbitrations.
c) Section 77 which provided for determinations by the industrial
tri bunal in respect of the reservat ion of work of a defi ned nature
for employees of a specified race (for the purposes of only this
section 'employee' was defined to include Blacks). therefore
statutory job reservation.
d) The 'closed shop' provision was included in the specific
matters which may be dealt with in an industrial council
agreement.
Of interest is one of the objections to this Act which was
submi tted in a memorandum by the Trade Union Un i ty Committee
(which excluded the Non-White trade union movement) to the
Minister of Labour as cited by Jankelsson (1975, p. 71):
"2. We are concerned that the implementation of the Bill will
cause the disintegration and eventual destruction of our Trade
Union Movement. The system of collective bargaining. industrial
concil tat ton, and sel f-government in industry which has developed
successfully during the past 30 years will vanish with the trade
untons ,"
A concern that unfortunately was real ised in the shorter, but not
longer term, as the new leA eventually did have the effect of
spl itt ing the trade union movement into a number of separate and
opposing groups based on differences in political and racial
outlooks. The government had achieved its aim of taming the trade
union movement by depriving it of the ability to present a unified
front on any issue. The result was that the racial composition of
trade unions early in 1957 was that 55 catered for Whites only, 16
for Coloureds and/or Asians only, 54 were regtstered in respect of
both Whites and Coloureds, but in fact drew their membership
entirely from one or other of these groups, and 59 were genuinely
mixed unions. Yet, there were many Wh ite workers that welcomed
the legtslation, in particular the artisan and skilled worker
categories who were safeguarded against interracial competition
through the job reservation provision.
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- The government amended the ICA again In 1959 in a further
perceived attempt to crush the Bl ack trade unions to the effect
that no Black could be appointed as representative of the
employees on an industrial council or at the proceedings of a
conciliation board. Also it made it Illegal for employers to
collect trade union dues or contributions to sick funds or other
societies from Black members by means of stoporders, unless the
Minister expressly authorised thi s.
- During this period the Industrial council system nevertheless
still continued to expand, with at the end of 1960, 94 industrial
councils in existence, covering 20 866 employers and 479 344
employees, with 87 agreements in force, and representing 34~ of
employment in mining, manufacturing, construction and electricity.
Of note is that dur t ng the period 1946 to 1960, a growth of 93~ in
the number of employers and 350% in the number of employees
covered by industria 1 council agreements occurred.
- Section 78 of the ICA relating to freedom of association of
employees was amended by the Industrial Concil iat ion Amendment
Act, No.43 of 1966. Under this section an employer could be
compelled, upon appl teat ton to the Minister by a trade union, to
deduct trade uni on membershi p fees from the remunerat i on of its
emp1oyees and to pay such fees to the trade union concerned.
- The Industrial Conet l tat ion Further Amendment Act, No 61 of
1966, was also passed in this year to amend Sect ion 65 of the Act
to the effect that no employee could take part in any strike which
did not affect relations between the employer and employee.
- At the end of 1968 the operati on of the ICA had had the effect
of encouraging a movement of workers into the excl us i vely White
unions, which was despite the objections which the White trade
unions had originally lodged against the racial separation of
unions.
- In the first few years of its existence the industrial tribunal
had also dealt with an increasing number of demarcation disputes
between industries, which were reported as being handled
successfully, with the number of such references decl i ning since
1966.
- In 1970 the ICA was amended by Act No 21 of 1970 with regard to
training schemes not related to industrial council agreements.
This amendment also provided that any provision of an industrial
council agreement relating to the training of employees may be
declared binding in an area additional to that in respect of which
the industrla1 counc i l is reg is tered, or upon emp1oyers and
employees in any other industry or area.
- South Africa was regarded as reaching a cris is point in
industrial relations in 1972, up to which point in time industrial
legislation had operated well to the advantage of the White worker
in securing his position, raising his standard of living and
catering for his wel fare. In contrast, the Black worker had had
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his trade unions rendered all but powerless, with the works
cOlMlittee system offered In Its place. These conrnittees had not
achieved the object i ves for which they were established under the
Bantu labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953. The number of
Blacks covered by industrial council agreements had also risen
considerably, by 86% from 1962 to 1972, according to Jankelsson
(1975, p. 86), with more Blacks than members of any other race
group affected by i ndustria1 counc11 agreement s , Before 1972
White trade unions were the dominant force in industrial council
negotiations and were in general the decisionmakers for the rest
of the workforce covered by industrial council agreements,
including Black workers.
- The industrial peace that had reigned in South Africa for many
decades came to an end in 1973 with the series of stri kes that
occurred in Durban in January and February 1973, involving mainly
Black workers - over 90000 as reported by Leite (1986, p. 11).
The problem facing the government and South African conmerce and
industry was how to give the Black worker more adequate
representation in the negotiation of matters affecting is working
life, with pressure also mounting for recognition of Black trade
unions.
- The response to th is crt sis was for the government to amend the
Bantu Labour Act of 1953 with the Amending Act, the Bantu Labour
Relations Regulation Amendment Act, No 70 of 1973, extending the
works committee system in order that it may improve
management-worker relations. A significant change affecting
industrial councils was that with the permission of the Secretary
for Labour, Black works convni ttee representati ves coul d then,
together with the White labour Officer, sit in on industrial
council meetings, though they had no vote. The Black worker was
still however left without the power to bargain collectively and
directly on an industry level with regard to matters affecting his
working 1He.
From 1975 to 1987, the following major developments in the labour
relations system and legislation pertaining to industrial councils
occurred. From 1988 hence the more contemporary developments are
treated separately under the appropriate sections of this document
and wi 11 therefore not be incorporated here.
- The events of 1973 and subsequent to this such as the Soweto
riots of 1976, contributed to the growth in Black culture
consciousness and the expansion in Black trade unionism, despite
the lack of the latter's legal status according to Leite (1986, p.
11), precipitating the major changes in labour legislation which
occurred in 1979 as a result of the appointment of the Wiehahn
COlMlission of Enquiry in 1977.
- The purpose of the Wiehahn Commission of Enquiry appointed in
1977 was to investigate all labour matters, but with a specific
mandate on all discriminatory employment practices. The first of
the six reports of this Commission appeared in Hay 1979.
According to Finnemore and van der Herwe (1987, p. 8) the single
mos t important recoemendat ton of the Conrnlss ion was that the
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definition of 'employee' be changed to Include Black workers. with
the implication that for the first time In South Africa's labour
history. the dualistic system for Blacks and Whites would no
longer exist. should these proposals be Implemented.
Other recorrrnendat ions of the Wiehahn Commission as reported by
Finnemore and Van der Harwe (1989. pp , 20 - 21) included freedom
of association. the autonomy of unions In deciding membership
criteria. provisional registration for new unions. veto rights for
industrial counctl parties against admission of newcomers.
continuation of the closed shop practtce , removal of
discrimination in apprenticeship training, the establ ishment of
the Industrial court. the abolition of job reservation. the
establ tshment of a National Hanpower Commission. and unitary
labour legislation for all. The maintenance of the conrnittee
system for plant level consultation was also reconmended, in the
bel ief that labour peace could only be served if strong structures
existed at both industry and enterprise level, as added by Ramsden
(1987, p. 23).
- Due to a caut Ious government react ion to these reconmendation
only a few amendments were introduced into the ICA in 1979. Those
affecting Industrtal councils were the following from Finnemore
and VanderHerwe (1989, p. 21):
a) Migrants and ccnmuters were excluded from the new definition of
emp1oyee, thereby denyi ng large numbers of workers access to the
industrial cone tl tat ion machinery and In partlcular industrial
councils. However, other Black workers were for the first time
granted trade union rights under the new definltlon of employee in
the ICA.
b) Provisional registration of unions was Introduced, although It
was at the discretion of the Registrar who could also withdraw
such registration. Registration of mixed unions was still
forbidden except in spec Hie cases allowed by the Minister.
- Finnemore and Van der Herwe (1989, p. 21) report that
consol1dations tn particular the Black trade union movement due to
the impetus of the new legislation followed. The Federation of
South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), the forerunner of the current
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was founded in
1979, with I strong preference for multi-racialism and plant level
organisation and bargaining. The Council of Unions of South
Africa (CUSA) , in a sense the forerunner of the present NatioOll
Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). followed In 1980 with a focus on
Black union leadership and Interests.
- Further of the Conmtssion's recoemendat icns were incorporated in
amendments to the ICA in August 1981. Haln implications for
industrial counci 15 as obtained from Flnnemore and Van der Herwe
(1989, p. 22) were:
a) The title of the Act was changed to the Labour Relations Act,
No 28 of 1956, the current deslgnat ion.
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b) The removal of all racial di scriminatlon which permitted all
Blacks, regardless of origin, full entry to the formal collective
bargaining mechanisms, such as industrial councils, as laid down
in that Act from wh i ch they had been exel uded for more than 50
years.
c) Full autonomy was granted to unions in respect of their
membership and all racial restrictions to union membership were
removed.
d) The Black labour Relations Regulation Act was repealed.
- Sideris (1982, p, 11) comment s on these subsequen t amendments
to the leA in 1979 and 1981, with the opinion that they did not in
any substantial way alter the provisions dealing with industrial
councils, and adds to the foregoing the following further changes
of relevance:
a) The Registrar could conduct enquiries into industrial councils
to investigate irregularities.
b) The secrecy cl ause which made it an offence to disclose
information at an industrial council meeting was extended to all
persons attendi ng such meet ings.
c) Employers governed by an industrial council agreement were no
longer required to register wi th the Department of labour (now
Manpower) .
- Finnemore and van der Merwe (1987, p. 70) ascribe most emergent
Black unions' initial criticism of the industrial council system
and reluctance to participate in it to the follOWing arguments:
a) Outright rejection of the system on the ground that they were
excluded from the system at the outset and were thus unable to
participate in its establishment.
b) Opposition based on their perception that negotiations at a
central ised level were far removed from their power base on the
f actory fl oor .
During these early post-Wiehahn years many emergent unions
consequently strived to establish their factory floor power bases
through the negotiation of plant level recognition agreements
outside the official collective bargaining system.
- However, significant trends occurred in terms of increased
participation in the industrial council system by these emergent
unions since the implementation of the Wlehahn proposals in
1egislation. An important step forward was when the Metal and
Allied Workers Union (MAWU), a major emergent Black trade union,
joined the National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel,
Engineering and Metallurgical Industry in 1983. HAWU however
still retained its position of reiterating that factory floor
bargaining was fundamental and industrial council bargaining a
supplement to it. This trend is supported by Horn's (1988, p.
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29) observation that in 1984 the pol icy of most emergent unions to
bargain at factory level rather than at Industrial council seemed
to have changed, as an increasing number joined industrial
councils in addition to keeping their options open for factory
(plant or establ ishment) level bargaining. The emergence of these
two tier collective bargaining arrangements has been comnen ted
upon by Allan (1987, p. 24) and others as adding to the pressure
that will be brought to bear on industrial councils. This major
issue in the future of the industrial council system is addressed
in more detail under later sections.
- In November 1983, as reported by Horn (1988, p. 29), the
Department of Manpower held its first ever summit to discuss the
role of industrial councils. Significant at this sunvnit is that
the idea was rejected that industrial councils were in need of
major changes to survive. However, certain prob1ems were
identified which included the council's image and the need for
greater professional ism in order to dispel criticism levied
against the system.
- The National Manpower Commission (NMC) submitted a report in
1984 on an investigation into levels of collective bargaining and
other issues (1984, pp. 115 - 119). Based on the evidence put
before it, it noted certain alleged shortcomings of industrial
counc i l s, these bei ng :
a) The cumbersome procedure in establ ishing an industri al council.
b) The right of veto entitling existing parties to block admission
of new parties.
c) In terms of its functioning, that the parties who negotiate
agreements are not fully representative of all industry members,
in particular employees.
d) The inefficient operation of and inadequate treatment of
dispute resolution by industrial councils.
The NHC however considered that some of these alleged shortcomings
were based on misconceptions of the system and also cited the
following strengths of industrial councils:
a) The impersonal and more expert negottat ion of agreements to a
1arge extent.
b) long term goals are given preference to short term advantages.
c) Uniform standards and effective protective mechanisms are
provided to employees.
d) It is eminently suitable for the determination of other
conditions of employment and benefits such as pensions, sick
benefits and training.
e) All employers are bound to specHlc norms and standards,
leading to stability and security.
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Their prime reconmendat ion was that industrial counc t l s should
thoroughly review their procedures and methods of operating (a
theme that is increasingly reinforced in conmentary on the
industrial council system In the post-Wiehahn literature).
- Industrial Court judgements in respect of the industrial council
system that have occurred since the inception of the industrial
court in 1979 are covered at more 1ength inSect ion 3.4. However,
two judgements had made major significance for the system and
deserve reference here in the historical development of industrial
council s.
The first was the case of the Metal and All ied Workers Union
(MAWU) versus Hart limited in 1985, as referenced in Table 3.4, in
which the union had appl ied for the company to bargain with it at
plant level in addition to bargaining at industrial council level.
The company insisted on bargaining at the central ised industrial
council level only, with no obligation perceived to also bargain
with the union at plant level in addition to this. The court held
that the two systems of collective bargaining were not
incompatible and although bargaining at plant level should be
encouraged, such negot iat ions shou1d be vol untary to be effective.
In other words, there was no obl igation to also bargain at plant
1evel, although it was held to be advisable.
The second was the case of the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU)
and Others versus Asoka Hotel in 1988, as also referenced in Table
3.4. The trade uni on demanded negot tat ions on actual wages where
the parties were bound by an industrial council agreement setting
minimum wages. With the employer's refusal to do so a strike
ensued, resulting in the dismissal of the strikers, who applied
for reinstatement to the court. The court held that the
industrial council agreement did not provide for actual, but only
minimum wages, and therefore the strike was legal and the
strikers' dismissal and the employer's refusal to bargain at plant
level on actual wages, an unfair labour practice. In this
instance the obligat ion to also bargain at plant level on actual
conditions was established.
- In concluding this discussion on the historical perspective to
industrial councils until more recent times, Horn's (1988, p. 30)
sunmat lon was that the fundamental labour legislation changes in
the first half of the 1980's saw a dramatic growth in Black trade
unionism, with at end 1982, 395 000 Black workers having become
members of registered trade unions, and 511 000 at end 1985,
predicting these figures to treble from the 1985 levels in the
year 2000. At end 1988 these figures stood at 956 969 according
the the Central Stat istica1 Service (1989, p. 475). Although at
this stage a doubling of the 1985 figures are a reality, it would
appear possible that his prediction of a trebling in numbers might
yet be rea1ised too.
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3.3 STATISTICS AND TRENDS
Trends in the overall utilisation of the formal labour relations
system in South Africa, with the contribution of industrial
councils highlighted, are exemplified In Table 3.3.1.
In the utilisation of the formal system, the role of industrial
councils, concil tation boards, mediation, voluntary and compulsory
arbitration, industrial court referrals and labour appeal court
referrals are included. As the labour Appeal Court had only been
in operation for four months by the end of 1988, limited
statistics only are obviously available for this court at this
point in time. Other indicators of compliance with or utilisation
of the system are reflected in the registration level s of trade
unions and employer organisations, as well as the memberships that
they represent. This utilisation of the formal system as a whole
is emphas ised in th is presentatt on on industrial coune t l s as the
latter institut ions should not be viewed In isolation to the
broader statutory 1abour relations framework and its integrated
parts.
Where available, data is provtded for 1985 to 1989 in Table 3.3.1
to enable multi-year comparisons. The lIR (1988, p, 47) however
caut ions that labour relations statist tcs such as these should be
interpreted with care and should only be regarded as indicators of
trends rather than in-depth presentations, bearing in mind that
off tcf al statistics fromthe Department of Manpower (DMP), while
more comprehensive than other sources, are generally late in
appearing or incorrect. Furthermore, employers do not always
report all Industrial relattons incidences such as work stoppages
and strikes as required to the authorities, whilst those figures
obtained from the media normally represent for example only about
S~ of recorded strikes. Also, analysing the causes for say
strikes based on trigger issues, can be superficial as strikes are
probably due as much to increased levels of worker awareness,
hi storical infl uenees, poor negotiat ing skills, daily supervisory
relations, etcetera, as they are to wages, conditions of service,
d t smissal and recogn it ion disputes. These comments are well worth
not ing, although analyses of industrial action will not be
considered in th is document.
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TABLE 3.3.1
Utilisation 2f lli formal l.lb.2.Y..t: relations system in~ AfrJ.il
~ .:. l2.a2 (from Department of Manpower, 1990, Inst itute for
Industrial Relations, 1990, Central Statistical Service, 1989, and
S A Trade Unions l1 brary, 1989)
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
MONITORING ITEH 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS:
Hain agreements 86 77 86 62
Other agreem
Employers 48 329 47 032 45 941 44 927
Employees 1 084 278 961 302 964 881 988 801
64
213
30 633
634 042
CONCILIATION BOARDS:
Wage agreements 1 1 N/Av
Employers 2 2 N/Av
Employees 116 116 N/Av
Applications:
Total 514 1 294 2 312 3 035 5 604
ULPs 364 1 075 2 091 N/Av N/Av
% ULPs 70,8 83,1 90,4
• Note the Department of Manpower reporting period changed in
1989 to 1 November 1988 to 31 October 1989. All data is provlded
as available only.
290
1 194
28
2 980
112
77
2 386
21
1 230
7
5
964
INDUSTRIAL COURT CASES:
(As available, tata1s will not correspond, only cases received
during year recorded, excluding carried forward/outstanding
from previous years)
Court of law funct ions - to 31/8/88
Urgent interim relief (S17(ll)(a)
Reinstatement orders (S43)
Arbitrations (545,46 and 49)
Unfair labour practices (S46(9))
Demarcations (576)
Appeal s (S21A)
• Note Arbitrations under 1989 include 'other' referrals too as
these were not i temi sed.
TOTAL CASES 801 2 042 3 533 3 838 4 492
LABOUR APPEAL COURT REFERRALS
(1/9/88 - )
30
REG I STERED TRADE UN IONS:
Number 196 195 205 209 212
Hembers 1 391 423 1 698 157 1 879 400 2 084 323 2 130 117
REGISTERED EMPLOYERS ORGS:
Number 270 272
Members 45 681 37 362
271 262
39 827 35 465
252
N/Av
....................................................................
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Of importance in both Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 is that the 1989
decrease of 354 759 employees in comparison with the 1988 figure
of employees covered by industrial council agreements is due to
the fact that the Metal industry's main agreement involving 311
136 employees was not operative on 31 October 1989 when the
statistics were finalised by the Department of Manpower. With the
inclusion of the Metal industry employees this figure would have
been 945 178.
Trend analyses of industrial council s up to the last published
data for 1989, best demonstrate the impact of these institutions
within the formal labour relations system in South Africa and
serve to substantiate certain aspects of the discussion on the
historical development of Industrial councils deal t with in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Not iceable In Table 3.3.1 In terms of organisat Ion and i nst Itutton
participation trends is that whilst the number of employer
organisations and their members, as well as Industrial councils
and their membership, is declining, the trade union movement is
exhibiting a strong and marked growth. Conciliation board unfair
labour practice (ULP) referrals and the utilisation of the
industrial court, in particular for UlP referrals, also sustain an
upward trend.
Table 3.3.2 exhibits relevant details from 1925 when reporting on
industrial councils first commenced, to 1989, as available, with
percentage changes from one year to the next also provided. Of
interest is that employee numbers covered by industrial council
agreements have only declined overall by 5% In the twelve years
from 1975 to 1988, and that the racial composition, especially
amongst Blacks and Asians has remained relatively unchanged since
1975. Not Included in this table are the latest 1990 statistics
as these have not been publl shed yet.
Unofficial sources however report that at end 1990 the industrial
council count stood at 91. According to Table 9.3 in Section 9,
four councils were officially deregistered during the 1990
Department of Manpower reporting period from November 1989 to
October 1990, namely the Industrial Council for the Liquor and
Catering Trade (Pretoria) effective 14 December 1989; The
Industria1 Counc 11 for the L1 quor and Ca teri ng Trade,
Witwatersrand and Vereeniglng effect ive 14 November 1989; the
Industrial Council for the liquor and Catering Trade (Durban)
effective 10 August 1990; and the Industrial Council for the
Tobacco Industry (Transvaal) no effective date provided but
gazetted on 7 September 1990.
One new industrial council was registered during this period, on
27 Harch 1990, the 'Nywerheidsraad vir die Graankooperasiebedryf'
under government gazette 12417 of 12 April 1990 by government
notice 283 of 1990. The parttes to this new council are the
'Werkgewersorganisas1e vir Graankooperasies' and the'S A Yster-,
Staal- en Verwante Nywerhede-Unie'.
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TABLE 3.3.2
Industrial councils. industrial agreements i!lS1 employers .i.!lS1
employees affected .l.2ll.:. 00 (from Central Statistical Service,
1989, Department of Manpower, 1990 and Horn, 1988, p, 31)
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
IND COUNC AGREEM ERS EES ,;, EES BY RACE
YEAR NO % NO ,;, NO % NO % W C A B
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1925 2 Not available
1930 45 +2150 Not available
1940 60 +33 Not available
1950 86 +43 108 - N/Av 370 000 . Not ava t l able
1960 94 +9 87 -19 N/Av 792 000+114 Not ava t l able
1970 102 +8 94 +8 N/Av 899 000+14 Not ava il able
1975 102 0 92 ·2 39 146 - 1 046 105+16 18 20 7 55
1976 102 0 102 +11 41 124 +5 1 065 366 +2 18 21 6 55, 1977 102 0 102 o 39 933 -3 988 372 -7 20 19 7 54
1978 102 0 99 -3 39 528 -1 995 299 +1 21 18 7 54
1979 102 0 102 +3 40 483 +1 1 045 929 +5 20 19 7 54
1980 105 +3 98 -4 41 280 +2 1 095 472 +5 19 19 7 55
1981 104 ·1 99 +1 46 668+13 1 265 008+15 17 20 6 57
1982 104 0 77 -22 44 811 +4 1 103 455·13 14 21 7 58
1983 102 ·2 87 +13 46 075 +3 1 171 724 +6 16 20 7 57
1984 103 +1 94 +8 51 031+11 1 183 399 +1 14 23 7 56
1985 100 ·3 86 -9 48 329 -5 1 084 278 ·8 14 23 7 56
1986 99 ·1 77 -10 47 032 -3 961 302·11 16 22 7 55
1987 97 ·2 86 +12 45 941 -2 964 881 0 15 22 8 55
1988 95 ·2 68 -21 44 927 -2 988 801 +2 18 21 7 54
1989 94 ·1 64 -6 30 633-32 634 042-36 Not ava i l able
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
In 1985, the last year that statistics on the economically active
population were available to the Central Statistical Service
(1989, p. 20), the economically active population in South Africa
stood at a tot a1 of 8 692 363. In that year those employees that
were covered by industrial council agreements constituted 12,5' of
the economically active population. In the same year there were
1 391 423 members of registered trade unions, or 16~ of the
economically act i ve population.
Thus as a proportion of the economically active population, there
was only a marginal difference between employees covered by
industria1 counc t l agreements and those who were members of
registered trade unions. '11th the inclusion of unregistered trade
union membership, unfortunately not reliably recorded to allow for
meaningful compari sons, the balance would most certa inly be in
favour of union membership. Many union members would also be
covered by Industrial council agreements.
The observation being made Is that in the past industrial council
versus trade union (registered) coverage of the working population
appeared to be very much on par, demonstrating industrial
councils' impact on collective bargaining In the macro context.
-67·
,In 1989, according to the Department of Manpower (l990, p. 26),
there were however 2 130 117 reg i stered trade uni on members
against a reduced 945 178 employees falling within the scope of
industrial councils, if the Metal industry employees are included.
Whilst industrial council coverage of employees, based on these
adjusted figures, reduced by 13% between 1985 and 1989, membership
of registered trade unions increased by 53%, which accompanied by
the 6~ reduction in the number of industrial councils for the same
period, creates a very concerning prospect that has amongst other
factors given ri se to the Quest ioning of the future role and
impact of the industrial council system In South Africa.
Mitigating against this is however the earlier observation on the
relative stabil ity in industrial council coverage of employees and
their racial compos it ion over the longer term.
Nevertheless, on the basis of numbers alone, and these as
ment ioned before shoul d be interpreted wi th caution, the prospects
for the Industrial council system do not seem optimistic.
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•3.4 tmllil tillS AFFECTING INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
It was also considered useful in charting the htstcrtcal
development of industrial counc t l s , especially in the more recent
years, to sunrnarise those matters that were deaIt with and ruled
upon by the supreme court and the indus tria1 court, since the
latter's establ ishment in 1979, on legal interpretation and
precedents pertaining to the industrial council system. Such
interpretations and precedents are very illuminat ing in terms of
the operation of industrial councils as well as principles in
collective bargaining that affect them.
Industrial Law Journals from their inception in· 1980 until October
1990 were sourced for the purpose of this investigation. Those
supreme and industrial court cases that were indexed as applicable
to industrial councils have been included in the extract provided
in Table 3.4. The details on each case and the judgements passed
will not be discussed, but only noted for possible further study
and analysIs.
TABLE 3.4
t.2lLr1 suu In respect 2f Indystrial councils (from Industrial Law
Journals, 1980 - 1990)
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
CASE DATE(S) 01SPUTE/ ISSUE
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
National Industrial Council of the 29·
Printing and Newspaper Industry 30/5/79
v Copystat Services (Pty) ltd
&Others
Agreement binding
Blacks in industry
Industrial Council for the
Bui lding Industry (Transvaal)
v All Construction (Pty) Ltd
& Another
State v Lyons Brooke Bond (Pvt)
Ltd (Zimbabwe)
National Industrial Council for
the Leather Industry of S Av
Parshotam & Sons (Pty) Ltd
Grafton Furni ture Manufacturers
(Pty) Ltd v Industrial Council
for the Furniture Manufacturing
Industry, Natal & Others
11,13· Payment of agreement
14/3/80 contributions
4/6/81, Employee or
7/8/81 contractor
28/9/82 Contributions due
to counc i 1
25/10/82, Agreement closed
30/11/82 shop an unfair
labour pract ice
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Industry and
plant 1eve1
bargaining
Counc il dispute
settlement
respons i bi 1i ty
Counc i 1 dispute
settlement
9/11/82, Unfair dismissal
29/12/82, clause in
28/2/83 agreement
11/4/83, Jurisdiction of
27/4/83, dispute
2/6/83 settlement
23/2/84, Agreement not ice
17/4/84 of termination
13/6/84, Agreement exemption
15/6/84, application
24/9/84
25/7/84,
9/8/84,
5/10/84
2/10/84,
8/10/84,
2/11/84
20-
22/5/85,
12/7/85,
11/9/85
Nod1e1e v Mount Ne1 son Hotel &
Another
Nat ional Union of Textile Workers
v Industrial Council for the
Clothing Industry (Natal) &
Others
Un Hed Afri can & All i ed Workers 30/7/84, Counc il dis pute
Union of S A & Others v Minibus 10/8/84 settlement
(Pty) Ltd
Metal and All ied Workers Union
v Hart Ltd
Rhodes v S A Bias Binding
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
Metal and All ied Workers Union &
Others v Stobar Reinforcing
(Pty) ltd & Another
Matshoba &Others v Fry's Metals
(Pty) Ltd
Manquasela & Others v Rheem S A
(Pty) Ltd•
National Union of Textt 1e Workers v28/5/85, Agreement exemption
Industrial Council for the Cotton7/6/85 appl icat ion
Textile Manufacturing Industry
t
Consolidated Woolwashing &
Process ing Mi 11 s ltd v the
President, Industrial Court &
Others
Textile Workers Industrial Union
(S A) &Another v Fabricius No
&Others
Consolidated Text t1 e Hills Ltd v
President, Industrial Court &
Others
3/12/85, Council dispute
7/7/86 settlement
12/6/86, Review of veto to
8/7/86 party admission
13/11/86 Council dispute
settlement
National Industrial Council of the 6/1/87
Leather Industry of S A (Footwear
Section) v National Union of
Textile Workers & Others
Agreement stop
order
deductions
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Metal & All ted Workers Union & 3/2/87, Jurisdiction of
Others v Rheem S A (Pty) ltd 19/2/87 dispute
set t 1ement
Nat tonal Union of Text l1e Workers 2/3/87, Admission to
v Industrial Council for the 24/4/87, council
Cotton Text 11 e Manufacturing 24/8/87
Industry (Cape) & Another
Gina v Sea Breeze Motors 26/6/87, Counc 11 dispute
4/9/87 settlement
Black Allied Workers Union & 23/7/87, Counc 11 dispute
Others v Init 1a1 Laundries [Pty) 29/10/87 settlement
ltd & Another
Cele v La Crete Hotel 10/8/87, Counc 11 dispute
31/8/87 settlement
• Monametsi & Others v Tr1 fon 24/9/87, Councl1 disputeIndustries (Pty) Ltd 5/10/87 settlement
National Union of Textl1e Workers 12/11/87, Admission to
v Textile Workers Industrial 2/12/87 councl1
Union (5 A) & Others
Ulac Paints (Pty) Ltd v 17/2/88, Counc 11 dispute
Bul bulta No & Others 7/3/88 settlement
Mashapa & Others v A C John 15/1/88, Councl1 dispute
Plastics Engineering (pty) ltd 29/1/88 settlement
Ngubane v Clover Oa i r les 19/2/88, Jurisdiction of
5/5/88 dispute
settlement
Electrical & Allied Workers Union 18/3/88, Councl1 dispute, of S A& Another v Cathdal an 12/4/88 settl ement(Pty) ltd
Vumisa v Vision Creations 1/6/88 Counc 11 dispute
settlement
Bl ad All ied Workers Union & Others22/7/88, Counc 11 m1 nimum
v Asoka Hotel 11/10/88 plant 1evel
actual wages
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile 2/9/88, Admi ss ion to
Workers Union of S A v National 3/10/88 council
Industrial Council of the
leather Industry of 5 A
Consolidated Textile Mills Ltd 20/9/88, Counc t l dispute
v President, Industrial Court 30/9/88 sett lement
& Others
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Oanster v 0 J & Sun Eng Ineerlng e c9/12/88, Coune tl d t spute
15/2/89 settlement
Ngtdt &Others v Arthur Young
Trust &Others
Uotel &Restaurant Workers Union
& Others v Southern Sun Hotel
Corporat Ion & Another
23/2/89, Counc t 1 d t spute
16/3/89 settlement
7/4/89, Coune tl d tspute
13/4/89, settlement
19/6/89
20/6/89
Amalgamated Clothtng & Textile 12· Admtsston to
Workers Union of S A v National 13/4/89, counc t1
Industrial Counc t 1 of the leatherl1/5/89
Industry of S A
•
Olamlnl &Others v Crl sson
(Pty) ltd
Photoctrcutt S A (Pty) Ltd v
De Kl erk No & Others
19/4/89, Counctl dtspute
10/5/89 settlement
respons tbt1ity
28/4/89 Jurtsdtct Ion of
council
lebona & Others v Trevenna
Black Electrtcal & Electrontc
Workers Union & Others v
H D Electrical
9· Counc I l dispute
12/5/89, settlement
3/7/89,
15/8/89
29· Coune 11 d tspute
30/5/89, settlement
19/6/89,
20/7/89
S· Coune 11
6/6/89, demarcation
19/6/89
28/6/89 Counc 11 dispute
settlement
Nattonal Unton of Metalworkers
of S A&Others v Somta Tools
(Pty) ltd
Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied 18/9/89, Voluntarl sm In
Workers Union v S A Prtntlng & 11/10/89 bargatntng
Al1ted Industrtes Federatton
State v Morntngstde Nursing Home
(Pty) ltd
Cape Gate (Pty) ltd v Namane 2/2/90
&Others
Besuns du Plessts (Pretoria 14/6/90
Foundries) (Pty) ltd v National
Un Ion of Stee1 & All Ied Workers
Counc 11 d hpute
sett lement
Industry and
plant 1evel
bargi tn lng
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
It ts Interesting to note that of the 36 cases reported, 26 or 72'
of these related one way or the other to the dt spute seU leeent
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Ifunctions and procedures of Industrial councils.
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4. ESTABLISHMENT!
COUNCILS
COMPOSITION AtiO OPERATION Qf INDUSTRIAL
,
The parties to industrial council s and the relevant provisions of
the Labour Relations Act No 28 of 1956 (LRA) that govern the
establishment and operation of industrial council s will be
discussed In this section.
4•1 PROY ISIONS Qf !!if 1.MIDlB RE LAT IONS AO tfQ za Qf ill§
Those sections of the LRA (1988) that apply to industrial
councils, with the exception of their dispute resolution functions
as already discussed separately in Section 2.7.2 of this document,
are Sections 18, 19, 20,21,23, 27, 27A and 48. These sections
will not be covered in detail here, but a sUlllllary will be provided
of these general provisions of the LRA relating to the
establishment, composition and operation of industrial councils.
Wi th reference to these provisions an industrial council can best
be described In the follOWing terms, which expands on the synops15
prov tded In Section 2:
- An Industrial council 15 a permanent statutory body.
- It 15 created voluntarily by an equal number of representatives
of employers and/or registered employers' organisations on the one
hand, and registered trade unions on the other hand. The proviso
is that individual employers will only be allowed to join
industrial councils if they are not eligible for membership of an
employers' association which 15 already a party to the council.
- These parties should be representative of the undertaking,
industry, trade or occupation and area for which the industrial
council is registered with the Industrial Registrar.
Representivlty is at the discretion of the Registrar, but Is
generally Interpreted as meani ng that the parties shoul d represent
the majority of employers or employees In an area, industry,
occupation or trade, with the 5~ + 1 principle normally being
appl led. However, the LRA lays down a number of tests in SI9(4)
for determining the representat tveness of the parties to a
council. Jankelsson (1975, p. 119) expands on these
represent ivity requ i rements wh Ich can have the fo11ow1 ng outcomes:
The parties may firstly be sufficiently representative in the area
for which registration 15 sought even If a trade union or
employers' organisation has no members In that area. Also, the
parties may be regarded as sufficiently representative of the
Industry even if the trade unions which are parties to the council
are not reg15tered 1n respect of all classes of persons employed
in the industry concerned.
- Upon reg15trat ion an industrial council becomes a body corporate
and 15 capable in 1aw of suelng and being sued and of acquiring,
holding and alienating movable and Inrnovable property.
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t- The individual parties to the industrial council will not be
held llable for any of the obligations of the council.
- Industrial council agreements are enforceable as delegated
legislation from the date of publ icatlon in the government gazette
by the Minister of Manpower.
- These agreements are binding for the period spec t fted In the
Gazette on all parties to the council. as well as all other
employers and employees who are engaged or employed in the
undertaking. industry. trade or occupation and area to which the
agreement relates. even though they may not be a direct party to
the counc l l.
- Two·thirds majorHy vote of the representatives at a council
meeting will const Hute a decision by the council, provided that
in the case of a dispute concern i ng an alleged ULP wh ich has been
referred to the council for a decision, the latter shall only be
binding on the part tes to the dispute if such part ies have agreed
to the decision in writing.
Despite the fact that an industrial council is in effect
establ l shed when the parties concerned voluntarily come together
and agree to bargain with each other on the industrial council. It
will only be officially recognised after the Industrial Reglstrar
agrees to its registration.
The following requirements need to be met for registration of an
industrial council to take place, as described by Bendix (1989,
pp. 368 - 369):
- An industrial council firstly needs a constitution in order to
register. Section 21(1) of the LRA rules that an industrial
council constitution must comply with the following directives:
a) State how representatives on the council and their alternates
are to be appointed.
b) Provide rules for the appointment, removal, duties and powers
of office-bearers and officials.
c) State how representat ives will vacate their seats.
d) Provide procedures for the call ing and conduct of meetings.
e) Establish procedures for dea11 ng with disputes.
f) State under wh i ch circumstances additional members will be
allowed to join the council.
g) Provide for the proper keep ing of books and accounts, the
audit Ing of such books and inspect ion of these by the parties to
the coune 11.
h) State for which purposes funds will be applied.
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t1) State how excess funds wi 11 be invested.
j) Provide for alteration of the constitution and the winding up
of the council .
- After approval of the constitution by all parties, it is
submitted to the Industrial Registrar, together with the
prescribed appltcat ion specifying the scope for which the council
wishes to be registered.
- The Industrial Registrar will publish a notice of the
application received in the government gazette and allows time for
objections to be lodged. The Registrar will at the same time
ensure that the council has compl ted with all prescribed
procedures, that the constitution contains no Illegal provisions,
that no other council is registered for the same scope and that
the parties are sufficiently representative.
- Once the Registrar is satisfied that all the prescribed
conditions have been met, the industrial council will be
registered, a notice to this effect publlshed in the government
gazette, and a registration certificate submitted to the council
concerned.
The certificate of reglstrat ion bestows the right to
self-government on the parties to the councll, whereafter they may
independently regul ate their affairs, and those of others in the
industry or area if their agreements are extended, as they deem
fit, provided no 1aws are broken. Both the area and industry in
respect of which an industrial councll can exercise jurisdiction
is therefore al so defined in this certificate of regi stratlon.
Belmonte (Note 4) of the Department of Manpower, Johannesburg, on
the issue of sel f-governance, confi rmed the Department's Regional
Offices' llmlted involvement with industrial councils, apart from
establishing representivity of industrial councils on a regional
basis for both the establishment of new council s and the renewal
of industrial council agreements.
The role of the Industrial Regi strar in the process of the
establlshment and operation of an industrial council and its
agreements Is important and is briefly cOllll1ented on as below by
the current incumbent since 1988, 0 WJames (Note 3):
- The registrat ion and deregistrat ion of industrial counci15 in
terms of the provts tons of the LRA.
- Ensuring all the relevant sections of the lRA are adhered to in
the conduct of their operations.
- Receipt and review of the annual audited financial statements of
industrial councils. Special attention is paid to surplus funds
invested by industrial councils in terms of the LRA, to ensure
that these are not invested inappropriately and also that
contribution income is at a level that is beneficial to the
industry and members. Property and other less speculative
investments are sanctioned in preference to for example stock
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tmarket Investments.
- The approval of industrial council constitutions and admission
of parties to council s.
- The exerc i se of dlscret ion in the establi shment of
represent1vlty of parties to an industrial council and the council
itself. The Department of Manpower's attitude is that S~ + 1
representlvlty is regarded as sufficiently representative, which
may already be covered by the constitution of a particular
industrial council. However, lower percentages may be found
acceptable, depending on the various elements present at the time.
4.2 CURRENT COMPOSITION MiD PARTIES IQ INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
The LRA (1988 pp. 36 - 37) refers to the parties to industrial
councils as the following in terms of Section 18:
"Any employer (i f the registrar approves); or group of employers
(if the registrar approves): or registered employers'
orqantsatten: or group of registered employers' orqan tsat tcns: or
group of one employer and one or more registered employers'
organisat Ions (i f the registrar approves); or group of employers
and one or more registered employers' organisations (if the
regi strar approves) • Together wi th any registered trade union; or
group of registered trade untons ."
The section on Definitions in the LRA (1988, pp.
clarifies these parties more fUlly as following:
2, 4 and 6)
·'Employer' means any person whomsoever who employs or provides
work for any person and remunerates or expressly or tacitly
undertakes to remunerate him or who, subject to subsection (3),
permits any person whomsoever in any manner to assist him in the
carrying on or conducting of his bustness: and 'employ' and
'employment' have corresponding meanings."
·'Employers organi sation' means any number of employers in any
particular undertaking, Industry, trade or occupation associated
together for the purpose, whether by itself or for other purposes,
of regulating relations in that undertaking, industry, trade or
occupation between themselves or some of them and their employees
or some of the i r emp1oyees. •
·'Federation' means a federation referred to In section 80(1)."
.,Organ isatIon' means an employers' organtsation. •
·'Trade Union' means any number of employees in any particular
undertaking, industry, trade or occupation associated together for
the purpose, whether by itsel f or with other purposes, of
regulating relations in that undertaking, Industry, trade or
occupatIon between themselves or some of them and the i r employers
or some of their employers."
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,Subsection (3) in the lRA (1988. pp. 8· 9) refers to labour
brokers being classified as employers. and section 80(1) (1988,
pp. 101 - 102) of section 80 on "Federations of employers'
organisations or trade unions" reads as follows:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2). the registrar
may with the approval of the Minister register any federation
consisting wholly or partly of registered employers' organisations
or trade unions or a federation of any such federations. which has
as its object or as one of its principal objects the promotion of
the interest of employers or employees, as the case may be.·
Registration of employer organisations and trade unions is
therefore mandatory for eligibility as party to an industrial
council for these organisations.
However, it should be noted that all employer organisations are
not established solely for the purpose of regulating the labour
relationship and to facilitate collective bargaining. whereas
trade unions are formed exclusively to represent and protect their
members'. interests in the labour relationship and engage in
collective bargaining. Bendix (1989, p. 63) mentions the major
types of employer-created groupings and the extent to which they
become involved in industrial relations issues, as follows:
- Trade organi sat ions to promote and protect common business
interests.
- Chambers of commerce or industry to represent the interests and
optnions of busi nessmen towards government and other sect ions of
the cOllll1unity, including manpower and industrial relations matters
of general concern to business, but excluding collective
bargaining activities.
- Employers' associ at ions specifically establ ished for the purpose
of collective bargaining and generally constituted on an industry
basis.
The latter type of association will therefore be focussed upon as
potential party to an industrial council. Salamon (1987, p. 207)
defines such an employers' association as ·any organisation whose
membership is composed of employers and whose purposes include the
regulation of relations between employers and their employees or
trade unions."
Reference is made to 'potential party' as not all employer
organisations that are formed for the purpose of collective
bargaining do so to form and belong to industrial councils. For
example, the Chamber of Hines in South Africa engages in
collective bargaining but is not party to an industrial council.
A semantic differentiation is made by Bendix (1989, pp. 63·66)
between other employer organisations and the employer association
which focuses purely on collective bargaining. This distinction
is not adhered to in this document, and the term employer
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,organisation will be understood to refer to the collective
bargaining employer institution, unless noted otherwise.
Membership to an employer organisation is however not a
prerequisite for an individual employer to also become a party to
an industrial council, as the lRA does provide for membership by
individual employers. Employers can therefore participate in
centralised industry-based bargaining without belonging to
employer organisations. Industrial councils have for example been
established between individual (single) employers and their trade
unions or with individual trade unions.
This however brings one to another difference between the employer
organisation and the trade union as collectives. This difference
is that employees need to combine with one another in trade unions
to achieve relative power in the labour relationship, whereas the
individual employer operates from an established power base and
need not combine with other employers for this purpose. This
relative independence is strengthened in South Africa by the
statutory access to centralised collective bargaining and dispute
settlement mechani sms by individual employers, and not only
through their organisations.
The historical experience in Britain as sunmarised by Bendix
(1989, p. 64) was that employers' organisations were formed in
react ion to the then emergi ng trade unions. Despite thi s
opposition, trade unionism still grew and the employer coalitions
cont tnued for bargaining· purposes and the establ ishment of joint
pol tcles and strategies, which had proved to be successful when
concerted industrial action was applied by employers.
Salamon (1987, p , 208) is however of the opinion that the more
recent emphasis on organisational (decentralised or
plant/establishment) level bargaining in Britain, brought about by
full employment in the 1960's, has led to employers leaving
employer organisat ions in order to have greater freedom to
determine thei r own strategies on matters 1ike productivity
bargaining, etcetera. Although South Africa has also experienced
this trend towards decentralised bargaining within the informal
labour relations system, as discussed earlier and el sewhere, the
reasons were initially pressure from emerging Black trade unions
and their reluctance to participate in the formal industrial
relations structures, but now followed by similar type of employer
motivattons as in the British experience.
Generally, though, employer organisations are nowadays created for
the purpose of joint (as opposed to individual enterprise level)
collective bargaining in reaction to trade union strategies and
organisation, and at the most prevalent collective bargaining
level. It would seem too that their organisation and
classification corresponds with, and is also reactionary to, that
adopted by their counterpart trade unions.
With reference to trade unions as parties to industrial councils,
Bendix (1989, p. 40) describes the trade union as the collective
in the labour rel at tonshlp that has the highest profile, serving
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,as the proactive party to which the other parties such as
employers and the State normally respond.
In addition to the definition provided earl ter of a trade union as
contained in the lRA, several other definitions of trade unions
are also avatlable, with the definition of Salamon (1987, p. 58)
favoured as it incorporates the three elements that he maintains
distinguishes trade unions from other employee collectives such as
committees. These three elements are the nature of their
membership, their purpose and the means that they employ to
achieve their purpose. The lRA definition of a trade union in
particular does not include the element of means, namely the
collective bargaining process. Salamon's definition reads as
fo11 ows:
"Any organisation, whose membership consists of employees, which
seeks to organise and represent their interests both in the
workplace and society and, in particular, seeks to regulate their
employment relationship through the direct process of collective
bargain ing wi th manaqement."
It is important to recall as well why employees join trade unions
rather than bargain individually with employers. The prime
motivation for forming trade unions is due to the latent element
of power in the collective relationship. The power of the
employer is perceived as best being matched by such a combination
of workers who would obtain concessions which would otherwise have
not been granted to the individual employee, and in doing so,
attempt to improve their position, both at the workplace and
society as a whole. The power bases of trade unions and employers
are governed by several factors, but the most important of these
for trade unions are their membershi p strength and for employers
their direct control over the provision of work and financial
rewards.
From this follows that the establishment, organisation,
composition and coverage (scope) of an industrial council would be
closely 1inked to the classi ficat ion and organisat ion of the
employer and employee parties that voluntarily agree to its
formation, also in a direct response to one another's
organisat ion, power base and strategies.
Indeed, wi thout these parties to it and the i r conrni tment to
support the system, industrial councils would not exist and some
attention is therefore devoted to basic concepts surrounding the
classification, organisation and functions of the employer and
employee collectives, which with their specific industry
characteristics, are superimposed on the councils that they create
and operate, giving such councils each their unique character.
This superimposition would naturally be subordinate to the
operational and composition directives laid down in the lRA
pertaining to industrial councils, but provides an insight into
the individual character of and spec Hic problems experienced by
different industrial councils, as exemplified during the
discussion in later sections on the two industrial councils for
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the Building and Metal industries as well as the contemporary
issues that surround industrial councils.
4.2.1 CLASSIFICATION, ORGANISATION A!!D FUNCTIONS Q.E EMPLOYER
ORGAN ISAT IONS
The following classification of employer organisations is offered
by Bendix (1989, p. 64):
- Single national organisations such as the Chamber of Mines in
South Africa.
- Regional organi sat ions where an industry is geographically
spread, with a coordinating national federation, of which the
largest locally is the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation
(SEIFSA) .
- Specialist organi sations for industries with varied speciality
areas such as those for civil engineering firms in the engineering
industry.
- Local organisations for a certain area which bargain at district
and regional level only.
The principles of employer group internal organisation are very
similar to those of trade unions, with voluntary membership and
the adherence of democracy also being subscribed to. Like trade
unions, they are al so constituted by industry on an area, regional
or national basis.
Examples of the types of employer organisations in South Africa as
provided by Finnemore and Van der Merwe (1989, pp. 69 - 71) are:
- Regional organisations such as the Eastern Province Automobile
Manufacturers Association which includes Delta, Samcor and
Volkswagen .
- National organisations for certain industries are the Steel and
Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) with
about 3 000 members, the Building Industries Federation of South
Africa (BIFSA) wi th about 4 000 members, and the Chamber of Hines
as another type of national organisation with a significant impact
on the economy.
- Regional, cross-industry organisations that serve a broader
function than industrial relations alone are such as the Midland
Chamber of Industries for the Eastern Cape region, as well as
nat ional bodies such as the South African Federated Chamber of
Industries.
It becomes apparent that the classification and organisational
concepts referred to would dictate the corresponding organisation
and scope of the industrial council established, of which the
Metal industry's industrial council is a notable example.
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,According to Bendix (1989. p. 65) employer organisation
membership recruitment acttvity is however not as active nor as
forceful as in trade unions. large member companies can also tend
to dominate the proceedings of employer organisat ions. as well as
the industrial councils on which they serve.
The literature suggests that the objectives and functioning of
employer organisations would depend very much on the type of
labour relations system in a country and how collective bargaining
is structured. Bendix (1989. pp. 65 - 66) lists the following
generic functions and corresponding objectives of employers'
organisat ions:
- Representation of the collect ive interests of employers vis a
vis unions. also regarded as their primary function. Their
objective in collective bargaining is to ensure uniformity in
wages. conditions of employment and procedures within the
industry. Douwes Dekker (1983. p, 3) also describes collective
bargaining as the tradittonal 'defensive' task of employer
organisat ions.
- Representation of their members' interests with governmental and
other agencies. normally by invitation. so that matters of
importance to in particular trade unions can be brought to
government's attention. especially regarding new labour
legislation when the relationship between government and trade
unions do not allow for direct communication.
- Provision of advice to employers in an industry on matters such
as procedures. industrial relations strategies and practices as
well as mediation services. so that a sound. consistent and
concerted labour relations strategy can be employed in the
industry in the interest of the maintenance of industrial peace.
- The establi shment of comprehensive benefit funds to enable
individual and smaller employers to provide these to their
employees on a cost effective basis.
A further classification of employer organisation functions is
provided by Salamon (1987. p. 212) who places emphasis on the
primary funct ion of employer organisations as to support and
promote the commercial objectives of its members. outlining their
major activities as follows:
- The direct negotiation of collective agreements with trade
unions.
- Assisting its members In the resolution of disputes.
- Providing help and advice to its members on industrial relations
matters.
- Representing its members' views and interests to government and
other agencies.
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Similarities and differences are present, with the inclusion of
dispute settlement assistance important In the latter formulation
based on the Brit ish model.
It is worth not i ng too the object ives of the largest employer
federation in Britain, namely the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI), which directly and indirectly represents 304 500
companies with about 12 mill ion employees, namely:
- To formulate and influence policies in respect of industrial,
economic, fiscal, conrnercial, labour, social, legal and technical
issues.
- To provide a focal point for those seeking the views of British
industry.
- To develop the contribution of British industry in the creation
of wealth wi th ina free enterprise market situati on.
Douwes Dekker (1983, p. 4) would add to these functions the
proactive function of accepting increased responsibility for the
social dimension of the market economy, or social responsibility,
an emerging aspect that can have a marked effect on the future
mission and operation of industrial councils, as discussed at more
length in section 2.8 on other functions and services of
industrial council s .
4.2.2 CLASS IFICAII ON, ORGAN ISAIl ON Am2 FUNCT IONS QE TRADE UN IONS
The underlying di fferentiating factor between trade unions is the
type of membership interest that they represent. Here it is
worthwhile considering why employees become trade union members,
aside from the broader motivation to match the power of the
employer in the labour relationship. Backer and Weston (1987, pp.
5 - 6) refer to the following advantages of trade union
membership, which also reflect the generic interests of trade
un ion members:
- To receive a fa i r wage and security of work and income.
- To have the opportunity to air grievances and obtain power
through the un ion•
- To receive respect and recognition from other workers.
- To satisfy the politicial aspirations of workers, of particular
relevance in South Africa.
- To limit management's discretion in making decisions.
- To influence businesses, communities and even legislation
through the un ion.
- To participate in union-Initiated cOlllllunity development projects
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such as housing, feeding, recreation and social welfare.
- To resist intimidation by other employees, If compelled to join.
Conversely, the major disadvantages of trade union membership are
the possibility of losing one's employment as a result of
union-Initiated industrial action, and intimidation to comply with
group activity and action Initiated by unions and their political
connectIons.
Because trade unions purport to represent the interests of their
membership, and these being the major cOlllllon interests or concerns
that motivate employees to join or form trade unions, the
objectives of trade unions as discussed shortly would logically be
derived from these motivations of individual members.
Specific membership interests as well as trade union strategy have
contributed to trade unions both historically and within present
day practice organising themselves on a membership interest basis.
This has led to three broad classifications of trade unions, which
also represent broad examples of trade union organisation, that
are furthermore of particular relevance to the composition and
coverage of industrtal councils to which such trade unions may be
parties.
It could also be postulated that trade unions in terms of their
membership interests and organisation would have the most
significant influence on- the coverage and scope of industrial
councils that they assist in establishing or are party to, rather
than the employer parties, who have already been commented upon as
being largely reactionary in this process.
Bendix (1989, 43 - 46) sUlllllarises trade union classifications and
organisational types as follows:
OCCUPATIONAL UNIONS
Membership of occupational unions is derived from a certain
occupation and because they therefore organise across several
industries, are al so described as 'horisontal' in character.
Their power base is the strategic importance and skills of the
workers that they represent, whereby production could potentially
not continue if the various grades of workers ina particular
occupation are organised to strike. Potentially, if
representation requirements are met, these unions could serve on
industrial councils for several industries in which their members
are employed, such as artisans' unions. However, such industrial
counei ls would generally be organised to provide coverage on an
occupational rather than industry basts, which is provided for in
Section 19 of the lRA.
Four types of occupational unions have evolved, which in
chronological order of evolution have been the following:
- kI:ifi 1ln..1.2n1: The main concern of these unions is the protection
of the skilled status of their membership, emphasising the
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•recruiting, controlling and training of apprentices to their
trades. Very few pure craft unions still exist due to the
dilution of skills by the introduction of new technology,
resulting in them now also recruiting from allied occupations or
having amalgamated with other unions in particular industries to
form industrial unions, as discussed further on.
- promotion Unions: These are variat ions of the craft unions, but
recruitment is amongst workers who possess a particular skill
which is achieved by on-the-job training and promotion rather than
through an apprenticeship, as in the case of an establ tshed craft.
A South African example is the Footplate Workers' Association on
the railways.
- Unions ill Unskilled illi1 Semi-Skilled Workers: These unions fill
the void below the craft and promotion unions and restrict their
membership to lower-level workers, who then represent a specific
occupational interest, especially popular amongst Black workers in
South Africa. They could become similar in characteristics to
general or industri al unions, depending on the nature of their
organisation. Their power base lies in mass organisation and the
prevention of 'scabbing'.
-~ Coll ar Un i ons: These un ions were established due to the
traditional differences between the interests of manual and
non-manual or white collar workers. White collar unions have also
developed slower than the rest of the trade union movement,
possibly due to the perceived alignment with management or
'professional' status, but has accelerated in recent years due to
the shift to serv i ce industries in the economies of many Western
countries. In Britain, for example, Salamon (1987, p, 117)
reports that white collar unionisation accounts currently for
about 4M. of total trade union membership and is accordingly
exerting a greater impact on trade union thinking in this country.
This could be attributed to the significant change in the British
labour force whereby the proport ion of the worki ng force
classified as white collar has risen from under 2~ in 1911 to
over 5~ in 1981.
The development and growth of white collar trade unions in South
Africa should receive particular attention, as this is seen as the
main growth area for the trade union movement in the future.
Their propensity to establish or join industrial councils would be
conceived as greater than for other type of unions, due to
differing characteristics attributed to them and their members.
These distinguishing characteristics such as ideological.
organisational, attitudinal and other differences will not be
discussed in detail here, but should be considered for the
potential future impact on the industrial council system in this
country.
White collar trade unions' organtsation appears be more complex
too than that of other types of trade unions. Although most of
these unions will only organise workers in a particular industry,
those representing certain professions may organise across
industries.
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According to Backer and Weston (1987, p. 2) the categories of
employees that would be included in these type of unions would be
office workers, computer staff, laboratory workers, bank and
insurance officials, teachers, and others in related fields or
professions. In South Africa typical white collar unions are
those representing employees in the banking sector and in building
societies, namely the financial institutions. Of interest is that
Backer and Weston (1987, pp. 1 - 2) do not categorise white
collar unions under craft or occupational unions, but as a
separate category within the South African trade union taxonomy.
Salamon (1987, p. 94) adds further that In Britain some white
collar unions may restrict their membership to a single
occupation, while others may become mult t-cccupat tcna l and cross
industries, or confine their membership to a single industry or a
single employer. Professional associations such as the British
Medical Association and the Royal College of Nursing are included
in this category in Britain and conduct collective bargaining on
behalf of their members in addition to their role of maintaining
professional standards.
GENERAL UNIONS
Membership to these unions is theoretically open to any employee,
and Is based on the politically inspired Ideal of organising the
entire working class into one cohesive body, as well as the need
to represent unskill ed workers without reference to industries, or
to form amalgamations of unions operating In different industries,
whereby all workers are generally recruited and then passed on to
unions in other industries. Sectoral Interests however tend to
predominate and these unions are being supplanted by industrial
unions.
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
These unions organise workers in a certain industry only, but they
do not necessarily organise all classes of workers in that
industry. An industrial union may either seek to be a mOnopoly
union (the only union for all workers in an industry) or a single
industry union (organising as many workers as possible in one
industry only), of which the majority are of the latter type. It
could be said that the industrial council system is very much
based on and encourages the concept of industri a1 unionism,
although it does cater for other union categories and
organIsat ion.
It is believed that the original concept of industrial unionism
was to serve a socio-politlcal purpose, whereby together with a
general strike, workers can take control of their workplace and
industry, including the appointment of those who manage it.
The advantages of industrial untont Sll are seen as: Forming
stronger unions, elimination of Inter-untcn competition in an
industry, the reduct ion of the number of unions that an employer
has to bargain with, the correspondence of union and employer
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organisations with improved Industrial planning, expertise gained
by union officials in the Intricacies of a particular industry and
the Improvement of unions' power bases through the ability to
strike an entire industry.
Disadvantages, and why this has not become the only form of
unionism, are: Sectoral Interests often still dominate, union
poaching can ari se from probl ems In establ ish i ng industry
boundaries, and the breakdown and re-amalgamation of historically
diverse unions are often difficult to achieve.
The advantages of this form of unionism seem to outweigh the
di sadvantages, as it would appear to be supported by the formal
South African labour relations system as well as the bulk of the
trade union movement, as demonstrated by the Congress of South
African Trade Unions' (COSATU) proclaimed campaign as reported by
Slabbert (Note 11, p. 4) of one industry, one trade union, one
federation, namely one trade union for each industry. Whether
this endorsement of industrial unionism through the industrial
council system was a longer term strategy to co-opt the Black
trade union movement into the official system, is a debatable
issue. It would nevertheless appear to be working as the
advantages of the system, albeit to achieve sectoral objectives,
are progressively becoming more attractive to these trade unions.
Considerably more has been written about the objectives and
functions of trade unions than those of their employer
counterparts. Al though the overall objective of a trade union Is
to represent the interests of its members, and being principally
democratic institutions, the wide range of Interests of members
both in and outs ide the workplace as exempl If1ed earl1 er, have
made these object i ves multiple and complex, ranging from those of
individual members to broader objectives within the economic and
socto-pol tt tct al sphere.
A distinction is generally made between the objectives of trade
unions, which are intended to express their members' aspirations,
and the functions or roles that they perform In order to achieve
these object tves , As the key proact Ive partl es in the labour
relat lonshtp, it is necessary to focus some attent i on to these
objectives and functions of trade unions in order to appreciate
their role and influence as parties to industrial councils, and
furthermore to consider appropriate strategies to nurture their
responsiveness to responsible participation in industrial councils
within the formal labour relations system.
A generic classification of trade union objectives is provided by
Bendix (1989, pp. 4B - 53), which outlines six general alms of
trade unions, with the emphasis placed on particular objectives
depending on the type of society. For example in a society where
the majority of trade union members perceive themsel ves as being
oppressed or deprived, as In South Africa, the socio-pol itical and
economic objectives of trade unions would receive priority. These
objectives are surrmarhed as follows:
- Economic: A trade union's prime reason for being is to ma IntaIn
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and improve the economic status of its members, namely pay and
benefits, In bargaining with the employer, otherwise it becomes at
risk of losing its membership.
- J..2.b Secur1tv: The importance of maintaining the job security of
members is reflected 1n unions' preparedness to often waive
econom1c benefits for some members so that all members may keep
the ir jobs. Th is concern is further expres sed in untcns '
involvement in issues that affect members' job security such as
dismissals, retrenchments, work ratlonaltsation and the
introduction of new technology, as well as the maintenance of full
employment in a part icular society.
- Soc1al Welfare: This entatls ensuring the welfare of members,
either by providing certa1n benefits itself or ensuring that these
are provided by the employer or the State to members. Pr1mary
welfare issues cover s1ckness, accident, death and pension
benefits, whil st secondary are health, safety, housing and
education.
- ~ Regulation: Trade unions attempt to achieve the joint
requl at lon with the employer of condtttons of service and other
factors affect i ng members' working lives or emp1oyment
relationsh1p, over and above wages and basic benefits. This is
generally effected by concluding joint agreements on items such as
working hours, overtime, leave, notice per1ods, dispute settlement
procedures, di smissal procedures, grievance handling,
retrenchment, etcetera, to the extreme of j01nt planning of the
work process and co-decisionmaking in the management of the
enterpri se.
- Socio-poJ1tical: Although trade unions are born out of the
capitalist system, most unions and their membership subscribe to
the broad social t st tc objective of overthrowing the capitalist
system of government and replacing it with one which would support
soctaltst principles and institute a planned economy. Because
trade union members are affected by the social and polit1cal
systems that dominate their lives, trade unions necessartly have
to represent the interests of thei r members in these spheres.
They will accordingly engage in political action in some way or
another, with the degree of pol iticisation based on the type of
system in which they and their members exist. For example, In an
inequitable system, unions would be obliged, based on the
percept ions of the i r members, to engage in direct and overt
political actions. The so-called polit1c1sation of trade unions
in South Africa should therefore not sumnartly be condemned in the
light of the foregoing.
- IndiVidual Development: Because a trade union consists of
indiv1duals, the moral, physical and intellectual well-being of
each member must al so be promoted. In undeveloped or developing
societ1es, additional facllities are also offered such as soctal
gatherings, lessons in practical affairs and opportunit1es for
education and training, with other avenues of self-fulfllment
explored in the more developed societies.
-88-
,,
The methods by which trade unions set out to achieve the foregoing
aims are classified as follows:
- Collective Bargaining with Employers: This is the trade union's
primary function and the method by which it attempts to Improve
the economic position of its members and to regulate their terms
and conditions of employment. Bargaining is however a continuous
and ongoing process and does not end with wage negotiations.
- ColJectlye Action: This is an integral part of collective
bargaining whereby through collective action such as go-slow,
work-to·rule, stri ke or boycott, unions can if they wi sh show
their power and attempt to pressurise the employer into continued
bargaining or adopt ing a position more favourable to the union.
- Representation II Companv.l..fitl: Unions provide for the election
of shop stewards to represent the workplace interests of their
fellow employees, so that they (the unions) can continually be
involved in or have knowledge of all actions that affect its
members which may occur at the workpl ace.
- MOllation 1tUh .2.t..M..r: 62sU.tl: Unions will attempt to affiliate
with other like-minded organisations, both nationally such as
federations of unions which could lead to sympathy and other
concerted actions, and internationally, whereby pressure can be
appl ied on a local employer by overseas employers, in order to
increase their bargaining power with employers and the State.
- Callectiye Bargai n1ng ~ Goyernment: They will seek to
represent the economi c and soctali nterests of union members at
the highest level and to Influence industrial and soc to-pel tt tcal
legislation. A pol tt tcal vehicle to participate actively in
government is often necessary, as unions can normally only assume
a representative role, with a general strike as the extreme threat
to achieve concessions. A South African example is the
affil tation of the trade union federation COSATU to the African
National Congress (ANC).
- Representatlon 2.n l2ill irul National~: Trade unlons will
seek representation on local and national boards engaged in
act ivit les wh i ch directly affect the union and its members to
safeguard their interests, for example manpower, pension and
economic planning committees. In South Africa the trade union
movement has in the past not generally been invited to serve on
committees of this nature, with representation at this and
governmental level effected indirectly through employer
federations and other agencies. Since 1990, particularly as a
result of the new political climate and greater insistence from
both employer and union bodies, there has been a greater
preparedness by the authorities to coopt and involve the broader
trade union movement in such consultations, for example the
National Manpower Commission (NMC) conferring with COSATU and
NACTU on proposed amendments to the lRA in terms of the SHC
Accord.
- ReDreseotat ion 12 Goyernment .in.d Erneloyer Organ 1sat 1ons: Un tons
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can take up issues, such as unfavourable legislat ion or general
discrimination in industry, with government or employer
organisations (or utilising the latter as well to apporach
government as within the South African situation) on behalf of
their membership, by making direct representations on the issues
concerned.
- pol itical Movement: In a system where union members are
generally dissatisfied with the economic and political status quo,
unions may seek to bring about a change of government by actively
supporting an opposition political party or forming their own
political wing, for example the labour Party in BrHain and the
ANC support by COSATU in South Africa.
- Benefit E.Yru1.1: Particularly in countries where employers or the
government do not provide sufficient basic social security cover,
unions try to assist their membership by establishing pension,
provident and medical aid funds and even housing and education
schemes. These schemes could however unduly bind dissatisfied
members to a un ion.
- Edycatjon lns1 Social programes: As a result of a trade union's
responsibility for the individual growth of its members,
especially those from underpriVileged cOlll1lunities, numerous unions
have instituted general education and social programmes for their
membership.
Vital for the achievement of trade union objectives is the concept
of power, which serves both as a goal to use against the other
parties to the labour relationship, namely employers and the
State, and also as a means whereby other objectives can be
achieved. The mobil isation and use of power is a prerequisite for
the effectiveness whereby trade unions can execute their
functions. Employers and their organisations are not as reliant
on the creation of power bases due to the natural power balance
being in their favour in the labour relationship.
The major sources of trade union power as ident i fied by Bendix
(1989, p. 51) are:
- The solidarity of members and their willingness to engage in
co11 ect ive act ion.
- The depth and extent of its organisation (a poorly organised
body with sma 11 numbers wi 11 wi e1d no or very li ttl e power).
- Its ability to evoke sympathetic action from other organisations
in the industrial and scctc-pol tt tcal sphere.
- Its ability to influence governmental agencies by either direct
or indirect means.
Finally, Bendix (1989, p. 41)
mult ipl tctty of contemporary trade
the British Trade Union Council, as
Donovan COlll1llssion, these being:
provides an examp1e of the
union objectives 1n thoseof
set out in its evidence to the
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,- To improve the terms of employment.
- To improve the physical environment at work.
- To achieve full employment and national prosperity.
- To achieve security of employment and income.
- To improve social security.
- To achieve fair shares in national income and wealth.
- To achieve industrial democracy.
- To achieve a voice in government.
- To improve public and social services.
- To achieve publ tc control and planning of industry.
4.2.3 CURRENT PARTIES TIl INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
For details on the actual current parties to and the current
registered industrial councils, reference is made to Appendix 1.
Unfortunately the Department of Manpower was not at 1iberty to
provide their schedule of industrial councils to the writer, but
an extract was permitted from their current industrial council
gazetted agreement f i l es as at October 1990.
It should be noted however that this information might not reflect
the true state of affairs, as firstly industrial councils that do
not have published agreements would not be included here. Also,
industrial counc 11 s that are no longer operative or have dissolved
but ~ave not been dereqtstered yet by the Registrar, would still
be regarded as current and would appear on the schedule in
AppendiX 1. The only other readily available publ t shed reference
on industrial councils and their parties is contained in the South
African Trade Union Library's annual publication, which had
unfortunately not been publ ished yet with the most current data
for 1990-1991 at the time of finalising this document.
4.2.4 COMPARATIVE STATISTICS Qfi EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS Arm IBADf
JllilQtfi
The advent of sanctioned Black trade unionism and the
implementation of selected other recomendatlons of the Wiehahn
Commission in late 1979, had a marked and irreversible effect on
the South African industrial relations system. To what extent
this impacted on the parties or potential parties to industrial
councils, their numbers, growth and organisation, and the
resultant effects on these bodies' participation in the industrial
council system, can be deduced from the trends provtded in Table
4.2.4, based on available information.
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TABLE 4.2.4
Comparative statistics 2.!l employer organisatIons, l.!:J..dJ: unions.
iru1 jndustrl a] coyne IIi 1n~ Atr lei till :. l.2.a.2 (frolD the
Central Statt st ica I Service, 1989. Oepntment of Manpower. 1990.
Trade Union Council of South Africa. 1980, the South African Trade
Unions library. 1989. the Independent Trade Union Guide. 1989, and
the Institute of Industrial Relations, 1990)
..................--..............................................
1979 1989 CUANGE
PARTY
REG UNR TOT REG UNR TOT REG UNR TOT ,
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
NUMBER:
Empl Orgs 250 252 N/Av 252 +2 +1
Tr Unions 167 36 203 212 85 297 +45 +49 +94 +46
Ind Counc N/A N/A 102 N/A N/A 94 N/A N/A -8 -8, IC Agreem N/A N/A 102 N/A N/A 64 N/A N/A -38 ·37
Rec Agreem
- N/A N/Av N/Av 313 +313 N/A
MEMBERS:
Emp I Orgs
Tr Un Ions
Ind Counc Ees
Ers
FEDERATIONS:
Empl Orgs
Tr Unions
28 185
• 701 758
1 045 929
40 483
9
10
N/Av
• 2 130 117
634 042
30 633
11
10
N/A N/A
• 1 428 359 +203
-411 887 ·39
-9 850 ·24
+2 +22
o
,
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
• Registered trade union membership only recorded.
tfQll: Where figures oml tted, not available from sources.
It woul d appear that in the ten years since Wlehahn there has been
a great disparity In the growth in the number of trade unions
versus employer organhat Ions, with the percentage growth In trade
union membership numbers showing a dramatic increne.
Unfortunately comparat he 1989 figures for employer organisation
membership were not yet aval labl e for coamentary.
This considerable growth In trade union membership could partly be
attributed to the legttlllllSltton of the Black trade union
movement, n well as a greater preparedness .mongst Blick trade
unions to seek registration In recent yurs. It should also be
borne in mind that these union IDelllbershlp figures would be very
understated as figures for registered tr.de unions are genenlly
only reported for paid up JDembershlp, whi 1st figures for
unregistered trade unions Ir. nOrllally not readily available or
unre l labl. due to lack of structured reporting.
Possibly predicting a sl.llar trend loc.lly, Sallmn (1987, pp.
208 - 209) reports that the nUlllber of ellployer organ hat Ions In
Brttaln had declined frOlll 1350 In 1968 to over 300 In 1984, lIalnly
due to the closure of slIall local org.niutions and the
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have already
and wi 11 be
council s for
ama1gamati on of others with tn larger national assoc iat tons,
ranging tn membership from 11 to 121 000 members.
Salamon also comnents (1987, p. 70) on an overall decline of
about 2 mtllion tn trade union membership tn Britatn between 1979
and 1983, with the major growth area in the face of this decline
being that of whi te collar trade union membership due to the
general shift in employment structures from manufacturing to
service industries which is occurring in the developed industrial
countries. The South African labour movement might not yet be in
this phase, but it is certainly a prospect for the future.
4.3 OPERATION Q£ INDUSTRIAL COUNt ILS
Main features of the operation of industrial councils
been dealt with under Sections 2.6,2.7 and 4.1,
further exempl Hied in Section 7 on the industrial
the Building and Metal industries.
Reference is made here to Jankelsson's (1975, pp. 123 • 125)
discussion on the organisational structures of industrial
councils, which highlights the following aspects regarding the
organisation and operation of industrial council s:
- The organisational structure of an industrial council depends
largely on the number of employees covered by its agreements,
ranging from perhaps only one subcommittee for a sick pay fund
with other decisions made at full council meetings in respect of a
small Industrial council. By contrast, a large industrial council
could consist of an executive comnt ttee which di scusses financial
and administrative matters only, and other special ist committees
such as a complaints and exemptions committee, various funds
committees, a training comtttee , etcetera. Added to this should
also be differences attributed to the unique characteristics of
the particular industry and the nature of the part ies to the
industrial council, who as stated earlier in Section 4.2 would
tend to superimpose their own organisation and objectives onto the
industrial council's structure and its operation.
- An industrial council would employ administrative staff to
administer the affairs and funds of the council, as well as
agents, also called inspectors, to monitor the implementation of
agreements, headed up by a counc11 Secretary. The counc il
Secretary's funct ion is to manage the council's employees, arrange
meet ings, take mi nutes, prepare and subml t agreements, supervise
the administration of benefit funds and the collection of council
levies or dues, supervise the accounting function, receive reports
from inspectors and to deal with any matter which may arise in the
daily running of the council's affairs. For exampl e, a large
industrial council such as for the Metal industry, currently
employs approximately 156 full time personnel nationally.
Essentially the prime function of council personnel is therefore
to administer and monitor the various agreements of the councf l ,
Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain detatls on the total
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Inumber of personnel currently employed by all industrial councils
duri ng this study, and it is suggested that th is can best be
achieved by an independent survey of all industrial councils.
- The appointment of agents/inspectors is specifically provided
for in Sections 60, 61 and 62 of the lRA, bestowi ng on them
certain investigatory rights which also relate to the
investigation into and monitoring of whether trade unions,
employers' organisations and industrial councils themselves, are
observing the provisions of their respective constitutions. In
addit ion, such inspectors have right of access to industrial
counc tl meet ing s and may participate in the proceedi n9s , but with
no voting right on the council.
_ large industrial councils such as for industries that are
organised on a national basts, establish regional cOll1Tlittees,
councils or joint boards to assist in the administration of their
agreements, with often separate bodies to admini ster 1arge funds,
including extensive committee and subcorrmittee structures dealing
wi th various aspects such as exempt ions from the condi t ions of
published agreements, interpretation of technical schedules,
redrafting of technical schedules, etcetera.
- The routine work of industrial councils would involve the
monitoring of the implementation of its agreements by its agents
and general administrative functions performed by council
officials and staff, which embraces in particular the
investigation of complaints relating to non-compliance with the
main and other agreements, as appropriate. With national
industrial councils thts routine work would normally be delegated
to regiona1 counc 11 s or conmittees, wi th the nat iona1 body acting
as coordinator. Other routine activities include the processing
of correspondence between trade unions and emp1oyers'
organisations and to anyone of the conmittees of the council.
Where no separate fund administration bodies exist, these matters
would be dealt with on a routine basis by the council personnel.
Council officials would also arrange and preside over all council
meetings, of which there can be several per day, and attend to the
related secretarial functions.
In terms of organisation and composition industrial councils may
differ in many ways. Apart from structural differences, the
composition of industrial councils vary from industry to industry,
with some consisting of one employer or employers' organisation
and one trade union, whilst others might include representatives
of a number of employers' organisations and trade unions.
According to Appendix 1, in October 1990 there were for example 15
national industrial councils, 3 single enterprise or in house
industrial councils and 52 industrial councils with only one
employer and one trade union party, which would include the
former. An example of an in house single employer/single trade
union industrial council is the Industrial Council for the Sweet
Manufacturing Industry (East london) between Wilson-Rowntree (Pty)
Limited and the Sweet Workers Union. (Of interest is that the
employer party dur1 ng the course of this research advised that
this industrial council is no longer operative and will be
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,dis sohi ng due to decreased represent ivity in the i r plant of the
single trade union - a problem that could face other similarly
organised industrial councils too).
Because of the diversity of organisation and operation of
industrial councils, Sideris (l982, pp , 13 -14) contends that the
legal description of the industrial council system conceals the
way in which it actually operates in reality. This observation is
based on the opinion that firstly not all Industrial councils are
'industrial' industrial council s with some covering one
establ ishment only and others covering only certain geographic
regions. Secondly, neither are all industries covered by
industrial councils, with none for example having been established
for the Mining industry (a separate discussion on the Mining
industry alternative to the industrial council system is provided
in Section 9). The latter coenent is however not material as the
industrial council system is based on voluntary precepts and
participation of all industries is therefore not mandatory, whilst
the former comment does have substance.
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5. INDUSTR IAL COUNt IL AGREEMENTS
Bendix (1989. p, 106) perceives the purpose of collective
bargaining as being to reach agreement, with the process of
reaching agreement involVing negot tat tens, the keeping of minutes
during negotiation meetings, and once agreement has been reached,
culminating in the draWing up and signing of a formal agreement by
the parties. She also refers to the following concepts
surrounding collective agreements. of which industrial council
agreements fall wi th in the same scope.
5.1 I:!fU Qf COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
- 1M Agreement 1.2 Bargain: This is the first type of agreement to
be reached between the parties and formalises the establ ishment of
the collective bargaining relationship (although collective
bargaining already commences with the approach for either
recognition and/or the suggested formation of a bargaining body).
This agreement to bargain can be a recognition agreement In the
case of enterpri se/establlshment level or decentrallsed
bargaining, or the establishment of a bargaining association such
as an Industrial counc i l , The agreement to bargain will conta in
basic procedures for the conduct of the bargaining relationship
and for the settlement of. possible disputes that might occur in
the relationship. It therefore sets the parameters for further
consultation, negot iat ion such as on substant i ve matters, and
cooperatIon between the part ies. For this reason such an
agreement Is genera11 y a1so referred to as a procedural agreement,
but should be distinguished from other procedural agreements that
might be concl uded after the establ tshment of thi s initial
agreement. At decentraltsed level this type of agreement would
typically be called a recognition agreement and at central or
industrial council level. would be in the form of the constitution
of an Industrial council.
- procedyral Agreements: These agreements covering procedura1
issues such as disciplinary, grievance. retrenchment. dispute, and
other procedures. may follow. The main or subs idiary agreements
of industrial councils may contain such procedural arrangements.
- Subs tantive Agreement s: Subs tant i ve is sues negot 1ated on between
the parties are normally separated from procedural agreements as
they are more subject to change than the latter. Substantive
agreements cover ma t ters such as wages. benefits and cond it ions of
employment. that are normally negotiated at regular intervals.
Typically, these are the issues that are covered in the main and
other agreements of industrial councils.
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5.2 ENFORCEABILITY Q£ At!O WITHDRAWAL EB.QM COllECTIVE AGREEMENTS
The 1ega1 enforceab 11 ity of collect ive agreements is of importance
to the parties concerned, even in a voluntary system of collective
bargaining. In certain countries provision is made for the
statutory enforcement of coll ect ive agreements, or when not
granted statutory status, can be enforceable under contractual
obligations in comnon law if properly constituted.
Non-compliance with a collective agreement that complies with
coemon law contractual requirements may be addressed firstly by
civil action, supported by interdicts, to prompt offenders into
complying with the terms of an agreement.
Secondly unfair labour practice legislation may provide for the
breach of a collective agreement as constituting an unfair labour
practice, with recourse provided through the dispute settlement
machi nery of the relevant labour statutes.
Non-compliance with 1egislated agreements such as industrial
council agreements, which are regarded as delegated legislation in
terms of the official statute of the LRA, can result in criminal
sanction being applied to offenders.
South African labour law, through the LRA, provides for both
statutory enforceability of certain agreements, as well as
currently unfair labour practice provision for non-compl iance with
other collective agreements that meet certain requirements.
Section 31A of the lRA (1988, p, 49) on the 'Effects of Certain
Agreements' prescri bes that part i es to such agreements comply with
certa in statutory requi rements and that the fi na1 agreement be
referred to the Inspector of Manpower within 90 days of its
conclusion in order to obtain force of law. Thi s provision
applies primarily to, and also gives limited recognition in the
LRA, to the existence of other collective bargaining agreements
such as concluded in the informal labour relations system.
Under the princi p1e of vol untari sm part ies cannot be coerced into
a permanent relationship and most recognition agreements or
bargaining association constitutions provide for the withdrawal of
either party from the agreement. Due notice of such withdrawal
should be given, normally subject to the provision that the
Withdrawing party abides by the terms of current agreements until
such time as these expire.
5.3 INPUSTRIAl COUNCIL AGREEMENTS
There are primarily two types of industrial council agreements,
namely the 'main' agreement and other subsidiary agreements. The
main agreement deal s chiefly with substantive issues such as wages
and conditions of employment, often including certain procedural
matters. Subsidiary agreements normally cover specific benefit
funds and other issues that might not need to be negot 1ated as
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frequently as the ma in agreement items, or warrant separate
negotiations to be effective.
The normal process in the negotiation and conclusion of industrial
council agreements, which is considered as haVing over time
established itself as a stable and formalised procedure, is
sunrnarised as follows, also drawing on Bendix's (1989, p. 432)
expos it ion. Reference is also reconrnended to the deta t l s provided
in Sections 24 and 48 of the LRA (1988), which will not be
reproduced here.
- Agreements on substantive issues such as wages and condi t ions of
service are usually effective for a certain period.
- About three months before an agreement is about to 1apse, the
parties to the industrial council agree to a date on which
renegottat ion of the agreement wi 11 conmence.
- The union(s) that are party to the council will thereafter
submit their proposals to the Secretary of the employers'
association(s), who may respond wi th counter-proposal s to their
union counterpart{s), or merely acknowledge receipt of the unions'
proposals. More recently, the proposals and participation of
non-parties are el icited too to comply with the provision that
these parties are consulted and their interests considered when
industrial council agreements that govern them are negotiated.
- Negotiations may take place in continuous sessions or be spread
over a longer period. It is important to note that parties to the
industrial council also meet periodically to discuss other matters
on a formal bas is, and do not only get together for the
negottatton of substantive matters.
- The Secretary of the industrial council w111 minute the
proceedings of the negotiation meetings and the decisions reached,
as well as prepare the final wri Uen agreement.
- Where agreement is not reached and negotiations end in deadlock,
either party may declare an official dispute. Depending on the
const itution of the council, the matter may be submi tted to
arbitration or mediation, or the dispute will be processsed
through the official dispute resolution mechanisms. Should
agreement then still not be achieved, a legal strike may be called
or a legal lock out instituted. However, industrial council
negotiations rarely result in industrial action, with agreement
eventually reached as a rule.
- The parties are regarded as being in agreement if a majority on
both sides has agreed to the conditions negotiated. In the event
of multiple employee and employer parties on a counc 11, individual
unions and employers/employers' associations who are not in
agreement may refuse to sign the agreement, or withdraw from the
council. In the event of such refusal or withdrawal, where
agreement has been reached by the major'ty part ies, those
employers and employees represented by the dissenting parties will
however still be covered by the eventual agreement, should the
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Minister of Manpower be satisfied that the remaining parties in
support are st ill sufficiently representative of the industry,
area or categories of employees concerned. This is a situation
that for example occurred over several years In the Metal industry
where certain trade unions refused to sign their agreement to the
main agreement of the national industrial council for various
reasons, although they did not withdraw from the counc t l .
- An interesting point is when agreement is not reached and the
dispute resolution mechanisms are not applied to facilitate
agreement. Would the industrial council then still be able to
operate if there for example is no current main agreement in force
and there has also been no informal 'gentlemens" agreement
between the parties to comply with the conditions of the expired
agreement? Again, this situation arose in the Metal industry in
1986 when a majority could not be obtained due to the two major
trade union parties' refusal to sign the negotiated new main
agreement, as reported by Ramsden (1987, p, 100). The spectre of
no main agreement and therefore no effective means of controlling
the wages and condit ions of serv ice of large numbers of employees
in this key industry, prompted one of the unions with a casting
vote (allegedly too upon the instigation of the other
non-signatory union) to relent and as such save the main agreement
for the industry. As the major functions of industrial councils
evolve around the servicing and monitoring of their agreements,
the effect of such non-agreement would surely be the eventual
dissolution and deregistration of the industrial council through
either the withdrawal of the parties thereto, or lack of
functioning in the opinion of the Industrial Registrar.
- The final agreement is contained in a written document
specifying the amended terms of the agreement and submitted for
approval by both parties.
- The period of the agreement may vary between one and four years
as agreed by the part tes, and a new agreement is negot iated before
the previous agreement expires. Jankelsson (1975, p. 123) adds
that the agreement period relating to a particular industry is
usually constant and has been set by tradition. Particularly in
times of high inflation shorter periods might be more desirable,
with some agreements taking inflation into account by specifying
gradual increases in wages over the period of the agreement so
that the frequency of negotiations is minimised. Should more time
be required to renegot tate an agreement, appltcat ion can be made
to the Minister of Manpower for a temporary extens i on of the
existing agreement, or a gentlemens' agreement can be reached to
adhere to the provisions of the expired agreement in the interim.
- Industrial counci 1 agreements may remain such gentlemens'
agreements or common law contracts between the part ies or be made
enforceable as delegated legislation by being publ ished in the
Government Gazette. The latter approach is more often opted for
and Involves submitting copies of the agreement, together wHh the
prescribed forms, to the Minister of Manpower for gazetting. Once
gazetted, any contravention of the agreement wi 11 const Hute a
criminal offence, prosecutable in the criminal courts.
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- As mentioned earlier too, industrial council s may negotiate
other subsidiary agreements in addition to their main agreement in
respect of for example benefit schemes and funds, should these
issues not be incorporated in the main agreement. Therefore, at
end 1989, in addit i on to the 64 ma in agreements in force accordi ng
to the Department of Manpower (DMP) (1990, p. 28), 74 additional
benefit fund and other agreements appl ied to industrial councils.
In this process of negotiating and concluding industrial council
agreements, Jankelsson (1975, p. 132) aptly points out that the
key factor at the industrial council bargaining table between
employer and employee representatives however remains the relative
power of the parties concerned. This concept and the use of
bargaining power by the parties is also expanded upon in the
description of the collective bargaining process provided in
Section 2. The industrial council system tends to preserve the
balance of power between the partt es through the various
provisions of the lRA such as the requirement that employers and
trade unions are sufficiently representative of the industry, area
or occupations that it has jurisdiction over· a contentious issue
that is discussed further in Sections 9 and 10.
Bendix (1989, pp. 432·433) outlines Section 24(1) of the LRA
which provides for the following contents to be negotiated in
industrial council agreements, added to which are other items that
are al so typically included in these agreements:
- Minimum wage rates, average minimum rates and method of
calculation
- Wage and salary scales
- Grading systems
- Piece-work rates
- Incentive bonus schemes
- Payment of industrial council levies
- Pension, insurance and sick fund contributions
- limitations or prohibitions on overtime
- Payment of money in l t eu of not i ce
- Prohibitions on deducting monies, other than those specified in
the agreement, from the employee's wages
- Prohibitions on set-off debts
- Regulations regarding time and manner of payment of employees
- Regulations regarding the maximum number of employees in each
section or regarding proportionate distribution of employees
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- Prohibitions on piecework
- Prohibitions on the employment of persons under a specified age
- Prohibitions on ' payments in kind'
- Prohibitions on contract work
- Provision for a closed shop
These items would obviously be over and above the standard main
agreement clauses such as scope and appl icatlon of the agreement,
parties to the agreement, period of operation of the agreement and
defi nit Ion of the terms used in the agreement, etcetera.
In addition, industrial council main agreements will normally also
contain certain clauses which either relate to specific conditions
in that particular industry or special features not found in other
agreements, in addition to the more common regulations regarding
hours of work, maximum working hours per week, payment for
overtime and for work on Sundays and Public Holidays, notice
periods for different categories of employees, regulations
pertaining to paid public holidays, annual leave, sick leave,
lay-offs, short-time and desertion, in fact almost resembling the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act in terms of the substantive
conditions of employment covered. Once gazetted, industrial
councfl agreements howeve,r const i tute superior 1egis1 at ion which
supersede the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.
Currently industri al council agreements may al so include
procedural matters such as retrenchment guidel ines and procedures
for dealing with disputes which do not arise during the course of
industrial council negotiations. However, dispute procedures
would normally be contained in the council's constitution and not
form part of the ma in agreement.
Due to the general application of industrial council agreements
and the fact that they normally only provide for minimum wages and
conditions of employment, Individual employers, whether party to a
council or not, may offer their employees improved wage rates and
conditions of service. The main proviso is that these conditions
and benefits should be more, but not less than those contained in
the industrial council agreement. These supplementary wages or
conditions may be conferred voluntarily by the employer or
negotiated with a resident trade union, the latter which is the
situation that typically applies when plant level recognition and
substantive agreements are concluded between individual employers
and trade unions who also fall within the jurisdiction of an
industrial council and are subject to its agreements.
A council may however grant exempt ions from all or some of the
terms of an industrial council agreement to a part Icul ar employer
or employee if its constitution so provides and this discretion is
exercised. The applicant is issued with an exemption certificate
if approved, or if exemption is denied, the employer or employee
·101-
may appeal to the Minister of Manpower against the decision of the
council.
Industrial counci1 agreements are administered and monitored by
the industrial council, who appoint administrative personnel and
agents or inspectors for this purpose. The role and functions of
industrial counei 1 personnel have been touched upon already in
Section 4.3.
The monitoring of agreements is handled by agents or inspectors
who may be appointed in terms of the LRA and who visit
organisations which are subject to the jurisdict ion of the
counc il , ensuri ng that such organ isat ions are reg is tered and
comply with the terms of the industrial council agreement. Any
transgressions are reported to the council, which wi 11 attempt to
ob1ige the emp1oyer or employee concerned to rec t i fy the
situation, fail ing which criminal proceedings are inst ituted.
The operation and administrative/control functions of industrial
councils are funded by industrial council levies or dues which are
payable by all employers and employees within its jurisdiction.
These levies are established by individual councils and are
normally of equal amounts for both employers and employees, which
employers are authorised to recover from employees' earnings for
payment to the council. These levies are mandatory for all
parties where gazetted industrial council agreements apply. In
the event of the minority ungazetted agreements, it would be
assumed that the payment of dues and the applicat ion of the other
terms of the agreement would still be enforceabl e in terms of
normal contractual or common law statutes.
Another important facet of industrial council agreements is that
these can be extended to non-parties to the council. An
appl ication for the gazetting of an industrial counci 1 agreement
may be accompan ied by a request that the terms of the agreement be
made binding by the Mi nister of Manpower on all employers and
employees in the industry, trade, occupation or area for which the
council is registered, and that would then be cons idered as
fall ing under its jurisdiction.
Appl icatton may al so be made for the extension of the agreement to
an area other than that in which the council has jurisdiction,
provided that there is no other industrial council registered for
that area.
In both these instances of extension, proof of represent1v1ty has
to be furnished and confirmed by the Regional Office of the
Department of Manpower to the Minister of Manpower, who must be
sat i sfled that non-extension may result in unfair compet it ion from
employers who are not covered by the agreement.
The issue of the extension of industrial council agreements has
also been a content ious one, which has in particular been fired
too by the deregulation debate, which is addressed in Section 9 on
contemporary issues on industrial councils. Advantages and
disadvantages of extension and methods whereby Interests have been
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acconrnodated are described as follows by Bendix (1989, pp. 434-
435) :
- For employers the main advantage is that it prevents other
employers from paying lower wages and thereby gaining a
compet it tve edge over employers who negot tate and adhere to higher
minimum wage rates and conditions of employment. The
non-extension of agreements would therefore mitigate against
employers bargaining centrally on industrial councils.
- The Minister of Manpower's increased reluctance, however, to
extend Industrial council agreements, arises from two reasons or
disadvantages of such extension. The first concern is that some
parties to Industrial councils are not representative, an Issue
which is becoming a major and recurring theme when the future of
industrial council s is discussed. The second is that it prevents
small businesses from operating effectively and fulfilllng their
job creation and economic roles, the prime motivation behind the
Government pol t cyan deregulatt on of industry and convnerce - with
the counter-argument that non-extension under these circumstances
could lead to large-scale exploitation of employees.
- These problems have had the effect that Industrial councils have
been urged to grant exemptions to those small businesses who
present a strong case for such exemption. Also, councils are now
required to consul t with and consider the interests of non-parties
when reaching agreements, which has generally served to make the
extension of agreements more acceptable to all parties concerned.
In general, it has been suggested that industrial council
agreements can either keep wages for an industry too low or
alternatively create too high wage levels that can adversely
affect the profitability of smaller employers within an industry.
On the other hand, according to Backer (Note 10) in the Paper
industry, wage determinations (in the absence of an industrial
councll and related agreement, but essentially wi th the same
effect), have had a beneficial effect in that smaller
organisations that could have exploited workers have been
submitted to certain controls such as minimum wages for employees.
In circumstances where the profitability of organisations could be
adversely affected by this form of Industry regul at ion, the
exemption system could be util ised with circumspect ion to balance
the situation. Koekemoer (Note 6) reports too that it is
understood that the Department of Manpower Is invest igat ing the
small business sector and its potential exclusion from the lRA, as
an option to address this issue. The scope of industrial councll
agreements would cbvtously be materially affected by such an
amendment to the lRA.
Table 5.3 provides an analysis of trends in and coverage of
industrial council agreements from 1984 to 1989, confirming a
decline in the number of Industrial council agreements against a
similar downward trend In employer and employee coverage. The
minor gain in the employee category during 1987 and 1988 is offset
by the dramatic drop in 1989 due to the exclusion of the 311 136
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Metal Industry employees as a result of that tndustry's main
agreement not betng operative at end October 1989. Added to this
is Jankelsson's (1975, p, 3) reporting that at the end of 1973
the number of employees affected by industrial counct 1 agreements
represented 41% of total employment In mining, manufacturing,
construction, the motor industry and electricity, whilst in 1928
only 6% of employees tn these sectors were covered by tndustrlal
council agreements. Unfortunately comparable data for 1989 was
not avail able from the official sources.
TABLE 5.3
Industrial councO~ agreements llll :. 1.2.e.2 (from Department of
Manpower, 1990)
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
DATE
AGREEMENTS
NO %CHANGE
EMPLOYERS
NO % CHANGE
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
31.12.84
31.12.85
31.12.86
31.12.87
31.12.88
31.10.89
94
86
77
86
68
64
-9
-10
-12
-21
-6
51031
48329
47032
45941
44927
30633
-5
-3
-2
-2
-32
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
EMPLOYEES
DATE WHITES COLOUREDS ASIANS BLACKS TOTAL
NO % NO % NO % NO % CHANGE %
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
31.12.84 165976 14 267379 23 85494 7 664550 56 1183399
-
31.12.85 156162 14 245301 23 79241 7 603574 56 1084278 -8
31.12.86 151816 16 210113 22 71075 7 528298 55 961302 ·11
31.12.87 148660 15 216591 22 72346 8 527284 55 964881 +,4
31.12.88 182196 18 205648 21 65337 7 535620 54 988801 +2
31.10.89 Not avail able 634042 -36
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
ti2.ll: Due to the Metal tndustry matn agreement not betng operattve
at 31 October 1989, the 311 136 Metal industry employees were
excluded from the total employee numbers.
5.4 RElATIONSHIP TIl QIlitB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The major other types of collecttve bargatning agreements that can
compare with tndustrial council agreements are wage determtnations
under the Wage Act, No 5 of 1957, enterprise level recognition
agreements and cone11 tat ton board wage agreements.
The origins of these matn types of alternate agreements that have
developed, wtll not be expanded on here. Sectton 3 on the
historical perspect t ve on Industrtal councils whtch presents the
major developments tn the South Afrtcan labour relattons system
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and legislation, has covered certain aspects of the status of the
other agreements in the formal system, such as wage determinations
and conciliation board agreements, as well as the evolution of
plant level recognition agreements in the late 1970's and the
1980's.
Official recording and registration of domestic or enterprise
level recognition agreements only commenced in 1984, although they
have been In operation since the late 1970's. Sideris (1982, p.
34) mentions that at least 70 recognition agreements with Black
trade unions outside the formal industrial council system had been
signed by 1981. The current recorded figure at end 1989 stands at
313 according to the Institute of Industrial Relations (1990, p.
47).
Table 5.4 provides comparative stat ist tcs on the di fferent types
of collective bargaining agreements for available periods,
exhibiting what could be the conrnencement of a slowing down in the
trend towards recognition agreements during 1985. Data on Wage
Act determlnat ions was unfortunately not ava i labl e and has
therefore been omitted.
TABLE 5.4
Comparative trends in industrial coync1J, CODCn iat10n J2.2.ill illiI
recognition agreements 00 .:.~ (from Central Statistical
Service, 1989 and Department of Manpower, 1990)
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1984 1985 1986
AGREEMENT NO ~ EES ~ NO ~ EES ~ NO ~ EES ~
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Ind Council 94 - 1183399 - 86 -9 1084278 -8 77 -10 961302 -11
Cone Board 1 116 - 1 116
Rec Agreem 53 - 124475 - 125+136 147329 +18 Not available
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1987 1988 1989
AGREEMENT NO ~ EES ~ NO ~ EES ~ NO ~ EES ~
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Ind Council 86 +12 964881+,4 68 -21 988801 +2 64 -6 634042 -36
Cone Board
Rec Agreem 89 -29 48734-67 Not available 313 Not available
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
tim: Publ tshed conciliation board agreements only are recorded,
whilst the vast majority of these are observed as 'gentlemens'
agreements and thus not reported. Percentages are percentage
changes from one period to the next. Bear in mind again that
311136 Metal industry employees have been excluded in 1989 as the
main agreement for this industry was not operative at 31 October
1989.
Further commentary
versus recogn it ion
on the trend in industrial council agreements
agreements is that whilst initially the
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emergent Black trade union movement sought plant level recognition
due to both the reject ion of the industrial counc11 system and
simultaneously to develop its power base, it has in recent times
accorded greater legitimacy to the system and willingness to
participate in it as a result of specific advantages that have now
been perceived in its utilisation. This has led to the role of
recognH ion agreements changing to that of being supplementary or
complementary to industrial council agreements. whereby trade
unions strive to negotiate improved conditions and wages and more
plant-specific substantive and procedural Issues at enterprise
level, in addition to the negotiation of general wage levels and
conditions at central industrial council forum. thus contributing
to the current two tier collective bargaining system that exists
in South Africa.
In a critical assessment of the industrial counc11 system and
specifically recognition agreements versus industrial council
agreements, Sideris (1982, p. 52) poses the question whether
recognit ion agreements el iminate the undes i rabl e tendencies
expressed in industrial council agreements (which can also be
interpreted as the perceived disadvantages of industr1al council
agreements). The aspects favouring recognH ion agreements were
regarded as:
- The elected worker representat ives are more representative of
their membership. with most of them workers themselves. who are
therefore more in tune with their members' needs. resulting In a
stronger bargaining mandate.
. .
- The recognition agreement provides channels for report back and
caucusing of workers' demands and views.
- Plant based recognition agreements normally contain detailed
di spute procedures to enable di spute resolution at shop floor
1eve1.
- Provision is made for elected worker representat ives to have the
right to perform their duties and to be protected from
victimisation.
- Workers have di rect access to thei r representat i ves in the event
of grievances and complaints instead of having to go to the
industrial counc11 and for example submit a written complaint.
- Recognition agreements are not only policed by worker
representatives but by workers themselves. plus that in varying
degrees workers participate in the drawing up of the agreement.
- Organ ised workers on the shop floor have imed1ate access to
spectfic sanctions and pressures.
- The strike as a weapon is not statutorily taken away from
workers under certain circumstances. unless such restrictions are
negotiated Into a recognition agreement.
- Recognition agreements set out disclpltnary, victimisation and
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retrenchment procedures which offer workers more protect ton than
that contained tn most tndustrial council agreements.
She however also potnts out certatn potent tal deficiencies tn
recognlt Ion agreements, which are not elaborated on here, but are
tn gist slmtlar, tf not opposite, to those levied against
tndustrlal council agreements.
Bendix (1989, p, 369) furthermore corrwnents on the addlttonal
status of Industrial council agreements In relatton to the other
types of agreements due to the followtng:
- Once publ ished in the government gazette they become delegated
legtslatlon and are enforceable tn terms of the LRA.
- Any transgresston of a published tndustrtal council agreement Is
subject to crlmtnal sanctton.
- Industrtal counc t l agreements are usually extended to
non-parttes, namely all employers and employees in the area,
industry, trade or occupation for which a council is regtstered,
trrespectlve of whether they are party to the council or not.
The matn contemporary tssues though that have been ratsed In
respect of the interre lat Ionsh tp between Industry and enterprt se
agreements apart from thetr dtfferlng charactertstics, legal
status and bargaintng levels, are threefold: Employers have
ftrstly tnststed as conditional to plant level recognitton a
commitment to trade unton regtstration and partictpation tn the
industrtal counct 1 system. Secondly, they may refuse to bargatn
at plant level on issues which have already been deal t wt th tn an
industrtal council agreement. Thtrdly, they may insist on one
level of bargaintng and consequently one type of agreement only,
namely either at i ndustrtal council or enterprtse 1evel. These
issues are dtscus sed further tn Sect ion 9.
The extent of this has been that several industrial court cases
have had to address the problem of appropriate bargaining levels
and collective bargaining agreements. Reference is made to Table
3.4 in Section 3 for further details on this.
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6. INTERNATIONAL CQMPARISONS
In Sectlon 3 on the historlcal perspective on lndustrtal counclls,
lt was mentloned that the South Afrtcan lndustrtal council system
was modelled on the system reconmended ln Brltatn by the Whitley
Commtttee Reports tn 1917, this Conmtttee whlch was appotnted ln
1916 and was reported to have had the full title of the Commlttee
on Relatlons between Employers and Employed.
A general compart son wlll therefore be made with the Brittsh
system of collecttve bargalntng as the closest tnternatlonal
parallel that would seem to extst to the formal South Afrlcan
labour relations system.
Reference ls made to the labour leg15lation
developments in Britain, for as in South Africa,
leglslatlon that normally would provlde form and
structures such as industrlal councils.
and related
it 15 thls
purpose to
Major labour legislation that evolved ln Great Britain was the
followlng, as obtained from Jankelsson (1975, pp. 33 - 34):
- The Concll1ation Act of 1986 which prlmarlly focussed on the
facll itatlon of the settlement of dlsputes by the Mtnister of
Labour after the prior use of voluntary mechanisms had falled,
through elther cone t l tat 10n or arbitrat 10n. Contrary to South
Afrtcan labour legislation, arbitratton awards arrtved at were ln
no way legally bindtng on the parties. These measures were
apparently very successfully appl ted ln the pertod precedlng the
First World War.
- The Industrtal Courts Act of 1919 whlch represented the
reconnendattons contained in the Ftfth Report of the Whitley
COl1ll1tttee. This Act, aslde from being designed to assist trade
unton organlsation, establlshed a permanent industrial court to
which disputes coul d be referred with the consent of both partles,
provtded again that the use of existlng voluntary machinery had
failed to achieve a settlement. Thts court in a sense replaced
the funct tons of the Comml ttee on Product 10n as referred to later.
The awards made under thls Act were also not legally blndlng,
again a major departure from the South Afrlcan situation.
The Whitley COlTll1ittee had made other reconrnendations too, of whlch
some were never incorporated into the Brl t ish 1ega1 system and
remained part of the voluntary system whlch had existed up to that
ttme and stlll continue to do so. These recommendattons dld have
dtrect relevance to industrial counclls, al so prompted the
formatlon of the ftrst tndustrial counctl ln South Africa, and are
summarised as fall ows from Jankel sson (1975, pp. 34 - 35), with
the writer's comnentary:
- In well-organised industries there should be a three tler
structure of joint bodies (joint tn respect of associations
between employer and employee parties), namely a national 'joint
industrlal council', followed by a second tier of assoclated
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district or regional councils and a lower tier of works comittees
at plant level. Thus an early recognition of the real tty that in
practice industry and plant level collective bargaining cannot be
divorced from one another, but should rather be of a complementary
and integrative nature. Of note is that the works conrntttee
system was not advocated separate ly nor externa1 to the formal
system. Jankelsson (1975, p. 66) observes that with the
introduction of works councils in South African labour
legislation, it would appear that the Government failed to
understand the Whitley system as it was originally intended,
namely whereby works councils or committees were regarded as part
of a more complete industrial relations system (where industrial
relations is defined too as embracing both human relations and
labour relations). Instead, it chose to introduce works
comittees as an alternative to trade unionism and collective
bargaining for excluded Black workers.
- The prime funct ion of these bod Ies were reconrnended as to meet
regularly and frequently, and not only in the event of crises, for
the" ... cons iderat 1on of matters affecting the progress and well
being of the trade from the point of view of all those engaged in
it, so far as this is consistent with the general interest of the
community". A somewhat broader definition of functions and duties
as applicable to industrial councils in the lRA, that extends
beyond the employer-employee relationship and places less direct
emphasis on the maintenance of industrial peace, although implied
in the description.
- Regarding their composition, national and district (regional)
councils, also known as Whitley Councils, were to consist of equal
numbers of representatives of organisations of employees and
emp1oyers at the appropriate 1eve15, and the works conmt ttees to
consist of management and employees in particular establ ishments.
There would therefore appear to have been a need for close
correspondence between internal emp1oyer body and trade uni on
organisat ion at the various 1evel s for councll s to operate
effectively, as well a good integration of the lower tier works
commi ttee system 1n the overall bargaining structure. It could
al so be said that the three tier structure evolved from the actual
organisation structures and operation of trade unions and employer
bodies, as well as the prevailing shop floor practice in
collective bargaining. In terms of composition, similar concepts
on organised labour and management at the more central ised levels
as with industrial councils therefore apply.
Underlying these structures was also the concept of joint
consultation, with Clegg (1972, p. 186) maintaining that the
Whitley Conmittee had established three important principles ofjoint consultation as It subsequently developed in Britain with
what would be interpreted to be the Conmtttee's guidelines on
issues to be treated at plant level, to quote:
" •.. that there are many topics of concern to employers and trade
unions, and to managers and men, which are not suttable for
settlement by negotiation and collective agreement; that these
topics should be handled by cooperat ion; and that relat ions within
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the plant should
cooperat ion over
agreements. •
be predominantly or entirely confined to
issues outside the scope of collective
Seemingly then, the works committees at plant level were regarded
as being consultative and collaborative bodies but not as
negotlating forums, with coll ect ive bargaining per se being
conducted at the higher structures, wh ich was a1so the intenti on
of the South African works comi ttee system.
Clegg (l972, pp. 128 ·129), in a historical overview of the
British industrial relations system, discusses the generally
successful creation of permanent joint industrial councils, as
advocated by the Whitley Conrnittee in the post-First War
reconstruction of industrial relations, for the purpose of
collective bargaining. A parallel to the local Wage Board also
existed at the time in the form of Trade Boards to cover
industries where the organisat ions of employers and the unions
were too weak to sustain a system of collective bargaining.
Between these two structures, by the end of 1920, the great
majority of wage-earners and large sections of salary-earners were
thus covered by some form of collective bargaining or statutory
wage-fixation in Britain. The linkages between the South African
formal labour relations system and this British model therefore
become fairly apparent.
The first nat iona1 agreements in Britai n were negot ia ted by thejoint (industrial) council in the Chemicals industry, which was
established in 1919, with awards issued by the Conrnittee on
Production, as the main arbitration tribunal was then called.
This tribunal appeared to have the abi lity to enforce such council
agreements as the 1atter did not have the authori ty to make these
binding, with a role possibly similar to the Minister/Department
of Manpower in this context. Within a relatively short period up
to 1920 there followed the formation of similar joint councils for
the Gas and Port Transport (namely the docks) industries. By 1921
Clegg (1972, pp, 205· 206) reported that mainly due to the
government's intervention to promote the establishment of joint
industrial council s , 73 were set up by 1921, with 47 surviving the
depression in 1926. Between 1939 and 1946 another 56 joint
industrial council s or similar bodies were set up and revived,
establishing a trend at that time towards industry-wide regulation
of all aspects of industrial relations.
By 1965, however, Clegg (1972, PP. 442· 445) was of the opinion
that although the Whitley model had not been replaced, there were
at least eleven respects in which the system had moved a
considerable distance away from its initial assumptions,
attributed to for example the loss of authority of employers'
organisations, and the greater trends towards decentrallsed
bargaining and trade union democracy. He concluded that every
element in the Whi t ley model was then beginning to operate In a
di Herent way from the model' s prescript Ions, and that the
industrial relations system that had evolved in Britain urgently
requi red a new model.
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The Industrial Relations Services (IRS) (1988. pp. 6 - 7)
confirmed the decline since the 1950's in the influence of
employers' assocations and industry-wide pay negotiations as
workplace bargaining (as opposed to consultation only) between
shop stewards and managers became more widespread and influential.
This trend was attributed to a number of influences. a notable one
being the high levels of employment in the 1950's and 1960's which
served to increase the bargaining power of individual employees
and work groups. and the willingness of employers to concede pay
increases to attract and retain labour in a period of relative
1abour shortage.
The Royal Conmission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations.
chaired by Lord Donovan, also known as the Donovan Conmission,
appointed in 1968, accepted that the Whitley model was no longer
valid, to quote from Clegg (1972, p. 452) "The practices of the
formal system have become increasingly empty", perceiving that
fragmented bargaining was now the dynamic of the system, but also
acknowledging that there was still a place for industry
agreements.
The Donovan Commission was of the opinion that tndustry agreements
could set out "guidelines for acceptable company or factory
agreements" and "settle minimum earnlngs levels for a standard
working week". On the assumpt ion that most industry agreements
were lncapable of regulating workshop or shopfloor relatlons, it
was considered that this function could be performed by properly
constructed plant or lndustry agreements. This Commission's model
however regarded the employer and not unlons as the 1nit iators of
the plant level bargalning process, for contrary to the Whitley
model, it did not put employers' and employees' assoc iat Ions on an
equal footing.
The culmination of the Donovan Commisslon's Reports on lndustrial
relatlons reform in BrHain led to the promulgation of the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971, whlch replaced the Whitley model
and accepted the ' two systems' model of the Donovan Report
according to Clegg (1972, p. 468). The IRS (1988, p. 7)
descrlbed the two systems as bei ng the formal system embodled ln
the official institutions, the cornerstone of which was the
1ndus try-wide collect1ve agreement, with the other the 1nforma1
system based on workplace negot iat ions. The Conrniss 10n had
regarded these two systems in confllct, with the lnformal system
tending to undermlne the regulatlve effect of the formal one. Its
flnal recommendat 10n on the dualistic labour relat Ions system was
to advocate the formalisation of the lnformal system as a way of
securlng the orderly and effectlve regulatlon of workplace
lndustrial relatlons. Although these recommendations were not
formally legislated, many of the changes were Widely introduced.
Cunningham and Flnnemore (1989, p_ 7) observe that because the
British industrial relations system has been established on the
two principles of voluntary association and mutual consent, the
role of the State is restrtcted to that of an advisor and
protector of employees who are vulnerable or unable to resolve
disputes. Negotiation will therefore occur voluntartly beheen
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employees and employers, both at industry or plant level, wherever
their relative power bases 1te , There are therefore no
legislated, albeit voluntary, collective bargaining structures in
the British system, as opposed to the South African system.
Certain similarities with the formal and informal, or dualistic,
labour relations systems in operation in South Africa are present.
However, the Bri t ish model has advanced whereby the existence of
the two systems has been recogn i sed and gUide1ines on how to
accomodate the two have been presented and implemented. This is
an area where progress is required in the local model to assist
parties in establ i shing a working relationship between different
bargaining levels.
Roberts (1987, p. 289) states however, that despite the fact that
the significance of industry-wide negotiation has decl ined in the
private sector in Britain since the Second World War, it still
remains of varied importance in a substantial number of
industries, with a variety of bargaining at various levels (or
multilevel bargaining) taking place in more recent times. Joint
industrial council s still exist and operate in conjunction with
plant level structures. The preferred bargaining level and
structure would, as in most instances, depend on the prevailing
circumstances in the particular industry or country, with
prescription in this regard appearing not to be appropriate.
With respect to general international trends in collective
bargaining that have relevance to industrial councils,
consideration of for example movements along the
decentraltsed-central ised continuum of collective bargaining
provide some useful global pointers. Ramdsen (1987, p. 17),
cit ing Cordova, reports that most European countri es have
traditionally opted for industry-wide bargaining, while Canada,
the United States and Japan have tended towards enterpri se
bargaining. However, there has recently also been a trend towards
the diversification of bargaining levels in these and other
countries. For exampl e, new forums of negotiations have emerged
at enterprise level in European countries such as Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Similarly,
countries with traditionally decentraltsed systems are moving
towards the inception of certain forms of industry-wide
bargaining. Thus, the two tier bargaining system that has evolved
in South Afri ca is by no means unique.
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7. ill INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS fQB I!!E BUILDING A!iD METAL INDUSTRIES
An overview of these two operational examples of industrial
councils will be provided, with the emphasis on areas of concern
experienced by these councf ls , as well as other considerations
pertinent the future of the industrial council system in general.
7.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
7.1.1 BUILDING INDUSTRY
limited data on the origins of this industrial council is
available. Koekemoer, the council's Manager : Agreement
Admin istrat ton (Note 6) and Stapel berg, General Secretary to the
council (Note 7) however provide the following relevant facts:
Similar to the
previously a
agreement was
Witwatersrand,
industrial council for the Metal industry, it was
national industrial council of which the first
gazetted on 22 May 1925 coveri ng Pretoria,
Pie termari tzburg and Durban.
At one stage the council was divided up 1nto variousjurisdictions, wi th the Industrial Council for the Building
Industry (Transvaal) being established and registered on 5 March
1948. Ten industrial councils now exist in the building industry,
with the one for the Transvaal bei ng the largest.
Annually a Secretarial conference is held where these different
industrial council s congregate in a common forum to di scuss issues
of mutual concern such as the standardisation of training in the
industry and the treatment of employers/ees that change from
province and reg ion. Otherwi se they operate independently from
one another.
Originally the Industrial Council for the Building Industry
(Transvaal) was not registered for the current four areas as
discussed in more detail further on, with amendments haVing
occurred in its jurisdiction up till the current coverage. The
council is currently also divided up in two regions for the
Transvaal, a Northern and a Southern region.
Employee membership, which fluctuates because of the reporting
method discussed below, stood at 41 544 combined for the two
Transvaal regions in October 1990. This represents a 4,46~
decrease on the average figure of 43 484 for 1989, but should be
interpreted with caution due to the reporting method applied as
discussed below.
Of note is that in the reporting of employee membersh t p data, the
theoretical number of employees is obtained by dividing the total
number of contribut ions paid between the number of weeks in a
month, which is the most convenient measure ava i l abl» of
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membership coverage. Stapelberg (Note 7) points out that actual
figures would be higher than those reported because of turnover
amongst employees. Nevertheless such figures can be used as a
yardstick to demonstrate fluctuat ions in the Industry.
The major employer organisation, the Building Industries
Federation of South Africa (BIFSA), has according to its
Industrial Relations Adviser, De Vllliers (Note 14) been in
existence for almost 96 years. It however does not get involved
directly in collective bargaining, although its member employer
organisations do.
7.1. 2 I1EIAI. INDUSTRY
Historical data for the National Industrial Council for the Iron,
Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry of South Africa was
primarily obtained from Ramsden's (1987, pp. 33 - 45) exposition
as derived from a publ icatlon by Webster.
Of note is that the development of this industrial council has
been closedly interl inked with developments in labour relations in
the Metal industry itself. The origins of the Metal industry in
South Africa date back to the 1830' s when the fi rst foundry was
establ ished in the Cape, which serves as a starting point in
tracing the sources of the Industrial council.
European inmigrants established White craft unions which dominated
the industry for many years during the pre-Wlehahn era, that is
from 1830 to 1979. The first major trade union active in the
industry, the Iron Moulders' Society of South Africa (IMS) was
established in 1896 as a craft union, eventually opening its
membership to Coloureds and Asians in 1944 after an industrial
union for Coloured and Asian metalworkers was established in 1937,
posing a threat to it. By 1942 two Black trade unions for
metalworkers had been established, although they were not of great
s igni ficance at the time.
During the First World War a shop steward movement developed in
the engineering industry (colncidin9 with a similar movement in
the United Kingdom during this period), resulting in joint
employee/employer bodies called Joint Boards being establ ished in
1918/1919 to draw up and pollee industry agreements. These Joint
Boards were the forerunners for the National Industrial Council
for the Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry, which was
established In 1943. Allan (1987, p. 25) mentions that several
regional Industrial councils for the Metal industry were in fact
in existence before 1939, and he might well be referring to these
Joint Boards.
The major and still current single large employer body, the Steel
and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA),
was established just prior to the formation of the industrial
council In 1943. At that stage SEIFSA represented 19 employer
organisations, with seven trade union parties serving on the
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council. As at February 1990 the council has grown to 43 employer
affiliates to SEIFSA representing 3 278 individual employers, and
14 trade union part tes, according to the August 1990 report of the
council's 46th Annual General Heeting (1990). The first national
agreement on wages and working conditions was negotiated between
SElfSA and the trade union parties in 1944.
The craft dilution and job fragmentation that had started to occur
in the Metal industry since the First World War was exacerbated by
the rapid growth of mass product i on during the Second World War,
making the craft unions' craft protection strategy no longer
appropriate. Th is resulted in these unions embarking on a
defensive action and using their positions on the industrial
council to introduce job reservat ion into the industry. Statutoryjob reservation was introduced via the industrial council
negotiations in the engineering industry in 1958 for 15 categories
of work In terms of the leA of 1924 and remained in force unt ll
1978 when it was finally removed by an industrial council
agreement.
The current major Black trade union in the industry, the Hetal and
Allied Workers' Union (HAWU) (now the National Union of Metal
Workers of South Africa or NUMSA) was established in 1973 in the
aftermath of the intense industrial action which occurred in
mainly the Durban area. Despite a strong employer/management
res istance campa ign, accompanied by police harassment, this union
experi enced a rap id growth in membersh ip.
When Blacks were finally given the right to participate in the
industrial council system in 1979, the unions in the Hetal
industry reacted by either maintaining racial exclusivity (the
existing White unions), or opening their ranks to Black workers,
or the formation of parallel Black unions, or the emergence of
independent Black trade unions (also known as the ' emergent'
unions). The more militant emergent unions however rapidly
overtook the perceived White controlled parallel Black unions. In
practice therefore a new dualism emerged in the industry, although
the Wiehahn Conrni ss ion in its recommendations had sought to
integrate Black and White forums for collective bargaining.
Host of the established unions, including those that had opened
their ranks to Blacks, remained firmly committed to the industrial
council as the primary negotiating forum in the industry. The
emergent unions however, opted for a non-statutcry form of
bargaining In the form of plant 1evel recognition agreements, of
which HAWU was a notable proponent.
At this juncture, the role of SEIFSA as the single major employer
association on the national industrial council, becomes
particularly important. After the publlcation of the Wlehahn
Commission Report in 1979, SEIFSA advised member companies that
all negotiations should be conducted through the industrial
council, which conrnenced the controversy In this industry on the
concept and realities of two tier bargaining. This resulted in
collectively, for the period 1979 to 1986, the Hetal industry
experiencing the most incidents of strike action. Despite the
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SEIFSA guldel Ines , employers nevertheless responded to union
pressure and in 1980 began to negotiate recognition agreements at
phnt level.
According to Ramsden (1987. p. 100), SEIFSA's policy on
collective bargaining on which these guidelines were developed, Is
based on four fundamental principles: Freedom of association;
representativeness; unitary bargaining (that Is. negotiations at
one Instance "II th all Interested parties); and vol untari sm.
Certain accoemedat tons In SEIFSA's polley of centralised
co11 ect Ive barga ini ng were however Introduced due to increas ing
pressure for enterprise level bargaining from both unions and
member companies. The main accolmlodation was the introduction of
the special clause to the controversial 1986 main agreement which
required Individual employer consultation with trade unions on the
Implementation of wages and condi t ions at establ Ishment level that
were more favourable than the ma In agreement prov is ion s •
The Impact of these events was that the 1986 industrial council
negotlations very nearly failed to reach agreement. with agreement
at the 1987 negot iat ions perceived to be very remote if the Issue
of two tier bargaining was not resolved, with speculation that the
industrial council could collapse due to failure to reach
agreement.
In the meantime HAWU, after struggl ing for more than three years
for wage bargaining at plant level. eventually took a decision tojoin the national industrial council in 1983, but emphasised that
plant level bargaining would not be precluded. During the first
round of Industrial council negotiations that it participated in
in 1983, MAWU failed to win what it perceived to be significant
wage Increases and therefore refused to sign the main agreement.
HAWU also took the issue of multilevel bargaining to the
industrial court when it brought a case against Hart limited in
May 1985 in an attempt to establ ish the legal right to negotiate
improvements at plant level over and above the conditions set by
the industrial council. The court ruled against HAWU. stating
that bargaining in good faith at plant level should be voluntary,
and that the court could not compel parties to bargain at more
than one level. Although this ruling has subsequently been
superseded, It had major relevance to labour relat ions in general
at the time.
The South African Boilermakers Society (SABS), one of the more
traditional multiracial unions in the industry, although holding
the view that central ised bargaining should be retained at
national Industry level, also Insisted on conttnuing wage
negotiations at company and phnt level after industrial council
negotiations had been concluded. It had furthermore called for
changes to the industrial counci 1 system and refused to sign the
1984 main agreement for that reason. The SABS made history too
when It signed a procedural agreement, which would include the
regular negot iat ion of wages with the Kew Divis ton of Barlows
Manufacturing Company. with a simtlar agreement havtng been signed
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between this company and HAWU in August 1985. This organisation's
pol icy on bargaining levels is discussed separately under Section
9.
The debate on appropriate bargaining levels In this industry has
not been resolved yet and is treated further under the general
discussion on bargaining levels with relevance to industrial
councils under Sections 9 an 10.
Since the establ ishment of the industrial counctl itself, it has
with growth experienced virtually the same learning curve as has
trade unions according to De Jager (Note 8), who has been General
Secretary of the Council since 1976.
De Jager also comments that current and past membership data for
this council is most 1i kely understated, as wi th s imil ar figures
for the Building industry. With computertsatlon of admintstration
systems, statistical recording for the council as well as the
accuracy of data wi11 be enhanced in the future.
Industry statistics as provided by De Jager (Note 8) and the 46th
Annual Report (1990) shows the following overall trend from Hay
1979 to February 1990, for the total period of reporting of
statistics for this council:
- A growth in total employer coverage from 7 354 to 10 534 of
43,2%.
- Relatively stable employee coverage with a sl ight increase of
I,~ from 382 552 to 385 844.
- An 131% increase in trade union membership within the above
employee coverage, from 29,7% or 113 787 in 1979 to 68,2~ or
263 254 in 1990.
7.2 COMPOSITION Arm COYERAGE
7.2.1 BUILDING INDUSTRY
There are currently ten industrial councils in the Building
industry, each operat i ng independently from the other. The
Industrial Counctl for the Building Industry (Transvaal) is the
1argest of these and has therefore been selected for the purpose
of this study.
The parties to the council as at 27 Harch 1990 according to
Stapelberg (Note 28) and before the entry of a new trade union
tater in 1990, provided representation of 51,1~ of the 11 350
skilled and semi-skilled employees falltng within the scope of the
agreement, which then excluded general worker categories. At that
time too the employer parties, excludtng those that only employed
general workers, represented 64,~ of the total of 1 256 employers
in the industry. These 815 employers, represented through their
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associations on the council, al so employed 83,1~ of all skilled
and semi-skilled employees In the industry. At October 1990 the
average number of employees covered by the council's main
agreement according to contributions paid, numbered 41544 in
comparison with 43 484 in 1989 and 40 208 in 1988.
Horn (1988, p , 60) reports that in 1988 approximately 42% of
employers were represented on the counctl, employing in the region
of 85~ of the workforce in the industry. Union part ies to the
council then represented approximately 5~ of the workforce, which
was also prior to the withdrawal of one of the major union
parties.
The trade union and employer parties on the council as at 1989 are
1tsted below as provided by Stapel berg (Note 7) and the Haln
Agreement for the Building Industry (Transvaal) (1989). According
to the offici a1 records of the Department of Manpower at October
1990 as detailed in Appendix I, this is still the current status
in 1990:
- White Building Workers Union (WBU)/Blanke Bouwerkersvakbond
(BBV)
- Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of South Africa
(AUBTW)
- Master Builders Association (Witwatersrand and Transvaal South)
- Master Builders and Allied Trades Association (Pretoria and
Count ry Areas)
- Master Masons and Quarry Owners Association (South Africa)
The industry that is represented by the industrial council is
entitled the Building and Monumental Masonry Industries
(Transvaal) in terms of its main agreement.
Regarding the official trade union parties the following mention
should be made as imparted by Stapelberg (Notes 1, 7, 27 and 28):
- AUBTW is the oldest trade union party to the council, wi th 3 783
members in the industry in March 1990. It represents skilled and
semi -sk 111 ed worker categori es, with some general workers too, the
latter which have been excluded from the 1990/1991 main agreement.
- WBU which represents skilled White tradesmen only, used to be
the strongest trade union in the industry, but no longer holds
this distinction, with 2 717 skilled worker members in the
industry for the Transvaal as at March 1990.
- Building Construct ion and All Ied Workers Union (BCAWU), a trade
union for unskilled workers In the industry, with more than 42'
representation at the time, resigned from the tndustrial counctl
on 16 May 1989 accord ing to the 1989 Annull Report ( 1990) • At
that stage all other aspects of employment had been negotiated
between the parties, except wages, which appears to have been the
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divisive hctor and the prllDCt reuon (or the union's'ltthdrlw.l
from the counc i 1•
. Building Industries Workers Union o( S A (BIWU) Joined the
industrl.l council on 10 HlY 1989 u I p.rtyaccording to the
council's 1989 Annual Report (1990) lnd had not yet been
tncorporated into the 1989/1990 m.in 19reement. This union
represented 2 505 employees In Harch 1990, a gain of about 750 on
their 1989 numbers •
• The Industrial council experienced some particular problems
relating to representivlty when BCAWU withdrew from the council,
for together 'lith the previously unregistered and non-party union,
Construction and All ted Workers Union (CAWU), these t'lO Bl.ck
trade unions represent a very large portion cf employees in the
Wltw.tersrlnd, Pretorh Ind Northern Iron. De Vi 11 iers (Note 14)
coements on the interesting developments th.t occurred in this
industrial counc t 1 in late 1990 whereby CAWU has appl ied for
reglstrltion and admission to the council Ind'las admitted n.
full puty on 2 October 1990 (it preViously had observer plrty
stltus only). whilst BCAWU is well.dv.nced in the process of
re-admission.
The prompt (or those unions joining and rejoining the council
respectively. was interpreted by De Vt1llers IS being due to the
fact thlt the gonera 1 worker in the industry had been wri tten out
of the current agreement due to insufficient representation. The
full Implication of this was that no wages and conditions were
prescrl bed (or th is category of worker, with no othor protect Ions
applicable as normally contained in an industrial agreoment.
The two unions subsequently agreed to both apply together for
admission to the council. with industry bargaining regarded as the
better alternat tve , The Industrial council now however has an
unique problem in that although CAWU is a full party member, In
terms of the current .Igreement in force, Its members ne not
covered by the agreement. although still contained In the
council's const Hut ion, lIICaning that the scope of the main
agreement would again have to be revised. Thus a trade union Is
serving on a council for which its members are technically not
covered in Its agreement.
Reglrdlng the previous representivity proble. experienced by the
industrial council, De Villlers (Hote 14) suspects that after the
audited lIIC!.t>ership figures of CAW Ire suballtted. it in Its own
right will represent IIOre IIIC!mbers than all the other trade union
parties.
Stlpelberg (Note 27) conflrlM!d the foregoing ••dding that CAW hIS
brought with It about 11 500 IIIC!mbers lS.t August 1990 and BCAW
will .dd about 15000 to 17 000 IIIC!mbers. BCAW's letter of
re-.ppliCltlon to the council WIS reported IS bting submitted on 8
September 1990. HctDbershlp trends show too that so.i -skilled
'Iorker coverage has increased IIOro than the unskillttd catlgorles
IlIIinly due to the success o( tho industry training progrUllaOs.
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A press statement was released by the council in August 1990
(1990) advising that after 42 years this Industrial council would
lose the largest section of its workforce when the amended main
agreement came into force on 3 September 1990 due to the unskilled
or general section, comprising 72% of the total number of the
employees In the industry, being excluded from the main agreement
in essence as a result of their trade unions not being represented
on the Industrial council. In this press statement, subsequently
published In August 1990 (-Labour unrest", 1990). it was warned
that about 43 000 general workers would lose the legal protections
and benefits afforded by the council. Undoubtedly these kind of
facts had a major impact on the decision of these two unions tojo In the counc I l .
Of note in the main agreement of this industrial council is that
no employer may employ an employee to perform skilled work and no
employee may perform such work unless the employee is registered
with the council. Stape1berg (Note 27) explains that this only
applies to employees above the level of general worker as it ties
in wi th the modular tra inlng system for the Indsutry.
In terms of current coverage of the council, the area and scope of
app1 icatfon of the current agreement is divided into three areas,
ranging from the East Rand, Johannesburg, West Rand, Vereeniglng,
and Heidelberg to Hidde1burg.
Registration applies to certain areas and also in respect of
certain Interests. Other Industries may also purport to represent
these Interests, with previous overlaps between the Building and
the Furniture industries now being resolved by a demarcation
determlnation.
De Vt11ters (Note 14) discusses the main umbrella employer body
for the industry, BIFSA's role in respect of collective bargaining
in the Building industry in general and the Building industry for
the Transvaal in part icular.
BIFSA has twelve registered employer bodies affi1 iated to it
nationally, with many of these active on industrial councils.
These employer bodies obtain labour relations, legal and economic
advice from BIFSA and participate in the organi sat ion's training
prograllll1es for the industry.
BIFSA does not have any direct involvement in Industrial councils,
although it obta ins copies of the council agreements and
amendments to agreements only. All dispute issues are resolved by
industrial councils themselves, although BIFSA might assist with
advice only. Of the ten industrial councils registered nationally
in the Building industry, BIFSA representatives have no seat, vote
or any involvement in these.
The main differences with Its counterpart body in the Metal
industry, SEIFSA, are as follows:
- There Is only one industrial council for the Hetal industry, a
nat ional one, with ten regional counei15 in the Build i ng industry
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t(although the latter used to have a national Industrial council) .
• SEIFSA gets directly Involved In centralised collective
bargaining, which BIFSA does not.
• SEIFSA appl tes job gradlngs in the Industry. whilst BIFSA
focusses on skills categories of employees.
The advantages of belonging to BIFSA for employers in the industry
are especially attached to the training colleges which are funded
so1ely by members at the rate of R39m.
7.2.2~ INDUSTRY
According to Ramsden (1987. p. v) the group of industries known
as the Metal industries Include the following Industrial sectors:
- Automot tve Parts Manufacturing
• Electrical, Electronics and Telecommunications
• Engineering
• Ferro Alloys
- Fosndry
- Iron and Steel
- Manufacturing
- Plast tcs
There were as at February 1990, according to the report of the
46th Annual General Heeting of the council (1990), 43 employers'
associations and 14 trade union parties to this nationally based
industrial council, with 10 534 individual employers and 385 844
employees affected by its agreements (or 40,~ of all employees
covered by industrial council agreements at end 1989). which also
makes It the largest industrial council In the country.
The employer associations, representing 3 278 individual employers
at February 1990, all belong to various employer organiutlons
which In turn belong to the Steel and Engineering Industries
Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) which serves IS the single
bargaining forum for employers on the Industrial council. These
party employers range froll small scale engineering workshops to
vast plants for the manuhcture of base metals.
Two major trade union groupings occur on the indus tria 1 counc 11 as
discussed by Ramsden (1987, pp. 53 ·59). namely the
Confederation of Hetal and Building Unions (CBHU) and the South
African Coordinating Council of the Internatlonal Hetalliforkers
Federation (IHF SACe). Of the 14 trade union parties to the
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industrial council, 8 are affil iated to the CSHU. to which all
traditional trade unions except S A Yster en Staal and the Mine
Workers Union (MWU) belong, and forms a powerful caucus of mainly
White, skilled workers in the industry. The SACC was established
in 1974, with most of the emergent trade unions affil iated to H.
The Mlneworkers Union and S A Yster en Staal operate as
independent bod ies.
Ramsden (1987. p, 59) also observed that three of the SACe
affiliates in particular tended to take a fairly unified stance in
industry negotiations. namely the Metal and All ied Workers Union
(HAWU). the Electrical and Allied Trades Workers Union of South
Africa (EATWU) and the Steel, Engineering and All ted Workers Union
of South Africa (SEAWU). Only the latter union still exists as is
with HAWU hav i ng been absorbed into the Hationa1 Un ion of
Metalworkers of S A (HUMSA) on the council and EATWU having been
replaced by the Metal and Electrical Workers Union of S A
(MEWUSA) .
However, according to SEIFSA. the SACC of the IMF has since 1989
not been utilised as a coordinating collective bargaining body in
the Metal industry. A possible reason for this has been the
significant growth in membership of HUMSA since this period and
more importantly the lack of SACe union unity during the 1989
national strike in the industry.
59 Representat i ves each of the employer and trade uni on parties
currently serve on the industrial council, with a total therefore
of 118 council representatives.
About 40 other potential employer and trade union part 1es operate
around the fringes of this industry. making their presence felt
periodically. De Jager (Note 8) reports that attempts have been
made to acconrnodate these other employee bodies, for example by
allowing them access to industrial council negotiations as
observers. Recorded in the report of the 46th Annual General
Meeting (1990) was that invitations were extended to 45 non-party
trade unions and employer organisations to participate in
negotiations for the 1990/91 main agreement.
However, the resistance of the registered trade unions that are
existing parties to the industrial council to permit the
peripheral unions' unofficial involvement at council level, has
apparently served as stimulus for the trend of these trade unions
towards registration.
Other features pertaining to the participation and representation
of trade unions on the council are:
- An influx of smaller trade unions with more special 1st interests
to become part ies to the council, is occurring.
- Other newer trade union parties such as HAW and the National
Automobile and All ied Workers Union (HAAWU) before their merger
and withdrawal, tended to resist the entry of the smaller
specialised unions in order to retain the principle of
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Imajorltarlsm on the council.
The counc 11' s scope 0 f reg is t ra t ion is very broad and covers all
the sectors that constitute the Metal industry.
Of note is that employer categories are divided into federated
(party) and non-federated (non-party) employers and reported on
separately by the council. At February 1990 party firms
represented 31,1% of total employers and 72,0% of total employees.
and non-party firms 68.~ of employers and 28,0% of employees.
Although the represent ivtty of employers on the council would
appear to be relatively low. these are however the employers that
represent the majority of employees in the industry.
68.2~ of the total employees reported at February 1990 were
unionised between the 14 trade union parties.
A problem with statistics on coverage in this large industry is
that employer membership and employee coverage figures provided by
emp1oyers do not necessarily correspond wi th the council's
official figures, which is currently being investigated by De
Jager (Note 25).
The trade union and employer parties to the council as at August
1990 are detat l ed in fu11 In Append tx 1.
7.3 OPERATION AtiO MANAGEMENT
7.3.1 BUILDING INDUSTRY
Stapelberg (Note 1) reports that in total there are currently ten
industrial council s in the building industry, all regionally
based, of which the one under investigation for the Transvaal is
the 1argest. There are nine offices for the Industrial Council
for the Building Industry (Transvaal), located as follows:
Benoni. Johannesburg (Head Office), Klerksdorp, Krugersdorp.
Potchefstroom. Pretoria, Secunda, Vereeniging. Witbank.
The Transvaal council is further divided into a Northern and a
Southern region. The Northern region employed 47 full time staff
at end 1989 and the Southern region 158, therefore 205 in total.
The objectives of this industrial council as extracted from its
Constitution (undated, p. 4), are:
-4.1 Consider and regulate. in accordance with the provisions of
the Act and this Constitution. matters of mutual interest to the
part ies and to prevent and settle disputes.
4.2 Promote good relationship between employers and their
emp loyees.
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t4.3 Use Its endeavours generally to lIIatntlln Industrial peace.
4.4 Promulgate agreements concluded by the parties tn tel'llS of
Section 48 of the Act and to administer It.
4.5 Consider, advise and make representltlons on any leglshtlon
or proposed legtslatlon affecting the relatlonshtp between the
employer and employees.
4.6 Consider and deal with such other matters as may affect the
tnterests of the parttes.
4.7 Take further actton In terms of the provtslons of the Act.
4.8 Estlbllsh and admtnlster vartous funds to the advantage of
emp1oyers and emp 1oyees. •
As mentioned prev tous ly In Section 7.1.1, the Secretaries of the
Independent regional Building Industrial councils meet annually to
discuss Issues of mutual Interest, although each council
represents an autonomous jurisdiction and operation.
The constitution of the council also provides for tts operating
structure. Brtefly, according to Koekemoer (Note 6), the council
Is organl sed as fo11ows:
- Two major sect Ions existed previously, namely the Skilled
Chamber for sk t 11 ed workers and the Unskilled Chamber for the
general labour categories of employees. These two Chambers met
once per month at either the Johannesburg or Pretoria offices.
SInee September 1990 the Chamber sys tem was however abo1Ished and
only negotiations are still handled by separate corrrnittees for
skilled and unskilled workers.
- Full council meetings ue held once every month. At these
meet ings minutes of meetIngs of the vartous sub-connt t tees to the
council are discussed and thetr declstons rattfted, is well IS
important matters such IS demarcatIon Issues, probl ems in the
appl tcatlon and admtnlstratlon of the lIlaln agreement, and
exempt Ions cons idered.
- There are two negotlatton sub-committees, one for skilled and
another for unskilled workers, whtch consist of an equal nUlllber of
employer and trade union representattves, that meet exclusively to
negot late (and renegot late) agreements pertaining to wages and
condlttons of employment.
- Three other umbrella sub·cOtl1lllttees operate wlthtn the council,
also with equa l representation between employer Ind elllployee
bodies. These are the follOWing:
a)~ Structures Comlttee: An ad hoc coaalttee deal tng '11th
the training and reglstratton of etlployees tn the various
cltegorles In tho tndustry.
b) [In.nchl ComUtec: An ad hoc comlttee dOlltng with tho
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establishment of the rules of the di fferent benefit funds and
financial matters in general.
c) Executive COlTlT1ittee: This ccemit tee meets every second Friday
and considers routine operational matters such as appl ications for
overtime exempt ion, scope of the agreement, etcetera.
Stapelberg (Note 27) reports that a new conmittee has been created
which met in November 1990 and will be focussing on
representations to the State as a unified front. In addition
there is also a newly created Steering Conmtttee with the purpose
of streamlining the operation of the council.
When questioned on his functions as General Secretary, Stapelberg
(Note 27) reports that under normal circumstances when the council
is not involved in negotiations (annually between February to
April), about 50% of his time would be devoted to meetings and
activities related thereto. Normally there would be about one
council meeting per month, plus other ad hoc meetings.
Preparation for meetings would entail preparation of material and
comprehens ive documents based on the work of severa1
sub-comtttees , the recording and distribution of minutes
thereafter, etcetera.
About 15% to 20% of his time would also be absorbed by dispute
resolution entail ing keeping abreast with the most recent
developments, industrial relations network involvement, sitting in
on certain dispute meetings (these are normally handled by another
council official), queries resolution, clarification of problems
with interpretat ion of rul es and the agreement, etcetera.
Another approximately 20% could be focussed on image bui lding for
the council and the industry, such as public relations activities
at universities, technikons and other organisations. The balance
of time would be devoted to normal administration and management
duties such as investments, keeping senior staff up to date on
progress, amendments to the agreement and constitution, assistance
to employers on presentations to employees on counci 1 benefits,
with active i nvolvement too in the registration of training
candidates, their call up for training and regrading of their
positions as they progress with their studies (many of these
dut Ies would however be delegated to other council staff).
A very marketing orientated focus which was necessary to alleviate
the representivity problem that the council had experienced.
7.3.2 WAL INDUSTRY
This national industrial council is structured in three broad
tiers, namely the six regional councils at the lowest tier, the
National Executive COlll1littee and then the national industrial
counctl at the top tier.
De Jager (Note 26) reports that the representatives of the parties
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,on the regional councl1s Ire Ipso hcto the nattonal industrhl
counc t1 which meet s for nat tona l negot lit Ions and the annual
qeneral meettng (AGH). At the AGH the nlttonal council appoints
the natlonll execut ive conntttee from alllOngst the represenhtlves
and In Iddltton the 'permlnent' Chairman Ind Vlce-Chlirmen of the
eight goup technical comlttees are also members of the executtve
conrnlttee.
The six regional industrhl Industrhl councils are based in the
main Industrial centres, nlmely the Trlnsvul, the Orange free
State and Northern Cape, Natal, Border, the Midlands and the Clpe.
Trade unions and employer organisations Ippolnt representatives on
these regional councils, totalling S9 each at August 1990, and the
representatives on each regional council t0gether form the
national council, in torms of this council s constitution.
funding of the operation of regional councils Is by way of imprest
from the nlttonal council's Income. Levies are uniform throughout
the Industry and all Income vests in the nlttonal council.
The objectives of the nltlonal industrial counc t l . as extncted
from Its Constttution (1985, pp. 2 - 3) are u follows:
"(a) to consider and regulate, in accordance with the provisions
of the Act, matters of mutual interest to the parties and to
prevent and set t 18 d tsputes i
(b) ~o promote good relatl.onshlps between employers and employeesi
(c) to use tts enduvours genenlly In the directton of
maintaining Industrhl pucei
(d) to secure the complete organisatton of employers and employees
in the IndustrYi
(e) to secure for employees regular employment and to minimise
unemp1oyment i
(f) to Idmlntster agreements arri ved at by the part ies;
(g) to consider. advise and make representations of any
leglslltlon or proposed legislatton affecting employers and
emp1oyees i
(h) to consider and deal with such other .Itters IS may affect the
Interests of employer and employeesi
(t) to establish and regulate unlfrom working hours and conditions
of employment i
(j) to secure the recognition and observlnce by all persons In the
Industry of any agreement negot Iited by the plrties i
(k) to receIYe and ra he IIOneys by such Mans IS the Counc t1 aay,
(rOfi tiM to tilDe. consider advlubh for the purpose of
furthering the objects of the Council In the Interest of Itlploytrs
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and employees
moneys to such
Councllj
In the Industry, including the disbursement of
persons, bodies or organisations on behalf of the
,
(1) to purchase, take on lease or in exchange or otherwise acquire
and sell, dispose of and otherwise deal with movable and inrnovable
property for the Council's own needs of all kinds for the purpose
of furthering the objects of the Council In the interests of
employers and employees In the Industry.
(m) to borrow or ra ise money in such manner as the Counc il may
think fit, and in security of such money so borrowed or raised, to
mortgage, pledge or charge the whole or any part of the property,
assets or revenue of the Council for the purpose of furthering the
objects of the Council In the interests of employers and employees
in the Industry;
(n) to do such other th ings as may tend to the furtherance of the
above objects or any of them."
Due to the vast size and scope of this Industrial council, many
specialist committees and structures are established to perform a
wide range of funct ions, either regionally or at nat i onal level.
A11 an (1987, pp, 28 - 31) illustrates the structures that the
nat ional Industrial council operates. These structures and
specialist committees all have defined membership criteria,
objectives, functions and specified authority. The main ones are
1isted below, with a brief description of their respective
funct ions and opera t i on.
- National Executiye 2.f 1M National Industrial Council: Is
elected at the annual general meeting of the national industrial
council and consists of equal numbers of employer and employee
representatives. There were at the time 26 elected
representatives with two alternates for each, with the Chairmen
and Vice- Chairmen of the 8 Group Technical Conmittees also
coopted onto this body. As the governing body of the national
council It administers the council's affairs, gives rulings and
creates precedents, endeavours to settle disputes and is the body
through which sound industrial relations in the Metal industry is
maintained.
- National Indystrial Council: Comprising of the 118 employer and
employee parties, with objectives and functions as set out in the
constitution of the national industrial council, as presented
above.
- Negotiating Conmi ttees: Heet regularly to negot iate for example
House agreements for individual employers not covered by the main
agreement, supplementary agreements to the main agreement covering
specific sectors, and technical schedules contained in the main
agreement. Negotiations on specific wage rates for each
occupation, that is the schedules and divisions, are handled by
specialist negotiating teams which are nominated from that sector
of the industry.
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- Special Standing Sub-Collll1tttees: Established so that specialist
knowledge on part icular matters is available, for example Pap
Smear Sub-ConmH tee, Hours of Work Sub-Collll11 ttee , etcetera.
- M ~ Work i ng Comml ttees: Appoi nted as and when the need arises
to for examp1e prepare for dra ft subml ssIons on proposed labour
legislation changes, etcetera.
- National~ Technical Conrnittees: Eight such conmittees, that
comprise the eight basic sectors of the Metal industry, with
meetings convened to resolve matters of conflict relating to
interpretation of specific technical operations. These technical
committees have the function of "Interpreting the relevant
sections of the agreements as they factually stand" according to
De Jager (Note 26). Thus the Foundry Group Colllt1Htee interprets
the Foundry provisions, the Plastics Group Colllt1ittee interprets
the Plastics provisions, etcetera.
- Regional Councils: Six regional councils estab1 ished In respect
of the various magisterial districts set out in the national
counc ll 's cons tt tu t 1on, respons i b1e for adml nis ter ing agreements
in their areas, with designated agents ensuring agreements are
being observed in the respective regions.
- SeC/lonal Technical Committees: To assist regional councils in
administering the main agreement, consider agents' reports,
assessments, appeals, etcetera, relating to the specific industry
sectors.
- Regional Speciali st Sub-Committees: To advise on matters such as
the appointment of regional council staff, to investigate
disputes, etcetera, and may be of a permanent (standing) or an ad
hoc nature.
- Agents: De Jager (Note 26) reports that 'Agents' are appointed
by the council. If they are found to be suitable the council
app11 es to the Hi nis ter of Manpower for them to be appo1nted as
'Designated Agents' in terms of Section 62 of the LRA. 'Agents'
only have the authority of the council and can only exercise their
powers in relation to the employers and employees who are members
of the counci l' s parties, whereas once they are appointed as
'Designated Agents' they can exercise their powers (Section 61 of
the lRA) in respect of all employers and employees in the
industry, that is including non-parties.
Regarding the foregoing, additional conrnents are:
- The constitution of the national industrial council provides
that all conrni ttees and structures are constituted on a 50 : 50
basis between employer and employee representatives, providing for
equal voting which lends Itself to a consensus based resolution of
disagreements.
- Before permanent appointment, i ndustrtal counc il agents serve a
proba t ionary per iod and shou1d endeavour to vis it each of the
establishments covered by the main agreement at least once per
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year. Sideris (19B2, p. 23) argues that this would not entail
effective pol icing of the main agreement as more frequent visits
should be scheduled for this purpose.
The national industrial council is headed by a General Secretary,
who asat Augu st 1990 was supported by 171 fu 11 time personnel
(total therefore 172) employed at the national and regional
offices, from the report of the 46th Annual General Heeting
(1990).
In questioning De Jager (Note 26) on his activit ies as General
Secretary, he est imated that he can devote 50% to 70% of his time
on the 200 to 500 meetings held annually at the national office
alone on negotiations and technical problems in the industry.
This would involve agenda preparation, the actual attendance of
meetings, recording and distribution of minutes, etcetera.
Other activities involve dispute settlement or referral of which
there were about 20 referrals to the industrial court in November
1990 alone (actua1 other referra15 wh ich were either resolved or
in the process of being attended to would have been considerably
higher), the processing of fund exemption applications which are
channelled through the national office, the admini strat ion of the
12 published and monitoring of the 16 house agreements, obtaining
statistics from union and employer parties and analysing these,
preparation of agreements for submi ssion to the Department of
Manpower, motivations to the Minister of Manpower on the
publishing and extension of agreements, normal telephone
enquiries, administration and handl ing of complaints.
Overall, a particularly heavy workload.
7•4 COLLECTI YE BARGA INIHG FUHCTI ONS
7.4.1 BUILDING INDUSTRY
Stapelberg (Note 1) mentions the following examples of subjects of
negotiation in the Building industry's industrial council:
- Benefits: Pension fund, holiday fund, medical aid fund, sick
fund, stabilisation fund (to cover cyclical unemployment during
lulls in the industry), inclement weather fund (applicable mainly
to waterproofing and external building operators), mil itary
service fund, tool insurance fund, employer guarantees (two weeks'
wages guarantee from new contractors entering the 1ndustria1
council), 20 year employment guarantee fund.
- Regulation Q.f matters 2f mutual interest: Wages, hours of work,
overtime, holidays and holiday periods, registration of employees,
registration of employers, safety, dispute handling, attendance
1ncent ive bonus.
The resultant industrial cauncll agreement, which was previously a
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very bulky document has, accordtng to Stapel berg (Note I), been
'deregulated' to cover minimum conditions only, leaving the
remainder as domest tc Issues for resolution between indivtdual
employer and employee parties.
The main agreement of the industrial council applies for a one
year period. The agreement was due for renewal before 31 May
1990, with the latest agreement publ tshed under government notice
R20I3 of 24 August 1990 from Stapel berg (Note 28), but appl tcable
to skl1led and semi-skilled workers only, due to lack of
representivity on the council of unskilled or general worker
categories, as discussed more fully in Section 7.2.1.
The two negotiation committees for skt1led and unskilled workers
normally meet on several occastons before end of January of a year
to ensure that the final agreement ts lodged with the Department
of Manpower by beginntng February to comply with the four month
revtew and rat t ficat ion period.
Although BIFSA has no active and direct role in the collective
bargaining activities of Industrial councils within the industry,
in term~ of its advtsory services to member organisattons, De
Vill ters (Note 14) reports that it had in the past issued Nat tonal
labour Directives which were wtthdrawn due to being percetved as
too prescriptive. However, during November 1990 it was agreed to
reintroduce these but in the form of National labour Guideltnes
for the industry which will primarily focus on procedural
guidel ines for employers.
In addition, BIFSA has issued other publications such as a
practical gUide to employers to fair employment practices to
asstst in labour relations in the Building Industry, as compiled
and edited by De Villiers (1989). A direct impact on the
collective bargaining functions of industrial council s is however
not envisaged as most of the agreements in the industry are
primarily substantive agreements, although several are starting to
include procedural issues.
7.4.2 &ill INDUSTRY
The content of collective bargatning tn this Industry is detailed
tn SEIFSA's handbook on the main agreement (1989) for reference,
and wt 11 not be reproduced here. Ramsden (1987, p. 48) states
that the areas covered by the agreements of the nat iona1
i ndustrtal counc 11 seek to achteve the followtng:
• To lay down minimum rates of pay for specific levels of'tork
(although SEIFSA does not believe that 'mtnimum' rates are
establ tshed).
- To regulate working arrangements for employees while at work and
provide protect ion for employees so that they are not requtred to
work excessive hours.
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,- To provide protection for employees and their famt1ies tn the
event of f llnes s , death and old age.
- To ensure that tratntng is carried out throughout the tndustry
on an orderly basis and for the benefit of both employers and
employees.
In addttIon to the ma in agreement there are several substdiary
agreements relating to benefit funds and schemes. as well as
'House' agreements and other enterprt se level agreements.
House agreements have been negot iated since the early 1960' sunder
the umbrella of the matn agreement and contain speciftc agreements
and/or conditions of employment dtsttnct from those of the main
agreement for certain large enterprises In the Metal industry that
have obtatned exemptions or have been excluded from the provtslons
of the main agreement due to the unique nature of their
operattons, according to Allan (1987, p. 42). These and other
exempt tons have been regarded as necessary due to the large scope
and coverage of the matn agreement.
Stderis (1982, p, 21) reports that in the early 1980's there were
up to 300 exemptions to the main agreement. De Jager (Note 26)
suppl ted tnformat ion that for the pertod 1 November 1989 to 31
October 1990, 592 appl tcattons for exempttons were received by the
counc Il , of wh ich 460 were granted on the basis app1ied for,
partial exemptions were granted for 31,67 were refused and 128
were,sttll under consideration as at 31 October 1990.
De Jager reports that in August 1989, House agreements covered 16
firms and 59 338 employees representtng 13 major employers in the
industry. These are registered as Sect ton 31 agreements in terms
of the lRA (1988) and are not categortsed as recognttlon
agreements, wi th the i r coverage mon i tored and reported on by the
council. At February 1990, according to the report of the 46th
Annual General Meet i ng, there were 16 House agreements covertng 13
ftrms.
SEIFSA has perceived the House agreement facility as providing an
acconrnodatlon of the divergent demands of employers within the
industry and do not regard it as a response to a demand for
supplementary plant level bargaining by unions. Al though the
condtttons of service and employment benefits negotiated have
tended to be superi or in most cases to those prescri bed in the
main agreement, the unions have identifted the resource costs of
for example attending up to 20 additional negotiations as being
problemat tc.
The matn agreement essentially covers wages and condttions of
employment and amendments to tt are negotiated annually from Harch
onwards. Ramsden (1987. pp. 48 - 49) reports on the ne90tiatlon
process tn the Metal tndustryas follows:
- Before negott at tons take place. the tndivldual proposa15 of each
participant trade union have to be coordinated. Untons belonging
to the CBHU coordtnate thetr proposal and demands tn thts forum.
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,By approximately March of a year union demands are formal ised and
presented to the nat ional industri al council.
- These demands are circulated to all employer associations to the
industrial council. A series of meetings is then held between all
the members of SEIFSA in which the trade union demands are
considered and the employer response to those demands is
formalised by the SEIFSA Board of Management. The Board of
Management then makes recommendations to the SEIFSA Council which
then formulates their negotiating position.
- The industrial council negotiations which ensue are attended by
between 200 and 400 employer and employee delegates representing
the interests of the 43 employer associations and the 14 trade
unions. These negot tat ions are reported as being of a very formal
and ritualistic nature and have been criticised as being more of a
'speech making' than a direct negot iat ing process.
As at February 1990 the main agreement pertained to 10 534 firms
in the industry and 385 844 employees. It applies for a period of
one year only. The current main agreement according to SEIFSA
(1989) was to have remained in force until 30 June 1990. The full
main agreement is a very voluminous document and the handbook
sunmary issued by SEIFSA is obviously a very useful service to the
industry.
In addition to the main agreement, there were 11 other published
supplementary agreements effect ive in the industry at 28 February
1990, namely for the Iron and Steel Producers Association of S A
(ISPA) sub-croup, the Lift Engineering agreement, 7 benefit and
training fund agreements, the Registration and Administration
Expenses agreement and the Art Isan Training and Recognition
agreement for Metal and Engineering Industries.
The current round of negotiations were concluded after a total of
17 separate meetings, accompanied by a NUHSA dispute, strike
ballot and employer lock-out ballot, with final agreement being
reached on 3 September 1990 in terms of the SEIFSA Council Report
(1989/1990). It was reported ("Metal industry pay deal", 1991, p.
3) that the amendments to the main agreement were finally
published on 4 January 1991, with the wage settlement made
effective from 1 July 1990.
As in previous years where delays in the negot iat ion and
publishing of the new agreement had occurred (Allan (1987, p. 41)
cites 1986 as an example too), the group of industries falling
under the scope of the main agreement are technically without
their statutory conditions of service, which can 9ive rise to
considerable uncertainty in the interim. A 'gent1emens' agreement
to comply with the new negotiated conditions however applies until
such time as these are gazetted, wi th few transgress ions reported
according to Angus (Note 24).
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7.5 PISPUTE RESOLUTION FUNCTIONS
7.5.1 BUILDING INpUSTRY
Stapelberg (Note 1) reports that employees in the industry with
grievances generally approach their trade union, who then refer
these to the industrial council for resolution. About two and
more grievances are handled by the council per week, with a high
overall success ratio for those disputes fall ing within the
council's jurisdiction. In the 1989 Annual Report (1990) it is
noted that of the 143 disputes referred to the council for
consideration, 58 or 40,6% were settled by the council, 34 or
23,~ reached a deadlock and the remaining 51 or 35,6% were found
not to be within the council's jurisdiction.
The most cOl1ll1on types of disputes referred by employees relate to
unfair dismissal and non-payment of certain kinds of benefits.
Employers also take up issue, normally with employees who want to
1eave premises without authori ty, etcetera.
Koekemoer (Note 6) observes that the council's constitution does
not provtde for a negotiated dispute resolution procedure, which
is a consideration for the future. The council would comply
strictly with the dispute resol ut ion procedures prov tded for by
the LRA in handl ing disputes referred to it for resolution.
Stapelberg (Note 27) confirmed that as at October 1990 a
negotiated dispute resolution procedure had not been finalised
yet, but was on the agenda for when the general worker categories
were re-included in the main agreement.
The practical operational aspects of dispute resol ut i on in this
i ndustrlal council are dealt with as follows as sunrnari sed from
Horn's (1988, pp. 48 - 66) research on the dispute resolution
functions of seven selected industrial councils, which included
this industrial council.
- Disputes are categorised into disputes arising out of alleged
contraventions of agreements (essentially disputes of right) and
other disputes.
- Disputes of right are referred to the industrial council's
Executive Committee, consisting of an equal number of employer and
trade union representatives, that meet every Friday to handle all
matters outside the day to day operation of the industrial
council. If thi s forum is unabl e to resolve the issue, the matter
is referred to either a Northern of Southern regional committee
(the industrial council is divided into these two areas) which
also meets weekly. If the matter is still unresolved, it 15
referred to the main body of the industrial council for
adjudication. Non-compl lance wi th the decision of this body
results in referral to the courts.
- Other disputes are dealt with by a Disputes COlllnittee, which
comprises of two employer and two trade union representatives with
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the then Assistant Secretary as Chairman. This co"",ittee convenes
whenever the need arises to resolve disputes of thi s category.
Attempts are always made to select representatives who are
impartta1 to the dispute at hand. If the dispute cannot be
resolved by this coemittee, the facility exists for the
establishment of a larger committee and, following this, the full
body of the industrial council to hear the dispute. Should the
dispute not be resolved at this level, further referrals in terms
of the LRA dispute procedure would be made.
- All disputes are to be submitted to the industrial council in
writing. Certain disputes thus submitted (in the minority) where
blatant irregularities have been cOlTlllitted, are resolved directly
through the intervent ion of the Secretary and do not go to the
relevant comtt tee . The majority of disputes however are referred
to the Oi sputes CORm i ttee.
- Disputes are in the main settled, or a decision taken to proceed
further, within two weeks after having been reported to the
industrial council.
- The role of the Oisputes or alternative Committee (depending on
the nature of the dispute), is perceived as being only a mediatory
role, facilitating an agreement between the parties and not
attempting to impose one on them.
- Unfair dismissals and retrenchments were at that time the most
frequently occurring disputes. Of interest is that Stapelberg
(Note 1) reports more recently that unfair dismissals and
non-payment of benefits (that is agreement contraventions) are the
most common dispute triggers.
Finally, Horn (1988, pp. 41 45) in his findings on the
aforementioned research, held that three of the five labour
experts surveyed identified this industrial council as being one
of the successful industrial councils in terms of its dispute
settlement activities, despite not having a negotiated and
formalised dispute resolution procedure.
In the council's press statement of August 1990 as referenced
earl ier, it was pointed out that the cost of handling disputes for
this council amounts to approximately R40 000 per month and would
increase drastically with the deregistration of the council's
scope of jurisdiction to exclude unskilled workers, whereby all
future disputes for these workers would have to be dealt with by
way of conciliation boards. The latter mechanism was expected to
increase the workload of the Department of Manpower and place
addit ional burden on the State (and therefore the individual
taxpayer) to foot the bill.
7 . 5.2 WAJ. INDUSTRY
A negotiated dispute settlement procedure is contained in an
annexure to the main agreement of the national Industrial counctl,
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which is sunmarised as follows from Sideris (1982, p. 21):
- The dispute is firstly referred to the appropriate regional
council and written statements are submitted by the parties
concerned.
- If it cannot be resolved at th is 1eve1, It is then reported to
the Executive Committee at national level, accompanied by full
particulars on what steps had been taken to settle the dispute.
The Executive Commi t tee investigates the matter or may appoint a
Board of Enquiry. If no settlement is made after three meetings
(not more than two in one day), then the matter is dealt wi th at
the next regular national industrial council meeting, unless the
Executive Committee decides that it should be settled invnediately.
The decision on the settlement is made by ballot, returnable
within 14 days. SEIFSA reports that this particular form of
dispute resolut ion has however never been util ised by the national
industrial council.
- Should settlement still not be reached, the council would decide
whether to either report to the Minister of Manpower that it is
unable to settle the dispute, or whether the dispute should be
submitted for arbi trat ion. In the event of arbi trat ion, an
arbi trator who is acceptable to both parties is nomi nated.
In respect of strike action in the industry, the national
industrial council's philosophy according to Sideris (1982, p.
24) is to recognise this as legitimate trade union activity,
provided it is legal. Illegal strikes are obviously not condoned,
and the industrial council's stance is not to intervene but to
refer parties to the provisions of the main agreement and point
out the illegal ity of the strike or lock out, whichever appl ies.
Horn (1988, pp. 41 - 45) in his research also reports that three
out of the five labour experts surveyed rated this industrial
council as one of the most successful in resolving disputes,
whilst only one ranked it as less successful compared to the seven
other industrial councils surveyed.
An indication of the level of dispute settlement activity for this
council is provided by De Jager (Note 26) in citing dispute
resolution statistics for the period November 1989 to October
1990. Of the total of 1 462 disputes referred to the national
industrial council for consideration during this period, 677 were
resolved, 144 ended in deadlock, 38 were resolved between the
parties after referral to the council, one other went to
mediation, 37 to arbitration, 443 to the industrial court, 83 were
withdrawn or regarded as such, 83 did not fall within the
council's jurisdiction and 355 were still under consideration on
31 October 1990.
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,7.6 Ql!!1B fUNCTIONS AND SERVICES
7.6.1 BUILDING INDUSTRY
The industrial council administers a wide range of benefits,
i ncl uding holiday pay and incentive bonuses, over and above those
normally administered by industrial councils such as pension,
medical aid and sick funds. In other industries holiday pay and
incentive bonuses are normally administered and paid by individual
employers, but this industrial council assumes this function to
ensure that all employees receive these benefits.
The council's pension scheme, the Building Industry Pension Fund,
was established on 1 January 1948, and is still in operation and
viable after serving the industry and its employees for more than
40 years. An information pamphlet entitled 'Building Industry
(Tvl) Pension Scheme - Guide Book for General Workers' outlining
the scheme in basic terms is provided to all employees, which
includes contact details for the nine industrial council offices
and the three trade unions that are parties to the council.
According to the press statement released by the council (1990) on
amongst other matters the loss of benefits by the deregistered
genera1 workers in the current ag\"'eement, the fo11 owi ng benefi ts
of the counc il were high1ighted:
- Pens10n benefits: Attached to the pens ton fund of the council
are funeral benefits, death benefits and disability pensions, with
tota1 funds accumu1ated to over R400 mi 11 ion for the unsk ill ed
worker categories alone. Hore than R16,5 million was also paid
out in respect of the di fferent pension benefits during 1989.
- .sJ.g Benef1 t EY.n.d: Sick benefi t payments are provtded for
periods up to six months and in cases of term1nal di seases for
over 12 months.
- Hol1day f1uls1: This assists 1n saving moneys for employees to be
paid at the end of the year when the 1ndustry closes for the
Christmas break and is continued despi te employee mobl1i ty within
the industry.
With employee body represent ivity of the council hav1ng been a
major issue, this council had embarked on an act ive campaign
amongst employees to promote the services and benefi ts of the
council. A well-researched and basic information pamphlet
targeted to the major employee groupings had been drawn up and
distributed to employees in the Transvaal Building industry
through the nine offices of the council in this province.
Stapel berg (Note 7) reported a favourable response to this
brochure.
This pamphlet entitled 'You and the Industrial Council working for
YOU' simply conveys the following message:
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"For your today and tomorrow.
An Industrial Council - An Industrial Council is the place where
trade untons and employer associat ions meet democrat ically to
negottate: Abetter 1ife for you and your chtldren.
Secure your place in the Industrial Counctl for the Buildtng
Industry tn the Transvaal· and have a real say in your today and
tomorrow.
The Industrial Council secures and provides:
1. Hol tday Honey ('money' In Ita1i cs throughout).
2. Honey when you are ill.
3. Honey when you hurt yoursel f at work.
4. Honey when you cannot work because of ratn, hai1 or snow.,
5. Honey when you ret ire.
,
Speak to any office of the Council (see back cover) or Union to
have a stake tn these and other benefits.
Get ahead. Unite in this democratic organtsatlon.
Don't delay, participate today."
A message certainly appealing to those basic security needs as
demonstrated by many employees' motivations to form and join trade
un ions, but emphas is i ng the security/benefl t fund concept that is
key to this industrial council.
Other visible and useful promotional items introduced by this
council, directed to the employer population In the industry, are
bilingual single poster calendars issued annually since 1986.
These calendars are formated in the council's contri but i on year
which runs from 16 October to 12 October, and apart from providing
standard calendar data, include pertinent Information of interest
to employers in the industry. For example, disputes and items
that result in the most problems in the industry, are analysed and
gUidelines provided in these calendars to assist employers on
topics such as unfair labour practices, grievance and disciplinary
procedures, etcetera.
Of interest too according to Stape1berg (Note 1) is that the one
trade union party, BCAWU, before its withdrawal from the council,
had approached the counctl for assistance in gaining the release
of detained trade un ion members. The counctl turned down this
request as being outs ide the scope of Its actIvlt 1es.
This poses the question, especially in view of the discussion on
the potenttal social responsibility role of Industrial councils,
to what extent they would be prepared to enter the soc to-pol tt tcal
arena on behal f of their membership. Could such actton
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Ifurthermore perhaps at the time have aided in retaining the
participation of the trade union concerned?
Finally, the council also provides other informative bulletins to
parties, such as a recent circular on AIDS guidelines to
employers, and has proposed similar documents on grievance and
disciplinary prodecures for the future.
Industrial council s in the Building industry do not appear to
operate separate training schemes, with BIFSA operating training
prograllll1es for the whole industry funded entirely by employers to
a tune of R39 mill ion, as stated by De Vi1liers (Note 14). The
industry's long-established Training Board provides training
progranvnes operated on a modular system. These progranrnes provide
opportunities for training from unskilled to the highest
designated tradesmen categories in the industry. During 1989,
9214 persons and in 1990, 12092 persons attended these industry
training progranvnes.
7.6.2 Mill1. INDUSTRY
A large number of benefit funds and schemes are admini stered on an
industry basis for this national industrial council. Allan (1987,
pp. 32· 40) reports that by mutual agreement SEIFSA, the
employers' federation, is responsible for the administration and
management of certain funds arising out of the operation of
industrial agreements in the industry, providing an extremely
comprehensive and well managed package of fringe and social
security benefi ts wh ich have been ta il ored to the needs of the
broader Metal industry.
Seven supplementary benefit and training fund agreements were in
force for the industry as at 28 February 1990, as per the report
of the 46th Annual General Meeting, namely for the Technological
Fund, Group Pension Fund, Group Ufe and Provident Fund,
Engineering and All ied Industries Employees Medical Aid Fund,
Education and Training Fund, Sick Pay Fund and Metal Industries
Medical Aid Fund.
The detail s of these funds are generally negot iated in separate
subsidiary agreements to the main agreement of the national
industrial council. Angus (Note 24) estimates that at October
1990 about RS bill ion was invested in total in pension and
provident funds for the Metal industry, indeed a formidable
figure. De Jager (Note 26) convnents too that in total about
280000 employees in the Metal industry are currently covered by
all benefit funds. The five main funds are summarised as follows
according to the SE IFSA Council Report (1989/1990):
- Engineering Industries Pension fJmd: Establ ished in 1957,
converted to a contributory pension fund on 2 June 1975. Notably
too the rules of the fund were amended during 1986 to provide for
the pledging by members of their own contributions as security for
housing loans granted by employers. Benefits totalling R89
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,million were paid by the fund during 1989. In 1989 it also had
62200 members, with assets totalling R2,1 billion. SEIFSA reports
that this fund is to convert to a Pension and Provident Fund
effective from 1 Hay 1991.
• M.tlil. Indystries Y..r.2YR Pension E.Y.ru1: Came Into operat ion In 1966
to provide for pension and death benefits for employees not
covered under the previous fund, and was converted to a
contributory pension fund on 1 July 1978. Similar provisions as
to the other fund apply, lncludtnq the pledging of contributions
as security for housing loans. Benefits totalling R98,1 millton
were pa Id by the fund durl ng 1989, with a membersh i p of 245700 and
assets of R3 bt l l l on .
. lli.k ill E!ms1 ill .tM l.r2.n..a. Steel. Engineering iD.d. MeUll urglcal
lndustrv: This fund was established in 1955, applicable to members
of trade unions and employees of employer part i es to the main
agreement. Two schemes, 'A' - the original - and' B' used to
apply. At end 1986 Scheme Ahad 47818 members and Scheme B 170644
members, but these were restructured into a single scheme in 1989.
The fund paid benefits totalling R9,4 mill Ion in 1989, with a
total membership of 215000 and assets of R16,1 million.
- M.tlil. Indystries Medical AM EYru1: Was Introduced in 1965 for
employees who were members of the trade unions party to the main
agreements and in the employ of employers who are al so party to
the main agreement. Benefits totalling R56,4 million were paid
during 1989, with 31600 members at end 1989 and assets of R56,4
million.
- Engineering illi1 Allied Industries Emplovees Medical Aid~:
Was established in 1975 to provide medical benefits for eligible
employees not covered by the Metal Industries Medical Aid Fund.
Benefits totally R464000 were paid by the fund during 1989, with
3000 members.
The main advantage of these industry funds is cons idered by De
Jager (Note 26) as being that employees can move within the
industry without losing benefits. A problem however is that many
employees do not fully understand how the funds operate and
therefore do not fully utilise them. Employers or unions should
therefore ensure that employees recover the large amounts of
unclaimed contributions vested in several of these funds, or
alternatively transfer these unclaimed amounts into a fund that
cou1d benefl temp1oyees with in the industry.
Unfortunately detail s of other services of the nat iona1 industrial
council could not be obtained. A comment was however made in
Allan's (1987, p. 60) research on this industrial council that
all respondents (that is management, unions and officials of the
nat ional Industria1 council), had felt that the absence of a
professional mediation and arbitration service for dispute
settlement was unacceptable for such a large industri al council.
The wrl ter was not aware of such a serv ice being developed at the
time of completing this research, but it is obviously a
consideration for the future if such a need is expressed by the
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parties.
7.7 PROBLEM AREAS A!!Q £!l.I!.ffif PROGNQS IS
7.7.1 BUILDING INDUSTRY
The major problem for this industrial council as explained by the
council's General Secretary, Stapelberg (Notes 1 and 7) was that
of representivity in the industry, in particular as a result of
BCAWU, the largest union's, previous withdrawal from the council.
Horn (1988, p. 62) also conments on the problems experienced with
BCAWU prior to this event, when its withdrawal seemed imninent and
was regarded as a major threat to the cred i bi l i ty of the
industrial council. These problems were manifested in the
non-attendance of council meetings by BCAWU, unreasonable wage
demands being made during wage negot iations and with the
industrial council subsequently being branded as responsible when
these denands were not met.
The opinion was held by Stapelberg (Notes 1 and 7) that if trade
union representivity on the industrial council was not increased,
and the council was disbanded on these grounds after the expiry of
the main agreement, it would most probably still continue
operating afterwards for the sustained benefit administration of
accrued benefi t funds for current employees. New employees
entering the industry thereafter would however be unable to share
in these benefits, apart from on a voluntary basis, which would be
very unfortunate, in particular for small contractors who would
not be in a position to establish and administer equivalent type
of schemes for their employees on an individual basis.
It is fortunately now confirmed that BCAWU is well advanced in the
process of re-admission to the council, ascribed to the
realisation that their membership would lose too much in terms of
both exclusion from agreements for the industry and the loss of
accrued benefits if the council ceases to exist. Especially
medical aid benefit participation had, according to Stapelberg
(Note 7), shown remarkable growth in Black employee membership.
Trade unions would have to cope with these loss of benefit
problems and it would seem that they are consequently now looking
more favourably at industrial councils because of the benefit
scheme services and advantages involved, in contrast with the
post-Wiehahn resistance amongst emergent Black trade unions
against participation in the industrial council system.
The council's challenge was thus to improve representivity through
its recruitment and awareness campa 19n and prove to the Department
of Manpower that a definite growth In membership and coverage was
occurring, which needed to be accomplished by the end of Hay 1990,
when the previous agreement expl red.
This has obviously been successful albeit too late for the
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agreement renewal,
non-party union and
amongst union parti es
full adml ssion to the
as CAWU, a previously unregi stered and
potentially with the largest membership
to the council, had applied for and obtained
council.
,
The anomaly though, according to De VIlllers (Note 14) was that
the new agreement was concluded in the meantime, but had to
exclude the general worker due to the lack of representivlty In
that area. Now wi th CAWU on the council, the sttuat ion has arisen
that Its membersh i p is techn Ica11 y not covered by the current
agreement, which wi 11 need to be revised again.
A final consideration, if representtvlty problems with employees
should recur in the future, Is the possibility of voluntary
membershl p and coverage by the counctl , an area wh ich still needs
to be Investigated and developed as a viable option for
cont inuat Ion.
In the council's press statement of August 1990 (1990) on the
problems facing it with the deregistratlon of the general worker
categories from the 1990/1991 agreement, the reason for the
decl Ine in represent ivlty, or the (in retrospect temporary)
demise, of the council in respect of unskilled or general workers,
the major factors contributing to this situation were cited as
being the following:
" 1. The Ins is tence by the Oepa rtment 0 f Manpower on
representation criteria based solely on quantitative measures and
thetr unwillingness to extend industrial council agreements to
non-parties.
2. The refusal of the two major Black trade unions namely, BCAWU
(Building Construction and Allied Workers Union) and CAWU
(Construction and Allied Workers Unions) to accept central
collective bargaining on substantive issues at industry Ieval ."
James (Note 3) however suspects that employer represent i vity might
also be an issue in this Industry, with many of the smaller
employers, as a result of the nature of the industry, not being
sufficiently represented or available for active participation on
the industrial council, whereby the larger organisat ions could
domi nate the employer representat ion on the counct l • Yet, as
stated in Section 7.2.1, these party employers represent about 8~
of all employees in the industry, and would obviously have a
significant say in the operation of the council and Its
agreements.
Contradictory to the above, Stapel berg (Note 28) contends that
about 5S~ of the Master Builders' employers employ 10 or less
employees.
De VIlllers (Note 14) also raises the subject of employer
representivlty. Many employers In the Industry are not registered
with the employer organisations, and are subsequently covered by
the extension of the main agreement. With the approximately 14000
employers In the Industry nationally, and the majority of them
-141-
,,
classed IS 'bakkle builders', agents hive great dl fflculty In
monitoring the Implementation of IndustriAl Agreements. The SiDe
problem would apply to the Industrhl council for the Transvul.
In addition, there Is the unique nature of the Industry to contend
with, which Is very nomadic, making It difficult too to obtAin
employer unity as pointed out by De Vllllers (Note 14). Activity
In the Industry Is also very closely 1Inked to economic cycles.
About 9~ of all regl stered bu Ilders, categorised IS
micro-builders or operators, employ ten and less people. The
reamlnlng 10\ fall within the small, medium to large business
categories, with a very small proportion of employers employing
about 8~ of all employees within the Industry.
The exercise of the council's jurisdiction and Implementation of
the main agreement, IS pointed out by Koekemoer (Note 6), Is
clouded by situations such IS where companies are s Huated In
Johannesburg, but employees are seconded elsewhere that fill
outside tho council's jurisdiction. The legislation pertains to
where the association between the employer and employee occurs,
therefore the locatton of work, and not the official base of the
employer. This Is obViously a 1Imitation that would affect other
Industrhl councils as well.
Bendemann's (Note 17) forthcoming research on Industrial councIls
in the BuildIng Industry will explore the perceptions of employers
on these Industrial councils and what flctors influence these
perceptions, which should be of interest to Industrial councils In
this Industry.
7.7.2 ~ INDUSTRY
De Jager's (Notes 8, 25 and 26) observations In this regard are
discussed below, wi th referenced additions by other authors
provtded on perceived problems and opportunities for the national
industrhl council of this key Industry.
- Emplover u.n.,iU: Especially with such a large constituency, this
is obviously the prime challenge facIng the major employer
federation In the industry, the Steel and Engineering Industries
Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA).
Ramsden (1987, p. 99), with reference to the controversy on plant
level versus Industrial council level bargaining withl" the HttAl
Industry and SEIFSA' s pol Icy In this regard, hlghl ights one of the
major factors affecting ellployer unity In this observation:
wBecause so lIany companies have expressed their dissatisfactIon
with SElfSA and In fact are leaving the federation, SEIFSA has
moved towards a greater wIllIngness to bargaIn at pl ant level
although at this stage they are not openly adlllttlng as laUch. W
SEIFSA's offIcial pol icy on collective bal'9alnlng and the lssutS
surrounding It have al ready been discussed In Sectton 7. 1.2 on tho
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,historical development of the Helil Industry Industrhl council
and will also be revisited In Sections 9 and 10.
Added to this is. that of the employers' organisations that are
party to SUfSA. several of the hrqest coepan te s employ an
estimated 80\ of the employees In the Industry and subsequently
have substantt a1 representatlon on the SElfSA Board of Hanagement.
The potential Is therefore there for these hrge employers to
dominate thinking and negotlattons within the employer contingent
on the national Industrhl council. The remaining employers are
medium to small operations, the litter who generally employ no
more than 2S to 10 employees.
Ramsden (1987, p. 71) aho concludes that: -Because of the highly
dispersed nature of the Industry as a whole. the unions'
organlsatlon efforts have focussed very hrqely on the lIaJor
groups. It Is thus these large employers who witness the eHects
of the SElf SA policies In their organisations and who are best
able to Judge their effIClcy.-
• I..r:.su1t ILnion !!!.~mb(!r:shlR .111.tnrU.U: Assurances aro Importlnt that
trade union leadership ropresent members' Interests In the
bargaining forum. and not sectoral Ideological objectives.
Sideris (1982. p. 1) echoes this sentiment In clUng In Interview
conducted by L Wltz of the Unlvers Ity of the Wltwltersrlnd History
Department with D Hartwell. ex AssIstant Secretary of the Garment
Workers Union:
·Solly Sachs talked about the Industrhl Concll htton Act IS a
form of opium .... I t lulled workers and trade union lOlders Into
some sort of I stupor In which they clean forgot there were
workers' struggles·.
The effect of this opiate has obv tcus ly st tl l continued during the
operat tcn of this Act's successor, the lRA, with the
workertst/popul tst struggle subordinating the dellOcratlc
principles and object tves centatned within purist trade union
Ideology.
furthermore, the Industry Itself Is chlnglng drlllltlcally, with
the previously unregistered trade union body thlt Is now ItOvlng
tOWArds registrAtion. becOllllng the .ajor numerical force In the
future. The percept Ions of these brold IIftabershlps should be
understood and consultation with thctfl should bt assured. Issues
on what IIIfmbers and employees really require In collectlv.
blrgalnlng should be addressed too, such IS whether preferences
Ire for predOlllnant ly cash or perks •
• RegrucotlYlt.Y: Reprnenttvlty Is also In Issue In this
Industry, lalnly In the proving of representtvtty vhen new
agree..nts nttd to be pubHshtd. and partlcularly relating to
trade union representation. Although there appears to bt a
grctater trend alDOngst trade unions to rf9lster and gain .access IS
partl.s to tho Industrial councIl In the Industry. two problMs
feature.
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Firstly, trade unions cannot always provide accurate membership
data, especially on a racial basis, whilst the newer ones do not
yet keep records.
Secondly, object ions from exist ing trade unions, such as S A Yster
en Staal's resistance to the National Union of Metalworkers of
South Africa's (NUMSA) registration for the Metal industry,
required headcount verification formalities to be instituted to
prove representativeness. This necessitates that an Inspector
from the Department of Manpower conducts a headcount veri fication
within the magi star t al district concerned, to establ i sh the 5~ +
1 representlvity gUideline of the Department of Manpower.
Although the LRA tends to operate on the bas is of equtty and the
law, this type of equity does not deal with the quality of
representation obtained, which is very important in negotiation
discussions. The competent trade union official for example is
perceived as a greater asset to a union and its members (as well
as the opposite bargaining parties) than the number of members on
the books.
Overall though, the representivity of trade unions has improved in
the industry over the last few years. Allan (1987, pp. 57 - 58)
reports that where in 1980 the trade unions on the industrial
council represented less than 25% of the total industry labour
force versus the 83% employer representation, the s t tuat ion in
1987 was such that the trade union parties represented some 7~ of
the workforce and the employers 73% of the total employees in the
industry. Union sentiment on this improvement was that whereas
they had previously been engaged in 'collective begging' on the
national industrial council, the situation in 1987 was perceived
as being one of real collective bargaining.
De Jager (Note 25) points out another feature of the industry that
can exacerbate the obta i ning of accurate membersh i p and coverage
figures of employers and employees within the industry. Firms
party to the national industrial council are generally the larger
organisations which could potentially take over and/or amalgamate
with smaller non-party firms. In this event, rationalisation and
retrenchment can occur, with retrenched skilled employees for
example again creating their own non-party businesses, and thereby
increasing the numbers of the latter.
Party employers are presently numerically representative in terms
of the number of employees in the industry but not the number of
employers. One way of improving the representivity of party
employers was proposed as breaking employers down into industries
and magtsterial districts within which they operate, which in one
exerctse increased the representivity of party employers by 16,7'.
Therefore if the units of particular party employers in specific
industries and districts could be counted as separate entities,
about 8 000 party employers versus about 7 000 non-party employers
would be identified. Employer representtvtty at this stage though
is still based by the Department of Manpower on the number of
emp1oyers covered and not the number of employees employed by the
party employers.
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- fitln agreement: Greater flexibil ity should be introduced into
the industrial council main agreement, especially with such large
coverage, otherwise too many exempt ions wi 11 be requested and
granted, as has been the case. Where these exempt ions pertain to
wage rates, uncomfortable precedents can be created, and lead to
trade union party objections to such exemptions. This issue is
being forced further by deregulation and the drive for small
business development.
In the past, when problems were experienced with the conclusion of
the main agreement, such as in 1986, and certain trade union
parties refused to sign the agreement, the extension of the
agreement to non-parties and non-signatories came under criticism.
Ramsden (1987, p. 126) made the folloWing point in this regard on
the 1986 main agreement, which should serve as a caut ionary note
to future industry agreements falling on similar circumstances:
"In effect the industrial council main agreement is no agreement
in the true sense of the word. Of the estimated 500 000 employees
in the Metal industry, only 91 000 were signatories to the main
agreement. The bal ance either refuse to sign or are not party to
negottat lons, but to whom the cond it ions of the ma in agreement are
extended by the Minister of Manpower. The main agreement on its
own is not capable of institutional ising confl tct ."
SEIFSA however states that the 500 000 employees cited by Ramsden
seems inordinately high. It should be noted too that since this
statement in 1986 the trade union parties to the 1990 and 1989
main agreements represented some 200 000 of the industry's 350 000
tota1 work force.
De Jager (Note 26) is presently worki ng on a project to
rationalise and debureaucratise the many agreements pertaining to
this industrial council.
- Technological changes iD.l1 industry restructyring: Changes in
technology and economic foci i can have a marked effect on the way
the industry is operated in the future, and have certainly also
had a major impact on developments in the Metal industry in the
past. This could cause a major restructuring in the industry and
impact on the scope of the national industrial council •
In an industrial council with such a wide scope, the need may
arise within certain subsectors to create their own bargaining
units or industrial councils. The logistics of such a
reorganisation are however not straightforward, as considerable
consultation and negottation with all affected parties and
non-parties would be necessary.
A proposal to handl e future potent 111 restructuri ng of the
council's scope, such as for the Plastics industry, which
currently falls within the scope of the Metal industry, is to for
example establish itself initially as a separate group operating
under the auspices of the present industrial council. Such an
embryo council could still lace itself into the main industry
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Iagreements, then set up a separate industrial council with its own
set of agreements under the umbrella coordinating industrial
counc i l . Therea Her Its scope cou1d be expanded to include say
the Chemical industry's workers, where the previous industrial
council was disbanded, with progressive dereglstration from the
Metal Industry industrial council implemented.
On the subject of the scope of the counei 1, De Jager (Note 25)
makes reference to the historical development of and influences on
this national industrial council that have affected its scope.
The original intention with the wide scope was that the government
in the pest-ear peri od wished to have a strong industrial council
for this key industry. A national industrial council was
therefore encouraged out of the six regional counci 1s for the
industry.
Certain sectors li ke the Business Equipment sector which is
covered under this broad scope, could not register a separate
industrial council in the Industry, and although not out of the
industry is excluded from the main agreement, which becomes an
anomalous situation. The net result of this type of arrangement
i s that should a dispute arise in the Bus iness Equ ipmen t sector,
it must be referred to the national industrial council and the
parties cannot apply for a conciliation board as it still falls
under the jurisdiction of the Metal industry's industrial council.
Another example is that of when certa in sectors wish to break away
completely and will not accept that they are covered under thejurisdiction of the national industrial council. The Lawnmower
sector in particular have asked for a separate determination and
that the scope of the council's cert tficate of reg istrat ion be
curtailed. The effect of such curtailment on other small sectors
within the main industry would be of concern as should the
industrial court for example agree to this, it could cause a
breakaway movement with the industry breaking up into a large
number of small industrial councils. The multi-disciplinary
nature of certain employers would also lend itself to a very
bureaucratic system developing amongst all these small councils.
Another potential issue of coverage is that at this point the
counci1 has refrai ned from negoti at ing agreements for employees
outside the shopfloor level, namely white collar worker
categories. Should sufficient representat Ion of such employees
occur, a request might be submitted to the counci 1 for the scope
of the main agreement to be extended to include these employees or
alternatively for a separate agreement to be concluded for thea,
- Benefit fw1d.1: These are not a problem as such, but could become
one should the industrial council be dissolved for one reason or
the other. Simtl ar to the Building industry, the councll's
benefit funds play an important role in the industry. At present
the council administers two pension funds, with several billion
rands sitting in trust for employees within the industry. The
administration of these funds will necessitate continuity of this
service by the council or equivalent body, for periods potentially
spanning several generations of beneficiaries. The extent of the
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,counc ll ' s large benefl t funds and schemes are covered more fully
under Section 7.6.2.
- Uh2.Y! brokers ns1 j ndependent contractors: labour brokers,
contracting out the services of an estimated 40 000 - 50 000
workers In the industry, create a problem too as it is difficult
for the Industrial council to exercise adequate control over them
and bring them under the employer net. Independent contractors,
who are an Important part of the industry, also fall within this
category. The pract teal Impl teat ion of these elements within the
industry is that it 15 difficult to exercise compliance with the
ma in agreement by labour brokers and Independent contractors,
which can disadvantage employees and other employers in the
industry. Very often the industrial council needs to become
involved in resolving such issues arising between the various
part les.
- b2 1ll.r bargaini og: Interest ingly, De Jager (Note 8) never
raised this as a problem for this industrial council, although he
did allude to it (Note 25) in discussing the contradictions and
confl tcts between centraltsed and plant level bargaining in
general. The focus of this issue would appear to be more within
the employer circle itself or it could have abated somewhat in the
more recent past. Be that as it may, the principles that
surrounded the Metal industry bargaining level debate still remain
relevant and topical and are treated extensively elsewhere in this
document due to their importance to the industrial council system
in general.
Finally, it is also appropriate to add the conclusions from
Allan's (1987, pp. 64 - 72) research on this industrial council.
Although his research primarily focussed on the challenge of plant
based bargaining on the industrial council system as operating in
the Metal Industry, the following problem areas were highl ighted
duri ng the exami nat i on of his seven key propos it ions re lat ing to
the issues and controversies which then faced the national
industrial council:
- There was an absence of a unified front approach from both the
employer and employee (union) parties which hampered the
development of a basic national main agreement which could
acconmodate appropriate bargaining structures at other levels,
that 15 at sectoral, company and plant level.
- Joint representat ions to government level would have been
unlikely under the then political scenario due to negative
perceptions by both parties, that 15 union parties alleging
emp1oyer collaborat i on and co11 us ion with the State, and employer
parties' perceptions of a pervasive pcltt ical element invldlng
bona fide industrial relations negotiations.
- The resistance by employers to accommodate two tier bargaining
within the nlUonal industrial council structure, which could then
have resulted tn a major confrontation between employers and
unions, and could furthermore have prejudiced the ongoing
existence of the industrial council in its present form.
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- A lack of willingness and conrnitment to change behaviour. with a
spirit of unilateral ism prevail ing on the part of both employer
and employee parties. to the detriment of future codetermination.
To what extent these issues and problems have been resolved have
not been lncl uded in the scope of this present study.
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8. S!LB.ID MiD RESULTS
In addition to a study of appropriate 1tterature on the subject of
industrIal counc i 1s • a survey was also conducted amongst
industrial councils, employer and trade union parties to
industrial councils and certain other individuals who are regarded
as authorities on or who have a vested interest in the industrial
council system.
This survey was intended to support both the prime research
objective of exploring the validity of the comment on the demise
of the industrial councll in the 1990's, as well as the two
subordinate objectives which were suemar tsed as follows in Section
1 on the study overview:
"The recording and discussion of views on contemporary issues and
future perspectives concerning the industrial council system, with
the generation of tentative reconrnendatlons that could impact on
the future of industrial councils and the system that they
support".
A qualitative approach was therefore adopted, as supported by
Allan's (1987, p , 5) bellef that " ... the nature of the issues,
and the dynamic process of change in the industrial relations
environment are not amenable to rigorous quantitative analysis."
11 1h2..Y..U1 ~ st re ssed jgij,n 1hi.t. lli 0vera11 .s.1lI.ll II Dr1rna r 11 y Q.f
j conceptual nature, illh 1M survey Qill.g regarded.u j
suPPlementary medium ill generating infonnation 12 SUDPort lli
.tl!u1.Y objectives.
8.1 HYPOTHESIS ANQ PROBLEM fORMULATION
The hypothesis, 1f an appropriate reference due to the nature of
the study, is essentially to disprove Hiemstra's statement quoted
by Jowell (1989) in the introductory section to this document,
namely:
"The Industrial Council has survived the first post-Wiehahn
decade. I don't th ink it will see out the second decade.·
It is proposed that the demise of the industr1al counc11 system is
not inminent and that with a reassessment of its role and
operation, will survive the 1990's.
Subordinate objectives of the study were firstly to obtain and
highlight views on contemporary issues facing the industrial
councll system, and secondly to provide proposals on how these
issues can be addressed in the future to support the continued
viability and existence of industrial councils.
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8. 2~ METHQOOLQGY
As ment loned before, it was cons idered appropriate to adopt a
qualitative Information gathering approach as It would allow for
as wide as poss ibl e range of responses to be prov tded in order to
obtain the most comprehensive spectrum of views.
The survey was conducted via a self-completion questionnaire of a
prlmartly open-ended nature, supplemented by personal interviews
where these could be arranged. Questionnaires were either matled
to potential respondents under a covering letter, or presented
personally to interviewees for completion and return after the
interview, or completed by the interviewer during the interview if
sufficient time was available for this.
Personal Interviews did not only always focus on the questionnaire
content, but also on other topics relevant to the study, therefore
it was not possible to complete questionnaires in all instances
during Interviews due to interviewees' time constraints. In
retrospect, it would have been advisable to have ensured
conplet tqn during interviews, as several of the interviewees did
not return completed questionnaires.
As there was a concern that some respondents woul d not wish to
conrnlt their views in writing on a questionnaire due to the nature
of their offices (for example representatives from Government
bodies), as much, but less direct, information as possible was
gleaned during these interviews and the questionnaire completion
not pursued. These responses have not been included under the
survey responses but are referred to either directly or
anonymously under the other appropriate sections of th is document.
With the above type of exclusions the eventual response 1evels to
the questionnaire were obviously adversely affected, as discussed
further In Section 8.6 on the survey limitations.
A detal1ed content analysis was performed on the responses to each
of the questionnaire items, broken down Into the frequency of
responses per organisation category, that is for either industrial
council, employer organi sation, etcetera.
Thereafter those more frequently occurring responses were
extracted and commented upon, as well as an analysis made of the
different responses amongst the organisation categories
represented, concluding with comparisons between the responses of
these groups.
These outcomes were used too to support the discussion on
contemporary issues in Section 9 and the recommendations for the
future presented in Section 10.
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8.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
The self-coeplet ion. primarily open-ended questionna ire. contained
ten items, based on the survey object Ives and on other relevant
issues that emerged in the course of the 1tterature study and
discussion with parties with an interest In industrial councils.
The full questionna ire is provided in Appendix 2, but the contents
are surrrnarised here to facilitate the present discussion.
- Identification of the type of organisation that the respondent
represented, under eight categories: Industrial Counci 1, Employer
Organ isati on, Trade Un ion Federat ion/Organtsat ion, Indivtdua1
Employer, Individual Trade Union, Government Body. Academic
Institution and Other. Respondents were not required to identify
themselves, but were requested to provide address details should
they require a copy of the survey report.
- An opinion on the major factors (i ssues) that have an impact on
the effectiveness of industrial councils, in general and for the
respondent's industrial council, if applicable.
- Suggestions on how the factors that are perceived
the effectiveness of industrial councils should be
improve councils' effectiveness. also in general
respondent's industrial council, as applicable.
- The perceived advantages and di sadvantages of establ i shtng and
funct ioning wtthi n industrial council s for both employers and
trade unions.
- An opinion on why certain industrial council s had dissolved
during recent years and how these dissolutions could have been
prevented.
- A rating on the effectiveness of industrial
centralised collective bargaining structures on a
likert·type scale.
- What alternative institution(s) could be considered in the
absence or place of industrial couneils in the formal labour
relations system.
- A rating on the importance of seven current and/or potential
functions and roles of industrial councils in both the business
and wider corrrnunity. with the inclusion of an Other category, on a
three point likert-type scale. These seven functions and roles
are: Collective bargaining, Dispute resolution, Benefit scheme
administration. Training progralmles, Educational upl Htment,
Social responsibility and Social change implementation.
- What the respondent considers the stance of a potent tal future
government under a new political dispensation will be towards the
industrial council system.
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- Finally, an opinion on whether the Industrial council system
will survive the second post-Wiehahn decade, namely the 1990's,
with a motivation for the response.
Oi fferent coveri ng 1etters to the quest ionna ire were sent to mail
respondents and interview respondents respectively.
8.4 ~ SAMPLE
As stated in an earl ier section, the Department of Manpower does
not publish specific details on industrial councils and their
part tes, apart from through the facil ity of government gazettes
and the Department of Manpower annual reports. Mail ing 1ists are
obviously not provided either to the public, therefore the
industrial council and party survey distribution was obtained from
the then most recent issue of the South African Trade Unions
library's Offichl South African Trade Union Directory 1989 - 1990
(1989) .
Twenty-four personal interviews were granted from industrial
councils, their parties and other authorities. Several other
interviews were al so sought but could unfortunately not be
arranged. These sixteen unsuccessful approaches were mainly to
employer parties to dissolved industrial councils, academics, as
well as trade unions and trade union federations.
In the end a total of 254 potent tal respondents, inc1 uding those
interviewed, were canvassed, as broken down in Table 8.4.
TABLE 8.4
Syrvey Questionnaires submitted sn lli Indystrlal coyncil~
in~ Africa
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
ORGANISATION
REPRESENTED
SUBMITTED
Hail Interv/ TOTAL
Other
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Ind Counc il 88 3 91
Emp1oyer Org 72 4 76
Trade Union Fed 2 2
Ind Employer 3 3
Ind Trade Union 70 3 73
Government Body 4 4
Academic Inst 2 2
Other/Consu1t 3 3
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
TOTAL 230 24 254
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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8.5 £lBY..E:t RESPONSES
Although several attempts were made to follow up parties on their
responses and the return of questionnaires, as well as to arrange
personal interviews, the end result ultimately was as presented in
Table 8.5.
TABLE 8.5
Analysts sf responses 12~ an lli Indystrial coyne 11 ll.ili!!I
in lli1h Africa
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
SUBMITTED
ORGANISAT ION Hail Intervl TOTAL TOTAL %
REPRESENTED Other SENT RECEIVED
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
I Ind Counci 1 88 3 91 19 20,9Emp1oyer Org 72 4 76 13 17,1
Trade Union Fed 2 2 2 100,0
Ind Employer 3 3 5 166,7
Ind Trade Union 70 3 73 8 II ,0
Government Body 4 4 0,0
Academic Inst 2 2 I 50,0
Other/Consul t 3 3 5 166,7
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
TOTAL 230 24 254 53 20,9
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
~:
I) The Government Body respondents submi tted personal views
whi ch were incorporated under Other.
Two Employer Organisation representatives had responded as
Individual Employers, hence the higher returns than
submtss ions for both these groupi ngs.
2) Five respondents had responded on behalf of more than one
organisation on which they served.
3) Other submissions to Academic Institutions and other parties
not directly linked to industrial councils, where responses or
interviews were not obtained, have not been reported due to
the potent ia1 adverse effect on response 1eve15 •
In addition, there were other responses such as the follOWing:
- Returned by post office with address unknown:
Three trade unions and one employer organisation
- Not registered yet, chose not to respond:
One employer organisation
- Too busy to ass is t:
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IOne Industrial counc tl
• Referred to counc i 1 part les for response:
One Industrial council
• Unable to give meantngful response as not active:
One tndustrta1 counc tl
• Returned by addressee as no longer assoctated with body:
Two tndustrta1 counc t15
- Not In a positton to divulge tnformatton regarded as
confidential:
Three tndustria1 counctl s
• Objected against researcher's academtc Institution:
One trade un 1on
- Referred to employer federatton for response:
One employer organ 1sat ton
After the conclusion of the study two further declines/apologies
for tnabllity to submtt responses were received. Similar other
responses possibly appl ted, but as these were not received could
not be tncorporated here, and could have contributed to the
relattvely low response level, which was a disappoint ing aspect of
the survey.
These sixteen formal declines would reduce the effective potential
responses to 238, with only a marginal Increase in the percentage
actual response to 22,3".
8.6 £lRID LIMITATIONS
The following limi tat Ions to the survey should be pointed out:
a) The numeric level of responses was disappointing, despite
attempts to telephonically follow up selected parties for their
questtonnaires and to arrange appointments for interviews. One
would venture to observe that either a degree of apathy or
reluctance to be perceived to either challenge or disrupt the
status quo, by ignoring or evading the issues surrounding
industrial councils. could be detected In the response level.
Also, certain response exclusions as referred to earl ier, as well
as formal and other potenttal declines, adversely affected the
overall numeric response level. It is suspected that many
industrial councils, based on the feedback from I few council
secretartats, are reluctant to divulge what In their opinion is
conftdential information to researchers and external parties, a
stance which must obviously be respected.
Nevertheless, it was felt important to report the data as
presented without man lpulatlon and undue contalllinat ion, bearing In
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mind this limitation.
~ 1.2 lli eventual relatively 1!!1ill mill lin 2f II obtained
versus lli ill potent ial respondents canvassed. 11 .ll stressed
1lli1 interpretat ion illi1 generali sat ion 2f lli fj ndings shoul d l2i
approached illh unl illi1 caution.
b) A further 1imitation was that all respondents did not always
complete all items and therefore the actual response frequency to
items ts also provided in the survey results to enable circumspect
interpretat ion of the outcomes.
c) In using the qual itative non-statistical approach, according to
Allan (1987, p. 13) "... the research findings and opinions
expressed, are not necessarily general isable to the industrial
council 'system' as a whole." Respondents have views based on
their particular platforms and ideologies, which can often be very
divergent. Also, due to the un ique features of and d Hferences
between industries and consequently their industrial councils,
generalisation is in fact not always advisable. Furthermore, in
disseminating and interpreting the results, the researcher could
furthernore tend to modify the vari ous opinions expressed.
In respect 2.f lli I2..Q..Qr numeric hill 2.f responses. it. II however
lli writer's opin ion 1hit. lli Qua 11ty 2f 1hill rece i ved in lli
sample.~ included 1Q.!!!f 2f 1M largest industrial councils illi1
mill authoritative parties. compensated ill 1b..ll limitation.
although in improved spread 2f representation. in particylar fr.Qm
~ mi2n parties. ~ hili Jlwl desired.
Special appreciation is extended to those respondents that
presented thoughtful, frank and thorough deliberations to the
questionnaire items and made their valuable time available for
thl s purpose.
With reference to the inherent 1imitations to qual itative
research, an attempt was made to optimise the potential for valid
results. This was done in two ways.
Firstly, the comments and responses were analysed by organisation
category or source so that biases of particular groupings could be
ident Hied and compari sons made on the extent of di fferences and
similarities in perceptions. Secondly, in the detailed content
analysts of the 'raw' responses, only in the event of complete
consensus in the interpretation of comments were these ranked as
being similar responses, to avoid contamination in interpretation
and consolidation by the analyst.
As noticed in viewing the survey content analysis provtded in
Appendix 3, this led to a large number and very wide range of
responses being recorded, but it was felt advisable to retain this
detail in order to reflect a more accurate response pattern.
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8.7 £.!BiTt RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS
A detailed content analysis was performed on the responses to the
questionnaire items. The outcome of this analysis is presented in
Appendix 3. The frequency and source of responses are also
provided in the appendix schedule, for as mentioned in the
preceding section, different biases and emphases can apply due to
dtffering respondent perspectives.
In~ 12 reduce contamination throygh anaJyst interpretation
ind. consoJ1dat ions 2.f responses. 2.O..U~ compl ete consensys 2f
opinion ru jpparent lli i response ~ II 1ltln.g 1M ~
response h.'t several respondents I Therefore j h1.9h nymber iDS1~
~ 2f responses .in recorded. 1!th..Wl 9.1ill ill impress 1on 2f IIWl:l
different biases 1ill1 perspectives sn lffill. min m2ll Ulli Y..e..a
similar 2! common issues. 11 kill however f.e.ll adVisable 12 J..wJ
1h.11 l1ill.il sU 1M ~ ana)ysis .1nlli.1 12 re fl ec t j ID.Q!J
accurate response pattern md.~ fir potential future probing
~ dissemination.
Despite the caution on generalisat ion with respect to industrial
councils, which has been supported by the range of responses
received confirming this observation, certain conmon views do
however occur amongs t the 53 respondents.
A sunvnary of the more generali sed findings of the survey is
necessary to facili tate ,interpretation and the highlighting of
contemporary issues and recommendat ions emanating from these, for
further discussion in the followi ng sect ions of th is document. It
should be reminded again that due to the relatively small numbers
applicable as a result of the dispersion of reponses,
i nterpretat ions and percentage references shou1 d be considered
with care.
The approach to be app11 ed is as fo11 ows:
a) Those views or responses that were presented by f2.w: 2r~
respondents 1.2 1M Questionnaire 11m will firstly be extracted
and presented by individual item and organisation category. Four
responses appeared, by visual observat ion and due to the spread of
responses, to be a reasonable cut off to apply to estab1 ish those
regarded as the more important factors under each i tern. These
responses are summari sed under key words or phrases for the sake
of brevity and presentation, and sequenced in highest to lowest
frequency (or importance) order. A brief summary of the other
lesser responses or factors is included, followed by an
interpretation of the results of this extract, which commences
with the five (or less) most important factors identified under
each questionnare i tern, as applicable.
b) The views of respondents within organisation categories~
m 2! Ill2!f responses ~ recorded wi 11 secondly be extracted
under each questionnaire Hem, with key words or phrases similarly
used for the factors of importance. Where there are only single
respondents to a group, these responses will be omitted. In the
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Ievent of just two respondents, only when both respond similarly
will their responses be recorded jointly In this extract. This ts
to provide an indication of the relative Importance attached by
the various groups to particular Hems. Again, a brief sUll'lllaryof
the other responses of the different groups and an interpretation
of the results will follow.
During this previous analysts a comparison will also be made of
the different groups' views on factors of Importance in the
industrial council system, to explore similarities and
contradictions that might have been revealed, wHh explanations
offered where possible.
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8.7.1 Hill IMPQRTANT FACTORS
The responses which were provided by four and more respondents
across all organisation categories are provided in Table 8.7.1,
broken down into organisation represented and sunmar1sed by key
words or phrases. These responses are also ranked from highest to
lowest frequency to provide an indication of relative importance.
Please note that throughout this and the following Table 8.7.2,
the following abbreviations will apply:
IC • Industrial Council
EO • Employer Organ 1sa t ion
TF • Trade Union Federat ion
IE • Individual Employer
IU • Individual Trade Union
AI • Academic Inst i tut ion
OC • Other/Consul tant
TOT • Total Response
I
Government Body has been omitted as a group in both Tabl es 8.7.1
and 8.7.2 as no official response was received. The percentage In
the final column is based on the total of 53 respondents. Other
percentages by group are based on the group total responses as
analysed in Table 8.5.
TABLE 8.7.1
Syryey resylts anal ysed lrllll2ll important factors
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM/ IC EO TF IE IU AI OC TOT ,;
RESPONSE
•••••••••••••••••••• • ••• •••• • ••• • ••• •••• •••• •••• •••• • ••••
1. What are in your opinion the major factors that have an impact
on the effectt veness of Industrial Councils.
1.1 In general
Oi spute resolut ion 3 2 2 2 9 17,0
e Counc ill ors 2 1 3 2 9 17,0
Bureaucracy 5 2 1 1 9 17,0
Counc i 1 personne1 1 2 1 2 1 8 15,1
Represent ivity 2 1 3 8 15,1
Admini strat ion 2 2 1 7 13,2
Acceptance/support 2 3 7 13,2
Relationships 2 1 2 6 11 ,3
Minimum standards 2 2 1 6 11 ,3
Comon purpose 2 1 1 6 11 ,3
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Processing time
Other Issues
Union mandate
Benefit schemes
Exemptions
4
4
4
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
6 11,3
6 11,3
6 11,3
5 9,4
5 9,4
1.2 Your Industrial Council
Union pot tt tctsat tcn 4
Agreement time 5
5 4
I
As for 1.1
Union majorltarism
Represent lvlty
4
2 2
1
1
1
2 2 13 24,S
7 13,2
7 13,2
6 11,3
4 7,6
2. How do you suggest that the factors that impair Industrial
Councils' effectiveness be addressed to improve their operations?
2.1 In general
2
Commi tment/att itudes 4
Independent self-
governance
1 2 3
2
10 18,9
7 13,2
Council training/
skills improvement 2
More professionalism 2
Agreement publicat
expedition 2
More representative
Market ing campa ign
Union training
Focus labour issues
1
2
4
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
2
7 13,2
6 11,3
6 11,3
6 11,3
6 11,3
5 9,4
5 9,4
Less bureaucracy 2
2.2 Your Industrial Counc
2 4 7,6
As for 2.1
Emp1oyer un i ty
3
4
3
1
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7 13,2
6 11,3
I I I I I I I I I
3. What do you perceive are the advantages and disadvantages of
establishing and functioning within Industrial Councils for:
3.1 Employers
- Advantages
Dispute resolution 8 5 2 2 2 1 20 37,7
Same wages/benefits 7 5 2 1 17 32,1
Negot htion forum 4 4 2 3 14 26,4
Benefit schemes 2 4 1 1 10 18,9
Reduces competttton 3 4 9 17,0
Sol tdarity/strategy 5 2 1 9 17,0
Se1f -governance 3 3 7 13,2
Order1y negoti at ions 4 2 7 13,2
Better relationships 3 2 6 11.3
Lega1 enforceab i 1i ty 2 4 6 11,3
Training schemes 3 5 9,4
Less costly disputes 2 2 5 9,4
Security/stabtl i ty 4 4 7,6
Central tsed forum 2 4 7,6
- Oi sadvantages
Adjust to lowest 4 2 2 8 15,1
Minima imposttion 2 2 2 6 11,3
Costly small 'ers 2 4 7,6
3.2 Trade Unions
- Advantages
Single wage/beneft ts
regulat ton forum 8 5 2 2 5 2 24 45,3
Legal enforceabtl tty 6 3 1 1 13 24,5
Industry solidarity 4 1 2 1 9 17,0
Benefit schemes 4 1 9 17,0
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Dispute resolution 6 1 9 17,0
Centralised forum 4 3 1 9 17,0
Optimal resourclng 3 7 13,2
Contro1/Influence 2 3 6 11,3
Impartial/fair 2 2 5 9.4
SecurHy/stabtl tty 2 4 7,6
Better relationships 2 4 7.6
- 01 sadvantages
None 4 3 8 1S.1
I Negot tat Ion time 4 1 7 13,2
01 spute time 4 1 7 13.2
Membership remote 2 1 5 9.4
4. Why In your opinion have ndustrtal Councils di sso ved during
recent years?
.
Employer plant level
bargaining 3 3 9 17,0
Union Ideologies 4 1 7 13.2
Other Issues 4 1 6 11.3
EmpIoyer dhuni ty 4 1 6 11.3
Technological change 4 1 6 11,3
Union pressure/
disputes 1 2 5 9,4
lack of conrnltment 2 2 5 9,4
Union representivity 2 3 5 9,4
Poor att Itudes 4 5 9,4
Cannot conrnent 3 4 7,6
Past union rejection 4 7,6
Union polltlcisatlon 4 7.6
Counc II management 4 7,6
-161-
5. How in your mind could these di ssolutlons have been prevented?
Cannot cOllll1ent
As for 2.1 and 2.2
5
4 1
2 2 10 18,9
Better conmuntcat tnn
/understanding 2
Could not prevent
1
6. How effect ive do you rate Industria Council s as central Ised
collective bargainin structures?
7. What alternative instltution(s) could be considered In the
absence/place of Industrial Councils in the formal labour
relations system?
I
Effective
Very effective
Moderately effect ive
15
4
5
4
4
1
1
3 5
1
1
1
3
30 56,6
11 20,8
10 18,9
None other
Emp1oyer forum
Union federations
12 3
1
2
1 2 4
2
1
1
8. How important do you rate the following current and potential
functions and roles of Industrial Counctls in both the business
and wider cOllll1unity:
(NI • Not important I • Important VI • Very important)
Dispute settling VIIS 10
Coll bargaining VIIS 8
Benefit schemes VI 10 5
Training schemes VI 10 3
NI 8 5
2
16 30,2
16 30,2
17 32,1
3 40 75,S
3 39 73,6
3 27 50,9
4 25 47,2
1 21 39,6
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
7
5
4
2
2 4
2 8
1 6
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
4
4
6
5Education upgrade I 9
Education upgrade VI 4
Social responsb HI 7
Social responsb I 5
Social change
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Sochl responsb VI S 2
Tratnlng schemes ) 7
Soc tal change S.
Educatton upgrade NI 4 3
ceu bArgatnlng 2.
Tratnlng schemes NI 4 2
Benefit schemes NI 2 2
Dtsputo settltng
Hous tng provl s ion VI
Sochl activities VI 2
I
Benefit schemes
Soc hI change
S 5
VI 4 2
5
2 2
2 •
2
)
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
16 30,2
15 28,3
1S 28,3
14 26,.
12 22,6
10 18,9
9 17,0
9 17,0
6 11 ,)
5 9,.
8 15,124
9. What do you cons tder the stance will be towards the Industrial
Counctl system of a potential futuro government under a new
pol It leal dlspensaU on7
Depends on whtch
do not know
Negattve if PAC bias 4
Retain and modify
Pos t t tve t f worker
support
4
3 2
I
6 11,3
6 11,)
Postttve ANC/COSATU
support cent barg 2
10. In conclusion. are you of the op nton that the Industrtal
Counctl system wt11 survtve the second post-Wtehahn decade, namely
the 1990' s7
Yes
No
17 12 2 5 6
2
- Hot hat ton Yes
Need coll barg forulII 6
Except tf PAC ruling •
Unton acceptance 2
1
2 9 17,0
6 11,3
4 7,6
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Mediation centre 2
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Other minority responses received to the Individual questions are
sunmarlsed below. The reader is encouraged to take note of these
items which were raised by single or only a few respondents as
there Is merl tin many of these.
1. Mi.1.2r factors 1!l.ll~ ill lmoact 21l!M effect 1veness 2f
industrial councils lt221h 1n general lDJ1 ill soecHic industrial
counclls):
The ability to reach agreement effectlvely and with least
disruption; the preparedness of the industry populations to use
and pay for council facilities; interests of the industry
population versus vested or personal interests; presence of two
tier bargaining; government Interference beyond minimum conditions
regulation; belief in the principle of collectivism; Black
(emergent) unions who want to participate; nature of industry and
size and number of firms In the industry; adequate numbers,
ablllty, attitudes and efflclency of council agents; willingness
of the parties to comply wlth industry agreements; adaptation to
and keeping abreast with change; effectiveness of agreement
monitoring; attitudes of councillors (party representatives);
conmunication of the council's role to parties and industry
populatlon and effectiveness of this cOlll11unicatlon; perceptlons of
council's role and functions by members; perceived impartiallty
and fairness of council's actlons; Willingness of both parties to
part icipate in a centralised unitary bargaining forum; willingness
of unions to cooperate on a combined forum; adoption of democratlc
processes; whether agreements are extended to non-part i es; narrow
sectoral or broader industry perspectives; qual Hat i ve versus
quantitatlve representivity; legal nature and comp1exlty of
council agreements; historlcal development with negative emergent
j
Black} unlon att i tudes to system; the size, scope and
urlsdiction of councils; number of employer and employee partles
n council; remoteness from membership; domination of council s by
ndivldual parties; time taken to negotiate agreements; council
greements versus' wage determinations; employer and employee
\urnover in an industry; workload of councillors; closed shop
lla uses; union bargainlng exclusivity demands at plant level;nterunlon rlvalry on council; joint control of benefit funds;ime taken for exemption applications; communication of
negotiation progress; government assistance and support to
counclls with problems; period of existence of council.
2. H2l!11M factors 1hll.11!!Ja1r industrial councils' effectlyeness
~ addressed 12 imoroye council s' effecttveness it221h in genera]
ind ill specific industrial councils l :
Hore flexibility in granting exemptions; voting not on party lines
but for Industry benefit; agreements not to be extended to
,on-parties; council access to company Information precluded;
tationallse on council and plant level bargaining items;
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impartiality and service orientation of counc11 staff with
suspicions of bribery eliminated; less emphasis on representivlty;
broaden representation to all with valid claims. limit
representation to trade rather than Industry, excluding parties
with no real interest; State interference in content of council
agreements and exempt ions to be liml ted; State power to refuse to
publi sh agreements or parts thereof to be limited; reeognit ion of
other collect tve bargaining arrangements and agreements;
depolitlclsation of unions; provide more positive experiences of
system and its benefits; agents (and council staff) greater
sensitivity to Black trade union needs, more involvement in
mediat Ion and cone l11at ion, more service orientated and less
punit ive; take advantage of climate of Improved cooperation and
less apparent government Interference; main agreements more user
fri endly; scope and juri sd let Ion of councils reviewed and adapted
to modern conditions; agreements to incorporate all areas of RSA;
improved general communication with the Industry; legislation to
accommodate two tier bargaining; exemptions for small employers;
more realistic worker expectations; less repressive employer
at t ttudes: counc 11 const ttut Ions and agreements to be modernised
and denccrat tsed; closer control of council registration
cert Iflcates; formal1sed dispute reso1ution procedures;
establishment of dedicated dispute committees; regular high level
meetings with Department of Manpower; wider publicity of role of
counc tl sin regulat i ng labour matters; tra ining to un ion s on free
enterprise system; training to employers on new IR dimensions and
labour law: comprehensive council constitutions; gUidel ines on and
expeditious processing of exemptions; lRA amended criteria for
agreement extensions; appeal mechanism against State refusal to
agreement extens i ons; senior and shop f1oar expert enced
councillors; remove power of industrial court in respect of S
46(9) of the LRA; council agreements to be approved by an
industrial tribunal prior to publishing; works councils issues not
to Include those in council agreementsi mechani sms for greater
democratic1sation and participation of rank and file members; wage
determinations also to apply with optional cover; eliminate
fragmented counc t l sub-commi t tee negot Iat ion forums; appoint
qualified and skilled staff in senior council postt tens:
remunerate council staff compet it ivelYi right to make council
decisions binding on all parties in labour disputes; former
agreements to apply as wage determinations until settlement 15
reachedi refer employer organ isat ion canstitut ion for gu ideli nes i
agreements to be reviewed and updated regularly.
3. IM Dercefved advantages iru1 dlsadyantages gf industrial
councils ill employers illi1~ unions:
3.1 [mDlover advant ages:
Forum to address wider issues; can draw out disputes and help
establish common ground (a dubious approach): removes managers'
industrial relat ions management burden; experienced negot iatorsi
council staff and agents ensure agreement implementat ion; tailor
made agreements for industry; apprenticeship schemes provide
sk11ls for industry; council other services and resources; body to
represent Industry at higher levels and control s t andards:
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Iestablished voluntarily; can improve productivity in industry;
educational experience for all parties; constructive forum
improving attitudes; perceived neutral body; standardised job
grading systems apply; Industry influence; democrat i c processes
appl led; can be representative of industry; workers have a say;
plant level bargaining not precluded; long term industry goals
have preference; protective mechanisms and security of employment
for employees; introduces measure of discipline in industry;
ancillary benefits such as housing loans to employees; specialist
staff administer counct 15; system has wealth of knowl edge; fosters
formation and regi stration of employer and employee bodies;
equitable representation of parties; generally minimal State
interference; const ttut ions ensure stabil ity and operat ional
guidelines; represent tvity regularly monitored; agreements can be
extended to non-parties; some protection against plant level
bargaining; exemption system prevents harm to smaller employees;
overall less costly and more convenient; bargain with all unions
in a unitary forum; improved budgeting of labour costs and
planning; aid to formulating employee policies and procedures;
participants more open minded; less union in-fighting.
Emplover di sadyantages:
None; none if responsible unions; lack of flexibll tty in own
affairs; mistrust of competitors; large employers compelled to
bargain twice at plant level; scope can be too wide; mismatch
between wages and productivity; allows interference in domestic
affajrs; bureaucratic dectstons at inconvenient times; higher
wages imposed; not always representative; accommodation required
for two tier bargaining with lack of clarity on obligations;
employer preference for plant level bargaining only; agreements
not tailored to company needs; generally bureaucrat tc and unwieldy
system; domination of parties who set conditions for the minority;
compromise on individual mandates for cOl1lllon mandate; employee
parties can disagree to exemptions; council workload deterrent to
managements; slow to satisfy local needs; difficult to obtain an
employer mandate; hampers small business development; registration
unacceptable to some employer parties; system unsutted to domestic
issues; slow dispute settlement; inadequate provision for
local/plant level disputes; contribution to council funds; time
for agreement publication; potential for national or sectoral
industrial action; cannot playoff unions easily; unions involved
with no membership amongst own employees; face combined union
membership strength; criminal versus civil sanctions of agreement
transgressions; agreements too legalistic; when exemptions not
easily provided can disadvantage certain firms; interemp10yer
competition hampering employer sol idarity; employer entitlements
neglected in agreements; more distant and fonnal negotiations can
strain plant level relationships.
3.2~ Yn.!M advantages:
Experience of democratic process for union officials; minimum
standards eliminate exploitation of labour; cOll'lllOn benefit and pay
structures apply; worker basic rights enhanced by external
representation; facilitates meeting of parties at a high level;
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Icontinuity of benefits and safeguards in high mobil ity tndustrtes:
employees have a saYi less confl let with more peaceful
negotlaUons i reduces interun Ion compet it Ion for worker support
and Interunlon r tval ry: job creat ton: union representlvity
malnt atned: less costly dispute resclutton: Influence on industry
training; greater worker Independence; representation and joint
decislonmaklng on benefit funds and training boards; can cover
areas where no membership; less costly than pl ant level
bargalnlngi influence over socio-ecnomlc and political issues;
improves general welfare In industry; Improved status to union
movenent ; closed shop provts tons t collection of union
subscript ions i security of union income and membersh i p ; generally
educational to part tc ipants: highest comon denominator can apply:
self-governance in industry promoted; equitable representation of
part tes: voluntary bodies; democratic processes applied; generally
minimal State interference; agreement from one set of negotiations
for whole Industry; generally more accomplished negotiators.
~ un.1.2n d1s adyantages:
Majority union control not assured; none, protect ions in LRA wtll
condone non-compliance and strikes (a further dubious comment);
employer sol idarity easlerly achieved; finding competent
representatives; employers tend to adhere to minimum rates and
conditions; prefer negotiations to be on actual and not minimum
wages; employers who refuse to bargain at plant level on actual
wages; Black workers still disadvantaged when not sufficiently
represented; organisation costly for 'honest' unions without
external financial support: minority or conservative (traditional)
unions can be disadvantaged; lack of competency of certain council
secretariats; 1imi ts scope for plant level barga i ni ng; more
diluted bargaining occurs; coordination of negotiations with other
unions; exemptions and exclusions from agreements; councll
functions can make unions obsolete; collective action potential at
shop floor bargaining level could lead to better gains;
disadvantages unions who are unable to become parties; slow to
satisfy local needs; compelled to pay councll levies; lack of
flexlbllityand bureaucratic; agreements also binding on unions;
registration unacceptable to some unions; mistrust of system which
also dominated by Whites in past; minorities may determine
conditions of the majority; potential credibtlity loss due to
association; veto right to admission of new parties; few or none
Black agents on councils; reluctance of some employers to bargain
centrally; time for agreement publ teat ion; compromi se pl ant level
demands for national or Industry demands; can lose members to
non-council unions bargaining at plant level; ideology can
overtake member interests.
4. lal1 certain industrial councils hill dissolved:
Employer fear of union strength and domination at centralised
level; divide and rule tactics by parties; ignorance of the
benefits of counci 1 membership; due to disadvantages of the
systemi advantages of plant level bargaining; ractal competition
on councils; ignorance of employers on the new labour dispensation
and reluctance to accept It; industries concerned not large
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enough; insufficient union representivity in a single
employer/trade union party council; divergent/selfish interests of
parties lacking conrnon purpose; resistance by party unions to new
unions joining councils; Interunion competition between party and
non-party unions for members; weak employer organisations; past
conservatism and unethical conduct of counc 11 s; premature
reasoning by part ies; general lack of representivity of councils;
too cumbersome dispute sett 1ement procedures; remoteness to
employees; lack of clarity on scope and demarcation of industries;
both parties favouring plant level bargaining; not keeping pace
with broader developments and change; vested interests causing
inflexibility and inability to adapt to change and manage council
affairs differently; loss of viability of the industry; lack of
cooperation between the parties; imbalance in parties' bargaining
power; lack of funds due to poor economic conditions; employer
resignations and reduced willingness to serve on counci ls; council
workload requirements causing biased employer representation;
closed shop agreements protect i ng unrepresentati ve unions and
impos ing membersh i p on employees; incompetency and lack of
knowledge of councillors; poor leadership on both sides; accepted
norms of bargaining and dispute resolution inadequate after
opening up of system; perceived unreasonable demands of emergent
unions; emergent unions' resistance to LRA constraints; lack of
solidarity between craft and general unions and interunion
rivalry; councils adopting more administrative than proper roles;
dissolution rather than admit mi 1i tant unions; general apathy and
lack of dtscip1 ine; State image of obstructiveness and lack of
bel ief in the system.
5. H.ID! 1hill disso1utions.t..O..Ul.d~~ prevented:
Could not as a vol untary system; historical origins which could
have been prevented; education of employers in labour relations;
remove LRA facility for party unions to veto entry of new unions;
comi tment to sys tem and cooperat ion, greater to1erance of
opposing views, with good sense prevailing; more reasonable and
genuine approach to emergent unions; constraints on unwarranted
militancy of certain unions; cannot prevent with po1iticisation of
union movement i fi nner stand by Department of Manpower to maintain
law and order, as well as stronger act ion by part i es and council
secretariats; better understand i ng of complemental i ty between
plant level and centralised bargaining; positive use of
technology; more focussed services by councils; greater mediatory
role in disputes; more sensitive to party needs with a servicing
rather than pol icing approach; an unviable institution should be
allowed to dissolve; better and equal representation; if
dissolved, could st 111 be re-estab1 ished on an improved basis;
strong and informed leadership on both sides; greater flexibility
to operate by State; competent council staff; improved
legislation; dependent on specific company policies on collective
bargaining; learning curve experienced leading to new concepts
which will result in the structuring of new councils; more active
traditional unions on councils; cooperative and sympathetic State
approach; greater flexibtl ity in adapting to change with
relinguishing of vested interests.
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6. lli effectiveness 2f industrial counclls II centralised
collective bargaining stryctures:
Add it ional responses are not appl icable here.
7. Alternative Inst i tytions 1hll~ 12!: considered In !M J2lill
2f industrial councO s in lli forma] labour relations system:
Industry Training Boards as a springboard; self-government concept
to leave to individual employers and unions with only voluntary
institutions effective; agreements at different bargaining levels
not subject to LRA and covering part les only; renamin9 only of
existing structure; alternative instruments such as wage
determinations; State hampers alternatives; rather strengthen
present legal basis of councils; employers' organisations to
liaise with unions on consultative basis at government level;
decentralise collective bargaining and retain other functions
centrally; separate administrative and other functions; certain
funct ions to be performed by employers' organisations and unions;
different forums for different sectors/Industries; plant level
bargaining; still evolving with no solutions; none other that can
achieve agreement with least disrupt ion; concil1at ion boards
unsuitable; none other but modernise and restructure; none other
but unions to combine and strengthen themselves; corporate
bargaining structures; incorporate formal role for IHSSA; State to
attend to small businesses in terms of deregulation with plant
level bargaining for larger employers and sophisticated labour
legislation; councils for industries with medium to small
employers and plant level for industries with large employers;
only required where agreements need to be extended to non-parties;
strategies to opt out of the formal system to be res i sted as can
lead to exploitation; will still require legislation to enforce
agreements; shop floor (plant level) bargaining not suitable; any
system both parties want and will be committed to on a voluntary
basIs.
8. Rating 2f lli importance 2.f 1M cyrrent iruI potential
fynct ions illiI DUll 2.f indystri al coyncil s:
No further response connent applicable here, except for 'Other'
functions added by respondents that are not provtded in Table
8.7.1. These are:
Job creation (VI); resolVing union political differences (I);
health progranmes (VI); production and service quality improvement
(VI); communication within industry (VI); labour peace maintenance
(VI); specialist services (VI); standard setting (VI); technology
change (VI); unemployed workers' support (VI); short time
regulation (VI); retrenchment processes (VI).
9. Ihl stance 2.f 1 potential fytyre government towards lli
industrial councl1 system:
Favourable In general; if forced to dissolve foresee labour unrest
to detriment of the economy; pos it tve if move to central control;
negathe if totalitarian for then a threat; positive as is a
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method to redistribute wealth: redistribution of wealth focus will
however be negative to employers; positive as they empower people
with more democracy; positive as shifts potential conflict to
employer/employee arena; employer attitudes will dictate whether
there will be intervention: negative if current government due to
deregulation: doubtful if conservative: could dispense with due to
negative historical experiences therefore educate on benefits of
the system: wi 11 depend of whether State or societal corporatism
will apply; will depend on propensity and ability of parties to
enter into trade off's to reach compromi ses; should be
representative to exist; exemptions doubtful If Black government:
the degree of nationalisatlon can make system obsolete; dispute
resolution role can diminish due to codification of practices; new
lRA will impact; either a powerful economic ally or a threat:
positive for an established system; depends on new Department of
Manpower, if COSATU, then anti -employer and free enterprise:
unpredictabl e when soc iety is undergo ing fundamental change as
structures and rules come under pressure: system is not empathetic
to African tribal 1Hestyle and its soctalIst concepts but will
exist whilst unions retain workertst aspirations and are not a
political threat; intervention only if ineffective or
deteriorat ing; cont i nue administering benefits and national
minimum 'wage; ANC/SACP government to apply stricter controls;
positive if not generating unemployment or stifling economic
growth: supported, with additional features such as proportional
representation of unions and national agreements to include all of
RSA; optimistically anticipating moderate government which will
not interfere with a well functioning institution; support but for
purpose of regimentation and control of the labour force; support
due to role of maintaining order in labour relations.
10. An op1n1on an whether 1M industrial council sYstem ~
syrv1ye lli 1990's. 1!illh motivation:
The only further response to the aff1 rmat ive and negative
questions was a 'no response' for one respondent who did not want
to comn1t to a view.
The other 'Yes' motivations were:
A vehicle for wider union influence and control; promotes
redtstrtbut ton of wealth; employers can make a contribution
through system to macro political environment; survived the
previous decade when threat was greater; due to social ist
orientation and participation in industry affairs; parties have
come to accept and support it; new government would not want to
upset issues that affect the economy unless the part ies create
problems; growth in COSATU unions that support central control;
rather refer to post·SeN Accord decade; new FEOSAl union
federation will impact; focus to change from collective bargaining
to administrative role; important element in a pluralistic
society: an existing infrastructure for Blacks to achieve goals:
political independence of councils advantageous; system will be
modified as emergent unions become more workerist; both employers
and unions will wish to retain their respective controls; economic
initiatives will determine survival; system has contributed to
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1hll hm in impact 2Il lli effecti veness 2f
1l2.2.t.h 1n general illil ill speci f1c industrial
labour peace and better benefi ts to workers; employer support to
vary and union support to grow; parttes wt1l jointly need to
address major potential socto-economic problems; will be subject
to stronger pressure to submit to union demands; st ill fulfil
useful funct ions with adaption to changing needs and
ctrcumstances; council concerned sattsftes the needs of both
parties; provided two tter bargaining not too problematic for
employers; dependent on attttudes and perceptions of parties;
survival dependent too on recept iveness to the needs of the
industry; survival not because of inherent merit, but because of
trade un ion support.
The four 'No' responses were supported as follows:
Political tnfluence on councils which has created employer
resistance; LRA proposed amendments wtll favour the more radical
unions to the detriment of the smaller moderates; will not survtve
in present form and as more dtssol ut tons occur root cause of the
inherent structure to be addressed and modified to re-establ ish a
more workable bargaining forum; COSATU campatgn of one union per
industry could eventually lead to one union per council wtth
several employer bodies, tmpact ing adversely on the collective
bargaining process.
With regard to those responses that occurred more frequently as •
recorded in Table 8.7.1, these could be regarded as the more
important and common issues occurring amongst the respondent
groups. It ts these Issues pertaining to industrial councils that
wi 11 be highlighted in the context of important factors that
affect the system and which wi 11 be treated further in the later
sect ions of the document.
A brief discussion of the more important findings on each question
item follows. Of note again is the divers tty of responses and
views that were offered which hampers synthesis and al so projects
an apparent lack of agreement on the various aspects of industrial
counc tls.
1. M11.2.I: factors
indystrial counc1Js
coyncils) :
The five most important factors regarded as either pos i t ively or
negatively affecting the effectiveness of industrial councils are
elaborated on belowtin order of frequency or importance:
- The effective resolution of disputes and problems in the
industry, providing for mediation, concil tatton and preferably
vo1untary, as opposed to mandatory, arbitration.
- The cal ibre of representatives (or councillors) elected by
employer and employee parttes to the counci 1, as well as their
knowledge of their roles as councillors and labour matters in
general.
- The level of bureaucracy, flexibility and prescripttveness of
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councils in negotiating and implementing agreements and running
the affairs of the industrial council.
- The role, training and Integrity of council personnel, their
ability to coemun tcate with all parties, theIr understanding of
the new industrial relations dimensions, and their perceived level
of professlena11 sm, factors that all contribute to the image of
the counc t l .
- The representative nature and strength of both employer and
employee parties to an industrial council, wi th majority
representation regarded as a requirement for the extension of
council agreements to non-parties.
The other factors of somewhat lesser importance, but still
relevant, are expanded on below:
- Clarity of council objectives, and effectiveness of
administratIon and procedures to achieve these objectives.
- The status and value attached to the council by 1ts members,
their acceptance of its central role and level of support and
involvement of the parties and the members that they represent,
therefore not merely an industrial council in name.
- The level of consultation between parties, establishment of and
qual ity of relat 1onsh1ps and the presence of joint dec1s1onmaking.
- The process whereby minimum standards and criteria are set for
the industry and wage stability is established.
- The degree of common purpose that exists, with recognition of
the joInt respons1b111tyof parties for the functioning of the
council, supported by cooperative and collaborative rel at tonshtps,
- The 1ength of time taken to process counc 11 documents,
especially for Department of Manpower submissions.
- The extent to which issues normally outside the scope of
collective bargaining such as social and political matters, and
which are difficult to deal with at this forum, are brought to the
industrial council bargaining table.
- The quality of the mandate that union council representatives
have from their constituents, in particular whether they do have a
manda te to raise certa in issues or make certa in demand s _
- The provision and effective control or administration of
industry benefit schemes.
- The extent and number of exempt ions granted by councils to
individual employers.
- The degree of polit icisat ion of trade unions on the council
whereby a strategy 15 applied to achieve political objectives
through council participatIon and activity.
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• The length of time for industry agreements to be approved and
pub1ished by the Department of Manpower.
The factors ra ised for speci fi c industrial counc i l s were very
similar or supplementary to those applicable generally. Reference
to specific industrial councils provided more detailed issues too,
although not divergent from the general issues.
The prime focus is however on the quality and extent of council
representation, the image of the council as supported by the
people It employs and its practice of operation, and the function
of dispute resolution as its major contribution to the maintenance
of industrial peace in the industry. Traditional collective
bargaining functions entatllng wage and conditions setting and
regulation did feature, but not amongst the most importantly
ranked factors.
2. ~ 1M factors 1hll.1l!1D.l1r indystrial councOs' effectiveness
~ addressed lQ imprQve councO s' effectiveness (both 1n general
illi1 fir specific indystrial councils):
In other words, what do industrial councils need to do to become
more effective, wi th specific reference to the factors that can
impair their operat f cn. The five most Important guidelines are
regarded as being:
- Convnltment frQm all parties to resolve issues and improve their
attitudes to collective bargaining, such as more reasonable
demands, less mil i tancy from and pol t ttctsatton of trade unions
party to industrial councils.
- Councils to re-affirm themselves as a form of self-government
divorced from the State and to be perceived as being independent
and democratic structures.
- The provision of induction, training and skills improvement to
all parties who serve on Industrial councils as well as council
staff, particularly in complex industries, on subjects such as the
LRA, the council system itself, and comamtcatlon and negotiation
skills.
- Councils should become more representative of all employers and
employees within the industry, trade or area, with such
represent ivlty clearly defined.
- The launching of an information and marketing campaign to inform
employers and employees of the advantages of the system and to
persuade them to organise so that their interests can be presented
on councils and council representivity likewise be improved.
The other areas of improvement ra ised were:
- The training of union leaders in 1abour rel ated matters to
enable them to unders tand the dynami cs of labour as opposed to the
dynamics of pol it Ics and social upl i ftment.
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- Separation of the social. economic and political systems, with
union (labour) leaders focussing prlmartly on labour matters
within the economic system, although not ignoring the other
dimensions.
- Greater professionalism and a more business-like orientation of
council staff, with the provision of professional specf al tst
services, will have a positive impact on the strength and image of
council s,
- The approval and publication of counctl agreements should be
speeded up.
- The level of bureaucracy of council operations should be reduced
and made more user friendly to its membership.
- Improved employer unity and voluntary compliance wi th informal
industry aqraement s .
Of the five factors highl ighted as most important for the
effectiveness of industrial counc 11 s, those not addressed by the
main proposals are dispute resolution and bureaucracy. Dispute
resol ution does not feature as an area of improvement in even the
lesser proposals, whl1st bureaucracy is addressed there. The
assumption on this basis is that the dispute resolution function
of industrial councils is operating effectively.
In terms of improvement priorities, two of the items did not
appear at all amongst the extracted factors from the previous
quest ion, name ly independent self-governance and
informat ion/marketi ng campaign. They, with the relat hely lower
ranked convnltment and attitudes from the previous Question, have
particular prominence here, which must be a reflection of current
needs and issues facing industrial councils.
3. 1M percehed advantages iIlS1 di sadyantages 2f 1ndustrlal
counclls fir employers l1lS11r.M1i unions:
Cogni sance of the advantages and di sadvantages of the system for
both parties is necessary so that the strengths can be capitalised
upon and the di sadvantages or weaknesses countered or adjusted to.
The extent of interpretation of the preceding sect ions is not
appropriate here as these are primari ly statements of fact or
perception. Of interest though is the level of agreement on and
relat Ive importance of the items.
3.1 Employer advantages:
The five most reported advantages 1n order of Importance were:
- The provision of a dispute resolution mechanism which is tailor
made for the industry and removed from the point of conflict.
- Establishment of minimum as well as uniform wages and benefits
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wages and
oppos ttton
for the Industry.
- Provision of a collective bargaining system and sanctioned forum
for negotiations on wages and conditions of service.
- Enables the provision of social security funds and improved
benefits for employees at lower cost and less administrative
workload for individual employers.
• Reduces unfair competition by setting of conmon
conditions of service as agreements also regulate
employers.
Other lesser important employer advantages cited were:
• Improves employer solidarity and joint strategy.
- The development of a system of self-governance with the ability
to direct and control the affairs of the industry.
• Negotiations are generally of a more orderly and responsible
nature due to often long standing relationships with unions who
are conversant with the specific industry.
• Fosters the conrnon destiny concept and provides opportunities
for developing better understanding, communication, cooperation
and relationships between parties.
• Compliance with council agreements 15 legally enforceable as
they are statutorily binding.
• Counc ll tra in i ng and educat ion schemes contrlbute to 1mprovement
of employee competence within the industry.
• The council dispute resolution process Is less costly.
• Provides security and stability to the industry as an
institutionalised permanent body.
• Provides a centralised bargaining forum for the industry.
Greater cohesion amongst respondents is obvious in respect of the
major advantages of the system wi th support for the top five
ranging from 37,7~ to 17,~ of total respondents. The more
traditional perceptions and functions of Industrial councils have
also been identHied as the most important employer advantages.
Emoloyer di sadvanhges:
The most Important employer diudvantages, of which there were
only three, are:
• The necessity to adjust to the lowest coarnon denOClinator in the
industry in respect of wage setting, which can lead to plant level
d tsputes for emp layers.
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- The principle of the imposition of minimum wages and conditions
that might not be acceptable to all employers.
- Costly as small employers are generally unable to meet higher
council wages and conditions.
These focus primarily around the concept of industry regulation of
wages and conditions of service.
3.2 ~ lID.12n advantages:
The five most reported trade union advantages of industrial
councils are:
- A single forum to negotiate benefits, conditions of service and
wages, and regulate these for a particular industry.
- Council agreements are legally enforceable, monitored by council
agents, with non-complying employers subject to prosecution.
- Can obtain industry solidarity, especially for unions with
totally different constituencies.
- Provision of employee benefits, with the collective element
enabl ing better benefits at reasonable rates, which is especially
advantageous for small er compan ies.
- Prpvldes a dispute resolution mechanism for the industry.
The other advantages for trade unions are:
- Provides a central i sed collective bargaining forum.
- Optimal resourcing is possible as greater economies of scale
apply if insuffienct resources are available to organi se at plant
1evel.
- Can obtain greater control and influence in the industry.
- The council secretariat can serve as neutral referee with
hearings generally impartial and fair.
- Provides stabl1 ity and security because an institutionalised
permanent body.
- Can improve coemuntcat ion, cooperation and att itudes between
part ies due to face to face interact ion in a construct i ve forum.
There was a particularly strong agreement amongst all parties on
the advantage of a single wage and benefits regulation forum for
trade unions, with a 45,3~ response to this item. The first five
advantages are probably too what would traditionally apply. The
type of responses are not very diss imi lar e1 ther between the
employer and employee categories.
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~ m.1.2n di sadyantages:
15,1' of the respondents, and
quest Ion item, interestingly
disadvantages for trade unions.
importance were:
a150 the highest response to this
reported that there were no
The remaining three responses of
- If negotiations and the final tsat lon of an agreement are too
protracted It can disadvantage workers as certa i n emp1oyers will
tend not to implement new conditions and wages until the new
agreement is publ i shed.
- Disputes may take too long to resolve.
- The system is remote from union membership which can impact
adversely on mandating, feedback to constituents and perceptions
on the efficacy of the process.
Presumably the reference to no disadvantages for trade unions is
conditional to the effective functioning of an Industrial council,
or alternatively a biased perception, although three trade unions
also supported th is observation.
4. lthYcertain indystrial counclls h.rifdlsso]yed:
The flve major reasons for these dissolutions in order of
importance are cons idered to be:
- Employer preference or lnsistence on plant level bargalnlng
whilst the issue of multilevel bargaining has not been resolved
yet, thereby disadvantaging the system.
- Differing ideologies of party unions, such as workerist versus
popullst.
- Where councils have tended to become social rather than
collectlve bargaining organisations, focusslng on issues other
than labour 'issues.
- Employer and employer organisat ion disunlty.
- Technologlcal changes whlch alter the structure and occupations
within industries, maklng councils for these trades and
occupat1ons obsolete.
Other vlews were:
- Pressure and disputes brought to counclls by unions with
employers retaliating by withdrawing, causing these councils to
collapse.
- Lack of cOImlHment from both partles to resolve disputes and
keep the counc t l funct 10nlng.
- Dec11ne ln represent1vity from less militant unions due to
indoctrlnatlon and intlmldatlon of members by the more militant
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unions.
- Poor attitudes of councillors ranging from indi fference to
paternalism to mtlHancy.
- Cannot cOlMlent as not familiar with circumstances.
- Initial rejection of Industrial council system by Blick
(emergent) trade unions due to their previous exclusion from the
formal labour relations system.
- The pol tt tc t sat ton and hidden agendas of certain trade unions on
counct ls ,
- Bad managemcnt and poor administration of certain councils.
There is not any notable consensus on the reasons for council
dissolution with a fairly dispersed range of speculations, many of
thcm related to the factors that impact on the effect i veness of
industrial council s , as already discussed. A sense of more
personal views or biases of respondents is also detected in the
tota1 responses to th Is item.
5. lfQ}t 1hw dissolutions illls1 h.iYJ Wn prevented:
18,9' of respondents felt they could not comment to th is or offer
suggestions, with a further 11 ,3~ referring to the areas of
improvement for industrial counc i l s for pointers. Amongst the
many responses provided, only the following two had some common
support:
- Improved cosmunf cat ton and understanding between parties for
example with frank discussion on fears and expectat ions.
- Could not prevent, as pain had to be experienced.
A few other responses also indirectly support the latter corment,
with the message that this learning process could ultimately
benefit the revitalisation of the industrial council system.
6. 1M effectiveness 2f industrial councils 11 centralised
collective bargaining structures:
One of the 53 respondents ranked industrial council s as being
completely ineffect tve (an indtvidual union) and another one
ranked them as being ineffective (an individull employer) as
centralised collect tve bargaining structures.
The remainder, and also the majority, ranked them It various
levels of effectiveness. 56,6' of total respondents regarded the.
as effective, 20,~ as very effective and 18,9" IS moderately
effect ive. Thus an avenge to above Iverage ranking, but
nevertheless tndicating that SOlD8 roa- for IlIlprovelMtnt of the
system is still posstble, If not necessary.
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7. Alternative inst Hyt ions 1hll~ ~ considered In lli Q.illi
2f Indystrlal councils.!1llM fonnal .lll2..!u: relations system:
It was apparent that respondents had given this some thought at
one stage or the other based on the type of responses received,
which were more and varied than anticipated. Conrnonal tty was not
eastly achieved except for a strong support of 43,4~ for the
current system, with the mot hat ion that no other suitable
institution could fulfil the industrial councll's functions.
Other responses with some general support were:
- A central employer-inittated forum such as the Chamber of Hines
system.
- No alternative, but federations or groups of unions should
combine to strengthen themselves in this forum.
The remaining alternatives were either combinations of multilevel
bargaining, or pertained to plant level bargaining, or emphasised
arrangements that were voluntary to the parties only.
8. Rilin9 2.f ~ importance 2f .the current iill1 potential
functions iDS! roles 2f industrial councOs:
The detail of this analysis as provlded In Table 8.7.1 will not be
replicated here. Aside from question 10's response, the greatest
consensus of opinion occurred in these ratings, specifically in
respect of the traditional functions of industrial councils,
namely dispute resolution (75,5~ very important), collective
bargaining (73,6~ very important), benefit schemes (50,~ very
important) and training schemes (47,2~ very important).
Respondents' opinions were also tested on potential other and
expanded functions of industrial councils such as education
uplHtment/upgrade, social responsibility and social change
implementation. There was some, but not marked, support for these
other functions, in particular education upgrade and less so for
social responsibility and social change implementation.
Certain other functions were also added by respondents, of which
the main ones were the provision of housing loans via benefit
funds and the provision of social activities to members.
The emphasis on dispute resolution correlates too with the high
priority that it received as a major factor impact ing on the
effectiveness of industrial councils.
9. !he. stance 2.f j Dotent Ial future goyernment towards 1M
industria] counc il system:
Respondents were provided the opportunity to specul ate on the
potenthl future pol It teal outcomes in South Africa and thetr
effects on the Industrial counct 1 systelll. It was not surprhlng
that the highest response of 15, 1~ refers to the fact that it
would depend entirely on which pol Hlcal dlspenutton comes Into
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power and who governs, as it is difficult to assess this at this
stage.
The further group of aga in divers i fi ed responses, covered several
'what if' scenarios if particular political parties or coalitions
came into power, with many perceiving a continuation of the system
in an either untampered or a modi fied form on the bas i s that some
system of centralised bargaining will still be required in a
future South Afri ca.
The other responses that received general support were:
- Negative stance if PAC bias in government as wi 11 break down the
system.
- A new government will need a collective bargaining forum to
regulate conditions of service, wages and importantly relations
within industry, and will t'herefore retain the system but modify
it to suit their form of government.
- Pos it ive if support for future government by workers as trade
unions are providing greater support to industrial councils.
- Positive because ANC and COSATU support a centralised collective
bargaining system.
Interestingly and ironically too, the governments under which the
system were not anticipated to survive were the present
Nationalist government and a Conservative government.
10. An opinion 211 whether 1b..e. indystrial council system nu
syrviye lli 1990's. ~ motivation:
90,6~ of the respondents voted in favour of the survival of the
industrial council system in the 1990's, with four (7,S~)
detractors and one (l,~) no response.
In motivating their 'Yes' responses several references are made
however that certain changes and modifications to suit new
circumstances and demands wi 11 be necessary to ensure the system's
survival.
The main supporting motivations were the following:
- A new system will have to be developed in its place, which will
be a major task, as there must be a forum for collective
bargaining.
- Although not a supporting motivation, but a rider to a positive
response, is the caut ion that a new government subscribing to
policies such as the PAC's could still lead to councils' demise.
- Initial Black trade union resistance has diminished due to
participation in the system proving that industrial councils are
beneficial bodies, especially in respect of benefit provision,
wage regulation and dispute resolution functions, therefore
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acquiring greater acceptance amongst the emergent untons .
• It Is an establ tshed and effecttve medlatton forum where parties
can Interact and a t r their views for the betterment of all In the
Industry.
The 'No' responses dtd not bring forth any al ignments and are
therefore not di scussed. Asunrnary of these responses t s however
provided earl ter tn thts sectton.
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8.7.2 !m.S.! IMPORTANT FACTORS aY ORGANISATION
The most Important factors Identified by each organisation or
group represented. where two or more respondentsin a part Icuhr
group have Identified these as being relevant. are presented In
Table 8.7.2 In respect of each questionnaire item. Due to
academic Institutions only having had one respondent. this
grouping will be omitted In this analysis. In addition. with
union federat Ions where there were only two respondents. only In
the event of both respondents support Ing a response wi11 this be
reflected. The responses are provided In terms of highest to
lowest frequency for each grouping and are abbreviated. based on
the Table 8.7.1 key words and phrases. with percentage responses
per group provided below each abbreviation.
The same other notes and corrrnents In respect of the format of
Table 8.7.1 apply.
TABLE 8.7.2
Survey results anal ysed lri organisation reoresented
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Ie EO TF IE IU OC
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1. What are tn your opinion the major factors that have an impact
on the effectiveness of Industrial Councils.
1.1 In general
Bureauc Htn stand
26,3 15.4
Proc time Ot sp res
21,1 15,4
Other Iss Acceptance
21,1 15,4
Un mandate IC staff
21,1 15,4
Otsp res Exempt 1ons
15,8 15,4
Relations Agr manit
10,5 15,4
Benefl ts Bureauc
10.5 15,4
Hi n stand Neutr/fa 1rio.s 15,4
Councillor
10,5
Conn purp
10,5
Represent
10,5
Acceptance Admt n Represent
60,0 25,0 60,0
Councillor Relat tons
60,0 25,0
Admin Olsp res
40,0 25,0
otsp res Counc 111 or
40,0 25,0
IC staff
25,0
Exempt tons
25,0
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Exemptions
10.5
Jurisdlct
10,5
1.2 Your Industrial Council
As for 1.1 As for 1. 1
40.0 25,0
U politics
40,0
As for 1.1 As for 1. 1
26,3 30.8
Agr time Represent
26,3 15,4
U politics IC percept
21,1 15.4
U majority
21,1
Represent
10,5
Benefl ts
10,5
2. How do you suggest that the factors that impair Industrial
Councils' effectiveness be addressed to Improve their operations?
Represent
60,0
Sel f·Govt
40,0
Hore prof
40,0
Bureauc
40,0
Commit/att Conmit/att
40,0 37,S
IC train
25,0
Agr publ
25,0
2.1 In general
Comlt/att Agent serv
21,1 15,4
Utraining Bureauc
21,1 15,4
Labour iss Market i ng
10,5 15,4
Self-govt
10,5
IC train
10,5
More prof
10,5
Marketing
10,5
Agr publ
10,5
1.2 Your ndustrial ouncfl
Empl unity As for 2.1
21,1 23,1
As for 2.1 Satisfied
15,8 15,4
3. What do your perceive are the advantages and disadvantages of
establishing and functioning within Industrhl Councils for:
3.1 Employers
• Advantages
Disp res Same w/ben Same w/ben Wider hs Disp res
42,1 38,S 100,0 40,0 25,0
Same w/ben 01 sp res Dtsp res Better rel Cost disp
36,8 38,5 100,0 40,0 25,0
Train sch
60,0
Sel f·govt
60,0
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Dtsp res Order neg Neg forum
40,0 25,0 60,0
Neg forum
25,0
Sol/strat less comp
26,3 30,8
tleg forum Benefits
21,1 30,8
Order neg Neg forum
21.1 30,8
less camp Sec/stab
15,8 30,8
Benefits legal enf
10,5 30,8
Cost dtsp Better rel
10,5 23,1
legal enf Self-govt
10,5 23,1
Central Agr tmpl
10,5 15,4
Red unrest Prod tmpr
10,5 15,4
Unitary Sol/strat
10,5 15,4
- Dtsadvantages
Adj lowest lack flex Adj lowest Adj lowest Htn impose
21. 1 15,4 100,0 100,0 100,0
Hln impose Cost empl
10,5 15,4
Hin impose
15,4
Emp domi n
15,4
Time/slow
15,4
Regulation
15,4
3.2 Trade Union
- Advantages
W/ben reg Disp res W/ben reg
42, 1 46 , 2 100, 0
lega1 enf W/ben reg
31,6 38,5
Sol1dart ty Benefits
21,1 30,8
Central legal enf
21,1 23,1
Resources Centrll
15,8 23,1
Cost less Er/ee meet
10,5 15,4
Better rel Cost dtsp
10,5 15,4
Neutr/fatr Contr/infl
10,5 15,4
Sec/stab
15,4
Exp U off W/ben reg
40,0 62,S
W/ben reg Red conf1
40,0 40,0
Solidart ty Neutr/fa i r
40,0 40,0
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Contr/infl
60,0
W/ben reg
40,0
Subs co 11
15,4
Self-govt
15,4
- 01 sadvantages
None IC 1evi es None
21,1 15,4 37,S
Neg time Lack f1ex
21,1 15,4
Oisp time Agr bi nd
21,1 15,4
Hem remote
10,5
4. Why In your opinion have Industrial Councils dissolved during
recent years?
COImlI tment
40,0
U admiss
40,0
U repr
37,S
U pressure
25,0
IC disadv
40,0
Other Iss Att Hudes
21,1 30,8
Empl disun Plant barg
21,1 23,1
U Ideology Interests
21,1 15,4
Technology ConmHment
21,1 15,4
Cannot com Cooperate
15,8 15,4
Plant barg Lack funds
15,8 15,4
Urepr
10,5
U demands
10,5
Militant U
10,5
5. How in your mind could these dissolutions have been prevented?
Cannot com Represent Cannot com Cannot com
26,3 23,1 40,0 25,0
2.1/2.2 Ind needs
21,1 15,4
Less U mil
10,5
Colll1l/under
10,5
6. Howeffective do you rate Industrial Councils IS centralised
collective bargaining structures?
Effective
79,0
Very eff
21,0
Effect i ve
38,4
Hod eff
30,8
Very eff
30,8
Effecthe Effective Hod eff
60,0 62,5 60,0
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7. What alternative instttutton(s) could be considered in the
absence/place of Industria1 Counc i1 s in the fonna 1 labour
relations system?
None other Hone other
40,0 50,0
U feders
25,0
foll owing current and potential
Council s in both the bus Iness
None other None other
63.2 23,1
U feders Pl ant barg
10,5 15,4
8. How important do you rate the
functions and roles of Industrial
and wi der conrnun i ty :
(NI • Hot important I· Important VI· Very important)
C Barg VI o Resol VI C Barg VI C Barg VI C Barg VI Tr Sch VI
79,0 76,9 100,0 40,0 100,0 80,0
o Resol VI C Barg VI o Resol VI o Resol VI o Resol VI C Barg VI
79.0 61,5 100,0 40.0 87,S 60,0
Ben Sch VI S Resp Tr Sch VI Ben Seh I Ben Sch VI o Resol VI
52,6 46,2 100.0 40.0 75,0 60,0
Tr Seh VI Ben Sch I Edue Up VI Tr Seh VI Ben Seh VI
47,4 38,S 40,0 62,5 60,0
Edue Up I Ben Seh VI Soc Ch VI S Resp VI Soc Ch NI
47,4 38,5 40,0 62,5 60,0
Soc Ch HI Educ Up I Edue Up I C Barg
42.1 30,8 50,0 40,0
S Resp HI Soc Ch NI Edue Up VI Edue Up HI
36,8 30,8 50,0 40,0
Ben 5ch I C Barg I Soc Ch VI Educ Up VI
26,3 30,8 50,0 40,0
S Resp I Educ Up VI Soc Ch I S Resp
26,3 30,8 37,5 40,0
S Resp VI S Resp HI Ben Sch I S Resp VI
26,3 30,8 25,0 40,0
Soc Ch I Soc Ch I Tr Seh I Soc Ch VI
26,3 30,8 25,0 40,0
Tr Seh HI Tr Sch VI S Resp I
21,1 23,1 25,0
Educ Up HI Educ Up HI Housing VI
21,1 23,1 25,0
Edue Up VI Ben Sch HI Health VI
21,1 15,4 25,0
Soc Ch VI Tr Sch HI Soe Act VI
21,1 15,4 25,0
Tr Seh I S Resp VI
15,8 15,4
C Barg I Soc Ch VI
10,5 15,4
Ben Sch HI
10,5
Soc Act VI
10,5
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9. What do you cons tder the stance will be towards the Industrial
Council system of a potenttal future government under a new
pol tUcal dtspensat ton?
Centr supp
40,0
Degree nat
40,0
Depend who
25,0
PAC negat New DMP
21,1 15,4
Depend who Worker pos
21,1 15,4
To retatn
21,1
Worker pos
15,8
10. In concluston, are you of the optnton that the Industrial
Council system wt 11 survive the second post-Wlehahn decade, namely
the 1990's7
- Mottvatton Yes
Yes
89,4
Yes
92,3
Yes
100,0
Yes Yes
100,0 75,0
No
25,0
Yes
100,0
.
Need forum U accept
31,6 15,4
Except PAC
21,1
Func/adapt
15,8
Mediat ton
10,5
Need forum Mediation
40,0 25,0
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
In discusstng these reponses, the tndivtdual responses as
contained In the key words and phrases w111 not be provided In
full again, as this would be a duplication of what has already
been presented in the tnterpretatton of Table 8.7.1's results.
Reference is therefore made to Table 8.7.1's exposition on the
analysts of the most tmportant factors and the summary of the
mtnority responses, should more information and detail be needed
on the tndtvidual items.
Again, each of the questionnaire ttems will be looked at
separately, and corments provided ftrstly on how each group
percetves the rel at ive tmportance of each response. This would
provide an tndication of a grouping's vtew on issues surroundtng
industrtal counci1s that they viewed as tmportant to the. at the
ttme that the survey was conducted (latter half of 1990). Some
reference will also be made to the minority responses to obtatn a
feel of the range of issues involved. The level of agreement or
lack thereof within a grouping will also be highl ighted, where
approprtate, and explanattons ventured.
Secondly, comparisons will be made between the actual responses
and wetght tng of responses between the vartous groupings, to
assess apparent similarities, differences and contradtcttons In
opinton. This will be useful too tn establ tshing whether the
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,industrial council system and its operation is in fact viewed
di fferent ly by the various part tctpants and observers, if not
indeed differently within a group itself.
It has already been contended that the wide range of responses,
especially supported by single or a few respondents only,
indicates that there could be divergent views on the system, even
within the same ranks, and presumably based on differing
experiences, percept ions, biases and attitudes towards the system.
Vested interest of parties is considered also to be a factor in
the formulation of views on the system.
1. Iii.1.2r factQrs 1hit. W i!l imoac t sn 1M efrec t 1Veness 2.f
industrial counclls .ill21h 1n general 1rui ill specific industrial
councils):
Industrial counci1s:
Industrial tounc t 1s were understandably very mindful of the
potential problems inherent in their own system such as their
level of bureaucracy, f1exiblli ty and prescriptiveness in terms of
agreement negotiation and administration and the running Qf the
affairs of the council. Amongst specific councils the length of
time taken to prepare and have agreements published by the
Department of Manpower was perceived as a major factor impairing
their effectivenss. This was followed by a concern for the time
that it takes to process industrial council documents for
Department of Manpower submissions, etcetera. A focus in major
factors therefore on their own internal operation and the effect
that it could have on industry members' perceptions of their
competence and image.
In respect of the parties to the council, a relatively high
response was received only on trade union representatives,
particularly those of the emergent unions, and the issues that
they bring to the bargain1 ng table, perceived as being
inappropriate to or frustrating the collective bargaining process.
The mandate of certain of these representat ives to raise
particular issues on behalf of their membership, as well as the
quality of the mandate in general, was also an area of concern.
Other high ranking responses related primarily to the
effectiveness of the performance of councils' various functions,
again with dispute resolution ranked as the most important here,
as well as the quality of relationships between parties, the
cal1bre of the party representatives and council staff enabltng
these functions to be fulfilled efficiently. The more
techno-legali st Ic 1ssues of representivity, exemption andjurisdiction regulations occurred lower down the ranking IS real
and prob1emat 1c to the council s themselves.
With vested interest in the system industrial councl1 s naturally
appear to be more introspect ive and concerned about the
effectiveness of their own operation and the performance of their
key functions, as well as those direct Issues that impact on this
performance. There was however a fair dispersion of reponses with
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limited strong support for individual Hems, although these were
not divergent and were generally complementary within the focus
discussed above. It does however indicate some difference In
emphasis on certain issues amongst councils, which would probably
be dependent on the nature of their Industries and the latters'
unique problems and features.
Emplover Organisat10ns:
As a party being serviced by industrial councils, although
constitutionally active members to councils, employer
organtsat ions have a more client-based view of the major factors
that impact on industrial councils. There was however a low
common response to the few items that were extracted as important,
wi th these responses being at the same frequency, and making
deductions on the relative importance of these not possible.
The effectiveness of collective bargaining and dispute resolution
functions of council s featured, as well as the acceptance of and
1eve1 of support to the counc t l by members and the role and
ability of council staff. Other factors evolved around the
processes and principles involved and further perceptions of the
industry of the council system. Examples are the willingness of
parties to agree to exemptions, to participate and cooperate,
their perceptions of the role and functions of the council, the
effectiveness of agreement monitoring, corrmunicat10n to the
industry, etcetera.
I1::isfJ U1l.1.2n federat ions:
The small sample of two respondents does not make an analysis here
very meaningful, as only responses by both were highlighted. It
should be borne in mind too that the two respondents come from
differing union 1deologies and backgrounds.
No unanimity occurred to thi s quest ion item. The range of
individual responses however covered factors such as the
collective barga1ning functions of setting minimum standards and
criteria for the industry and regulating wages, the calibre and
knowl edge of counc ill ors, represent tvi ty of part i es, council
bureaucracy, the time taken to process documents, the time taken
to get agreements published, other issues that are brought into
the bargaining forum, and the mandating and pot tt tc tsat ton of
certain trade unions.
The factors that should be important to the trade union movement
in general were nevertheless addressed, with the notabl e exception
of dtspute resolution and benefit schemes for the industry and
their membership. The different leanings art nevertheless hinted
at and within the context of unterunion competitiv1ty it 15
therefore not surprising that that I more consolidated response
was not achieved.
Ind1vldual Employers:
The most cohesive overall response varying frol 40,~ to 60,~ WIS
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received from this group, despite the fact that certain of these
employers have different philosophies on collective bargaining and
possibly stand in a competitive relationship towards one another.
The overall response is also a client-based one. wi th acceptance
of the role and support of the council system equally weighted
with the calibre and expertise of councillors. followed by the
effectiveness of administration and clarity of council objectives,
as well as the effectiveness of council dispute resolution
functions. For specific councils the pcl tt tct se t ton of certain
trade unions and their strategy to achieve political goals through
the council forum was also regarded as an important factor.
Other 1esser important factors related to the qual tty of
reIaucnshtps , counc il staff, other funct ions of counc I l s , and the
unresolved issue of multilevel bargaining. Interestingly, only
one employer rai sed the latter factor which was expected to be of
a higher profile than ranked. This could possibly be attributed
to the nature of the employer sample that emerged.
Individual Unions:
Not a very high nor uniform common response emerged. Again, those
responses that were extracted were of equivalent response level,
making meaningful deductions on relative importance not possible.
The effectiveness of council administration and objectives,
quality of relat tonshtps, effectiveness of dispute resolution
functions, the skills and related characteristics of councillors
and counc tl staff. and the exempt1on sys tem were high 11 ghted.
Absent were the suspected most important functions of councils,
namely collective bargaining and benefit schemes provision,
although these did appear as minority responses.
The poltticisation of certain trade unions was surprisingly raised
by trade union representatives, but this should in fact not come
as a surprise when one considers that the unions that responded to
the survey were primarily tradi t ional unions, with the exception
of one emergent union. The potential for 1nterunion conflict and
divergence of opinion would by inference result in the broader
spectrum in a general lack of agreement between different trade
unions on specific issues relating to Industrial councils,
although not on the more neutral features of the system.
Other/Consul tants:
These observers and specialists who are not ne~esurlly directly
parties to the system, see the single major factor impacting on
the effectiveness of Industr1l1 councils as that of the whole
issue of representivity. Their rehtively impartial perspectives
are Important as vested Interests do not generally apply and IlIOre
objecttve views are presumably provided.
A range of other minority responses occurred such as the
objectives and effecttve administration of councils, benefit
schemes, conmon purpose and quality of relationships, the issue of
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two-tier bargaining, the competencies and professionalism of
counctl personnel, the effect of State interference, abtl tty to
adapt to change, and the nature of the Industry concerned.
Generally a divergent response for the other items, but overall
placed at the more macro collective bargaining viewpoint.
(omparl sons:
Th ts will be the more comprehens ive comparl son prov i ded as the
discussion to the other question Hems would to a large extent be
deri ved from these observations.
There would appear to be general commonality in terms of the most
important factors raised, but the emphases of the di fferent
groupi ngs do dtffer. The trade un ion response was different from
anticipated and interpreted as being weighted by the nature of the
sample. Industrial councils focussed on their functions and
problems surrounding it. Employer organisations and individual
employers approached their responses from a cl ient perspective.
The two trade union federations had no definite corsncnal tt ies,
with a similar response pattern to the individual unions.
Consultants and other specialists took the macro collective
bargaining view of the system, with perhaps the most different
collective emphasis and more detached opinion than the other
groups.
At this early stage of the analysts it is therefore already
concluded that the perspectives of the various groups can differ,
although the factors raised are fairly common wi th the relative
importances differing, and that vested interests in the system do
have a role in these perceptions.
2. ~ 1M factors 1hll .1mlli.I: industrial council s' effectiveness
~ addressed 12 improve councils' effectiveness (both in general
iru1 ill speci fi c industrial council sl:
Indystrial Counc 11 s:
A range of proposal s were submitted, with the most important being
the improvement of connitment and attitudes of all parties, the
training of union leaders in labour matters (a majority opinion of
a particular union grouping), greater focus on labour matters by
unions (the same comment as for the previous item), the
strengthening of sel f-governance within industry, and the training
and greater professionalism of industrial council staff, supported
by improved marketing of the system and the expedition of
agreement publ ication and greater employer employer unity and
compliance with industry agreements, the latter which was specific
to certain industrial councils.
Other areas of improvement wi th less general support amongst
councils were voting practices on councils, representivity both in
the sense of more and less emphasis thereon, depolttictsation of
union parties, scope and jurisdiction review and redefinition, and
improved communication on the roles and functions of industrial
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counc tl s.
The response level s for the more general items were not very high,
and could be influenced by certain respondent weighttngs. As with
the observat ion when the corrmon most Important factors were
discussed, the areas of Improvement identified do not necessartly
correspond in respect of priority to the factors raised under the
question 1 reponses. Again it is concluded that the urgency and
topical relevance of a particular factor would rank it higher
under the suggest ions for improvements to the system.
The focus 15 QUi te different here to that of the factors that
affect the effectiveness of councils. Only three of the most
imporhnt factors are directly addressed, namely other bargaining
issues, relationships, and conmonality of purpose of parties, with
the other functional and operational aspects hardly featuring.
Emplover Organisations:
Not a very strong response with only a few common proposals
identified, namely a greater service-orientation of councll
agetns, less bureaucracy and a more user friendly or1entat ion, and
a market ing campa ign to promote and at tract parti es to the system.
Support for satisfaction with the system for specific councils was
a150 expressed.
The remaining responses were probably amongst the most numerous,
covering a wide range of all the possible areas of the system's
operation, indicating that these organisations individually have
considered many of the options available to industrial councils to
improve their performance.
With the exception of bureaucracy and possibly council staff, none
of the other factors were shown as priorities for improvement,
with the cllent-based perspective still retained, supplemented by
a possibly vested need to improve the image of and participation
in the system.
~~ Federations:
No conmon opinion 'lin available. Those individual proposals
ra15ed however were improved comnitment and att 1tudes, tra ining
and induction of council staff, Imputlallty and correct role
interpretation of council staff, more positive experiences of the
system to be prev tded to actual and potenttal parties, training of
union leaders in 1abour related matters as well as their prime
focussing on labour issues, and greater employer unity and
compliance with informal agreements.
Vtews frollldtfferent perspectives again emerge. The responses
however have a stronger relationship with the ItOst hlportant
factors raised by the indtvtdual respondents.
Emplover Organ hat ions:
Only one ftrm recomendatlon with I 40,~ response was recorded,
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namely the improvement of conrnttment and at t Hudes of industrial
councll parties. This has a strong correlation too with the most
important factors raised by thi s group, of which acceptance and
support of the system was one, with the adherence to the cl ient
point of view.
less general recomendations were on voting practices on councils,
self·government within industry, induction and training of council
personnel, rat ional1sation of items for plant and central
bargaining, review of representivity gUidelines, depol It tctsat tcn
of certain trade unions, marketing of the system, and more
opportunity for participation by rank and file members.
Indiyidual Unions:
A strongest 37,5% common support thus far for the improvement of
commitment and attitudes of council parties, followed by the
training and induction of council staff and the expedition of the
publication of agreements, as being the most urgent issues to be
addressed currently by industrial councils. This support is
related too to the major factors identified in the preceding
discussion.
Other minority union proposals are voting practices on councils,
self-government in industry, role interpretation and impartiality
of council sta ff, the improvement of represent tv i ty, 1ess State
interference in general in the operation of councils and their
agreements, the recognition of two tier bargaining,
depcl tt tcf sat ton of certain unions, wider publicity on the role of
industrial councils, and the training of union leaders in labour
matters as well as their prime focussing on labour issues.
Certain of these comments again reflect the di ffering views of
different union affiliations.
The potential bias of the sample is again stressed, with the
observation that the traditional functions of councils, apart from
the publication of industry agreements, are not raised as areas of
improvement, with the assumption that these are functioning to the
expectations of the trade union parties surveyed.
Other/Consul tants:
The main reconmendations for improvement, of equal weighting, were
the improvement of self-government in industry, the
professional1sation of councils and their staff, and a reduction
in bureaucracy with more fleXibility in council operations. The
most supported recommendation of 60,~ was to improve
represent1vity of all parties, which is consistent with the
priority that they attached to it as a major factor of council
effect iveness.
The macro collective bargaining view is thus retained by this
group.
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Comparisons:
An Important common feature is that Improvements to the basic
functions of industrial councils are not raised as major areas for
Improvement. The most administrative Issues responded on are that
of the time for the publ teat ton of agreements, as well as a
reduction in the level of bureaucracy of councils. Otherwise
commitment and attitudes of parties, that is factors surrounding
the quality of relationships, are regarded by the majority of
direct parties to councils as the major area of attention. COrmlon
support is also provided for the upgrading and professionaltsation
of council staff and related image Improvement factors such as
Improved cOrmlunication and marketing of the system, and the
principle of sel f·governance and Independence from the State by
Indus tria1 counc tl s .
Therefore a generally more uni fied view of the various groupings
on those issues that shoul d be focussed upon to Improve the
effectiveness of industrial councils, which in ttself Is a
pleasing aspect.
The following question items will not be dealt with in the same
amount of detail as the preceding two questions as these were
regarded as the more important of the comparat i ve analyses.
General observations on the overall group responses and their
relat ion to one another wi 11 therefore be presented.
3. I.bJ perceived advantages iD..d disadvantages 2.f industrial
counc i15 ill emp 1oyers iru11l::isil Wl.12n1:
3.1 Emoloyer advantages:
Industrial counc11s saw dispute resolution, with a relatively high
42,1~ support, as the most important advantage of industrial
councils to employers, followed by the collective bargaining
function of the establishment of mimimulD and uniform wages and
conditions of service for the industry, and aspects such as
increased solidarity and the promotion of a consolidated strategy
for employers within the indsutry. The provision of a sanctioned
and established negotiation forum and the potential for more
orderly and responsible negot tat ions were al so regarded as
important to them, inclUding several other factors. Generally a·
cORlllOn support pattern emerged wtth the more important functions
of industrial councils gaining prominence.
Employer organi sations had their highest consensus thus far of
38,5' for the dispute resolution and collective bargaining
functions of industrial councils, with higher levels of support
too for advantages such as the reduction of unfa i r compet it ion, a
negottation forum, benefit provision, security and stability
within the industry, etcetera. They responded very much to fOnD,
except that sol idartty of employers and joint stntegy fo".ulation
was not ranked as highly as anticipated, which could possibly
relate to previous observattons on problems with employer untty.
Full unanimity was finally obtatned frOll the two trade unton
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federations, despite their different philosophies, on the two most
Important advantages of industrial counci l s , namely the
establishment of uniform and minimum wages and conditions of
service and the provisions of dispute resolution mechanisms within
an Industry.
Individual employers' responses were not that cohesive and were
wider ranging. Only three items featured equally, namely the
opportunity to address wider issues, the improvement of
relationships and the dispute resolution functions of councils.
Other funct ions of counci ls did not get wider support. This
particular response pattern could possibly be relevant to the
debate on two-t ier bargaining which primarily affects individual
employer parties at this point in time.
Individual unions produced the lowest level of uni formity of 25,~
in their responses, which were the provision of a negotiation
forum and dispute resolution mechanisms, lower costs attached to
council dispute processes and the opportunity for more orderly
negotiations within the industry. This lack of uniformity would
certainly be related to the focus required on the advantages to
the opposite party, namely the employer.
Consultants and other specialists did not focus on the more
routine aspects of the system, but again on other macro level
issues such as the provision of Industry training schemes,
self-government and independence to regulate the affairs of an
industry, and the provision of an appropriate bargaining forum,
exhibiting a 60,~ high level of correspondence.
The traditional functions of industrial councils featured as the
most common and important advantages for employers amongst the
groups. Dispute resolution in particular was noted in all
instances, except by consultants and others. Also, indi vidua1
unions did not perceive great importance for the collective
bargaining wage and conditions setting function for employers.
Overall though, a generally consistent response by all
organisations.
Employer di sadyanhges:
Industrial councils ratse only two disadvantages as being
significant for employers, . namely the necessity to adjust to the
lowest common denominator in an industry in respect of wage
setting, and also the imposition of minimulll wages and conditions
that might not be acceptable to all parties.
Employer organisations have a relatively low but equally conmon
response, varying from the lack of flexibility to run domestic
affairs, to the speed of opent ion and unwieldiness of the system
and Industry regulation which mitigates against small business
development. The most extracted responses were al so recorded by
employer organi sat ions.
Trade union federations were again unanimous on the single major
disadvantage for employers as being the adjustment to the lowest
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coenon denominator. Individual employers at 40,0% also supported
this as a single common disadvantage. Individual unions indicated
a single Item too, but that of the Imposition of minimum wages and
conditions.
Similar major d tsadvantages were raised In one way or the other,
with most recorded by employer organisations.
3.2 I..r.idJ .u.n..1.2n adyantages:
Overall higher response levels and uniformity for all
organisations occurred in respect of trade union advantages. It
is surmised that this could be due to a latent need to justify the
system to the broader trade union movement.
Industrial councils perceived wage and benefit regulation at a
consensus level of 42,l~ as the most Important for trade unions,
followed by the legal enforceability of agreements, accompanied by
their perceptions of the other factor~ important to trade unions
such as industry solidarity, more optimal allocation of resouces,
etcetera.
Employer organi sat ions again provided the widest range of
advantages, headed by dispute resolution at 46,2~ response and
wage and benefit regulation at 38,5~ response, closely followed by
benefit schemes at 30,~ support, that is for the traditional
functions of industrial councils.
The two trade union federations still remained unanimous on their
single most important advantage of a single wage and benefi t
negotiation and regulation forum for an industry.
Individual employers at a 40,~ equal response level highlighted
as important the experience offered to union officials in a
democratic forum, the regulation of wages and benefits and the
improvement of union sol idarity within an industry as the most
important factors to trade unions.
Individual trade unions, at a high 62,5' consensus level,
supported the regulation of wages and benefi ts through a singl e
negotiation forum as the most important advantage, followed by the
potential for more peaceful negotiations and a reduction in
conflict associated with negotiations, as well as the perceived
greater impartiality and fairness of the syste...
Consultants and others perceived at 60,~ support the control and
influence of the industry as a prime advantage for trade unions,
followed by wage and benefit regulation.
This is the one question where one of the most consistent
responses occurred, with all groups ranking the industry
negotiation and regulation of wages and benefits as one of the
most important advantages for trade unions.
·196·
I!:W Wl.1.2n d I adyantages:
Industrial councils indicated no disadvantages to trade unions,
with the 1ength of time of negotlattons and simi larly time for
dispute resolution as potential trade union disadvantages, on par
with this observation, followed by the remoteness of their
membership from the system.
Employer organisations had somewhat different views, citing the
Imposition of council levies on members, the lack of flexibility
incurred, and the fact that agreements are binding on both
employers and trade unions.
No other common responses were extracted, except for 37, S~ of
Individual trade unions who reported no disadvantages for trade
unions. This is somewhat perturbing as it would be envisaged that
there would be some major disadvantages for this body, especially
as all organisations had responded some disadvantages for employer
parties. The nature of the sample could again have an influence,
unless this refl ects the true state of affairs as it currently
stands, therefore a system perceived by the majori ty as being of
greater advantage to the trade union movement?
4. ~ certain industrial councils h.i.Yl dtssolved:
The greatest group consensus was amongst individual employers
(40,~) individual unions (37,5~) and others/consultants (40,0%)
on particular triggers to the dissolution of certain industrial
councils. Although there were some cOnlnon elements, there was
nevertheless a range of opinion on the subject. As this quest ton
does lnvcl ve a certain amount of speculation if parties were not
involved in the processes that occurred, coemon threads are not
anticipated.
Industrial councils mostly favour the other issues that are
brought to the bargaining table, accompanied by employer disunity,
trade union tdeo loqtcal differences and technolQgical changes that
make certain councf ls obsolete. Due to their obvious vested
interest in the system they also offer the widest range of reasons
why council s have been dissolved.
Employer organi sations at a rehtively high 30.~ response
attribute the demise of counct ls mainly to poor ceunctl lor
attitudes on both sides. stressing too the probl ersat tcs of plant
level bargaining within a centralised bargaining syste...
Trade union federations had ne concerted opinion on this Issue,
with individual employers primarily focusstng en the disadvantages
of the tndustri al council systell as the main cause. Indlvtdual
unions highl ighted unton representivtty pertaining to the threat
to tradttional party untons fQr their IIembership by non-party and
often more mil i tant unions. as well as undue pressure by the
latter unions on counctls. CQnsultants and others were of the
opinion that COlTl11ttment of all parties to maintain the systell and
the resistance of party unions to allow other unions access to the
system. were the prime causes of dtssolut ton.
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Industrial councils and employer organisations appeared to be most
concerned about the reasons for the dissolution of councils.
Individual unions would appear to be naturally influenced by their
particular s ttuat ions and perceived tl',reats to thei r power bases.
5. ~~ dissolutions~ hill I2wl orevented:
The majori ty proportion of respondents felt that they could not
comment on tht s.
Industrial council s referred mainly to the areas of improvement
necessary for industrial councils as already discussed, adding the
requirement for less militancy of certain trade unions and greater
understanding and coneuntcat ton between parties.
Employer organisations supported improved and equal representation
of parties and greater sensitivity to the needs of parties by
industrial councils as being areas where these dissolutions could
have been prevented. No other common responses were offered by
organisations.
Industrial councils and employer organisations therefore provided
the most responses to this issue.
6. Ihi effectiveness 2.f industrial councils II centralised
collective bargaining structures:
There is not much more to corment to th is than discussed
previously, except to review the extent of opinion on the
question.
One individual union ranked the system as completely ineffective
and one individual employer considered it ineffective. the
remainder were generally in support of the system at various
levels of effectiveness. The contents of Table 8.7.2 with
reference to th is Hem will not be repeated here as these are self
interpreting. Of note is that industrial councils had the only
strong tendency of rating the system as very effective, whl1 st
employer organisations had the widest dispersion on the
effect tveness continuum.
The previous conclusion that scope for improvement is st 111
necessary and desirable remains.
7. Alternatiye institutions .thll~ bl considered in 1hl~
2.f industrial councils in 1bJl forma] 1.l1uuu: relations system:
The highest consensus of 63,ZS amongst industrial councils was
that no other suitable institution was available that could fulfil
the role of these structures. A supplement to this was provided
that although there was no other suitable institution, that trade
union groupings and federations should combine themselves to
strengthen their positions on councils. This could possibly refer
to the more traditional unions.
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Employer organ isat Ions also predominantly support Industrial
councils. with plant level bargaining provided as an alternative.
Trade union federations had no unified response and individual
employers also supported no other institution as the most conmon
response. 50.0% of Individual trade unions felt that the
Industrial council was the most appropriate. with the similar
cement on trade union strengthening also applying.
The range of other options occurred mostly amongst employer
organisatIons and consultants/other partles.
a. Rating 2.f 1M importance 2.f 1b.!l current lllil potential
functions irul roles 2f Industrial counclls:
Again. the detail of this analysis as provided in Table a.7.2 will
not be replicated.
Dispute resolution and collective bargaining functions were
regarded as very important by all organisations. with the highest
consensus level s after question 10 occurring for most groupings.
Industrial councils gave the highest level of general support for
all functions. with Inclusion of the more expanded functions of
education upl i f tment , social responsibility and social change
implementation and other functions. albeit at a more moderate
1eve1.
Consultants and others interestingly gave industry training
schemes ao,~ support as the most Important of all functions.
Individual trade unions were completely in consensus wi th
collective bargaining being the most Important function and trade
union federations had complete unanimity on the three functions of
collective bargaining, dispute resolution and training schemes as
being very and the most important. Of the newer functions
educational up l t ftment received the mISt support.
A strong support in general for the traditional functions of
industrial councils as being very important.
9. lli stance 2f j potent ill future government towards 1M
Industrlal counc il llill.IlI:
Again a speculat ive question with antiCipated divergent responses.
Ideological perspectives were expected too to have a strong
Influence here, which Is suspected they did.
The cOlllllOn features that emerged were firstly the stance that it
would be di ffi cult to foretell as It would depend on the new
political dispensation that actually emerges, a view supported by
Industrial councils and indtvidual unions. A further cOlIIDOn
feature was that of a pos it tve approach if workers supported the
new government due to their unions' present support of Industrial
councils, as raised by industrial councils and employer
organi sat ions.
In general though no strongly supported opinions were expressed on
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this issue.
10. An ooinion sn whether lli industrial coyncll 1llillI rll.l
survlye lllil 1990's. illh motiyation:
Those organisations that unanimously agreed that Industrial
councils would survive the 1990's were trade union federations.
Individual employers and others/consultants. This was despite the
fact that certain of these parties did not actively support the
system.
Industrial councils had one negathe and one' no response' and
employer organi sat ions had one negative as well. Two Individual
unions also responded negatively. These negative motivations are
provided in the previous discussion on the major factors Impacting
on the Industrial councll system.
Otherwtse all other respondents or organisations
of the system's survival. with a proviso though
counc t1 s would need to adapt to changes and
modifications in order to ensure their survival.
voted in favour
that industrial
undergo certa i n
In terms of motivations for the system's survival. industrial
councils and individual employers had support for the concept that
a forum for collective bargaining will st111 be required in the
future. Counc 11s and others/consultants also prov i ded support for
the role of councils as an effective and established mediation
forum that would enhance their continued existence.
A general opinion on negative motivations was not available. but
the individual views are sunmarised for reference in the previous
discussion on the major factors impacting on industrial counclls.
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9. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES lUIH INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
The main contemporary Issues. some of which could also be
considered as the challenges. besetting the industrial council
system In South Africa in general are sUlI'II1arised and discussed in
thi S sect ion under the head ings of the survey ques t ionna ire Items.
with the except ion of the improvements to factors that impair the
effect iveness of industrial councils. the prevent ion of council
dissolutions. the functions and roles of industrial councils and
future issues. which are treated in Sect ion 10 under
reconnendat tcns and future perspectives for the system.
These issues were extracted from the survey results, the
interviews with selected survey respondents and other interested
and authoritative parties. relevant literature and other
references. the comentary from the Building and Metal industrial
council representatives, as well as the personal impressions of
the writer.
Aga in the poi nt should be stressed. as done before In th is
document, that generalisation 15 not appropriate in a discussion
on a system that in fact contains many diverse perspectives and
features within its application (as opposed to its relatively more
simplistic legalistic origins). However some generalisation is
required with coemcnal it tes synthesised.
9.1 .~ FACTORS IMpACUNG QH IH.E EFfECTIVENESS QE INDUSTRIAL
COUNCILS
The five most important factors regarded as either positively or
negatively affecting the effectiveness of industrial council s
ident ifi ed duri ng the survey. and supplemented by other factors
regarded as important. are di scussed below.
9.1.1 Dispute ResolutiQn
This was reported in the survey responses as being the most
important factor influencing the effectiveness of industrial
councils. It was also perceived in the survey as a major
advantage of the system for both employer and trade union parties.
but was furthermore not rahed as an area for improvement. Thus
it could be concluded. that although important. it was presumably
functioning effectively to the satisfaction of the parties
concerned.
However, Horn (1988. p. 11) reports that concern hIS been
expressed by various industrial councils and employers on the
growing use of the industrial court and the unfair labour practice
law. with the allegation that unions may gain more from the
industrial court than industrial councils. and thus the passage of
a dispute via the industrial council is increasingly perceived as
being more a fonnal ity. Horn cons idered the reason for this as
being that industrial councils may not have the structures and
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frameworks available to cope with the resolut ion of disputes
effectIvely or they may in fact not be will ing to engage in this
function and see themselves more as an administrat ive body.
9.1.2 Coyne i1 Reoresentat ives J!ld iliff
RegardIng council secretariats and staff, over and above the views
obtained and detailed in Section 8 on the survey responses, there
are some perceptions that cause concern, especially amongst
council parties themselves.
Certain cOrmlentary is often made that council s can become .... fat
cat comfy organisations for handIcapped people" as quoted by
Swarbeck (Note 22) in defence that this is not always the
situation. It is this image that many councils are actively
trying to eradicate. Swarbeck stresses too, 1ike others, that
counc i15 depend very much on the people who run them for the i r
survival, therefore greater professionalism is needed to ensure
this .
Traditlena11y, industrial councils have tended to employ ex
Departmen~ of Manpower officials due to their knowledge of labour
law and pract 1ces, but they might not have the correct
business-minded approach necessar~ for the effective management of
council affairs. Ex policemen have also been reported as being
very conscientious and effective council agents, but it is
wondered too whether the type of background and i mage attached to
it is appropriate for the roles proposed for council agents.
9.1.3 Bureaucracy 1llil InflexibilitY
Again, repl teat ton of the findings in Section 8 on the survey
responses on th is subject wi 11 not be appropriate here, except for
additional views on the nature of the issues invol ved.
It is firstly considered by Slabbert (Note 11, p. 11) that the
perceived rigidi ty of the industrial council system can contribute
to the growth of radical trade unionism.
liebenberg (Note 12) also considered infl exibl1i ty and vested
interests of parties to industrial councils as being the main
stumbling block in terms of its future survival.
In terms of more tangible aspects such as industrial council
agreements, Swarbeck (Note 22) frOtll an employer organisation
perspective, supports the streamlining and modernisation of
industrial agreements whereby they can becolDt IDOr8 understandable,
simplified, and put employers in an unambiguous situation and
leave the employee parties well satisfied.
A further problem that he c ttes, as has already been ratsed, is
that of when an existing agreement has expired and a new agreement
has not yet been concluded or publ tshed (in his industry for the
Cateri ng and re lated trades it has taken two years to reach
settlement). It has been confirmed that 'gentlemens' agreements
can be very effective in this regard if all parties comply, but
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these normally apply for relatively short periods only. In his
industry they concluded that in the absence of a wage
determlnat ion, the BCOEA provisions should apply in the interim.
It Is apparent though that there is a need that some guidelines be
provided on how these very real problems be handled with regard to
the admlni strat ion of Industry agreements.
9.1.4 Bepresenttv1tv
As far back as in 1929, in the Sochl and Industrial Review of 5
January 1929, the Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers'
Organisations referred to the issue of industrial council
representivity, as quoted by Jankelsson (1975, p, 105):
"It must be remembered, however, that the agreements of Industrial
Councils cannot under the law be made binding on all employers and
employees in given industries, unless the parties to such
agreements are sufficiently representative of such industries, not
only over the whole area concerned, but in each and every district
concerned. The state of adequate representat i veness cannot be
attained or maintained unless both trade unions and the
organisations of employers concerned are strong and vigorous.
Much of the dissatisfaction one hears in regard to the alleged
inefficiency of our industrial legislation is due to ineffective
organisation. let us remember that only where organisation is
complete can the fullest benefits of this legislation be secured."
The philosophy of 1929 certainly still holds true for 1990 and
would still appear to underly the principles that the Department
of Manpower applies in the adjudication of representiYHy within
an industrial council. The Department has both been referred to
as being either too stringent or too lenient in respect of the
representivity issue, with some suggestions being offered in the
survey on how this conrnon problem of industrial councils could
best be accomncdated. Nevertheless, the majority opinion of both
employers and trade unions surveyed support the principle as
presented above. It is therefore not the principle that is at
issue, but the practicalities on how to apply it within divergent
industries and occupations.
The historical problem of Bl ack trade union representivHy, which
was at one stage a major area of concern, appears to have been
resolved to a certain extent. Jankelsson (1975, p. iY) in early
pre-Wiehahn research based on an overview of the industrial
council system and a study of the national industrial council for
the Hetal industry, had concluded that, while the systell had in
the past operated effectively to the benefit of Whites, Coloureds
adnAshns, it was questionable whether 1twould continue to do so
in the future. This observation was rooted in the fact that in
this era delegates of workers were becolling less representative of
the labour force with over 5.1 of the employees covered by
industrial agreements being African (Black), who were not
permitted to participate directly in the collective bargaining
process.
He cautioned too that this would result in the bargaining power of
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the registered trade unions, and consequently the effectiveness of
the industrial council system as an Instrument of control. being
reduced. He furthermore suggested that some form of change is
needed in the industrial relations system. as embodied in the
relevant legislation, in order that the objectives of (continued)
Industrial peace may be achieved.
Certain fundamental changes have indeed been brought about since
then. whereby Black workers and their trade unions have been
incorporated into the system. Overall at end 1989. 54~ of all
employees covered by industrial council agreements were Black,
which interest i ngly correlates with the percentage given by
Jankelsson for 1975, but with the difference that they would now
be represented, with more direct participation, through their
trade unions in the majority of cases. The issue of
representivity therefore is no longer a racial issue as in the
pre·Wiehahn era, but of a more logistical and practical nature.
Young (Note 19) refers to the industrial court case on the
representivity issue within the Printing industry industrial
council before it dissolved, which ruled in part icular that the
'sufficiently representative for recognition' definition in his
company. Mondi's, policy was in fact sufficient. Representivity
was in terms of the rul ing defined in respect of interest groups
and not necessarily whole bargaining groups. This ruling has been
referred to too by survey respondents as a consideration for
representivity criteria for industrial council parties.
What has also become apparent is that represent ivity is very
dependent too on the nature of the industry concerned. In the
Catering. Restaurant and Tearoom industry Swarbeck (Note 22)
reports that whil st 94~ of the 3 500 employers are represented on
the employers' association party to the industrial council. of the
25 000 employees, representivity is below 5~. The latter is
attributed by him to the nature of the trade, with many part time
and casual employees. difficulty in maintaining trade union
membership and keeping track of employees within the trade.
Interestingly though, a very strong usage of the industrial
council's facn ities and services are reported, regardless of
whether employees are trade union members or not. Thus. it is
deduced that low representivity need not be a problem under
certain circumsances if there is sufficient support and acceptance
of an industrial council by its membership.
Slabbert (Note 23) Assistant Director: Labour Relations at the
Department of Manpower confirmed that the Minister of Hanpower
will certainly consider factors such as the nature of the industry
when establishing representtvity of parties, especially if there
are many small employers operating within an industry. The 5~ +
criterion is generally only applied for registration of
organisations, whilst Hlntsterhl discretion to declare agreements
binding on non-parties where 1ess than 50s represent ivity occurs,
can be app1ied•
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9.1.5 Emergent IridJ Unions
The issue of emergent trade union resistance might appear to be
somewhat historical at this point in the evolution of the
industrial council system. However it is still in the forefront
of the minds of many, especially those within the system who had
to contend with it when it was at its most problematic. The
historical legacy and the attitudes that It generated do not die
out easily and to a large extent still Impact on the operation of
the system. The roots of thi s resIstance have already been
discussed at length in Section 3 on the historical development of
industrial councils and the formal labour relations system in
South Africa.
The major fail ing of the industrial council system was regarded by
Jankelsson (1975, p. 138) at the time of his 1975 thesis as the
fact that it then denied African (Black) workers direct
representat ion regarding the negotiation of the terms and
conditions of employment affecting them. This fatling has now
been significantly addressed by the subsequent labour legislation.
Flnnemore and van der Herwe (1989, p. 101) conment on the
understandable initial resistance of the Black emergent trade
unions to participate in the industrial council system due to the
racial development of the system in the pre-Wiehahn era of labour
relations. They make the following point too about the more
recent strategic utilisation of the system by these trade unions
and oppos ite trends that are emergi ng amongst the employer part ies
(on which the writer coments further as a cautionary note in the
concluding section):
"In general however, while there was initially a resistance from
the emergent unions in the early 1980's to entering the industrial
council system, it appears as if unions are now mak i ng maximum use
of the statutory, centralised bargaining structures that are
available to them but at the same time attempting to keep their
options open at the workplace as well. Some large employers, on
the other hand, while initially committed to the protection that
industrial councils offered thelll, are considering opting out of
these structures and handling negotiations solely at the workphce
or on an enterpri se level."
Unfortunately due to the poor response from Black trade union
parties to industrial councils to the survey questionnaire it was
not possible to val idate this perception currently.
As an exampl e though, two unions canvassed at the time by Sideri s
(1982, p. 78) in her research on the effect of industrial
councils on democratic trade union organiution, the Metal and
Allied Workers Union (HAW) and the General Workers Union (GWU),
expressed dissatisfaction with the industrial council syste. as it
existed then in the immediate post-Wiehahn implementation period.
The need for industry-based and/or regional or national collective
bargaining was however still confirmed, with few suggestions put
forward on the form that this bargaining should take. The options
then stated as being avai lab1e to the government according to
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Sideris in the same reference. to enable coopt Ion of these
emergent trade unions into the industrial counc t 1 system (buring
in mind It is a voluntary system). were:
- To retain the industrial council system as it exists and to
attempt to coerce trade unions into participating.
- To scrap the industrial council system and to allow trade unions
and employers to structure their own bargaining relationship at an
Industry level.
• To attempt to restructure the industrial counci1 system In a way
that would make it more attract ive to the Bl ack trade union
movement.
The type of coercion descri bed and structural changes did not
happen (a1though there cou1d have been more subt 18 coerc ive
elements at play), with greater Black trade union endorsement of
the central Ised collective bargaining system apparently developing
out of own volition.
Ramsden (1987, p. 2) ascribes the increasing preparedness of
Black trade unions to register and participate in industrial
council negotiations to the following reasons:
• The difficulties experienced in implementing recognition
agreements.
• Iha soctal benefits to be gained from industrial councils.
• The profes s i ona1 dispute set t 1tng procedures offered by
industrial councils.
She however adds: -Despite this move, these unions still see their
funct ion primarily in terms of shop floor organisat ion. There is
an ongoing confl tct between management and unions as to the
appropriate level of collective bargaining.· This conflict is
perhaps no longer as marked as during the early 1980's, but is
still an issue in certain industries and sectors, with respect to
the continuing debate on appropriate levels of collective
bargaining.
For a fuller motivation on the reasons why these unions would
participate on industrial councils, aside froll their strategic
agendas, the advantages of industrial council participation as
surveyed and detailed in AppendiX 3 ts a useful reference.
One analysis provided of the current situation is that leaders of
the newer or emergent trade unions who have elected to join the
systell come on board with specHic and IDOre often, political
agendas and ire inclined to prolllOte these and not necessarily
those of their melllbership. The results of n&9othtions are
therefore not always producing that which is expected by lObers,
and it is observed that agreement is gen.rally reached .asierly
when conducted directly with members or closer to source, which
could account to a certain extent for plant level bargaining being
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favoured in certa in Quarters.
It was observed by a respondent that in general members of
part icularly the Black trade unions are not as concerned about
ideology and politics as other parties are led to believe. It
should therefore be ensured that trade union leadership represent
what members need and not what their own assumptions of the
situation are. The leadership and memberships' priorities in
negotiations should therefore be matched to facilitate the desired
bargaining outcomes. In this manner a proper perspective can be
obtained on the benefits of bargaining at industrial counctl level
by these trade unions.
Regarding the trade union movement in general, the traditional
craft and skilled employee category unions are reported as being
more favourably disposed to the industrial council system, as
supported too by the survey results. Horn (1988, p. 12) cites
Horwi tz on a further crt tic ism of the sys tem by the emergent
unions, being that although the latter unions are not dismissive
of the system, they perceive it as currently still serving the
interests of mainly skilled workers (an allusion to these
traditional unions) by inflating and structuring wages at the
higher grades at the expense of the skilled and semi-skilled
workers.
9.1.6 (mployer Yn.1.1Y
Employers and their organtsations are exhtbiting a lack of unity
in the centrali sed bargaining forum, creating problems in getting
a sol td mandate from the employer parttes.
Furthermore, there 15 also controversy tn their ranks regarding
bargatning level s , with some supporttng central bargaining, others
favouring if not impostng plant level bargatning, and the majority
grapp11 ng with an accommodat i on between the two, aggravated by an
absence of clear practical and/or legal15ttc guidelines on how to
contend with thi s issue.
An Issue not relating to employer disunity, but that has
significance to the employer/employee collectivities that function
withtn or orbi t the industrial council system is that of the
balance of power in the labour relationshtp. Horn (1988, pp. 11
- 12) Quoting Haysom, refers to the htstortcal power imbalance in
whtch management in South Africa had traditionally been in a more
powerful position than trade unions, another legacy still being
contended with in different forms. This power imbalance was
considered as being contributed to by:
- Htgh unemployment whtch made the workforce, particularly the
unskilled and Black worker, vulnerable.
- Recesston that exacerbated the unemployment factor, wt th
management need i ng to retrench, adopt tng a more aggress ive
attttude to trade untons and ustng strtkes to implement such
retrenchment.
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- Where Industries were only partially organised, trade unions in
order to extend their presence Into unorganl sed sectors and
enterprises, had to stretch their slim resources which wukened
them from a collective bargaining point of view.
- Union act tv i t 18s had to take place In a context of repressive
1aws based on rac ia1 categori es .
Although managements and employer groupings might protest that
their power bases have been challenged and severely eroded by the
more militant and demanding of the emergent unions over the last
decade, they st ill have many weapons In their arsenal. Notably,
and this has been an unfortunate one for the Industrial council
system, has been the employer counter strategy to withdraw from or
refuse to participate In centralised bargaining forums such as
Industrial councils in reaction to the admission or demands of
these unions.
Apart from the other areas where respondents to the survey felt
that the Department of Manpower or the State could provide
assistance in respect of support or Improvement to the industrial
council system, the following issues had also been highlighted:
- Official statistics of reported industrial council membership
coverage of employees is suspected to be greatly understated. The
Depar,tment of Manpower's .practice is understood to be to only
count members in benefit, namely those who have paid their council
subscriptions during the past three months. They are regarded as
out of benefit if subscriptions are in arrears for more than three
months. The opinion Is that these employees should still be
included, as very often such payments are made on an annual or
infrequent basis, with the employees still under the jurisdiction
of the council. By inclusion of these employees in temporary
'non-benefit' the representivity issue could be considerably
alleviated.
- The official annual report of the Department of Manpower is felt
not to sufficiently give a true reflection of what and how
industrial councils are contributing to the maintenance of
industrial puce and the provision of ancillary services to its
members, employers and employees alike. The Department of
Manpower is encouraged to promote the industrhl council concept
actively, as trade union part18s have also been found to respond
positively to such a communication exercise.
Although cr tt tc tsa has been levied against the Department of
Manpower in terms of its processing of council agreements,
amendments to agreements, etcetera, and the t illll delays
experienced with the publication of new or amended agreements, the
workload of the DepartlMlnt should be taken In consideration too in
th Is regard.
In for example reviewing governHnt gazettes containing
applications for the variation of the scope of reglstntion of
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industrial counci 15 in terms of S 19(2) as applied by S 19(a) of
the LRA (1988) as available, but not complete, in the S ATrade
Unions library in November 1990, it was ascertained that
approximately 51 such variations were requested and processed
during the period 1970 to 1990.
Also, during this same extract, for the period 1970 to 1990, 12
applications for registration of an industrial council in terms of
S 19(2) (a) of the lRA (1988) had been lodged with the Department
of Manpower. Furthermore, for the period 1980 to 1990, 19
deregistrations of industrial councils in terms of S 34(2) of the
LRA (1988) were published, as detailed in Table 9.3.
Again, it is stressed that these figures might be incomplete as
the extract was done from avai lable library government gazettes as
thi s data coul d not easily be obtained from the Department of
Manpower. Added to this should be the agreement amendments and
new agreements that might have been negotiated by councils, for
the total of 91 industrial councils in 1990 according to
unofficial sources, that need attention, al though not always
annually as all councils would not negotiate agreements annually.
At the current cost estimated by the writer at about R300 to R350
per page to print and distribute the relevant government gazettes,
which is borne by the State, the cost of the admin1 stration of the
industrial counci 1 system from this point of view would certainly
seem to be quite weighty.
9 .1. 8~ 2f Iris1l 1ln1.Qn' Reg 1st rat i on
The issue on the scope of trade union registration that has
emerged recently at industrial court level, will be gaining and
requiring more attention in the future. This is based on the fact
that the LRA does not stipulate that a trade union must be
registered for a particular industry to be able to gain access to
that industry's industrial council. The recent first ruling in
the industrial court by De Kock as noted in the Industrial Law
Journal (1989, full reference not available) 15 such an example,
and provides that if a reg1stered trade union has sufficient
representivity within the scope of an industrial council, it may
gain access to that council, even though it 15 not specifically
registered for that applicable scope. A second test case in the
Printing industry of a similar nature involving PPAWU's
application for membership to the industrial council, that was to
be held in December 1989, did not materialise due to that
industrial council's dissolution.
Horn (1988, p, 66) reports that within a sample of seven
industrial councils the only trade unions perceived to be
attempting to make resolutions of disputes difficult in the
industrial council forull were those that vere not parties to the
councils concerned but were attempting to gain access and/or
control of the industry. Certain COSATU unions such as the then
Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa
(CCAWUSA) (now SACCAWU) that tried to obtain membership to certain
councils were at the time refused admission due to their not being
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regarded as regi stered for the industries concerned. The power
struggle to obtain control of certain Industries by particular
trade unions such as the South African COlllTlercial, Catering and
Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU), evolVing around the regtstrat Ion
issue, wi 11 thus be a further problem for counc i 15 to contend
with.
9.1.9 Impact 2.f Deregulation
Deregulation and job creation strategies as outl ined by the
Department of Manpower's 1985 Consultative Memorandum on
Industrial Council Agreements was viewed with suspicion by a
respondent of Allan's (1987, p. 59), and a sentiment possibly
shared by others, with the suggestion made ..... that the
Department of Manpower clearly had ulterior motives, that is, the
deregulation and job creation strategies were a thinly disguised
step to curtail the power of the unions."
The Department of Manpower, in support of the broader government
objectives of the stimulation of economic activity and job
creation, has made its policy on deregulation very clear, as
referenced in Sec t ion 2 from the Department's 1989 Annual Report.
This mainly impacts on the extension of agreements to non-parties
and the exemption system, which were debated in various forms in
the survey results. It furthermore can have a direct impact too
on the represent i vity of a counc11 and its part i es, as agreement
extens ions are normally dependent on acceptable represent ivi ty
levels of the council parties. In the press statement of the
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (Transvaal) of August
1990 (1990) when it was struggling with a major representivity
problem and had lost coverage for unskilled workers in the
industry, the fo 11 owi ng cOlllTlents were made:
- That the demise of the council in respect of unskilled workers
was brought about by two main factors, of which one was: -The
insistence by the Department of Manpower on representat ion
criteria based solely on quantitative measures and their
unwillingness to extend industrial council agreements to
non-parttes" •
- That the council regretted that the Department of Manpower had
contributed to the situation whereby large numbers of unskilled
workers in the industry had lost the protections and substantial
benefi ts offered by the coune11, • _.. in the pursu it of what it
understands as derequlatten", adding that: • Our endeavours
to persuade the Department that the council aetua11y represents a
major privati sed method of regulating working conditions and
worker benefi ts has fallen on deaf ears. Only when the government
is forced in time to pay for the forfeited social benefits and
dispute resolving mechanisms itself, wt11 it begin to understand
what it has done."
9.1.10 k2a iD.Si Jurtsdiction ~ Councils
The matter of the scope and jurisdiction of industrial councils
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has raised It s head on several occastons, tncluding by the survey
respondents. Attempts at clart ft catton have however been mlde
during several tndustrial court gutdeltnes and rulings as
referenced tn Table 3.4 for further Informatton.
Benjamtn (1981, p , 19) was of the optnton that the constttution
(and following this the resul tant agreements and procedures) are
not appl tcable to non-parties of the council. The industrial
court tn Matshoba and Others versus Fry's Metals, as tncluded in
Table 3.4, however supported the oppostng and legal1sttc vtew that
tndustrtal councils have a broader responsibtl tty to regulate
matters between employers or employer organtsat tons, and employees
and trade unton members who are not necessartly parties to the
counc tl, but fa 11 i ng wltht n 1t s registered jurtsd ic t ion.
Further treatment of this topic wtll not be focussed on here, as
It has already been discussed tn sufftcient breadth elsewhere in
thts documen t.
9.2 IliE APVANTAGES AtiU DISADVANTAGES Of INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
Fatrly comprehensive feedback on the advantages and disadvantages
of tndustrial council participation for employer and employee
parttes has been provided by survey respondents in the detail of
Append 1x 3, supported by further extracts and ana1yses inSect ion
8 on the survey results. It would have been opportune to
consol idate these results "11th contributions found tn the
1tterature to obtain a contemporary taxonomy of the advantages and
disadvantages of industrial council partictpat1on. These should
preferably be merged too wi th the reported advantages and
disadvantages of centralised collective bargaining forums which
are regarded as also being relevant to industrial councils.
Unfortunately the present scope of this project did not permit
this further exercise to be performed.
The advantages and dtsadvantages that were presented in the
survey, very .succinctly express many of the major contemporary
issues in industrial councils, of which unfortunately only certain
of these could be addressed in this document.
Of mention though are the opinions of the proponents of the
industrial council system, in particuhr the off1cill government
viewpoint, who are of the convict ion that the system has been and
will continue to be a success, citing Van der "erwe (1984, p. 60)
in hi s capaci ty of the then Di rector General, DepartlHnt of
Manpower, as follows:
•.•. I believe that the tndustrial council systell is a sound one
"11th a good track record, that the principles underlying the
system has wtthstood the test of ttme and that they are IS
relevant today as they were more than 60 years ago when the S1Ste•
was devised and 1ntroduced statutorily"
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9.3 DISSOLUTION Qf INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
Appendix 3 on the survey results provided many generalised and
specific propositions on why certain Industrial councils had
dissolved in recent years as well as several opinions on how these
could have been prevented. Opinions varied from union to
employer-Inttiated causes, depending on the party's perspective.
Camay (Note 18) observed though that regardless of the trigger, in
most instances the employer bodies made the dec is ion first to
withdraw from a council, resulting in eventual dissolution.
An attempt was made to perform a post mortem on certain of these
defunct or dissolved Industrial councils. It is hoped that an
explorat Ion of the events that 1ed to their demise could serve as
a caution to other Industrial councils experiencing similar
problems.
Table 9.3 provides a list of the industrial councils identified
from personal conmuntcat tcn, government gazettes and other sources
such as provided by the South African Trade Unions Library, as
having been deregistered or dissolved in the years 1980 to 1990.
This information was unfortunately not obtainable from the
Department of Manpower. The material ut t1 tsed is however
suspected as not being complete, therefore any possible omissions
are apologised for.
TABLE 9.3
Industrial counc11 s deregl stered su: dissolyed l2.S..2.:. 1m (from
persona1 connun i cat ions, government gazettes and other source
documents at the South African Trades Union library on 1 November
1990 and certa in Department of Manpower source documents on 24
October 1990)
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
INDUSTRIAL COUNC Il SOURCE DATE
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
IC for the Dental Mechanician
Occupat ion, RSA Dept of Manpower Unknown
Ourban Rubber IC G/N 169 of 1984 6/3/1984
IC for the Itquor and Cater ing
Trade, East london Dept of Manpower 20/6/1984
(reported as bet ng re-establ tshed)
IC for the Transvaal Chemical
Manufacturing Industry Personal COlllll 1986
IC for the Brewi ng Industry,
Witwatersrand G/N 88 of 1986 24/1/1986
IC for the Bespoke Tailoring Industry
(Witwatersrand) G/N 2533 of 1986 20/11/1986
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26/8/1988
1989
IC for the Baking and/or Confectionery
Industry (Durban and Districts) G/N 674 of 1987 9/9/1987
IC for the Baking and/or Confectionery
Industry, Cape G/N 718 of 1987 23/9/1987
IC for the Brewi ng Industry, Cape
Town Dept of Manpower 14/10/1987
National IC for the Dairy Industry Dept of Manpower 27/10/1987
IC for the Automobile Manufacturing
Industry, Eastern Province Dept of Manpower 25/2/1988
IC for the Loca 1 Authorl ty Undertaking
of Virginia G/N 641 of 1988
IC for the Baking and Confectionery
Industry, P E and Uitenhage G/N 657 of 1988 7/9/1988
IC for the Baking and Confectionery
Indust..ry (Pretoria) G/N 687 of 1988 21/9/1988
Nywerheldsraad vir die sutd-
Afrikaanse Ontwikkeltngsrade G/N 49 of 1989 13/1/1989
IC for the Li quor and Catering Trade,
Witwatersrand and Vereeniging G/N 1420 of 1989 14/11/1989
IC for the Li quor and Catering Trade(Pretoria) G/N 1504 of 1989 14/12/1989
National Ie for the Printing and
Newspaper Industry of S A Personal COllin
G/N 734 of 1990 Gaz 7/9/1990
IC for the Liquor and Catering Trade
(Durban) G/N 641 of 1990
IC for the Tobacco Industry
(Transvaa1)
10/8/1990
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Of note is that industrial counci15 light have been dissolved by
the parties concerned, but officially they rematn legal enttties
tn terms of the LRA until they are deregtstered under Sectton 34
of the LRA by government gnette under the luthori ty of the
Industrtal Registrar. It will be not teed that certain tndustrial
councils that have been reported as being dissolved, as presented
tn Table 9.3 when the tnformation.-as extracted, had not been
offlchlly deregtstered yet. Both recently dissolved and
deregtstered i ndustrhl counci15 for .-htch background tnfonDat ion
could be obtained wtll be addressed here.
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- National Industrial Counc1l ill 1M I21.1.a Industry:
Again. with reference to Horn's (1988. pp. 41· 46) research, of
the five 1abour experts surveyed on the effect Iveness of
industrial councils In respect of their dispute resolution
functions. two of the five identified this council as being less
successful in respect of Its dispute resolution functions.
This would not automatically point to the reason for its
dissolution, as no single event or circumstance would seem to be
the cause for councils going under, but rather a convergence of
several issues, possibly of a long standing nature. that culminate
In a particular event that rings the final death knell.
- National Industrial Council ill 11ll pr1ntlng .t.ru1 Newspaper
Industrv:
Unfortunately the other previous partles to this Industrial
council could not be lnterv1ewed. However, Young (Note 19) gave
his and his company, Hondi's, Impressions on the events
surrounding the demise of this councll.
In respect of the organ1 sat ion's stance towards collect ive
bargaining, Hond1, being within the Anglo Amer1can stable, is
favourably disposed to centralised collective bargaining and
percel ves 1t as an acceptab 18 pract1ce under certa 1n
c1rcumstances. These aspects are also covered ln thelr corporate
Industrial relat tons policy, although they do reconmend bargaining
on one level only, whether central or plant level, unless when
more than one trade union ls 1nvolved then a central bargaining
forum is preferred.
On the lndustr1 a1 council itsel f, whtch collapsed 1n 1989, the
Paper, Print 1ng. Wood and A1l1ed Workers Unton (PPWAWU), wanted to
organ1se Hond l' s mills, but the company referred the un 1on to the
then existent 1ndustrial council, and it subsequently regtstered
and became a party to the 1ndustrtal council. PPWAWU at that
stage represented about 8~ of the working populat 10n within the
Industry, thus qui te a slgn1f1cant force. The company was not
keen, in terms of 1ts pollcy, to negotiate minimum wages twtce at
industrial council and plant level.
Including PPWAWU. there were four other trade union parties to the
industrial council in its final stages, of which the S A
8011 ennakers Soc1ety was the second largest after PPWAWU, with no
signiftcant membershtp amongst the others. The four employer
parttes were Hondi, Sappt, Nampak and Carlton, including a small
non-party employer to wholl the industry agreement was extended.
Each party on the councll had two votes, with two additional, that
ts four, votes allocated to PPWAW because of its larger
membershtp s ile and concern that the other less representat tve
trade unton part ies could combine with employers to overrule it.
All tn all though, the relationship tn the industry detertorated.
The matn reasons for PPWAWU's resignation and the dissolutton of
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the counc tl are regarded by Young as the fo 11 owi ng:
a) PPWAWU bel ieved they could not control the whole mechanism as
their definition of democracy was that 8~ of membership should be
equivalent to 80'- of the total vote on the council, therefore
proport tcna1 representat Ion.
b) PPWAWU perceived that the traditional (White) unions were
siding against them with the (White) employers who had been
assoc lated together on the counctl for many years.
c) PPWAWU was poss Ibly also the first emergent Blad union thatjoined an industrial counctl, achieved with difficulty.
d) The employer parties themselves also perceived a shifting in
the balance of power and some felt it more approriate to bargain
individually at plant level.
Also, the fact that the industrial councll had no benefit schemes
attached to it made it so much easier to dissolve. Further
contributory factors were regarded as the bureaucratic nature of
the long-establ ished publ tc service type council, poor council
management, poor conmunication and the lack of conmitment
ultimately of employers to make it work.
It is officially reported that the council collapsed because
PPWAWU resigned from the council, due to it becoming more active
outside than within the council. The unofficial view would
however appear to be somewhat different •
. Industrial Council ill lli liquor iru1 Catering Trade (pretoria):
Le Roux (Note 20) as Director : Industrial Relations for the
Federated Hotel and liquor Catering Association of South Africa
(FEDHASA), the major employer body for this industry, provided an
overview why certain of the industrial council s within this
industry had d1sso1ved. He ascri bes the disso1ut ions to three
reasons, which are elaborated upon within the discussion for each
council.
The industrial council for the Pretoria area , which cOlIIIM!nced in
1932, was deregtstered on 14 December 1989 under government
gazette no 12223 of 22 December 1989 by government notice 1504 of
1989.
The main reason for its dissolution was that there were not enough
participating employers to the council. Changes in the industry
reduced the number of hotels to about 22, of which the major ones
were owned by groups, and which would normally have wuranted
representa t ion on the counc 11 for thell. However due to the
workload requirements and other priorities of the 8IDployer
representat ives from the large groups, they were unabl e to attend
council meet ings with council quorums subsequently not obtained.
In addition, there was only one trade union serving on the
council. The union mostly represented banDen, a long established
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, sweetheart' un i on with wh ich the counc t1 had been invohed in
non-conflict bargaining for about 16 years. The tndustrtll
councll agreement (in fact all of these) contained closed shop
clauses, which were regarded as problematic in this industry.
- Industrial Councll ill 1M llilL2r iru1 Catering Trade.
Witwatersrand illi1 vereeniging:
When the Annual General Heeting of the council established the
conrnittee for the councll in about 1985/1986, a contingency of
employees arrived and voted the employee representatives out, a
move suspected orchestrated by the emergent trade union the Hotel
and Restaurant Workers Un ion (HARWU), the forerunner of the
Conrnercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa
(CCAWUSA), which is now the South African COlMlerc1al, Catering and
Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU).
A large number of disputes were subsequently brought to the
councll by HARWU, with the negot tat ions perceived by employers as
becoming out of order. Employers were unable to handle the
demands that were tabled, causing a rift within FEOHASA itsel f
whereby a new employers' organisation was established by the
smaller independent hoteliers who accused the larger hoteliers of
manipulating the council. This new organisation petered out after
about six months.
At a following Annual General Heeting of the council, the employer
members voted to wi thdraw from the counc t l as they found the
situation untenable. The council was subsequently deregistered on
5 December 1989.
Horn's (1988, p. 79) investigation into and findings on dispute
resolution functions of a sample of seven industrial councils,
amongst which this industrial council (ICLCT) was one, are
discussed at more length elsewhere in this document. He
positioned this council, with the six others, on Purcell's model
of two dimensions of formalisation and trust in terms of its
dispute resolution functions. It was found to be the only
industrial council both low on trust and also low on
formalisation. He elaborates further on this and it is useful to
cite the full extract on some of the problems that had faced this
council:
• In the ICLCT, CCAWUSA, which is not a member of the council but
is in fact a major player representing a large proportion of
workers in the industry, was reported as having a low willingness
to settle for 1ess than its demands in a dtspute settlement which
has an adverse effect on the att Hudes of emp layers towards th is
union regarding the settling of dtsputes tn this forul. The
majority of tts disputes were reported IS betng subalitted IS
Section 43 appl tcations which reportedly made resolution
difficult, tended to create animosity between themselves and the
employers and thus impeded the chance of ruching a settlelllent in
this forum. In addition to this, relationships were reported IS
'not being as good as they should be' on the council body staff.
This results tn the IelCT securing I relatively low rating on the
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trust dimension."
In addition, of five of the labour experts Interviewed by Horn
(1988, pp. 41 - 46) on the dispute resolution effectiveness of
certain Industrial councils, three of the ftve Identified this
council as being the less successful In this area.
When considering the Issues raised by the survey respondents that
contributed to the dissolution of certain Industrial councils, the
Ingredients for failure were present of: Aggravat Ing trade union
pressure and dt spute activity, employer react ion, poor quality of
party relat ionships, lack of mutual trust, poor council staff
relationships that would certainly have contributed to Ineffective
council management, resulting in a generally demotivated state for
the whole counc t l , leading to its ultimate demise•
• Industrial Council ill 1M liquor 1nsl Catering Trade (Durban):
There was also a single trade union party on this council, with
the relationship between employers and the union being the Issue.
Again a .closed shop clause existed in the agreement. Employers
believed that the the union was no longer representative of the
majority of employees, with the union hiding behind the closed
shop clause and insisting on their right at the Industrial
council.
There was interference too from the Black A11ied Workers Un ion
(BAWU), which was active In the industry but was not registered or
a party to the counei1 at the time. It Is uncert a i n whether it
was the original party union or BAWU, which subsequently did
obtain registration, with whom the employers experienced problems
on the Issue of the exclusion of restaurants as a separate enti ty
in the Industry, as its demands were basically directed at the
larger hotels. The union refused to recognise the restaurant
groupings as a separate entity, which they had recognised before.
Employers held a mass meeting of members and decided they would
not consider the union demands and withdrew from the council. The
employers gave notice of their withdriwal on 10 May 1990 and the
council was subsequently deregistered on 10 August 1990 under
government gazette 12679 of 10 August 1990 by government not ice
647 of 1990•
• Industrial Council fsu: .tM Transvaal Chemical Manufacturing
Industry:
Tau (Note 21) General Secretary of the Chemical Workers Union
(CWU) that was a party to the above industrial council, provided a
background to the dissolut ion of this council. Unfortunately it
was not possible to meet with the employer organisations concerned
to obtain their views. However, the writer WIS In fact Indirectly
associated with this industrial council and is Famn tar with some
of the circumstances surrounding Its dissolution. Although
dissolved, this council has not been officially deregistered yet.
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The other trade union party to the counci 1, the South African
Chemical Workers Union (SACWU), would not agree at negotiations on
an increment in the contributions to the sick benefit fund for the
industry. This fund was running into financial problems and
adjustments were necessary. Apparently the fund had operated too
for two to three years without increases to contributions due do
agreement not being reached on the Issue. The employer parties
eventually felt that the situation could not continue and resigned
from the industrial council, causing it to dissolve.
The sick benefit fund has subsequently been liquidated but the
council's provident fund is still operating. Regarding the
latter, the trade union parties and Secretary of the industrial
ocunci l are still managing the provident fund. In the case of
dissolution of the fund, which is problematic, total assets would
probably be distributed on the basts of a th i rd to employer
parties, a thi rd to the trade union parties for the benefit of
their members, and the final third to the government.
There is naturally some resistance that the latter portion goes to
the government and a bursary fund for children in the industry or
some otber suitable purpose is being reconmended for the
allocation of the final portion.
It was regarded as unfortunate that the issue of the sick beneftt
fund caused the downfall of the industrial council. It was
regarded as a very good and reasonable scheme. It also came to
1ight that the opposing union SACWU had not consulted with their
membership on the matter, as it is understood that they only came
to know about the developments after the event.
The employer side was not without problems either. At the time of
the vote for di ssolution, there was a majority of three employers
in favour of the closure of the council. Tau is of the opinion
that if more had attended the meeting the vote woul d have gone the
other way. The larger employers had however ended up running the
industrial council and exercising the most influence.
There is a remote poss1bl tty that this 1ndustr1 al council m1ght be
rev1ved aga1n.
On the separate issue of 1ndustrial counctl benefi t schemes when
1ndustrial council s dissolve, Le Roux (Note 20) 1s of the eptnton
that benef1 t schemes would cont 1nue to operate as long as the
Industrial Registrar 1s satisfied that the Board' of Executors are
capable of running the scheme, with equal representation by the
parties to the council. The Board normally consists of the
parties to the council at the t1me of dissolution. These schemes
can also be referred to the Registrar of Financial Institutions
who could register and take over the schemes.
Uebenberg (Note 12) observed that in analysing the lIain reasons
for certain industrhl councils folding, a connon element has been
inflex1bility on either side, with the main theme of vested
interests and parties not being prepared to adapt to changing
circumstances. Reference is made to the Kew experiment in
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Johannesburg where the government was attemptin9 to establt sh a
free trading zone with for example no industrial council rules and
regulations applying. Neither the industrial council and trade
unions concerned would however rel ingutsh their hold. This kind
of stance could cause a problem for a small industrial council and
lead to its demise. Yet, in his opinion, times dictate that the
Kew type experiment should be implemented in 1ine with the
challenge of small business development.
9.4 EffECTIVENESS Qf INDUSTR IAl COUNCILS 1M COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The overriding opinion of the sample of survey respondents was
very much in support of the effectiveness of the industrial
council system, although scope for improvement was still indicated
in respect of the response pattern. Al so, in the other
discussions relating to the dissolution of industrial councils and
survival options, the need for improved effectiveness and in
part tcular the ability to adapt to change, were more forceably
addressed. The points made will not be duplicated here.
However, if is important to note certain other general criticisms
against the system, whether they are supported or not by the
reader, to highlight further areas of improvement or modification
that could be considered. It is suspected that the full range of
opinion was not canvassed in the survey, with only a minority
negative response from those parties that did participate. It
could be that mainly those bodies that were generally favourably
disposed to the system volunteered responses. As it is, only one
of the emergent unions had responded and it is wondered whether
the results would have been much different if the broader spectrum
of parties' opinions could have been obtained.
Sideris (1982, pp. 3 - 4) in her dtssertation on industrial
councils and democratic trade union organisations, considers the
issue of whether participation in the official industrial
conciliation machinery advances democratic worker organtsations,
and the effects for democratic trade unions of participation or
non-participation in industrial ceunctls. The view could possibly
reflect, for that time in the early 1980's, some emergent trade
union opinion on the council system.
She cites the main critictsms that have been put forward as being:
- That as it exists the industrhl council system is
unrepresentative of the majority of workers.
- As a result of divtsions within the working cl ass along craft
and racial lines, workers would present themselves at the
bargaining table as divided facing well-organised employers.
- The council systell is bureaucratic and inaccessible to most
workers.
- Negothtion is removed from the shop floor where workers are
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most organ i sed •
• The whole procedure of negot Iat Ion encourages a reltance on
skilled negotiators and trade union officials, diminishing the
role and participation of the rank and ftle.
- This It is argued can have an effect on the internal structure
of the union, reinforcing divisions between leaders and led, thus
undermining democracy. This particular criticism is explored in
her research, namely that the Industrial counci 1 system has an
effect on the fonn of organisation of trade unions and that it
imposes undemocratic structures and practices, namely whether
there is a link between participation on an industrial council and
trade un Ion democracy.
In focussing on two Industrial councils, namely the Industrial
Councils for ,he Knitting Industry (Transvaal Region) and the
National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and
Metallurgical Industry, the following further problems and
criticisms of the Industrial council system were extracted by
Siderls:
- Insufficient worker participation and involvement in the
Industrial council system, such as the operation of the industrial
council and attendance of meetings, etcetera, especially In the
large Industrial counctls like the Metal Industry where there are
many specialist sub-committees that deal with specific Issues.
- Insuffic ient agents whereby rout Ine checks to man f tcr agreements
may only occur two to three times per annum, or even less,
questioning the effectiveness of these checks.
- Grievances that are referred to the industrial council normally
relate to contraventions of the main agreement, generally brought
by a slngle worker against his/her management, hence prlmariy
individual and not collective issues, which is perceived as
undermintng worker soltdari ty.
- If shop floor trade union organisation is not sufficiently
strong, the i ndustrtal council could be seen to usurp the
functions of the shop steward, with workers supplanting the trade
union with the industrtal council and taking their grievances to
the Industrial council rather than the trade union (an interesting
observation made too by an employer organisation survey respondent
under the disadvantages for trade unions of participation in
industrial councils).
- Industrial council officials and agents should retain their
Impartiality, expeclally where disputes Ire concerned.
- It Is assumed that employer and employee part ies face each other
as equals on the industrial counctl, but in real ity the power
bahnce In the systell Is perceived IS resting with the employer
part tes,
- Where separate industrial councils exist with closely related
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industrIes, such as the Transvaal Clothing and Transvaal Knitting
industrIes, governing employees withIn the same plant, which could
cause some confusion and dtssat isfaction, but al so dtvtstens in
the workforce as negotiated rates of pay, hours of work and
benefit funds could differ.
In sunrnation, Sideris (l982, p. 30) was of the opinion that the
(prevIously) racially exclusive nature of the industrIal council
system had allowed unrepresentative unions to win substantial
benefits for thei r members, such as retent i on of certa in
prIvileged positions and very high wages, without haVing an
organised presence in a particular establishment. Her conclusion
was that industrial councIls served the larger sector of capital
(employers) and only a part of the working class, a labour
aristocracy, with more substantial advantages offered to
management than labour.
Allan (1987, p, 3) does not offer criticisms as such, but which
could be interpreted as being so, on the issues that the
industrial council system is perceived as grappl ing with. Several
of these have been taken up in this and the following section, and
were a150 ra tsed by the respondents to the survey. These Issues
are:
"- the lack of representivity;
- remoteness from shop floor;
- unrespons i veness to shop floor needs;
- allegations of collusion between establ tshed unions and
emp1oyers to counter the emergent uni ons;
- bureaucratic structures"
9.5 ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS
A fair amount of discussion has emerged in several sections of
this document on the issue of appropriate bargaining levels and in
particular plant or establishment/enterprise level bargaining
versus, or in conjunction with, central15ed bargaining at
industrial councils.
What has been experi enced as a major cha11 enge to the industria1
council system 15 where individual employers (normally large
employers wi th a strong and establ ished power base) or employer
organisations, elect to retain unitary bargaining at the forull of
their choice, precluding participation in the formal labour
relations system of industrial councils.
The views of these parties and why they choose to bargain on these
forums are important as they generally highlight many of the major
shortcomings of the precluded fcrua, in this case the industrial
counc il .
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lThe Barlow Rand group and the Chamber of Hines are the most
notable examples in this regard. Interviews were obtained with
representatives from both organisations. '11th the respective views
discussed below.
Hiemstra (Note 13) of Rand Hines provided some insights and the
background to the problems perceived in the industrial council
system and this major Group's philosophy on decentral ised
bargaining.
The high level of industry regulation. the extension of council
agreements to non-parties and the criminal sanction of these
agreements were raised as being problematic at present and would
be more so in the future. Hany employers. and not only Barlow
Rand. are also uncomfortable that council negotiations are not
involVing all the trade union parties and all employers.
The debate is not regarded as being about central tsed and
decentral,tsed collective bargaining in his opinion. but on
voluntarism versus compulsory bargaining. The Chamber of Hines
example of centralised bargain1ng, with agreements not extended to
non-parties, was cited as an example of a more vol untary system.
After the '11 ehahn reforms the Black trade un 1on res istance to the
system initiated the move to plant level bargaining, but they now
see signif1cant strategic advantages through the industrial
council system_ It is antic1pated too that they would continue
supporting 1ndustrial counc1ls after their objectives have been
achieved, as it 15 a very convenient system for the union movement
from an organisat tonal point of view.
A further issue not in favour of the industrial ocuncl1 system 15
that the def tnt t ton of certain industries is so w1de that they can
hardly be called industries and 1ndustrial council s, but more 1n
the nature of a nat tonal barga1n1ng forum. If industrial councils
could break down 1nto more homogenous sectors they would become
more manageable_ This was a problem experienced 1n the Printing
industry as packaging was also incorporated into the scope of the
industry, which can lead to demarcation problems.
Rand Hines is in a situation where productivity is extremely
important. Any system which hampers product ivi ty is therefore
regarded as very detrimental. For example it is virtually
impossible to negotiate a productivity scheme at any central
level, ending up with multilevel bargaining, with the negotiation
of wages and condit ions of service and product ivity schemes
conducted at company or plant 1evel.
With multilevel bargaining some companies would like to pay higher
wages, and therefore have to negotiate again with unions to
establ ish how much more, leading to double exposure to
negot iat ions.
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lOne of the arguments for central ised bugaining is the social
contract Issue. with industrial councils regarded as a vehicle for
this. National bargaining forums are more appropriate for social
contracts, and not Industry based forums. The Heta 1 Industry is
very close to this situation, but has the disadvantage of being
too dIverse.
The Barlow Rand Group does not prescribe to afftl iates what level s
they should bargain at, for it is not a conscious pol Icy of the
Group. Barlow companies generally practice decentralisation,
whilst several do not and do in fact participate in industrial
councils. Organtsatlonally within the Group a decentraltsed
approach is favoured as a broader business strategy and not an
industrial relations strategy. Because of the decentrallsed
management basts a philosophy (it Is stressed not a polley) is
adopted in most sections of the Group that collective bargaining
will take place at the most effective levels of decisionmaking,
for example a regional structure might be the most effective
decisionmaking level, but not at corporate headquarters. As the
execution of philosophy and principles take place at particular
levels, this ts where agreements with unions will be concluded.
Rand Hines itsel f participates in the Chamber of Hines collective
bargaining forum.
- Chamber 2f Hi nes:
l iebenberg (Note 12) provides the following narrat ive background
to th.e origins of the Chamber of Hines and the development of its
collective bargaining system:
The roots of the Chamber of Hi nes are traced back to the Rand
Rebellion of 1922, like most of the important labour relations
structures and statutes of this country.
As a result of the Rand Rebellion and the use of troops by Smuts
to quell the rebellion, he subsequently lost the election of 1924
and a new government came into power, a coalition of Afrikaans
fanners and English artisans. One of the first major laws passed
by this new government was the Industrial Conciliat ion Act of 1924
(ICA), designed to overcome the problems revealed by the Rand
Rebellion.
The old leA was designed primarily with the Hining industry in
mind. It provided for the establishment of industrial councils,
and one could tnfer that this structure was designed specifically
for the Hintng industry too. However, the Hining industry did not
establ ish an industrial council at the tiM and subsequently in
the almost 70 years thereafter has still not yet established one.
The industry has however f1 trted with the Idea of establ ishing an
Industrial council, first in 1927, when elDPloyers and employees
seriously considered an industrial council but rejected it at the
t tme. The reason for this was that the industry had had its own
home grown system which had stood the test of t tM since 1896.
which had worked well except for the Rand Rebell ton and several
strikes.
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lThe Issue was not looked at again until about 1948. when the Van
Ed Conmlssion of Enquiry gave consideration to the establishement
of an Industrial council in the Mining Industry. Both employers
and employees made representations to the Van Eck Conmisslon and
both parties expressed their desire to continue with the present
system.
Shortly after the promulgation of the Industrial Conciliation
Amendment Act of 1956. the industry again considered the
establishment of an industrial counctl and again concluded that it
should cont inue with the present system.
After the transpiration of a fairly long period. in 1976 a
government Conmi ss ion of Enqui ry (the Fransszen Conrn15sion) into
the establ15hment of a five day working week in the Mining
industry was appointed. It reconmended in the end that a five day
week should not be Introduced into the industry, but concluded
from evidence obtained in the course of the investigation. that
there was a need for the overhaul of collective bargaining in the
Mining industry and reconrnended consideration be given to the
establishment of an industrial council for the industry. It was
however felt that this was outside the terms of reference of this
Conrn15sion of Enquiry and was not pursued.
At the time of the apppointment of the Wiehahn Conmission of
Enquiry the government made the issue of collective bargaining in
the' Mining industry one of the terms of reference for the
Conrn15sion. as reported upon in the Sixth Report of the Wiehahn
Conrnission, dealing specifically wth labour relations in the
Mining industry, etcetera.
Wlehahn and his Conrnissioners basically reconmended that the
parties must decide whether they want an industrial council or
not. In its evidence to the Wlehahn Comission the Mining
industry stated it would prefer to cont inue with its system which
had stood the test of time but if it were to establish an
industrial council, under no circumstances would it consider
extending agreements to cover non-parties.
Membership of the Chamber of Hines is voluntary, with some members
having delegated to the Chamber as an employers' organisation the
authority to negotiate agreements on their behal f, whilst others
have not done so. Cerhin mines have not joined the Chamber
either, and operate mainly in terms of their own labour
agreements. I f an industrhl council wn ever established, its
agreements waul d only apply to cover parties who had voluntarily
joined together on the council. Trade unions were at the time in
hvour of an i ndustr1al council, but with the expl icit view that
industrial council agreements should be extended to cover
nen-part tes as it would then incorporate the whole Mining industry
within their sphere of influence.
Subsequent to the Wlehahn Comi ss ion's Sixth Report the Mini n9
industry establ ished its own internal Comission to look into the
industry's collective bargaining systell, the Van der Bosch
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lConrnittee. For two years this cOlTllltttee did an internal
investigation and performed a good task in looking at the systemic
objectives of a collective bargaining system, as well as the
strengths and weaknesses of the Chamber's spec Hie collect ive
bargaining arrangement, and whether the industry should estab1 tsh
an industrial council. It concluded that there were in fact very
few weaknesses in the Chamber's existing system but that the
weaknesses tha t were there, fatally flawed it.
The two weaknes ses were as fo11 ows:
- The Chamber's system did not provide for a monitoring authority.
- It did not provide for the enforceabtl tty of agreements.
If they had tried to correct the system, they could as well have
gone so far as to establt sh an industrial counct1 . In terms of
practteal it ies though, for example how could the monitoring of an
agreement have been app1 ied In respect of an underground
situation? The Hines and Works regulations regarding access is
very strict, especially for outsiders such as industrial council
agents. A1 so, with access regulations, many hours could elapse
from the time of an agent arriving at a mine gate until he arrived
at where the breach had occurred.
A further problem identified was in respect of enforceability of
agreements. The industrial council penalties would create
problems and the current enforceability arrangement was preferred,
which is a moral enforceability and not legal, with 'gentlemen1y'
honours at stake.
Thus, all in all a disinclination to opt for the industrial
council system which would have entailed some more bureaucracy and
levies to support it without reducing the weaknesses of the
current system.
In line with the Wiehahn COlll1lission recolll1lendations a security of
employment agreement was concluded in 1986 with nine of the eleven
unions recognised at the time, with the Hineworkers Union and the
S ATechnical Officials Association as the two non-signatories.
In essence thi s agreement addressed seven points made by the
Wiehahn COlll1lission, which can be sUlTlllarised into security of
employment.
Durl ng the course of drawi n9 up thIs agreement, the issue of
establishing an industrial council was frequently dealt with, but
stopped short of agreement to establish one, which also llleant that
the trade unions did not press for this.
In exchange for the security of emploYlllent agreement the Chamber
and Its part ies wished the government to cancel the schedu1 ed
person definition In the Hines and Works Act. The direct result
of the 1986 agreement was thus that on 10 August 1987 the Bi 11 to
cancel the scheduled person definit ion was read in Par1lament, and
00 8 July 1988 the new Hines and Works regulat ions caM into
being. Finally, on 5 December 1988 the first Black miner holding
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a blast Ing cert Hlcate led i team underground.
Since then the Chamber has not dtscussed the industrial council
system at all. but have noticed one Industrial council after
another reporting great difficulties. The system is not regarded
as at fault. for it does have flexlbl1 tty In terms of S24 of the
LRA. Problems are perceived as being caused by vested Interests
In the Industrial councils, as well as the non-voluntartsm which
subjects non-party employers to Industrial counc t 1 agreements.
The needs of the Industry and not the Industrial council should be
regarded as important. In the Hinlng Industry part les have tried
to achieve thl s by focussing on the Industry's needs and not those
of the Chamber members and their trade union parties.
The main feature of the Chamber of Hines system is that It Is
regarded as truly voluntary. Many members with problems have been
accommoda ted by recolll1lend 1ng them to ra ther conc1ude house
agreements, wi th ISCOR as an example in respect of its mining
operations.
At the beginning of 1990 a total of twelve trade unions
represented employees In collective bargaining processes on the
Chamber, but thi s changed to ten during 1990 when two trade unions
merged on 1 September 1990 and one small trade union lost Its four
members to another union in the Industry. The single biggest
trade union party is the National Union of Hineworkers (HUH) with
about 170 000 members.
There are 99 ml nes that are members of the Chamber, with the
numbers of emp 1oyees not reported, but they emp loy about 89' of
all employees In the Industry. Before the spates of retrenchment
total employees in the Industry were estimated at 750 000, with
about 600 000 of these employed by the 99 Chamber members (Vaal
Reefs Is the largest with about 44 000 employees on a single
mine). This 1s just short of the scope of all industrial counct ls
combined.
The Chamber's collective bargaining syste.. provides for three
separate negot lations on wages annually. These three separate
sets of negot i at Ions are wi th the six trade unions affiliated to
the Council of Hineworkers , the three Offlc1lls' Assochtlons and
HUH on Its own. Other systems are that meetings are held with the
three separate trade union groupings once every second IIOnth to
discuss bread and butter issues. but an open door pol icy exists
for the discussion of any other reasonable subjects if Issues
relate to single trade unions only.
Sideris (1982. p. 4) offers the IOttvation too why the trade
union IIOvement in the early 1980's put forward plant level
bargaining as the alternative by those who challenged the
industrhl council system. It was argued that negotiation at the
shop floor level strengthened the posit Ion of workers as that is
where they can organise IIOst effectively, in addi t ion to allowing
for more active participation of the rank and ftl. in negotiation
procedures. Plant level bargaining was also perceived IS
prOViding a stronger possibility for effectivi lDandatlng and
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lreport back procedures.
The challenge to industrial councils of two tier bargaining
systems as dtscussd by Allan (1987. p. 24) is seen as one of the
fundamental issues facing industrial councils. namely to create a
dual Industry and plant level bargaining structure within existing
structures which will be complementary to one another rather than
In compet it ion to. Allan further contends that with employers
being required to bargain at plant level subsequent to centralised
negotiations. more pressure will be brought to bear on industrial
councils and they could run the risk of becoming irrelevant.
Th writer's opinion is that recognition of the dualistic system of
collective bargaining in South Africa should be accommodated in
both the formal and informal labour relations systems and that
industrial councils should be sensitive and flexible in respect of
these trends to avoid becoming irrelevant. as cautioned by Allan
and others. These thoughts are progressed further inSect Ion 10' s
discussIon of th is topic.
However. much of this depends on perceptions on relative power
bases on. either side at a particular point in time. which can
change as the sources of apparent power change. To return to one
of the basic concepts of collective bargaining, that Is that
either party wi 11 prefer to bargain where they feel the greatest
advantage and power for themselves in the bargaining process.
vests.
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l10. DISCUSSION AND RECOHHENOATIONS
What does the future hold for industrial councils and what do they
need to focus on to ensure that there wi 11 be a future for them?
There was overwhelming opinion amongst the 53 survey respondents,
although they do not represent the full industrial counctl and
party population, that industrial councils will survive the next
decade. Even those respondents that are not act ively engaged in
or supporters of the system conceded to this. It 15 also the
opinion of the writer that the system has several durable
characteristics that provide a positive future proqncst s .
Many recoemendat ions were submi tted by respondents and other
contributors on how the industrial council system can both be
improved and its future vtabil tty ensured. The purpose of this
discussion will not be to consider each of these but to provide
some general, albeit tentative, thoughts and recormlendations on
the future direction of these structures. The detail of the
survey results as provided in Appendix 3 certainly does merit
further .consideration and investigation but regrettably falls
outside the scope of this study and would be useful for other
researchers to pursue.
The main issues to be considered for the future are again
presented under the appropriate questionnaire item headings, with
the .except ton of the major factors impacting on the system as
these are incorporated in the improvements discussion, which also
covers the prevention of dissolution of certain industrial
councils. Advantages and disadvantages of the system are not
covered again either as these have been adequately dealt with
already. The issues highlighted are primarily drawn from the
literature, personal discussion with various part 1es and personal
observat ion of the writer, supplemented by the survey responses.
10.1 IMPROVEMENT QE FACTORS:mAr ll1fA1.B INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS'
EffECTIVENESS
The five most important gUidelines identified by survey
respondents in respect of improvements necesury to the sys tem
will serve as a stlrting point, added to by other issues that are
of topical importance.
10.1.1 OUAl lTV Of RElATIONSHIPS
The simple truth that labour relations essentially do evolve
around relationships 15 more often than not lost in the conflict,
pressures, practice and operational activities surrounding
collective bargaining.
Similar to shop floor face to face industrial relations
interactions, the quality of the relationship between the ellployer
and employee parties at industrial council level is just as, if
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lnot more, tmportant due to the size of the populattons that they
represent and the Impact of the outcomes of their deliberations.
The survey results frequently emphastsed key words such as
cooperation, corrmunlcatlon, collaboration, support, Involvement,
trust, acceptance, conmltment, and phrases such as less militancy,
conmunal Ity of purpose, Improved attitudes, etcetera. These
references all pertain to the quality of relationships that exist
both on an industrial council and In the parttcular industry or
occupatton that it serves. In a central tsed collect ive bargatning
sltuatton where parttes have a forum to meet and tnteract
formally, it could be said that the bulk of relattonship building
101111 take place tn thts forum.
Horn (1988, p. 77), highlights features of these relationships tn
a discuss ton on the app1icat ton of Purcell' s mode1 to research
conducted on i ndustrtal councl15 on the two dtmenslons of
formalisation and trust which govern this tnteractlon, as
developed by Oouwes-Oekker. Purcell's model provides a matrtx
representtng patterns of tndustrtal relations and the interactton
between management and unions In this relat tonshtp. The potnt
that Oouwes-Oekker emphasised, as referenced by Horn, is that tn
the management/union Interact ton, in addttton to the formal Isat ton
of the Interact t on by way of rules and documented procedures, the
addlttonal dimension of trust is requtred to ensure a satisfactory
outcome for both parties of their interact ten.
To q,uote Horn (1988, p.. 77): ~Procedures alone, although very
important, cannot result tn a healthy relationshtp, the element of
trust and respect between the leaders of both part ies must also be
present. ~ Trust whtch borders on colluston is also cauttoned
against, espectally with stngle unton Industrial councils that
have longstanding relationships with employer parttes on these
counctls. Often when new trade unton parttes seek entry to such
an tndustrial council, the rtsk may be there of potential
'sweetheart union' confl ict aristng in view of percetved
favourit t sm.
Of interest too in this research of Horn's (1988, p. 80) is that
of the seven industrial counctls sampled and placed on the
conttnuum of trust and formaltsation tn the model in respect of
their dispute resolution functions, the only industrial council
that was positioned as being low on trust (and incidentally low on
formal Isat ion too) was thit of the Industrial Council for the
Liquor and C~tering Trade (Wi twatersrand ~nd Vereeniging). At
that stage, in 1988, the portent to the de.ise of thts council in
1989 was ~1re~dy present. Whether lack of trust between part ies
WiS the only contributing factor, is uncartatn, but it would
appear to have been a major influence on the course of events tn
the life of this tndustrill counctl.
Allan (1987, p. 70) tn testtng his seven key proposittons
regarding issues rehttng to the national industrial council for
the Metal tndustry, found the quality of relattonships is a IIIljor
area of lacking resulting in ~ lhaited rellisatlon of his
proposlttons being achieved at the tllll8.
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lAlthough most of his research addressed the 1ssue of the challenge
of two tier collective bargaining In the Metal industry, the
circumstances and major findings will not be covered under the
sectlon on alternative collective bargaining Institutions, but
more appropriately here. Briefly, when the Metal and Allied
Workers Union (HAWU) (now NUMSA) joined the national industrial
council for the Metal industry in 1983, a controversy comenced in
the industry when it Insisted on retaining plant level bargaining
in conjunction with the centralised Industrial council collective
bargaining system. Other trade unions in the industry also
f011 owed suit.
At the time of Allan's research (1986) the parties to the national
industrial council were engaged in negotiations over the levels of
collective bargaining In that industry. Thus this was a very
topical issue and with the significance of this, the largest
industrial council, and potential precedence of its negotlltlons,
the Issue became relevant too to the Industrial council system as
a whole. To refer a quote from one of Allan's respondents (1987,
p. 72): "If this Industrial Council can't be saved which one can?
It suffers less from the general criticisms levelled at many other
industrial councils. Owing to its size and importance, it is
imperative that they do preserve 1t.-
The seven key propositions of Allan's (1987, pp. 62· 72) will
not be detailed here, but an example 15 prcvtded in the first one,
as below:
"If there is a strong degree of unity and acceptance of the role
and leg1 t 1macy of trade union federations and employer
federations
then
a basic national agreement could be negotllted between the parties
which outlines the rules for developing and formal 151ng
relationships at other levels (sectoral, company and plant).-
Therefore a si tuat icn that appeared to be salvageable. Allan's
(1987, p. 70) concluding conments on his findings are significant
in the context of this discussion: "ln the course of this research
it has become clear that the parties have the capac tty to mod 1fy
the structure. The structure itself offers sufficient flexlbl1ity
to accommodate wide rang1 ng and divergent demands. What is
lack1ng, however, 15 the willi ngness and COfllll1 tment to change
behaviour••••• A spirit of un1hteralts. prevails on the part
of l22lll employers and employees to the detriment of any fona of
co·determination or specific ce-operat ive strategies
emerging. •
Whether this situation has changed was not probed in this study.
It has been contended on sevenl occasions that 1ndustrhl
councils will need to adapt to chang, and IDOdify various features
of the system to keep abreu t with t IlIMIs and the needs of the
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lIndustry and their members. A major obstacle could therefore be
the lack or willingness of the actual parties to inttiate and see
these changes through due to Inherent flaws In the relit lonsh Ip
towards one another.
The quality of relationships between employee and employer parties
to Indus tria1 counc ils wi 11 therefore be very important to the
sustained viabl1 tty of such councils.
10.1.2 COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES AHDillfI
Severa1 references have been made already regard i ng the need for
the parties to and employees of Industrial councils to lSstst in
Improving thei r own Images and the Image of the counc i ls that they
serve on, as well as their service and experthe levels. In the
discussions on the other ttems under this section, more specific
ment Ion will be made of how counc 11 representat ives and staff can
ach Ieve th is. Th 15 area a1so relates very close1y to that of the
marketing and coneuntcattcn focus required by councils.
As a further example on other areas of improvement In this
respect, is that in the past trade unions and their members have
developed negat i ve percept ions due to havl ng had bad experiences
with council secretariats and staff, as reported by Camay (Hote
18). Their impartiality towards the council parties should be
Improved and thus too unions I percept ions of the system. Camay
also commented on the perceived lack of training prograllllles for
industrial council agents, which needs addressing.
The necess ity for a permanent secrehrtat 15 a150 queried by Camay
(Note 18). For example, the secretarial and chairing functions of
councils could be alternated between parties to promote
self-governance of the deepest kind. An alternative to
industrial council agents are shop stewards and Industrial
Relations Officers in establ15hments, who can perform the same
functions as agents in monitoring industry agreements. Although
this proposal does not relate directly to this heading, it does
however place the persons that are possibly the most skilled in
the particular areas in appropriate positions.
The Department of Manpower is also conscious of this particular
shortcoming of most Industrial councils, with Slabbert (Hote 23)
offering suggestions such as:
- Councils adopting a 'think tank' and more entrepreneunl
approach and employing people that fit this mould rather than
bureaucrats and admi ntstrators.
- The education of parties and non-parties, especially the latter,
on the Industri al council systell.
- The training of especially agents and the hlage that they
project.
The Industrial Council for the Building Industry (Transvaal) as an
example, adopted a specific phn of action to enhance the IlIagl of
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lthe council and address the question of representation. One of
the primary interventions was for 111 agents to complete I course
In human relations and labour relat tons , which supports the
previous reconmendat ion.
10.1.3 REPRESENTIYITY
One of the findings of the research by Leite (1985, pp. 110·
120) on the acconrnodatlon of two tier barglintng in the Industrial
Council for the Building Industry (Transvaa 1), brought forth a
partlcul ar reference to the represent ivHy of Bl ack trade unions,
at a time when the Bhck trade union active tn the Industry was
not yet party to the industrial council. Leite's research
supported, amongst other findings, that the direct representation
of Bhck workers through their unions is required If the
industrial council system is to remain a legitimate vehicle for
collective bargaining at industry level.
The unilateral prescription of wages and working conditions for
Black workers by industrial councils was found not to be
acceptable, nor was the presumption by White unton parties that
they understood and represented the Interests of Black workers
better than Bl ack unions.
De Jager (Note 26) in discussing represent1vity in the Metal
industry, stresses quality versus the quantity of representivity
and the role of the Department of Manpower in this regard, as the
final decisionmaker on whether an Industrial council is
sufficiently representative or not for an Industry.
The State's role should be perceived as to guide parties to
councils to establ ish reasonable levels of represent1vity based on
quality rather than quant tty. The industry part ies themselves
know their particuhr situations better than the State.
Represent i vi ty can for examp18 fl uctuate day to day in certa i n
industries where seasonal factors prevail. Officials of the
Department of Manpower shou1d therefore focus more on who the
actors on the 1ndustrtal council stage are rather than the numbers
involved, as well as the relevancy of members. By their studying
the minutes of industrial council meeting proceedings greater
awareness of the processes and del iberat ions by industrial
councils on these issues can be obtained.
The above opinion of qual itlthe rather than quantitative
representlt 1on is strongly supported by the Build i ng industry for
the Transvaal 1ndustrhl council's press release (1990).
10.1.4 MARKETING Arm COHHUNICATIOH
This is regarded as one of the future roles and functions of
industrial councils and is discussed seplrately here due to its
importance, rather than under the future functions of councils.
The active promotion of the industrial council as a centralised
collective bargaining institution or jotnt tndustry service
organt sat ton is advocated, as well as encouragement to yet
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Lunregistered trade unions to attain registrat ion in order to
participate in the advantages of the fonnal labour rehtions
system, if this is still appropriate in the future. This public
relations drive in so far as the union movement in plrticular is
concerned, is considered important by Camay (Note IS).
This promotion should occur at both industrial council and
governmental level, and is being embarked upon already in both
Instances, wi th very encouraging results. James (Note 3) reports
that the Department of Manpower has taken a proact i ve approach in
this area whereby the industrial council system parttctpat ion
advantages are discussed wi th unregistered trade unions and they
are counselled on the benefits of registration for them and their
members. The approach that the Department adopts is that with
registration unions can achieve more for members with less effort,
and that all employers within an industry can be reached through
the industrial council system, etcetera. A major trade union
grouping, for example, that had remained unregistered for a long
time, had finally cOlllllitted itself to gain registration after
consultations with the Industrial Registrar.
Stapelberg (Note 27) was pleased to report too that the industrial
council, for the Building industry (Transvaal)' s campaign to
Improve representivtty, which was a critical issue for this
council, had also borne fruit with two emergent unions recently
joining and rejoining the council respectively.
Many.misconceptions about. the system should also be corrected in
councils' conmuntcatten prograrrmes, such as the rank and file
Impression that council negotiated wages and conditions are the
'government' rates and that actual wages are set at plant level.
This misconception of the process is obviously fostered by the
offictal gazetting of agreements. The independence of industrial
councils and their relationship with the Department of Manpower
shoul d therefore be clari fi ed.
10.1. 5 DEVELOPMENTS lli !liE 1.BA AMD lliE fORMAL LABOUR RELATIONS
SYSTEM
The role of industrial councils has primarily been discussed in
terms of the formal labour relations system in South Africa and
the Act that serves as its creation and reason for existence,
namely the Labour Relations Act No 28 of 1956.
As mentioned earlier in the body of this document, it is now
confirmed that further amendments to this key piece of labour
legislation will finally be enacted in 1991, especially in the
1ight of react ions and representations made by yuious bodies
regarding the amendments that were promulgated 1n Septelllber 1988
by the Labour Relations Amendment Act No 83 of 1988. It is fairly
certain at this stage that these amendments would pertain to
Sect ion 79 of the LRA on the 1labi 1ity of trade unions and
employers for their lllembers' actions during industrial action, the
redefinition of the unfair labour prlctice, as well as the periods
and procedures relating to utilisation of the dispute resolution
mechanisms of the LRA. The latter would certainly affect
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industrial councils in respect of their dispute settlement
funct ions.
Regarding the utilisation of the fonnal labour relations system as
encompassed within the LRA. offichl stat 1st ics have shown a
gradual upward trend in the number of employees covered by
industrial council agreements between 1986 and 1988, after an
initial decline in 1986, which in itself was encouraging.
However, even if the Metal industry employees were to be included
in the 1989 figures, there has now been a decrease on 1988
employee coverage numbers. Also 1988 had shown a sharp decline in
the number of industrial councl1 main agreements, followed by a
lesser drop In 1989. This is particularly perturbing, as well as
the steady decline since 1985 in the number of employers that are
covered by indus tria1 counc11 agreements, aggravated by a
significant decrease In 1989.
This Is in sharp contrast wi th the rapid increase over the years
reviewed in the utl1lsation of the conciliation board system for
mainly dispute resolution purposes, which appears with the
developing institution of the industrial court, as becoming the
most util1sed mechanisms for containing and resolving labour
relations 1ssues. This trend, including the increasing popularity
of decentral ised collective bargaining structures and agreements
such as plant 1eve1 procedural and substanti ve agreements, caul d
account for the impress ion of decreased vi abtl tty of many
Industrial councils and the system as a whole.
Although certain of these-features that relate to the utilisation
of the mechan isms provtded for within the lRA are pleasing, the
opinion is st ill maintained that the industrial council system
could be better utilised and should be revitalised as it
nevertheless still regulates the most wages and employee benefits
in the country and can furthermore resolves disputes the most cost
effectively for all parties concerned. Bendix (1989, p. 370)
conft rms the 1atter comment and expands on the issues that face
industrial councils in the future as being:
• Contrary to expectations, the industrial council syste. has not
wholly disintegrated with the advent in shop floor bargaining. and
st ill rema ins a force to be contended with.
• Industrial counci ls must accept that they are no longer sole
bargaining forums.
• Although they have become less relevant for a certain section of
the population, namely Blacks, most of the councils have continued
to funct ion, and may also become IIOre relevant aga i n in the future
for this group. (Which they would appear to have becolIII since
this statement was made).
• Industrial councils stf l l phy an Important role in that they do
establish minimull wages for a vast number of employees who light
have no other bargaining forul, as well as to acbintster
substantial benefit funds.
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- With the increased use of statutory d hpute-settlement
procedures by those Involved in plant level disputes, Industrial
councils have come to fulfil an Important function as intennediary
and mediator in this respect.
10.1.6 INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL AGREEMENTS
Much conment has been passed on the principle of enforceability of
Industrial council agreements, their criminal sanction, their
extens Ion to non-part tes , exempt Ions therefrom, time taken to
conclude and publish agreements and their general
comprehensibility, with differing opinions and reconrnendatlons on
these.
De Jager's (Note 26) observat ions in this regard are based on many
years' experience in the Metal industry with its extremely complex
and wide range of agreements. He cautions ftrstly against
potential monopolies on industrial councils and goes so far as to
suggest that the Competitions Board scrutinises monopolies in
terms of industrial council compositions. Espechlly in
negotiating industrial council agreements certain parties could
legislate themselves Into a favourable sltuat ton.
In add It i on, the Department of Manpower should scruti nhe
agreements, not only in terms of the requirements of the LRA and
other crHeri a, but to ensure that If agreements are onerous and
extension is requested to cover non-parties, that they are equally
onerous to the parties that drew them up. Finally, the Department
does not always apprectate the difficulty in translating
agreements, which is the responsibility of the industrial council
before submission. If dual language publication 15 required (in
the future there might even be further language reqUirements) then
negotiations should start even earHer to ensure that agreements
are adequately prepared for timeous submission.
Hiemstra (Note 13) connented that Industrial councils are
perceived as the highest fom of regulation for industry at
present, with some agreements prohibiting productiVity bargaining
which is not appropriate under present economic circumstances.
On matters pertaining to industrial council agreements and thei r
coverage, he adds that these are still problematic to employers
who are not keen on the systetl, in particular the extensions to
non-parties which can be extremely objectionable to certain
employer parties and will become more so in the future. However,
In the most recent discusstons on the proposed new labour
legislatton, employers and trade unions still appear to be
supporting the extension syste•. The crtminal hation of the
system is also regarded as problematic as tt is considered to be
part of civil and not crtminal law, with agreements enforced by
the law of contract and not ctvf l law.
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10.2 ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS
Any discussion on industrial councils cannot be divorced frOID a
discussion on collective bargaining levels as the bo are
intimately linked. When alternative Institutions to industrhl
councils are discussed, this Inevitably also revolves around
levels of collective bargaining. Under this heading It is
therefore also relevant to consider issues and progress in the
resolution of the debate on multilevel bargaining and the support
provided to di fferent collective bargaining arrangements.
This debate does not appear to be settled yet and must certainly
be on the forefront of the minds of central labour poltcymakers as
well as those coming to terms with the existence and issues of two
tter or rather. multilevel. bargaining as is currently practised
In South Africa. Many other survey respondents as well as
Interviewees such as Rajah (Note 15) highlight th is as a current
problem affecting industrial councils.
The writer's opinion Is that multilevel bargaining is a fact of
current collective labour life and that accorrmodations to defuse
the conflict and resolve the practtcal problems surrounding it.
should be considered and implemented as speedily as possible.
This is part i cularly important bearing in mi nd the vol untarism of
the current formal labour relations system. if one omits the
safeguards of the statutory aspects.
With regard to statutory safeguards and protections as contained
in the LRA and other labour statutes, these should not easily be
dismissed. Of concern in several quarters has been the temptation
of employers and trade unions. normally under pressure of the
latter, to embark on the so-called second generation agreements
(as opposed to other plant level recognition agreements) that
bypass certain provisions of the LRA and were prompted by the
controvers 1a1 1988 amendments to the Act. Caut ion has been
expressed by various authori ties and experts on the adviubili ty
of alienating certain rights and protections contained in the lRA
as well as the potenttal unlawfulness attached to such action.
The proposed new amendments to the LRA might well curtail this
trend if the final product is seen as being InOre palatable and an
encouragement to conformi ty. Greater acceptance of the offic ia 1
labour legislation might certainly also initiate I IIOvement back
to the formal centraltsed collective bargaining syste. of the
industrial council. The 1991 new LRA is therefore awaited in
anticipation and with Interest.
As collective bargaining institutions (not necessarily It
centralised level) few alternatives in the fOnDll labour relattons
system to tndustri a1 counc i1s were offered by survey respondents.
although I grounds"ell does exist for plant level bargaining or
other voluntary party·only 5yste.s at either pl ant or industry
level. On their own industrtal councils and other bargaining
arrangements would appear to not bt sat isfytng the full range of
collective bargaintng needs of the parttes, othenfise the Issue of
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multilevel bargllnlng would not hne becOClMt In issue. In
rullstic terms, when one considers the advlnt.ges and
dludv.ntlges of the Industrhl council system (also the Inverted
dludv.ntages and .dv.ntAges of s.y phnt level blrg.lnlng) n
det.lled In Section 9, both levels of bugllnlng do hive certain
flaws.
The diversification of blrgalnlng levels would therefore be very
much here to shy. The time for .cconrnodatlons, with the
.llgnment and integrltlon of complemenhlltles between the two
systems hn certAinly urlved, is suggested too by Douwes-Dekker
(Note 29).
Ramsden (1987, p. 17) conrnents on the trend towards the
diversification of bargaining levels internationally, is well n
the recognition and Institutionalisation of multi-bargaining
leve l s, as fo11 ows:
-This trend towards the institutionalisation of more than one
level of bargaining Indicates a recognition of the hct that there
are certain questions which lend themselves to specific trutment
at dlffer.ent l evals ."
With reference to other sources that support the potent 111 for the
type of accommodations envisaged, Ramsden (1987. p. 23) firstly
cHes State recognition during the Wlehahn proposals consideration
phase that labour peace could only be served if strong structures
existed at both Industry and enterprise levels. The structures
then envisaged were Industrhl councils at central level and
conmlttees (currently works councils) at enterprise level for
pllnt level consultation with employees.
RalDsden secondly reports (1981, pp. 28 - 29) that the evidence
submitted to the National Manpower Comission's report on
collective bargaining levels suggest that It 15 generally accepted
that bargaining at local level and central level can ex1st in
harmony and can complement one another.
The major potent hl problell according to Ratlsden (1981, pp. 16-
17) with the extstence and adoption of vlrious levels of
negottation/bargaining 15 that of coordination. with a need to
define which tssues are to be discussed It which levels, IS is
currently also experienced in practice. Alternatively, where
effective coordination 15 not possible, a return to one ltvel of
bargaining or an adllission thlt Iny latter can be discussed at Iny
level Is offered by her IS In opt Ion.
Al lin (1987. p. 2) contends too thlt: • ••• Phnt/coepany or
sectoral based buga Inlng IlUst c0llP1Hl8nt rdher thin cQllCleU with
centralised bargaining structures.· Thus plant Ind industry l.vel
bargaining Ire not IDUtually excluslv. and thetr cOIIPlfMntlry
nature should be recognised and structured appropriately to
achieve the .ffect tve cooperat Ion referr~ to in Raasden's
foregoing referenc••
In respect of the relatld t ssue of Inslst.nc. on a particular
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bargaining level by parties, to the excluston of other levels,
this will and has been more problematic in itself than that of
multilevel bargaining. Thts fonn of inflextbl1 t ty has proved to
be detrimenta 1 and supports the need for part ies to review thet r
philosophies and attitudes on issues such as these. which many
have certainly done to good effect as already exemplified in thts
study.
Ramsden (1987, p. 142) in the concluding section of her research
on two tter bargaining tn the Metal industry echoes this
observatton in the followtng statement on the status in thts
industry prior to the major and single employer federation,
SEIFSA's, change in stance to this issue:
"Plant level bargatning seems tnevitable. What 15 not certain t s
the future of tndustry level bargaining. SEIFSA's refusal to
bargain at two levels has been based on the prem1se that one tter
becomes superfluous. SEIFSA feels that plant level bargaining
will lead to the collapse of the tndustrial council. Ironically,
it now appears that the greater threat to the t ndustrhl council
is the refusal to bargain at plant level rather than pllnt level
bargaining itself.·
How these accorrmodat ions can be achieved warrants a spechl study,
although several proposittons have already been put forward on how
this acccemodat tcn can be addressed. and it is anttcipated that
there wi 11 be more tn the future.
Leite in his 1985 research considers the practicalities of the
future cohabitation of two tter bargaining in the Buildtng
industry tn the post-Wiehahn implementation period. He explores
in this research how complementary features of pl ant and industry
based co11 ect 1ve barga ining can both be operationalised and
institutionalised, in a model for collective bargatn1ng in the
Building industry. A reproduction of the model appears in
Appendix 4 and will not be dtscussed in detail here.
Leite's research was conducted by way of a comprehensive
questtonna1re to nine respondents representing the industrial
council and employer and employee parttes thereto (though the
latter dtd not include Black trade unton part1ctpatton at that
stage), as well as certatn non-party employers, for the Buildtng
industry in the Transvaal. The findings are of importance tn
respect of views towards the possible integration of industrial
council and plant level bargaining and agreements, and deserve
some mention in this context on the future perspectives of the
industrial council systelll. Although certatn of these views have
specific relevance to the Building industry for the Transvaal
only, some generic pointers can be derived therefrOll. The matn
ftndings are sunnartsed and extracted below from leite's (1985,
pp. 110 - 120) concluding section to his dissertation:
- The White trade union and the employer organisation, the Muter
Builders Association, were not in favour of the move towards shop
floor call ect t ve bargaining advocated by the emergent Blick trade
unions. Shop floor or local level bargaining was rejected where
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Industrial councils already existed and the key underlying
principle of Lette's model, namely the complementary nature of
Industry and local level bargaining. was not supported. This view
might well have changed over the five years since this research
was conducted, but could st 111 have remnants within the more
conservative elements In both the employer and trade union
contingents.
. Individual employer representatives were. despite various
concerns on the detail of the model. generally more supportive of
It and although they were in the main not in favour of plant level
bargaining. they accepted that they could not un i l aterally reject
thIs system. The concern on dehtl of the model pertaIned
prlmartly to the issues that could be subject to such bargaining.
Reference was also made In th is response to the industrl a1 court
ruling In the case of Hart LImited versus HAWU as discussed
already in Section 9. and the subsequent ruling in the BAWU versus
Asoka Hotel case which had thrown open the issues relating to two
tler bargaining. The message conveyed by these rulings was that a
refusal to enter Into a bargaining relationship with a
representative union at plant level could be regarded as an unfair
labour practice, as maya refusal to bargain certain issues such
as wages at plant level, whilst minimum conditions and wages are
already established at Industrial council level. The Industrial
council administration Itself also accepted the concept of a
complementary bargaining system In principle as illustrated In the
model.
. The Black trade union operating In the Industry, although not a
party, was reported as accepting the model in principle, and being
supportlve of both Industrial council and plant level bargaining
as well as the complementary character of such bargaining.
Other actual examples of acconmodatlons of multilevel bargaining
are the following:
Certain industrial councils, such as the Industrial Council for
the Electrical Industry (East london) (1988), Inc l udes in Its main
agreement provisions and guidel ines In respect of procedural
(recognition) agreements at establishment level, as well as
Industrial council dispute resolution procedure interaction w1th
those established at establt shment (plant) level i hence
recognising the realities of two tier bargaining in its Industry.
SEIFSA also eventually comprOtlised its policy in the Metal
Industry that substant tve Issues such as wages should not be
negot lated at more than one level. This hrge employer body's
contention was that bargaining on the SDle issue at two levels
could result in one level becOlling superfluous, and therefore
actively discouraged plant and cOlllpany level bargaining of issues
encompassed In the Industry main agreellltnt. A special chuse was
Introduced under reported considerable union pressure In the 1986
main agreement for the Metal Industry which somewhat obliquely
addressed the issue of two tier bugalnlng. This special chuse,
as quoted below by Ramsden (1987, p. itt), appeared In conflict
with the official SElfSA polley, as discussed above:
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"An employer who Intends to grant general i ncreues to all
employees or all employees tn a plrttcuhr category of employees
In excess of the guaranteed personal mlntmum i ncreues provtded
for In this agreement shall consult the trade unions of which the
partl cu 1ar emp 1oyees concerned Ire members.
Where an employer, following such consultation, grants such
Increues over and above that provided for tn th 15 agreement, the
Industrial counctl shall be notified of the increues granted.·
The purpose of this chuse was tntended to ensure that employers
could not un i laterally gnnt wage tncreues higher than the
negotllted industrhl council rites wtthout consulttng first wtth
the relevant union, In order that the htter's credtbility Is not
adversely affected by them dotng so after the conclusion of
council negot tat tons.
Aflexible stance would appen to be necessary by parties, wtth
resistance to the realities of contemporary trends tn collective
barga In tng bodi ng til to the put tes concerned. The converse
would thus apply too, to in parttcular employer parttes, that
Insist on a certain collective bugalntng level at the exclusion
of the other.
Allan (1987, pp. 44 - 45) refers to a considered prophetic speech
made by Van der Herwe, the then Deputy Director General of
Manpower in November 1981, with reference to the increasing demand
In those early post-Wlehahn days for phnt level bargaining. The
realttles of multtlevel bargaining had then already been very
quickly recognised 1n the offichl stance in th1s quotation:
"... At the present moment, there are clear indications that a
number of trade untons favour enterprlst-level bargaining above
Industry-leve1 bargaining through the tndustria1 council system
and that a grow1ng number of employers are entering tnto
recognition agreements. In this regard, I need to emphastse that
the government has comitted Itself to a polley of
non-Intervention in the regulation of hbour relations Including
reciprocal recognition agreements between employers and elployees.
.... It may be necessary for us, therefore, to closely re-exUl1ne
our hitherto strong preference for Industry-level bargaining, to
come to gri ps with real tty and to recogn lse the need for and
advantages of bargaining at the level of the undertaking in
certain circumstances. At the sue tilt, we should eXUllne in
what ways enterprise-level bargaining lIIay be structured to
complement Industry-level bargaining instead of replacing It and
In what way the dt sadvantlglS of tnterprlse-ltvel bargatnlng can
be .tnlllltsed. •
Tht writer 15 unaware of any uterlal prOCJress .ad. tn offictal
quarters in terms of these early proposa1s, wi th the exctption
perhaps of the 1egtttllSition of rtCOCJnttton agree..nts catered
for under other agretllents tn t ....s of the provsions of S31A of
the lRA (1988).
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\lith the issue not yet resolved eHher by the part iIS themselves
after some ten years down the track, State intervention In the
form of gUidelines might well become Increasingly more
appropriate.
10.3 fUTURE BQill M!Q fUNCTIONS Q£ INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
In the preceding discussions on the role and operation of
Industrial councils, emphasis developed on their dispute
resolution and potential soctal responsibility functions, as well
as the administ rat tcn and management of Industry-based benefit
funds and soctal security schemes for employers and employees.
The economies of scale and cost effectiveness relating to
Industri a1 counc i l systems and prograllllles have been a recurri ng
theme.
The wri ter poses that the future and cont inued viabl1 Ity of
Industria1 counc i 15 may not necessarily longer rest on the prime
principle of collective bargaining on wages and conditions of
service due to the decentral hatlon trend of this function.
Although two tier bargaining as it has established itself In South
Africa might not be of a permanent nature, attention should In the
Interim, and also as a strategic objective for the longer term, be
paid by industrial councils, especially those threatened by
survival or identity crhes, to the following key opportunities
and contributions that they can make (if they are not yet doing
so) to the promotion of sound industrial relations in particular
and society in general.
These funct ions and emphases might not correspond with the survey
results deal ing with this subject, as the latter appeared very
much to be still based on traditional thinking in this regard,
although some respondents had provided pleasing support to certain
of these.
Avery clear message that also emerged in the survey was that
greater fl extb t l ity in the operation of council s was needed, as
well as a more knowledgeable, professional and service-orientated
approach and image of counci ls, their staff and councillors who
serve on the councils.
Thh is with the prime emphuts of effectively serving and
adapting to the needs of its industry in a rapidly changing
society, in order to ultimately achieve its prime objective of
maintaining industrial peace. As bureaucratic and institutional
dinosaurs they certainly w111 not outlive this century.
10.3.1 GRQY.f BENEFIT AriD SOCIAL SECUBID SCHEMES
This entails the continued provision of group benefit and tmployee
soctal security schemes In a cost effective and efficient .anner
based on confi rmed and current needs speci fie to the Industry
concerned, so that the industry, employers and employees a1 ike,
become reliant on these industry based services and benefi t
-241-
II
prograllllles.
Soc tal security schemes that require and offer continuity of
benefl t s and fund Ing and supp1ement government schemes are very
Important In this context. The Issue of soctal welfare is an
Important one for partIcularly trade unions and such schemes of
Industrial councils, which trade unions are generally unable to
provide individually, would therefore be a valuable avenue to
secure a collaborative foothold with the trade union movement.
10.3.2 DISPUTE RESOLUTION FUNCTIONS MiD SERVICES
The professional tsat ten, promotion and encouragement of Industrial
councils and utilisation of the dispute resolution functions and
services of industrhl councils ts a key issue to their survival,
as hlghl ighted by the importance attached to It by survey
respondents.
Although this utilisation or at least referral, ts In many
Instances mandatory In terms of the official dispute resolution
mechanisms of the LRA, by providing expert mediation, advice and
gUidance. in the Investigation and settlement of discipHnary
matters, grievances and dispute settlement, greater voluntary
access may also be made by both employer and employee parties to
these facll it ies and services of Industrhl councils.
It is important, at thts juncture, to more fully consider the
research conducted by Horn in 1988, as also prev i ously referenced
In other sections. This research explored the effectiveness of
Industrial councils in resolVing disputes, as an Important
component of the dispute resolution mechanisms and structures of
the LRA. Horn (1988, p. 3) posed the follOWing questions and
considerations in respect of the dispute resolution functions of
Industrial counc t ls , to quote:
-The question thus is as to whether this system Is perhaps an
outdated one which was successful in the past but Is now unable to
cope with the dynamic and rapidly changing industrial relit ions
climate of the post-Wlehahn era. Alternatively, the system itsel f
could be correct in principle but may not have the frameworks and
people in order to cope with the resolution of disputes (which is
one of the major reasons for the system) and could be at present
fulfilling mainly an administrative function - in other words, the
parties and not the system perhaps need to adapt to be able to
successfully perform the dispute resolving function. It is
Important to detel'llline whether the syste. will be able to adapt to
future challenges and If it can, that structures lDust be Inherent
In the system to ensure success as I dispute resolving ..chants•• •
The major findings of Horn (1988, p. 75) based on his research on
I sample of seven successful and less successful dispute resolving
Industrial councils, pertain to the nature of dispute resolution
procedures and processes adopted by industrial councils. These
recollllM!ndations to improve the dispute resolution functions of
Industrial councils are quoted below:
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. dispute resolving frameworks be formally entrenched in
agreements or const Hutions
· the process of dispute resolution must be one of carefully
controlled mediat ion
· the use of Dispute Committees is essential
· the industrial councils be responsible for educating and
updating its members in labour relations
· the advisory role of the council Secrehry and his assistants is
Important in alleViating potential dispute situations and 15 a
role which should occur in all ceuncf l s ,"
Of note too in Horn's (1988, pp. 71· 75) findings are:
· That although the successful councils had not necessarlly fonnal
procedures recorded in any form of agreement, thei r dispute
resolution procedures were all consistent, fairly specific and
within certain time frames which were well known.
· Acertain amount of flexibility should nevertheless be retained
in dispute resolution procedures, particularly where these have
been formalised.
· Confidence of the parties in the dispute resolution functions
of industrial counclls can be obtained firstly by ensuring the
Input of all parties in the industry (that is both members and
non-members) in the development of dispute resolution procedures
and structures and secondly by Industrial councils actually
resolving disputes qUickly, cheaply and effectively.
• The number of disputes referred to industrial councils having
Increased from 1 167 in 1985, to 1 983 in 1986, and 3 084 in 1987,
as obtained from the Department of Manpower, requires that
industrial councils prepare themselves for this trend by improving
their effectiveness and capabilities in this area.
• Mediat ion 1s the preferrred route to arbi trat ion as it is
perceived as enhancing the working relationship between parties,
being basically also a forum for mutual agreement to solutions,
rather than imposition of such solutions.
· Unfair dismissals and retrenchments were the most commonly
occurring disputes in the sample of seven industrial councils
exami ned, 1ead ing to the recommendat ion on the educat ion of
members in particular relating to the tndustrial court gutdelines
for procedural and subshnt ive fairness in these areas, which
could reduce the referral of these types of disputes to tndustrial
counci 15.
• Allegations that the industrial council systell dispute
resolutton mechantsll was merely being used as I stepping stone on
the way to the industrial court could not be substantiated with
the sampled industrial councils.
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Horn (1988, p. 84) ftnally concludes that in his optnton, all
factors considered, there is no alternattve at present which can
provtde for more effecttve dtspute resolution than the tndustrial
counct I system. Yet, as he stressed, and as has been echoed
elsewhere too in this document, the participants and the systems
that they employ, are the decidtng factors in how effectively the
factltttes of the industrial counctl are utilised.
10.3.3 INfORMATION MiD GUIDANCE
Providing information and qutdance to both employer and employee
parties on a wide range of issues of cOlllTlon interest regarding
tndustrial relations issues affecting the industry, stmihr to the
servtces provided by the parties tndivtdually, has been raised as
as a function that can be enhanced by industrial councils.
These services should very much be of a proact ive nature, so that
the industrial counctl's image is perceived to be more dynamic,
professional and resourceful as opposed to the perception of a
State·instttuted and grey administrative body. Fottowing on from
this is a re-assessment of the caltbre, training, remuneration,
experience and attitudes of council personnel.
In his research on the dispute resolution functions of industrial
councils, Horn (1988, p. 74) was perturbed about the attitude of
members of the councils sampled, namely which did not permit
councils to issue gUideltnes or to conduct education programmes on
relevant common issues,. such as dispute prevention. In his
opinion the industrial council is the establishment which is ••••
in the best position to see which aspects of labour legislation in
the industry require attention or which particular issues keep
re-occuring as the cause of disputes and thus need attention or
ctarHicat ion. •
This also highlights the advtsory role that i ndustrtal council
secretariats and their personnel could play, leading to Horn's
(1988, p. 70) following observation:
·The implication of this advisory role is that council
secretariats and their assistants need to be well versed in labour
relations, constantly keep updating their knowledge and be
knowledgeable of their part tcul ar industry.·
10.3.4 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Initiating and managing sochl responsibllity prograllllM!s for the
industry in consultation and with the lSsistance of elllployer and
employee bodies is an area which hitherto seeals to have had
limited appl teat ten for industrhl ceunct l s.
This woul d a150 entail the counsell ing of these parties on
internal and external sochl responsibtl tty objectives and
promotion of this concept in the industry. As this is a very
imporhnt future perspecttve on the functions of industrhl
councils, as discussed in some breadth already in Section 2.8,
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reference is made to the latter sect Ion for thoughts on this
subject, which will not be duplicated here.
Of particular relevance here too is the principle of achieving and
forging common ground and interest between employer and employee
bodies, with objectives of sect al and community concern 11 ready
featuring prominently on the agendas of South African trade unions
and also on the draft agenda for the future South Africa.
10.3.5 EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS
There appears to be a strong need for industrial councils to
assist in mitigating against some problems besetting employer
organisations, as the future and operation of industrial councils
would appear to be Inextricably linked to those of employer
organlsations that are part ies to them.
This Is particularly relevant in terms of employer body withdrawal
from and reluctance to continue participation or become Involved
In the system, as well as individual employer philosophies on
plant level bargaining, that are all features of the present
situation. The wheel has indeed turned full cycle, for where it
previously was the emergent trade unions that res 1sted the system,
It is now the employer party that has adopted a wary attitude,
with the union body swinging in favour.
Thus, whereas in the past the problem of representation had
primarily concentrated on the trade union movement's partlcipat ion
In the Industrial council system, this trend is now reversing with
trade unions steadily perceiving and recognising the advantages of
the Industr1 al council system. Ideologically, the COSATU
philosophy of 'one union for one Industry' is ironically also
supporting th1 s movement. It is the employer participants that
now would appear to be movi ng away from the i ndustrhl council
system, whether for strategic or pol It ical-organi sat tonal reasons,
as evidenced in problems experienced with certain industrial
councils of late and resulting in their dissolution.
It is furthermore In the industrial council's interest as a
central coordinating collective bargaining body to ensure that
both parties' power bases and organisation are of an order that
they and the council can interact and operate effectively.
Areview of local employer organtsations, in measuring their
performance and activities against International shndards and
experience, provides the general opinion that there is
considerable scope for improvement, with problellls and
recolll11endations such as the following being offered, and which
should be pursued by industrial councils to guide elllployer
organtsations in the right d1rect1on and where appropriate take up
relevant issues at council level:
• Trade untons are generally better organised than employer
bodies, which decreases the latter's relative pos t t tcn of power 1n
relation to trade unions 1n collective bargaining.
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- With the exception of the larger employers who employ industrial
relations specialists, the majority of employers have an
inadequate knowledge of labour affairs, whereas this is the trade
union's area of speciality. The Industrial councils surveyed by
Horn (1988, p. 64) felt that the level of trade union parties'
knowledge of labour relations was generally good, whilst that of
employers was generally well below standard and furthermore that a
large proportion of all disputes which occurred in their
Industries were due to employer lack of knowledge of accepted
practices and procedures. This is also substantiated by feedback
received from respondents in the survey.
- The majority of employer organisations are still reactive
Institutions, and should be more proactive and active as regards
initiatives affecting the business conmunity and the general
interest.
- Employer disunity resulting from interemployer competition and
philosophy differences have caused industrial councils to either
become ineffect ive or col1apse in major industries such IS the
Printing industry.
- Industry and national training progranmes should deserve more
attention, especially relating to the advancement and development
of managerial skills from the ranks of Black, Coloured and Asian
employees, as many individual employers (and also trade unions) do
not possess the resources for or have a long term corrnitment to
progranmes of this nature. The continuity of training would also
not be interrupted because of employee mobil tty between companies
within an industry.
- With the education crisis amongst the major pool of labour
reaching critical proportions, more intervention is required by
the business conmunity in alleviating this national problem.
- Social, pol t t tcal and attitudinal reform acceleration in order
to meet the requi rements of the new South Afr1ca needs to be
addressed and supported by all major actors in the cOllllluni ty and,
as the business corrnunity is a major stakeholder in the future
stability and prosperity of this country, its concerted voice
should be heard loudly and clearly in supporting and guiding the
present reform process at both enterprise and national level,
otherwise this mission will be adopted by other agencies that may
steer a course inconducive to the business conmunity. Of concern
is that in many instances the boat might already have been missed.
Douwes-Oekker (1983, p. 9) expands on the foregoing and Idds to
these the fo11 owi ng concerns:
_ Social security benefits should be coordinated on I nltional
level, with employer organi $It ions and federations taking the
Initiative.
_ Hore guidelines should be provided by employer organisltions to
member companies on topical industrill relations issues. such IS
the recognition and collective bargaining processes.
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- The tenn employer organt sat ton should be confined prlnlirlly to
the bodtes which have or can enter Into an tndustrtal relatlonshtp
with trade unions or trade unton federations •
. Major employer organtsattons, Includtng the South African
Coordlnattng ConntUee on labour Affairs (SACCOlA), need to
develop fonnal social pol ictes is spectftcally dtscussed by
Douwes- Dekker (1983, pp. 18 - 19).
- Standards should be establ tshed with unton federat tons to ensure
conforml ty of the operat ton and rlnge of benefits offered by
Industrtal council sochl security schemes.
- SAC COLA should seek to establish jointly with unton groupings
gutdellnes to asstst the Urban Foundatton tn clarifytng objectives
In order to promote the tmplementatlon of plans to meet urgent
houstng needs (not excludtng acconmodatton and other needs of
migrant contract workers) and facilitate the development of vtable
Black urban communtt les.
- large c;:orporattons should be urged to support the functtons of
employer organ t sat tons (and industrial counci ls) t and if they want
to be tnvolved tn cOlll11unity activlttes, these should be done in
conjunctton with union leaders and In terms of guidelines
established by the social pol icy adopted by employer organisations
or set out in joint labour-management agreements.
Douwes-Oekker (1988, pp. 2 and 37) elaborates further on this
last proposal and puts forward a case for the federations of
organised labour and capital to enter Into negot tat Ions between
themselves on soctal policy issues, which could be presented as
demands to government agencies so that the industrial relations
system can be used to pressurise or support the State In social
and political refonD.
What better phtfona and forull for such negottatlons and
presentations than the establ ished Industrial counc tl systell that
had an existing infrastructure to access an industry and less
Importantly, bears offictal unction? The incorporatton of these
and other expanded acttvtties into the consti tut ions of tndustria1
councils would certainly build brtdges and improve relattonships
within an industry, as well as enhance their viability and
credibtlity amongst the business, tnde union and employee
cOlllllunlties thit they ultilDitely servi.
Thts vtew is supported by others. An encouraging cocrnent on the
expanded roles of tndustrial councils Wis made by Roos (1982, p.
35), the then Dtrector of the Cape Chaaber of Industrtes, IS
follows:
II alii not unduly tdealistic when I say the industrial counctl ts
more than just a channll through whtch employe,s extract IS laUch
is they poss i bly tin fro. employers. That may b' ani of its
functions, but tt Is also an ongoing tnstitution designed to
foster good relit tons throughout an tndustry •••• when the hard
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bargalntng is over, both stdes work together to prolllOte the
development of the tndustry IS a whole tn such matters IS
tratnlng, fringe beneftts, long term security plans and other
servtces ...••
Amore practical example of the evolution of conmon ground in a
fatrlyadversartal relattonship is provtded by Allan (1987, pp.
67 - 68) in his research on collecttve bargaining in the Metal
Industry. He observed that shared respons tb i l tty at the time
between employelt"s' associations and Black unions in the areas of
dispute resolution, social securtty structures, technical
schedules, etcetera, appeared equally idealistic and unattatnable,
but conrnented:
"Paradcxtcal l y , however, in the arelS of social security
structures and techntcal schedules tn particular, there are
gltmpses of such a relationship developing.·
Examples of the issues of shared reponstbil ity were cHed as the
detatl and development of more relevant pensi on and sick pay
benefits, assistance with home ownership, etcetera. A serious
constraint in the fuller development of these aspects was regarded
as the unions', in particular HAWU's (the most dominant union's)
lack of resources to cope with these activities.
The same might thus apply to industrial council s as to employer
organisations. the latter who Bendix (1989, p, 66) also suggests.
ltke, tndustrial councils, ,might become less relevant as bargaining
bodies in the future due to the increased incidence of plant-level
bargaining in preference or tn addi t ion to central i sed
negottations. The continued existence of employer organisations
are further perceived by Bendix as dependent more on their other
roles of representation to government and trade unions, advice to
members and the provision of group employee benefi ts, as well as
broader soc fa1 and commun i ty-based functions _ This future
prognosis could similarly be heeded too by industrial councils.
10.4 AWARENESS Arm ADAPTATION I.Q~
The necessi ty and abi 1f ty to adapt to change and a chang in9
soc Iety has a1ready been ra ised under the discuss i on of the future
options of industrial councils and the key requirements for future
survival of the systelll, In contrast wHh the dinosaur, for this
was the previous comparison, industrial council s still have the
opportuni ty to mutate from cumbersOllll bureaucr~t tc instHut ions
(tn the majortty of cases IS there are some exceptions) to IIOre
dynamic service organisations.
Manyof the pointers to the nature of this lIUtation have been
provided by the survey respondents, as well as in other
discussions within this document and will not be repeated her••
Aspects of the future potential political scenarios and how they
could Impact on industrial council s, have been speculated upon In
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the discussion of the survey reponses. As this has been but
speculation, any definite courses of action are difficult to put
forward. However, what will certainly be necessary will be
greater sensitivity to developments in the socio-political and
economic sphere. This should be accompanied by the fostering of a
culture within councils that would make them, and their respective
parties, more receptive to these broader events, as well as more
flexible and adaptive to changes as these occur, in order to
ensure their future survival.
One aspect that did not strongly come to light in the survey
repsonses, is that of developments and changes within the trade
union movement as a whole. Councils and their parties would
appear to tend to focus primarily on those events and trends
within their own industries or Jurisdictions.
In particular, the Increasing trend towards the unionlsatton of
white collar workers should be monitored, as this will eventually
Impact on all industries and could lead to I greater proliferation
of occupationally based white collar unions, bringing with them a
potentially different set of values, objectives and organisation,
which could superimpose itself on the industrial council system
and have an influence on how collective bargaining is conducted in
the future.
Not only industrial council s, but their employee and employer
parties, in particular the latter who are generally more
traditionally orientated, need to be sensitive to the forces of
change. An examp18 of a major employer body faced wi th th is
challenge was SEIFSA on the issue of two tier bargaining in the
Metal industry. Agroup of respondents in Ramsden's (1987, p,
101), research agreed that SEIFSA had, at the time, to change its
policy on the unitary forum of centralised bargaining due to
pressure being exercised by both unions and employers. It was
cOlllllented that: -SEIFA is changing to survive". A prudent course
of action under the particular circumstances, and a lesson to be
heeded too by other parties within the system, al so in view of the
particular problems being experienced then in the Hetal industry
on the issue of two tier bargaining.
With further reference to the role of the parties to industrial
councils, mention should again be made to Allan's (1987, pp. 62-
72) research and findings on the eumple of the national
Industria1 counc 11 for the Metll indus try, a1ready discussed under
the qual1ty of relationships in this section, which is applicable
too to this discussion IS this would also be an important change
focus for industrial councils.
Other major and more fundamentl1 changes are those occurri ng
within a society in transition with its attendant uncertainties,
fears and hopes. An attempt was lIIade in the survey to provide
informed speculation on the 'what ifs' of potenthl future
government options and their stances to industrial councils.
Although there is some justification in the 'wait and see'
approach recommended by several respondents, thi s does give rise
to a certain amount of uneue, as history, certainly also recent
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history, has proved how rapidly events can overtake sttuat tens and
status QUOS. Some judicious forwlrd planning and preemptive
action while there Is still opportunity to do SO, would certAinly
not go amiss and Is Indeed advisable.
In referring to the Impact of socul and political factors on the
Industrial council system, Allan (1987. p. 62) comments In this
research that in the course of the project • ••. it has become
very apparent that sochl change In South Africa Ind the
turbulence associated with it. I e the State of Emergency. has put
the collective bargaining arena under additional stresses.'
The nature of these stresses have changed in recent yurs, in
part lcular wi th the dramat tc events of 1990 and the attendant
scc tc-po l tt tc al uncertainties and upheavl1s that have occurred in
the prelude to the new South Africa. The power struggle and power
base con sol idatlons between the major labour and political
groupings have to a large degree chlnged the emphasis from the
traditional management· labour interhce and confl Ict to that at a
more macro level of industry and nltlonal domination, overflowing
onto Industrial council bargaining tables.
Strategic positionings are the order of the day, and the higher
level bargaining structures will find Increasing favour from the
broader labour movement for the attainment of sectoral objectives.
The wheel of decentraltsed to centralised bargaining has indeed
moved full circle as cOrmlented on previously and also by several
of the survey respondents. The role of lower collective
bargaining levels such as plant level bargaining in this future
scenario would make for some interesting propositions, outside the
scope though of this present study.
Hany survey respondents and other parties concluded that the
industrial council system itself is inherently sound and fine in
concept, with Horn (1988, p. 15) offering one of the lIany other
observat ions that .... it is perhaps practi ce which is corrupted
and needs to be examined in order to provide a sol ut ion.'
The Department of Manpower has itself hinted too at the necessity
for the industrial council systelll to keep abreast with the dynamic
nature of the labour relat Ionshlp, as quoted from the Department
of Manpower's Consultative Memorandum on Industrial Councils of
September 1985 (1985, p. 1):
'Since the adopt ion of the original Industrial Concil iation Act in
1924, the industrial council syste. has been the pivot on which
statutory coll ect ive barga ining in the Republ tc of South Africa
hinges. Over the past 60 years the underlying principles of the
system have wi thstood the test of tillll.
The employment security which industrial councils provide to
thousands of employees by way of their medical, pension and other
funds, 1ike training funds, has contributed significantly to
labour peace in the country. The training opportunities which Ire
made possible by industrial councils are of inestiluble value for
improving productivity and in combating inflation. The Sate
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therefore has a grut appreciation of the work done by Industrial
councils over the yeus in the manpower field.
The labour field Is, however, a dynamic developing one which can
not remain static. It is therefore advisable to rethink existing
principles and guidelines from time to time in order to determine
whether they have kept pace wi th the needs of the times.·
Allan, who also referred to this quotat ion, was developing the
theme towards the acconmodation of decentral ised bugaining
structures within the official labour relit ions system. However,
the litter statement should apply to other aspects of the fonnal
system and industrial councils In parttcul ar , being the most
vulnerable institutions In this respect.
Allan (1987, p. 2) also cautioned that within the example of the
debate of the relative importance of the various levels of
collective bargaining, conflicting philosophies emerged and points
out the .... very real need to modify the existing structures to
accormlodate the needs of all parties, filling which the Industrial
council structure runs the risk of becomi n9 irrelevant and
ultimately redundant."
Thi s subject is pursued further as a major future Irea of change
accormlodation elsewhere in this section.
It Is interesting too to consider the steps proposed by the
Department 0 f Manpower In the Consul tat Ive Memorandum on
Industrial Council Agreements (1985 pp. 5 -6). which Industrial
councils would be expected to take to address certain issues.
These six steps and foreword thereto, are provided below and It is
speculated upon to what extent these recommendations had In fact
been heeded and adopted by industrla1 counc 115 In these PIS t 5
years. Coincidenhlly, several of the issues raised during the
survey by respondents as important are In fact covered In these
guidelines by the Department of Hanpower, therefore it must be
assumed that they were ei ther too dlfflcult to implement or not
subscrl bed to ,
"In order to enable Industrial council agreements to utisfy the
evolving needs of the country, It will also be desirable for
Industrial councils to give decisive attention to the follOWing
matters which are submitted for conslderat Ion:
(1) The shortening and simplification of industrial council
agreements IS fir IS possible In order to flcl1itate understanding
thell and their enforcetDent thereby also .inl.15in9 the cost of
publication in the Government Gazette (R270 per page);
(2) the removal of provisions frOti agreell8nts vhtch .ay In gereral
adverse1yinfl uence or hamper the -
• craat ton of elllployment opportunities;
• retention of jobs;
• establishment of new underhklngs; and
• growth In the Industry.
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(3) the initiation of a greater degree of cooperation and
corrrnunication between employer and employee part Ies on industrial
councils in order to provide services and benefits and to crute a
climate of working together which will encourage non-parties to
become members of the respective organisations and trade unions;
(4) the improvement of services rendered by expediting procedures
for handling disputes and disposing of applications for exemption
from the provisions of agreements and, in general to maintain a
sympathetic approach on merit to applications for exemptionj
(5) making concerted efforts to improve reht ionships between
industrial councils and parties as well as non-parties and to
provide for consultation and the exchange of views with
non-parties; and
(6) the well-disposed consideration of eligible applications by
other employers' organtsat ions and trade unions for admission as
parttes to a counc 11 in order to Improve the representat ive
character of the parties to a counct 1..
Finally,' vested interest, brinkmanship, party line voting, and
other adversartal behaviours, should be dealt wi th and eltminated
for the sake of the benefit of the industry and its continued
vhbtlity, stability and security for all, and not only for the
benefit of certa in parties.
10.5 IBAQ.E UNION STRATEGY
Asurvey respondent had made a cautionary cOlll11ent on trade union
strategy in respect of the emergent union movement's current
support of the industrial council system. The COSATU trade
unions' motivations were specifically queried in the ltght of
their being signatory to an internitlonal agreement that includes,
amongst other items, the rejection of the industrial council
system. When questioned on this, It WIS contended by the union
federat ion that the system fulfilled the movement's current
purposes, hence their support for it. What alternatives were to
be considered in the event of rejection of the systeJl, were not
touched upon.
It Is not intended to dwell on or probe the above further I but it
does hlghl ight certain suspicions and concerns ~mongst the more
traditional union movement quarters and the employer bodies on the
nature of underlying strategies of the .ajor emergent trade
unions.
It was not possible regrethbly to obtain the offichl COSATU
opinion, as the major actor on this stage, on put Ic ipat Ion In the
Industrial council systell. Adler (Hote 16) who has assochttons
with this tr~de union IIIOvement on a benefit consultancy basts,
confirmed that the federation WIS supportive of the centralised
collective bargaining syste. as embodied In industrhl councils,
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and not as a matter of expediency.
Many of the survey respondents and others consul ted such IS Rajah
(Note 15) are of the opinion that the survival of the industrial
council system will in fact hinge on the power of trade unions and
their support of the system. in view of their preference for
Industry or national bargaining. opting currently for Industrial
councils. Other parties however suspect that this could merely be
a matter of expediency in order to reach certain ideological
objectives. exacerbated by the vying for political power in the
pre llmi nar t es to the new South Africa.
The local trade union movement Is. and should be. naturally
concerned about Its prospects in a future South Africa when the
history of the hbour movement in the rest of Africa is
considered. Only well established and strong labour organisations
have been abl e to withstand the efforts of new African governments
to curtail the former's power once their potential usefulness has
been outlived in respect of achieving political aims.
The issue of trade union expediency in their support for
industrial councils. is insinuated again in the follOWing extract
from Sideris (1982. pp. 63 - 64) on the then Federation of South
African'Trade Unions' (FOSATU) policy motion on industrial
councils as set out in the FOSATU Annual Report of November 1981:
-Industria1 counct 15 are at present unrepresentat he of the
majority of workers and .therefore undemocratic. The industrial
council s place cumbersome procedures and bureaucratic structures
in the way of direct negotiat ton between workers and employers.
Agreements are negottated with favourable conditions for a
mtnortty of workers at the expense of the majority. Ulttmately
tndustrial council benefit schemes. benefit management by putting
at their disposal large amounts of workers' money. In conclusion
the industrial counctl system is unacceptable in its present form
and that FOSATU afftl tate members should not enter tnto council s
on disadvantageous terms.-
Stderis. in the sallie reference, connents further: -This introduces
some ambiguity, for it means that tn SOlll8 situations unions could
enter on advantageous terms •. .• The pos it ion is not entire1y
clear. For while the policy motion rejects the council system as
unacceptable in its present fom. tt implies in SOllie cases there
may be advantages.-
The basic form of the system has not changed, but attttudes and
the perception of what is advantageous tn the light of these. It
Is a concern though of the writer that the basic philosophy of
rejectton could still be intact. although it is suspected too that
this rejection could be prhlarlly confrontational rhetoric, and
that there might in fact be a hrge de<Jree of genuine support for
the practical implicattons and advantages of the syste. for the
trade un ion movelllent. It i s hoped tha t tiM and events will
eventually throw more 1tght on thi s tSSUI.
Ramsden (1987 , pp. 136 138) provides a possible other
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interpretation of the greater willingness of emergent trlde untons
to plrttcipate tn centralised blrglintng. She refers to
Douwes-Dekker's four stages of the orglnluttonal development of
unions, which ucribes thts trend IS part of the present
evolutionary phue of emergent tnde unionisll tn South Afrtca.
The four phases are:
1. Unstructured Movement· When employers and the State perceive
unions to be a threat, and no tnteract tcn 15 entered into with the
developing untons.
2. Organisation Expression through Recognitton· The dlsrupttve
power of worker frustratton leads to companies reusessing and
recognistng the role of unions, leading to the conclusion of
prodecural arrangements for dealing with conflicts of interest and
rights at the workphce.
3. Centralised Involvement - As more and more recognition
agreements at establishment level Ire entered into, the necessity
for consol idation of influence and resources becomes necessary,
leading to collective bargaintng at sectoral or industry level, as
well as the establishment of tripartite bodies wtth employer
associations and government bodtes at nattonal 1evel to Influence
the country's socto-economic poltctes and pract ices.
4. Workers' Parttctpatton· The leadership at central collective
bargalntng forums become percetved as betng too far removed from
workplace issues and an attempt is made to involve unton members
In poltcymak1ng at tw~ levels, namely the influenctng of
management act ions and decis ions through plant based comml ttees,
and Influence on company boards through representatives elected by
workers.
The ultimate objective would therefore be more dtrect worker
participation in the processes that tnvolve them in terms of the
Idealistic concepts of true industrial democracy.
The majority of South African trlde unions could currently be
constdered to be withtn the thtrd phase of development tn vartous
degrees, with a need betng expressed for certain of the features
of the fourth phase, as supported by some of the survey resul ts .
The advent of the fourth phase should certainly be prepared for
too, IS tt could be problematic for employers and tnstttutions
that are still steeped tn traditional practices and attitudes.
10.6 fAll OBSERYATIONS
It ts tnteresting too, at this point tn ttM in the evolutton of
the Industrial council syste_, to consider and cOllpare sl.t1ar
future prognoses that had been lade SOH fi fteen years ago on
Industrt a1 counc i15 and to what extent these have been real ts.d or
reso1ved.
Jankelsson (l97S, pp. 202· 204) had at that t till drawn some
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system, with then a particuhr emphasis on the effective
representation of all workers covered by industrhl council
agreements (since resolved with the Wiehahn Comission propos al
Implementation in this regard). The outcomes of these issues are
provided as follows:
. In studying the historical development of the industrial council
system, the changing role of Industrial councils has been
highlighted. Whereas in the early days councils were concerned
solely with the negotiation of wages and working conditions, they
over the years also became progressively more orientated to the
provision of fringe benefits and social security schemes, in
addition to serving as a vehicle for the establishment of a
variety of training schemes for the benefit of their employees.
It Is envisaged, as already discussed In this section, that these
roles wi 11 develop further into the soclo-economic sphere as the
needs of socio-political transformation in South Africa in the
1990's are addressed .
. Industrial councils have succeeded in ImprOVing and stabilising
wages and working conditions and maintaining a high degree of
Industrial peace in the industries In which they operate. In the
absence of official figures, but based on general impression, this
would st ill appear to be holding true.
- The old works and liaison cOllllltttees were regarded (with limited
merit) as ineffective In allowing representation of Black workers
in the negotiation of their wages and conditions of service,
whilst being excluded from· direct representation on the Industrial
council system. It was feared that since the White, Coloured and
Asian delegates in the pre-W1ehahn era were becoming less and less
representative of the total labour force, it was queried whether
the industrial council system could cont i nue to operate
effectively in maintaining industrial puce and stability in wages
and conditions of service. The question might well be asked in
current years whether the opposite alight not be true.
- little li kel1hood of the recognition of Black trade unions was
perceived in the future, with the dangers of operating separate
industrial relations systems for different races highlighted.
These concerns have subsequently been addressed and legitimacy
granted to Black trade unions in a unitary industrial relations
systelll, of which the Industrial council Is part.
In more recent times there was Hiemstra's coment about the
Industrial council not surviving the second post-Wiehahn decade,
of which the outcome is obviously not yet available. When
questioned about this statelDtnt, Hiemstra (Hote 13) advised as
follows: That the statement was .ade at the tiM of the Printing
Industrial council's collapse, when trade unions bec.. IIOre
emphatic on insistence for industrial councils, with ellployers
becoming dis ill usloned with it and res ignin9 frOll tIIp1oyer
organlsat ions. Although he adllitted that events had overtaken the
prediction, the impression obtained was that the possibility had
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not been entirely ruled out.
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11. CQNCLVS IONS
The conclusions to this study are fairly brief and to the point,
as the discussions in Sections 9 and 10, supported by the survey
results of Sect ion 8, have already served the following important
subordinate objectives of the project, as extracted from the
introductory section of this document:
. The record i ng and discuss i on of views on contemporary Issues and
future perspectives concerning the Industrial council system.
. The generat ion of tentat tve reccmendat tcns that could Impact on
the future of industri a1 counct 15 and the system that they
support.
This is in addition to the theoretical, legal and historical
backgrounds, as well as the role and operational discussions on
industrial councils that were dealt with in the preceding
sections.
Regarding the prime purpose of the study, namely to explore the
val idity of Hiemstra's conrnent on the future of the industrial
council system, the reponses of those industrial council parties
and other authorities surveyed were applied to establish or reject
its validity.
To quote Hiemstra's statement:
-The Industrial Council has survived the f1 rst post·Wiehahn
decade. I don't th ink it wi 11 see out the second decade.·
To quote the specific questionnaire item directed to the 53 survey
respondents:
"ln conclusion, are you of the opinion that the Industrial Council
system wi 11 survive the second post-Wiehahn decade, namely the
1990's? Please motivate your answer.·
The response was a posit tve 'yes', with four 'no' and one
unresponded exceptions, including several preconditions attached
to the affirmations.
Hiemstra (Note 13) admitted too that his prediction is not yet
material ising at this stage, with current events having overtaken
it and the circulllstances on which it was based.
It should be stressed again that this WlS primarily a conceptual
study, wi th the survey serving IS a supplementary source of
information. The survey responses, due to the nUlDlric size of the
sample obtained, should be genenltsed with circu.spection,
although qual i tatively the sample contained SOtH of the largest
industrial councils and most authoritative parties. The findings
nonetheless brought forward important issues for consideration by
industrial councils.
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It is therefore concluded that the weight of surveyed opinion is
that the demi se of the industrhl counctl system is not nigh and
that the prognosis for the sustatned, if not increased, vhbil tty
of these structures is positive. The prerequisites for survivll
as well as the recolllllendations on their future role and the
treatment of issues impact ing on the system should however be
developed further and operationalised on I relatively urgent
basis, otherwise the opposite might well also come true.
Ultimately though, as pointed out correctly too by several
respondents to the survey component of the study, the future
developments in the country on both the economic and
scc tc-po l i t tc al fronts will direct the future course of the formal
labour re lat ions system and related structures such is industria I
counci 1s . We can but speculate on and prepare for the
eventualities at this point in time.
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·M.t.rl.1I H,ndltn; A..ociition
-1I1t.1 En;lneerln; Industrl..
A..oe lit Ion
·lIon-F.rrou. M,U I Industr I..
A..oclltlon 0' South Afrlc•
•plut Ic M,nu',ctur.rl Auoc-
Iltlon 0' South Afrlc,
.p lu_ll.rl ,nd [n;lnttrl .r...·
wart M.nutac tur.n A..oc lit Ion
·Port [IIUbeth [ngln"rl
A..oel.llon
·Prtc ilIOn H,nufactur In,
[n,ln..r. Auoc Itt Ion
-Prt..ur. V.... I M.nufacturera
A..oellt Ion 0' South AfrIC.
• a •
H,ln 10/11/89-)0/6/90
{WaUl! O. AlIlIll,nc, ,nil r,I.v I' 'on
AIIOC In Ion of SOyth Afrlc,
-hfrlg,,,u 'on ,nd AI' Conll.t Ion In9
M,nyftctu",nv ,nd SyPIIII",
AIIOCltltOn
-Shut M.U I Indull""
AIIOC 'n 'on of South Af, IC'
-SA Ag,ICU Itu,,1 M,ch'n"y
AllocIn ,on
-SA AHOC In Ion of Sh'lIbul111'"
,nil "'11" ,."
-SA [I,ct"o-PI,t InV 'ndull""
AIIOC In Ion
-SA Fut.n."a "tnuhctu"r,
AIIOC Itt 'on
-SA Found"y AHOC Itt 'on
-SA Induatr III Rtfrlv.rtt Ion
• Air Condit lon,ng Contr,ctora
AlloC Itt Ion.
-SA M,ch In. Too I ",nuhctur.ra
Allocltt Ion
-SA PUIIII Mlnuftctur.r, AIIOC It-
tlon
-SA R,dlo Ind T.I'vl,lon
M,nyftctur."a AllocUtion
-SA AtInforc.d Coner,t,
[nv'nllr, Alloelltton
-SA Tub. ",k.r, Alloc Itt Ion
-SA V,lv. ",nuftetur,r, ,nd
Aetu,to" Alloc lit Ion
-SA VIr. Ind \lIre ROil'
M,nuf,ctu"ln9 Alloel,tlon
-A..,IV,.,Ud En9ln"rln9
Union of South Af,,'c,
-AII,IV'.'Ud SocI,ty of
Woodwork.", 0' South Afr Ie'
-EnVlnll"ln9 Ind Allt.d
Work,ra Un Ion of South
Afrtc,
-EnVln..rln9 Indullrl,l ,nd
Mtnln9 \lo"k.r, UnIon 0'
South Afr Ie.
-Iron "ould.rt Socl,ty of
South Af"lc.
-M,t,1 ,nd El"trlc,1
Workera Un Ion of South
Africa
-"tn,work."t Union
-II,tlon,1 Union of "'UI-
wOrktrt of Sout" Atr Ie.
-.,dIG. T.I.wlllon. [I'ctronICt
,nd AIII.d Vork.,. Union
• 9 -
((
, C for the J••• ll.ry
and Pr.clous M.Ul
'ndu.try (C,p.)
I C for the Knltt tn;
Industry (TYL)
, C for the L,undry.
Cluning ,nd Oy.ln;
Industry (C,p.)
I C for the L,undry.
Clunlng ,nd O,.ln;
Industry (N,t,l)
-SA 8011.r.,It.r., Iran ,nd
SU.I Work.r •• Shlpbulld.r,
,nd 1I.ld.rs SOCI.ty
-SA [l.c t 1'1 c,l Wark.r,
AnaClltlon
-SA [ngln. Drlv.r" Flr.".n',
,nd Operator, AnaC11t Ian
-SA Ytter-, Stu I·, .n-
V.r.,nt... , •• rll.d.-Un I'
-St •• 1. [nglntlrlng ,nd Allied
lIork.r. Un Ion of Sautll Atr IC'
-Iran ,nd Stltl Pradue.r.
An of SA
-Aulg,•• Ud Eng,nUring
Un Ion of SA
,Am,lg,•• Ud Soc lIty of
lIaod.ork.r, of SA
-I ron Mou Id.r, Soc Itty of SA
- SA [l.c t I' Ie. 1 Wark.r, Allac
-SA [ngln. Driver., Flr•••n,
,nd Op.r.tor, An
-Sutd·Afrtkun,. "t.r, Stul
.n V.r ••nt. Ny•• rh.d.-Un I.
-LIft [n;ln..rlng Allocllllan
of SA
-[ 1.ctr le.l .nd AI1I.d Work.r,
Tr,d. Unton of SA
-SA [1.ctrlc.1 Work.r,
Alloe lat Ion
-C'P. J••• ll.r, M,nufactur.r,
Allacllt Ion
-J••• II.r, .nd Gold'.lth.
Union
• Tran'vIIl len Itt.r. Alloe
·Natlon,l Unton of Clothing
Vork.r. (SA)
-N,t lon, I Unton of Tut II.
Vorklr.
·C'P. Town ,nd District
L,undr,. CI••n.r, ,nd
Oylr, AIIOC t.t Ion
-L,undry. Cl.,nlng ,nd
Oy"ng Vork.r, Un Ion
(C,p.)
·Nat,1 L,undry. CI..nlr.
'nd O,e,.. Alloc lit Ion
-L,undr,. Dry·Cl..nlng ,nd
OJ"n9 [.plo,... Union
(Naul)
- 10 •
I SPA Sullgraup "9,••m.nt
1O/II/St-3OIe/gO
Lift [n9lnUring Agr •• •
m.nt
10/11/S9-3OIe/90
Haln Z111l187-J1/1/88
Haln 21/3/85-30/6/86
Haln 21IC/u-el1218t
Haln 19/I1tO-9IZl95
((
I C 'or til, l'undry.
Dry CIU"ln9 ,nd Oy'lng
Ir,O' (fYL)
HUlon,l1 C for th,
luth,r Indultry of SA
·Tr,n,.,,1 l'u"d,r,rs.
Clu",rs ,nd Oy,r, Anoe
.J"! Dry CI"n,r, ,no
l'uno,r,rs An
·NUlon,1 Union of l'und'r1ng.
Clunlng ,nd Oy"ng Work,r,
·l,undry. C I..n 'ng ,nd Oy.,ng
Work,rs Un' on of SA
'SA llundry. Dry CI"n Ing ,nd
0111ng Worker. UnIon
·Foot • .,r M,nuhetur.r,
F,d,r,t Ion of SA
·NIt 10n,I UnIon of luth.r
Work,r.
·TYl L.,th,r Ind AIIl'd
Tred.. Indullr,,1 Union
·AIIIIlgIII'tld Cloth Ing ,nd
Tut II, Worker. Un Ion SA
·Mldl,nd ,nd Bord,r Luther
Indultry M,nuflCturtr, All
·Wut,rn C'P' L.,th,r
Indultrl .. Anoel,tlon
·TVL Foot ... r , TInnIng ,nd
Lllther Tr,d.. Au
·AII of Tn Manuhctur,r,
0' Luggag,.
H,ndbag. ,nd G,ner,1 GOOdS
·NIt lanaI UnIon of Lllther
Work.r.
·TVL Luth,r and AIII.d
Tred.. Indullrlal Union
-Mtdl,nd and Bard., Luther
Indultry Manufacturer.
Alloe lit Ion
-V,st,rn Cape L,ath,r
Indultrl,. Anoclltlon
·Tn Foot... r , Tanning .nd
L"th,r Trad" A,.
-AU of Tn Manuhctur,r.
of Luggage. Ha"dbag, and
G.n,ral Good.
-S A Ta"n Ing [_p loy."
Org,nlut Ion
- TVL Foot.ear. Tan" Ing and
l"th,r Trad•• A,•
• lilt lana I UnIon of llltll.,
Vork,r,
- It -
Foot • .,r S.et Ion
Z71C190 (lit Hond.yl
- JO/6/90
General Good' S.e t Ion
J II J/89·30/6/89
H.ndbag Sect Ion
31/8/89-30/6/89
Ta""lng SectIon
Z6/1/90-30/81tO
((
I C for tn, LIquor and
Cat'rlng Trad., Bord.~
, C for the LIquor and
Catlrtng Trad., Cape
, C for the LIquor and
CaterIng Trad•• Durban
, C for the LIquor and
CaterIng Trad•• Ent
London
I C for the LtQuor and
Catering Trad•• P t.ter-
marI trburV
, C for til. Ltquor and
C.tertng Trade (1IItwater'-
rind and V.r ..n Ig Ing) ••
'C for til. LIquor.
C.terlng, Prhate
Hotel .nd Boarding-
House Trlde., South
Cout. Naul
, C for tile Local
Govern_.nt Under-
takIng
·IVL Luther and AIl,.d
Irad.. 'ndultrl.l Union
.Alllalg••ated Clothing .nd
Tut lIe Work.r. Union
·F.dlla.. (lIIp loy.r. An
((a.t London and Bord.r)
'[lIt London .nd Bord.r
liquor and C.ter Ing Trad.
[mllloyee. UnIon
·F.dll... (lIIployer. An
·llQuOr and Cat.r Ing Trad'
[mllloyee. Union
·HOUI, Bar .nd C'UrlnV
T"d.. E"'p loye.. Alloc
·F.dlla.. (lIIployerl All
·Natal LIquor .nd CaUr Ing
Trad. Employ..1 Unton
o".gllured 20/B/B- •
·F.dhu, E",p loye" All
·Th. NaU I LIquor .nd
Caurlng Trad.. Emllloy...
UnIon
·F.d.rated Hotel, LIQllor
and Cat,rlnv AllocatIon of,
SA, TVL
-Hot.1 and R"Uurant 1I0rk"l
UnIon.
'Natal South Cout liquor.
Cater Ing and Acco-adat ton
All
- Th. Natll LIquor .nd
Caurlng Trldll (-lI loy. "
Union
-lIlInlclpll [_ploy." Orvan l-
utlon
-S A AIIOclltton of lIunlclpal
(llp loye'l (lion-Po I It tcal)
Ha,n 8/6/90,)01419%
Hlln ./5/90')111/93
Hlln Actual 2014190·
31/5/90
Hlln Actu.l 1/3/88-
30/9/88
Mlln Actual 1/./90-
3019190
'I rellorted II hlwlng been re'UUblllhed
•• Dlilolved. but not y,t d.regllUred
- IZ -
(I C 'or the "'U
Tr,o,. (ut ~ondon
I C for the "1IIIn,r)'
l"d ... stry (C'D,1
I C for the MIII,n,ry
I"dustry (TVl)
Th' HUlon,1 I C 'or
the Motor Industry
I C 'or the ~otor
Tr,nsport Und,rUk Ing
(Good. )
I C 'or the 1I0n-
Europun P....ng.r
Tr,nsporut Ion Tr.d••
Durbin
I C 'or the Ophth.l.tc
Opt le,l M,nufteturtng
Industry
H,t 10n,I I C 'or the
Prlntlno ,nd "••sp,per
Indullry 0' SA •
·(ut london Nut Tr,,,,rs
AnoCIUlon
·(ut london Nut Tr,,,,
U"'on
·Mlllln.r)' AnoCIUlon (C'D')
·GH.,nt Workers Union of
the II" t.rn Prov Inc,
·Tr,nsv,,1 H.'d_'" M,nuhc'
ture,. Auoe Itt Ion
·IIU 'on, I UnIon of G,rlt,nt
Workers (SA)
·S A Motor Industry
(illploy.rs AlloelUlon
·S A V'hlcle BuIlders
,nd Atp. I r.rs Au
·Motor Indust ry (Illploy,..
Un Ion 0' SA
·Motor Indultry St,"
Alloellt ,on
·II,tlon.1 Union of M,UI-
workers of SA
·Motor Tr'Dlport Owners
Alloe 0' S A
·Motor Tr.nlport lIork,rs
Union (SA)
'S A Trtnsport \/ork.,s
Union
•T,.nsport Work.,. Un Ion
0' SA
- T,.nsport .nd G,n.,.1
Worker. UnIon
-Bu. Own.r. Alloc
-"'t,1 P••••no.r Tr,nsport
Elploy,.. Union
-S A Ophth.l.lc Optlell
M,nuftcture,. All
·Opt lei I Worll.r. un Ion
- Th' SA Pr Int Ino ,nd
All ted Industr I..
r'derU Ion
.Th, ",••p.per Pr,..
Union 0' SA
•Th' SA'ypoor,pll Ic,l Un Ion
""n Z~/~/89')0/9/9Z
""n 1110/88·31/1/89
""n Z9/8/86·)0/4/88
H.,n Aetu,l JO/10/89·
-31/8/~0 1 IJ/8/93
H.'n 16/6/89·31/12189
H.'n Zl/4/U·H/12l91
".'n 3/2189031/12/89
• Dillolvtd. but not J'.t d.reollt,red
- 13 -
((
I e for th, hUll
"ut rr'd' (PrUOrl')
1 e for til, A'tlll
",It rrld' (lilt·
.,tersr,"d)
I e for th, Raid
""'"9,r T"n,port
Industry (e,P')
I e for th, Raid
P'1S'"91r Tren.port
Industry (Port [Ilubeth)
I C 'or th, Stor.-
~"PI"9 Tred'
I C 'or the Sug.r
Mlnuflctur'ng Ind
R,flnlng Indu.try
·p"tOrl' ,nd DistrIct II,UII
"ut r r'd.r. AIIOC lit Ion
·Pr'torll ,nd lIu,,1 "ut
frld' (lBp loy". U"IO"
,Wlhlt.rsr,nd A,uI I Muur
SutCh,r, AllOClit Ion
-f"n,wIII A,UII M,U Tred,
[lIIploy,.. UnIon
-lloid P....ng.r Trln,port
[lIIploy.r, Au (C,p,)
.frllllwlY ,nd a.nlbu'
1I0rk,r, un ton (C.p,)
·Aold P....ng.r fr.n,port
AnOClltlOn (South,rn Ind
[utern C'P.)
,Sly 8u. Work.r. Union
·Port (II ubeth 8uI 1I0rker,
Unton
•Trlnlport ,nd AII t,d 1I0rk".
Un Ion Atr Ie.
·fh, S A Alloelltlon 'or
fh, Stor.ke.p Ing Tred,
(Incorporal Ing th, lilt-
_Ulrerlnd Ch••b.r of
II .. ' Tr.d.)
·fh, R..f (Stor,keeplng
T"d,) [lip loy.rl Anoc
·fh, Cone'"'on Sto,.. ,nd
A11 I,d Tr.d.. AIIUtinti
Unton
·Th. Sug.r Manuheturlng Ind
RefIning [_ploy'" Auoel.tlon
-Th' AlB.'g... t.d [n9lnllrlng
Union
-Th. fI.Ul Sug.r Indultry
(.ploy... Union
•Th' 5 A [leetr Ie. I 1I0rk.r,
Anoel.tlon
-Th. Sugar Ind".try (lIPloy, ..
Auoe'lt ton
·5 A 801Ie,...k.r.. Iron .nd
Stili IIorker•• Shtpbulld,,.
.nd 1I,lde,. SocIlty
• flit Ion. 1 Sug.r ,nd .., In lng
,nd Allied Indultr"l [eploy...
Union
.roOd ,nd A11lid IIork,r. Un Ion
•flit Ion. 1 Indultrlll,nd
CQMtrc111 Vorlll,. Un 'on
- u -
N,ln 30/ll/11-30/1 1/18
N,ln "ct~.1 I/l/S9
Jtlll/91
HII" &/9/6S (lnd MOlla.y)
- J yr,
H.ln lVl/87 (l"d Mona.y)
- 2 yr.
H,ln Z/6/89·31/3/92
M,ln 28/1/90-31/3/91
(I e for tilt ~.eet"'k 1"0
Industry P[
I e tor tilt S.eetlll'k I no
Indust ry (C,Pt)
I e for tilt S.eet
H,nuf,ctur ,n9
Induatry (hat
london)
I e for tht S.eet-
m,k In9 InduHr)' (JHB)
I e for tht Turoolll,
Au Uurtnt ,nd
e,urlng Tr'de, Pretor ..
( e tor tht Turoolll,
AuUur,nt ,nd
e'Urlng Tr,dl ('lit-
., urlr,ndl
The N,tton,' I C for
thl Tut III M,nu' ae-
turlnll (nduHr)' of the
A,publlc of South Atr ICI
I e 'or thl Toblceo
H,nuhctur Ing Indust 1'),
(Aultlnburg)
I e 'or thl Toblceo
M,nuhcturlng Industry
(Tr,nlv.. l )
I C 'or thl Tyr. Ind
Aubb,r M,nu',cturino
Indultry. [,Itlrn
ProvlnCI
C,nCIII.<I M,ln 19r ....nt 9/9/11
·lIutlrn CIPI S...t
M,nu',cturerl lis
·lIut,rn Prov Inet S."t
1I0rk,r, UnIon
-II,llon-Ao_ntr" (Ply) ltd
-S... t Work.rl Un Ion
-S-"t Indultrlll Anoc (TVLI
-S."t Workers Un Ion
-Pr.torlt Ind DIstricts
Cu.r.rs lilac let Ion
-Thl Prltor It lIquor ,nd
C,til'l no Tr,d.. [niployll.
Union
-Cu,rlno. RuUu",nt Ind
TurOOlll Assoe l,t Ion
'C,tIrlng [lIIploy..1 Union
-N,t lonl1 T.xt III
M,nu'letu"."s An
-AIIl"g'1II1 tid Cloth Ing ,nd
hxt I'. Wo"klrs Union SA
-Un Itld Tobleeo COIIp,ny LId
·Aultlnburg TIb,k••rklrs-
vlrln 10InO
-Atrlcln Tobleeo Vork.rs
Union
- Tobeceo E_p10yl,.. Org,n I-
utlon
-lltt lonl1 UnIon of CIg,rlttl
,nd Toblceo 'lark.,..
-Atr te,n Tobleeo Vork.rs
Union
-Thl Port E11Ublth ,"d
Ultln"IO. Tyrl ,nd lIubb.r
M,nuhet ur.rs [lip 10ylr,
Anoe lit Ion
-S A Yltlr •• Stul- In
V,,.,.,nt. Ilywerh.dl-Unll
-II,t lonl1 Auta-obll, ,"d
A11 lid '101'1111" Un Ion
- IS •
M'ln 3I13/88-l81 Zl90
M,I" lZllld8-J!/1Zld9
Hlln 1218/88-11/1/90
H'ln Z7/1/89-Z81Z189
HI In ZZI7/88'Z81Z189
Hlln Actu,1 2118/88-
30/6/89
HI In 216/89·31/3/90
Hlln 1110/88-31/3/90
Hlln 3/3/8"3115/89
((.
I C tor th, 1I0rU,d
r.. ttl, M,nwttetur1ng
I nC!wlt ry (C,p,)
·NUton,1 AssoelUlon of
1I0rH'd J'lt II, M,nwt,etwrlrs
·rut II, Worklrs Indwltrl,l
Union (South Arne,)
• 11 •
N,ln ZS/9181·J11J/la
APPESDU 2
OUESTlONNA IRE
I1tI. INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL suus l!J. SOUTH M1ill
Your opinions .nd c01lflents on the following upects of the Industri.1
Council systell in South Afric• • re .pprtci.t,d.
Before proceeding, pleu, indic.t, th, type of org.niSition th.t you
represent (./):
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYER TRADE UNION INDIVIDUAL I,
COUNCIL ORGANISATION FEOERAT IONIORG EMPLOYER
INDIVIDUAL GOVERNHENT ACADEHIC OTHER:
TRADE UNION BODY INSTITUTION .......... •••••• I
1.1 In gen,ral
(
1. Whit .rt in your opinion the major f.ctors thlt h.v, an imp.ct on th,
,ff,ctiveness of Industri.1 Councils. (Pluse mot ;vat, your response).'
:
· .
· . · .
· .
· .
· . · .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
. .
. .
· .
· .
· .
· .
1.2 l2.Iu: lndustr! a1 Council (if applic.ble)
· .
· .
· '.'
( · . . . · .
· .
·................................ . .
·.............................. . .
· .
· .
· .
. .
. .
2. HOti do you suggest that th, factors that ("p.ir Industri.l Councils'
,ff,ctiveness b••ddreu,d to ;"prov, ttutr op,ration? (S" next p19'
please)
·1·
VIR AFRIKAANS SUN ASSEBLIEF KEERSY
2.1 In g,nerl1
.............
. .
· .
. .
............
· .
2.2 t:2.lu: Industri.l Council (if .pplicable)'
......
( · .
........... . .
3. What do you percetv« are thfJ advantages .nd di sadv.ntag,s of
est.blishing and functioning within Industri.l Councils for:
3.1 Employers
(
Adyantages
..................
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
3.2 Tr.de Unions
Adyantages
· .
· .
· .
· .
Disadyantag,s
·....... . .
· .
· .
Diudy.aCla's
· .
· .
· .
· .
................
· .
· .
· .· .
· .
· .
· . · . . .
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4. Why fn your opinion hlv, cert.in Industrfll Councils dissolved durIng
recent yurs?
..............
· .
. .
. .
............................
· .
· .
· , ..
· .
· .
· .
· .
. .
· .
· .
...............................................
· .
· .
5. How tn your mind could thlSe dissolutions h.ve been prevented?
· .
· .
( · .· .
· .
· .
· .
6. How effICtive do you rite Industri.1 Councfls IS c.nt"lfsed col1ecUv,
blrg'fnfng structurlS? (~
Completely In,ffectfv, Noderlt,'Y Eff.ctive Very
Ineff,ctiv. Effectfv. Effect tv«
7. What .Iternatfve fnstftutfon(s) could b, consfder.cJ in the
.bstnctlp1lc. of Industrf.1 Councils tn the form.l lIbour "IItions
syst,.?
· .
·................................................. . .
·................................................. . .
· ,....................... . .
...................................................................
( 8. How import.nt do you rlt, the followfng current .nd potentf" tunc: ions
.nd rol,s of Industru! Councils in both th, busin.ss .nd wider
cOlIJIIIUnfty: (.,J
Not I.portlnt V.ry
I.port.nt Illlport.nt
8.1 Col1ectfv. b.rg.ining ••••••••••••••••• ·...
8.2 Dfsput. resolut ion ......... • •·........ ·...
8.3 B.n,fit sche.. • d.fnistratfon ·........ ·...
8.4 Trafning progr....s .......... ·........ ·...
8.5 Educltfon.l uplfftlHnt ....... ·........ ·...
8.6 Socf.l rlSponsibf1fty ........ ·........
8.7 Socfl1 ch.ng. i_pl,.nt.tfon .......... ·... ....
8.B Other (pl,.s. specify) :
· .
· .
· .
........................
· .
·3·
·.
·...
(9. Whit do you consider th, st.ne, tiil1 b, tow.rds the Industrill Council
syst•• of • potenti.1 future 90v,rn.,nt und,r • new politiCiI
disp.nSlt ion?
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
10. In conclusion, .r, you of th, opinion th.t th, Industri., Coune; I
syste. tii 11 survive th, second post·Wi,h.hn d'Clde, n",,,'y th, 1990' s?
PI"s. ",ot iv.te your .nSti.r.
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
Th.nk you very IlUch for your p.rtieip.tfon in this project.
Pl,u, return th, qu,stionn.irt in th, ,nclostd r.ply-p.id ,nv,'op, b.fo"
9 Hoycmbtr 1990,
Should you requir• • copy of the survey report sU1llll,ry, kindly .Iso
eompl,t, the .ddressfI d,t.f1s b,lw:
(
Him,
Tel. No;
.......................
.......................
Post" Add"ss
Cod.
A.C.!. REYNOLDS (/IRS)
RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY
1 OCTOBER 1990
T.l: (011) 332-6834 (Bus)
(011) 462-1495 (Rls)
·4·
AIIALIIII Q! CftllTfR CMITl9lf!lAlIII
AII.fYIAT IQIIII
IC • InellItrl.l Cou-cll
10 • IlIISlloyer Or,MI ..tlon
" • Trlde ~Ion "derltlon
II • Indlvl~l IlIployer
IU • Indl..,lo..l Trlde ~Ion
AI • Acact.lc lnetltutlon
OC • Other/CClnIUl tent
TOT. Totl' Inponee
!W.Ul1) Clove,.,..."t locty _IUed II no officii' rttpOnM recllved
Z) 'Ireent... (I) r..ponM bI.ed on totlL of 51 reepondlntl,
for 1Al1lcibLe tt_ only
................................................................_ _..- _ .
--- _ .
GUlITIC*MAIII IlIIl
Thl -Jor fecton thlt IlIIPICt on the
IffectlVlNtI of I~trl.l CGUlCIl ..
to
I I I I I I I I I I
I re 110 I" I II I IU I AI loci TOT I I I
I I I I I I I I I I
.................•..•••••••.•.•..........•.•••••...•... '-"1'-
I
I
I
(
tot In .""r.ll
• Clllr obJectlvea, wlth Iffectlve _Inluret Ion
end proctct.lr" to echlew CC!'ft1l obJectl..,.. z z 7
• Coneultulon 1Iith III pertl". "tlbll"-tt
of rel.tlonehlpl end Joint dlCl.I~I",
• Thl provilion end effectl..,. controL of benefit
Ich...
z
z
,
,
z 6
,
• Seulng of ,Inl_ U ...rdI end crlterll
end "tlblllhl,. ..... ItlblLlty z z , 6
( • Ufectlve r",Lutlon of dllllUt_/probl_
with provilion for ...1It lon, CGnCllIltion end
prlf.rlbL 'f voL~tll"'f erbl tnt Ion s z z z 9
• The IUtui .,.L.. IttecMd to tile CClU'C1L by
lu lCCeptence of lu centraL roLe,
end "4lPOf't ... IrwoL~ of tile plrtl.. end
the ..... thlt they repreunt. tllerlfore not
JUit I c"",11 In n-. z J 7
• The Ibllity to I'HdI ..~, I"ectlw'y end
1I1t1lout clllr'4)tlon or Inconvenlencl to t"-
InlMt,., z
• The pr.rldnell of the IreM',., jqlULltion to
Ull ... '0 cItV'ILop ,,,- CC!'ftIl'1 fecllltl ..
• n.. pr.rldnell of the IreM',., ....,.. to PI'f
.,.
..........-. -- .
QUIlTIOllIlA II' UP
fOl' COlftIl feclll tI..
I
I II
I
--- .
(
<.
,". callbr. of rtP"nentetlvn .Iected to tM
COlftIl end tll.lr ~ledte of tll.lr rol .. end
Ilbour _tttri In tttWul
• ,". c~llty of purpoe., cOClt)trltlon end
colilbotltive r.l.tlcwwtllpa tll.t Illve been
bttn "tlblhtltd, IIlth recognition of ttl.
Joint r"ponIlblllty of peret" for til.
hnctlonlne of ttl. cCU"C1l
• ,". pr"tnC. of t..o tI.r bar..lnl", end tM
l.IV'"olved 1.11» for ellPloyarl of btl". obllttd
to bt,...ln tllic. on the ._ IIIUII
• ,". rol., trllnlng end honnty of COlftIl
parlonnal, tll.lr ebility toc~IClt.
IIltll III partin, tll.lr WldIrttendl", of til.
nN IrIllatrlll r.l.tlorw dl-.lone, tllelr
perceived IMI of prof...lonell_, tllit
contrlbut. to til. l-ee of til. cOllW:Il
• Til. rtprntntletve Mture end Itr.,.tll of both
tllPloytr end tllPlO'f" pertl. to tile~Il,
IIltll _Jorfty rtP"ntntetlon "*,,Ired for the
••ttntlon of IIre--.t. to non-partl..
• Gown_It Int.rf.rence beyond "tlbl'''''ng
ceruln .Inl_ condltlorw thet tIlould IA»ly
In ..,.,Il II weU • In e«n:1l ..~tI
• ,lit ••ttnt ... ,...,. of .....Ione Iranted
b¥ cOllW:II, to Indlvlclat IIIPloyen
• 'rtptrednnl of pertl.. to ..,.. to ..... ,one
and IlolI I" It telt.. to dnt wltll tllMe
• ..lI.f In tile principle of collectlyl.
• ,lie ..Ittanc. of • 1lec:1t ~Ion "'leII"",..
to NlGtlltl It t"" 1.....1 .. ttlty brine
nN ...... It_ to CCU'C1l,
• TfIt I'" Itld IUIbef' of II,. In In Irdatry
• IptclflCllly tile Ibll I t'Y end .fflclency of
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• 'h. Ittltlodl of .,entl I • fecllltitorl or
pollc--.
• 'h. Ibllity It'd preperedne.. of tile pert I..
cClIIPly IIltll til. _In eer.-tt, plua tile
tbllity to do 10 In dlfflcult tcOllllalc
conditione
CCKn:1l tttntl/lNpectora I
I
I
I
I
to I
I
I
I
I
• Ability to IdIpt to end kHP ....t III til cllenee
• Ifftctlvtnttt of ttr..-nt pollcl",
• Ltvtl of burtluerecy, U •• lbllity n
p"Hcrlptlvtnttl
• Th. Iqtll of tt_ to prOCHI CN'CII ~tI
•• for DtpartMnt of M~r ..1.. lone
• 'h. tttltlodII of e~f llO'I I .lllItency,
Irdlfflrene. or pet.mell.
,
• 'h. c~lcttlOn of the ecg,cll't rol. to'
pertl" It'd -...berl In the InlUtry
• Th••fftctlvtntel of th... e~ICltlon lyet_
• 'h. perception of ....,..' rol. of I e«n:1l
I • I f\lld ..Inlltrltor or tptcl.lIlt fONl
• Th. perc.lwd fll,.,... end neutrtllty of the
cOUlCll'l tctlone I • not btl", 11M .. en
tatalon of or favourf". I pertlcultr perty
• Th. 1I1l1l,.... of bottl perU.. to partlelpet.
In I centrellMd Y\ltary bertllnl", fONl
• Tile 1I1l1l,.... of Y\f_ to coopttlt. "ltIt
one ntwen 0 COIDf.. """1"1,,, fONl
• ",.thtr or not e«n:1l .....-,t. Ire Dt""
to eMf' non-perU..
• Tile ptnptctlve of pertl .. to ttlt COIftIl I •
NrrGW eoctorll or fO#' benefit .f tM I"try
• Depere-nt .f~'o pt'tlCrlptlont on
r.......t1vlty I 0 ~lftotlw or cpntltotlw
s
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Tile 1...1 Nt"". 0' tho CClU'C1l Itr.-,t end I I I
Itl I~tlan 0' pt'o..cutlon I I' I
,". Nt"". erd cCllIPlealty 0' Itr~tI IIIlt"
11",I.r and mlO pt'lCticebl. Itr~tl IOUIht
• ,". IIhtOl'lcl1 rootl of tIM cCUlCIl IYlt. IIIItIl
prevlOUl Ileck 'llclUllon end lllOClltlon
vltll tile IPIrtll.ld lyet. clUIl,. NIItlve
IllCk tredl ",Ion .nltudn to tile IYlt.
• ,". ICope erd Jurlldlctlon 0' cCUlC1l1
• 'h. Iltant to ..... Ic" non-ilboUf' IIIUIt Ir'
brought to til. ber,.lnl". tlbl. llfIlcII Ir'
difficult to dI.l IiIlth ot COU'lCIl lewl
• ""tiler trlde ~Ion repr"antltlvtt IndMd h..,.
tile "'t. 0' th.lr conetlt'*ltl
1.2 Iptclflc I~trl.l cOU'C1l1
• 1I0t 'AlII clili.
• AI 'or ,.,
• "'.r. anly ant eIlIPloyer perty an cCUlCIl end
otller IlIPloye....r. \6Wbl. to ..t condltfone
• liz. 0' the I~trl.l cOU'CIl lu.U (••••
Mlt.l IncUtry lllide "ope)
- Ollt~./....t.... f~ bot" IlIPloyer end
..,loyee pertl ..
• ~Ion lerltlf)' to edllow political abJeetlvee
tllraugll cCUlCIl pwtlclpotlon and ectlvlty
• ~t.,tl.l tlon of '. , ... lit'll llIPiover
ortIf\lMtin Illt _UIt' ortIfIlMtlone'
NIdI .., .. ,..leetM••It.... In tile -Jorlty
• "" cOIPlulty of benefit ..~tl end
tlchnlc.l ~l.
• "" tl. tlllt It tilt.. to NIOtllt. ""_ It.
• ""'Iel.,t .....t. to offectlvely and ....,1.,.11
pollc. IIr.-,tl
• GoWif.,t polley tll.t or... CCMftd ~
IncUtrlll cCUlCIl ..r~u It. not .1 ..
z
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cowrld ~ lIIfe deta,.lnetlCN ~Icll un be
.,., f 'YClUI'tblt
• ••turt of IrGatry wi th ..-rt _II opereto,..
end tilth' lack of aClllh lat ICltlon In Ilbour
MUera and til. LIlA requlr~tI
• Lewl of turnowr ~t tllPloyere end
tllPlO)'ttt In tlla Inca-try
• ""a,. Jurhdlctlon I, leekl", owr l-.dlett
",I"'bourl", IlIIPI~ra
• ....entlvlty of both or altlltr pertl"
• AvaIItbll I", of pertl.. willi". to pertlclpett
• IIorkiOid of c~1I10r. laedl". to ",IgIlt
of pr..ent'tlon fra larttr tllPloyere and
perc.I* bl..
• C10tld Mop cleuat wh.ch can .Itllltt ... Inat
r...entlvlty
• "Iatorlcil dlwl~t: of CClU'lCII. ard a"lutlon
of Ilach crtltl", a autut lp) ctoc.td to
fill In a ntII • A aoc'tty
• bpl.r and IlIIPlO'fM perceptlen of the rola,
f,"tlCN ftI edIrInt.... of CClU'lC1I """""Ip
• I",I"enea ~ a -Jor't:y ""Ion lift ucluth.
pltnt lewl be,..I"I". rl",,, 1I1tll MJor'ty
r...entltlon. txcludl". .Inorltl.. fra
pertlclpetlon
• "" aUlIa end cral"'". of CClU'lC1I Itlff
pertlcularly dIe'r knowl" of tilt Ildatry
Int"",Ion rlftlry on tM CCUlICIl
• ~o'nt control of ..,. t: f\nil
• ,he lit_Ion of C«ftC' l ~tI "'I'" a.y
ell.... _ tt repreuntl.lt'f I....
• ,he rolt of IIIf'U who tand to ICt II polI~
r.tllar t"," 'eeHltlton
• "" tiM tlltt ~.on _"catlen tMO *"
to t • trlde ",,'on oppoelt.on
z z
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C-.,Icatlon bet...." the CN'CII If'd the I
lrdatry •• on protr... wlttl "'IOtlltlone I
I
.rlntMNtllp of ~I", pertl" l,illldl un dellY
..r.-nt bel,... r'Khed. ct.otlvlU,. the
pertt.., IrWitry populaclon If'd cCMCIl .t.ff
• Govt~t tnfl •• lblll ty In ...lltl,. cCU'lCil.
Itrhl". to IlIIprow rISWnlf'ltlvlty
• JIlt period of •• I.une. of • cCMIlCIl end ttl•
•atent to wIllch It. rul.. tl.w bItn developed
end ICCepttd by.ll pertln
JIlt provilion end .ffectlve ldalnhtrulon of
btntfl t flftil
• , ..t reluctenc. of Ilaclt trlda 11110lIl to
pentctpet. on th. eounc:l I
• In. ,1".1. IIPloyer/W1lon CN'CII till
objectivity If'd peycholotle.l dlltenc.
btt"",, til. percI "
• JIl. ~llty of the rtlatlonehlp bet"",, pertl.
• Iffectlve dhpuCt r"olutlon
s
z
1 7
J
z
z
• IyIt. of _jorlurl......... IllCk IIIlone Clf'l
OvtrVltla IIIlone for other rte" In perclculer
on wU". on Iliun with other Inter"t. I~ 4
2. IIolI t,,", ftecon thould be Iddrtutdl
2.1 In .....11
• More f1ulblllty • , In ,rantl,. of ulI!Ptlone
• Ce-Ie-nt to ruolve ,.~, .,. rMlOnlbl.
~, end I"••1I I trey f,.. If'd
pollClcllltlon of certa'n Crlda 11110lIl I •
IlIIprOWd InltuliM co colltctlw ..,..Inl",
• Yot'", an IrWiCrl.l CClU'CIl. Iflould be .....
on pertOf'llIl conviction end not 'patty II,..'
end I/lOuld not ...-oC. IndlvlcMl patty
Intertlt. but t.... of tM InlMtry-.be,..
•••
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• COU'CII. co "lib"'" th..-lwe II • fON of I I I
..If·lOW~t dIvorced fr. Cllt ItlC. end co I I
be porc.lwed I' bel". IUd,p'lIdl"t"" ct.ocroclel Z , 2 I 7
I
• COU'CII IIre-\U _e be .Ilowel co be pertln
anI, .U.lro IIIttl It.t. not to .1l0ll t"- to be
utnild to nan-part I.. ,
• COU'CII. 11m Mlthorl ty In t,,. of tile UA
to c.ll for CCllll*1Y Inf.,..tlan to IItU.
dllPlc" llIItch ohould be prtcludld II puu
.." tlIIPloytre off ttl. ,yet.
-'".re ohould be IIOr. lftllM:tlan ond trelnl".
of III perU" lItIo ,.rw on InlUtrl.l eClU'ClI,
II 11111 II clU'C1l ,t.", pertlculerly In
CCIIIIIlu IIldAtrlH1 and .110 an tilt UA
end til. ''fIt. ItnU, Includl". c~lutlon
end I\ItOthUon ,kllll
- htlonolillUon raqul red on "".t It_ .re for
InlUt,l.1 clU'C11 end lItI.t or. for plene
lewl bI,..lnl",
- Council n." ohould correctly Interpret
tll.I, rol" end fu-ctlone .. oenont. to
til. COU'lCII end the partlH tllereto
an • NUtrel end c~leted bell.
- Council. "'auld be reprHentotlw of .ll
1IP10'fIt"I .... IIIIPloyeee 'IHili n tilt
InlUtry, t,. or ....., wltll IUCfI
,tptlllntlvity clHrIy de"no;d. tIlUI
reprtllfttlvtty to be IIIIIPf'OWd
- CorMrMly. I lIon ...-.nclvlcy
II .ttilit Inet f ...... of IIIOCIIUon
1I1t11 10llef' ,......nt.elon tcetptld In 1M
PMt. ptO'tldld 0lMf' Wtlone ,I.. pottlelpat.
- lopttIIftt.tlon Mould be open to .Il III~ wild
ct.l. IIltllln tM IMat,.., or tr.
- Ll-ttl". of 'tprHlntlelon by t,. retller tNn
InlUtry to IIpt'OW ,......"t.t1en
- lopttIIfttlvlty furtllet" to be IIllted If coo
life..... pertln hwol¥Od tNt 11M ftI reel
Intlttlt or conulbutlon to ftIIOclnl-
• file Itlt. IIIould noe Intorfen In tile contlf't
of council ..~t. b¥ Includl". or
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..eludl,. c.rtlln .cten to eon'ortI wi t" I I I
the toW""" perty·. poll tlcll IdeolDIY Z
lll. ltat. "'auld not be ebl. to ".,C
..tllptlone to eClU'lC1L ..r~tllfttn
cOU'C1l1 IIId Ilr.edy declined CIltH
• IUlplclone ., bribery to end ~ cOlllCIl
offlclill "'auld be avoided ~ dlacourttl".
til. preetlc, of glYlng and ree.lw',. ,lftl
• JII. neeotl'tlon of ..r...."u auuldt tile
Incbtrl.1 council .yet. "'auld ba lanctloned
provtded they Include I..owd conditione and
...... I I tllO tl.r bargalnl,. reeotnllad
• Jr. ",lonI Co refrain fr,. 1""'1,1,. In
politic. ltd eoncenCrate only on t..ovl". till
_"cyof IIfl of 1IIIIP'0'Y"8
• Mort poalclYl laperlancn of tilt eyet. Mould
be provided
• COU'CII .uff and ","U "'auld ba .".
r"pontl". Co Ilack tree» ",Ion IlIIdI
• COU'CII IItl\t. to adopt 8OI't fONlI roln
In 1Idiition end conclUatlon
• COU'CII ...,t. Mould btcc.t ... IINlee
orlent'tld and In. punitive. I bal,.
IItlp'ul ltd dlpla.tlc ratlMr tIItn """lpful
burtaucrau
• Gretter proflUlanall_ and .... IMlnne-
II k, IAlf'OICl' .., ccaft: II • t.ff IIIll IIIYI •
poaltlve l...,ct on eM acrtnltt..f counclI.,
.. 11111 .. tM prcw'.'on of prof.lonel
""Ie"
• late tcfwInt... of tM IlIPf'OYad ell.c. of
eoop,ntlon In tM CCU'try IIlth rtfw.nce
to tilt "'fOtlltlon proc...
• ,at, tcfwInC... of , ....tef' f,... for
proactive eetton 4a to .........A'C·.
atene. of ..,..nt In, Intlt'ftrllft
• IIIln Itre-lci Mould be Mdt .. UMt'
friendly
• lM level .f burMucracy of COU'eIl. e"ould
z
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,he 1e0Cll end Jurlldletlon 0' cert.ln council.,
....1.lIy til, I.rter onee, Mould be redefined
erdJor rtc*.ced
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be r~ed IIlth 1Illt'. ~er 'rllNly I... Z Z 1 4
1
1
1
• Alre-tU a/lould Incorpor.U .11 .,... of t'"
.~I\c
• In'OIWtlan/Mrll.tl". ellllPll", to In'.,.
tIlPloyer. end tlIIPloyeH of .lIIt.... of the
lyet. end to pertuede th. to "llIIt ••
10 tll.t Int,,"u cen be P""lfIted on council.
end r."lIItlvlt., IlIPf'owd Z Z
I~ c-...lcetlon In "",til lilt" the
IncUtry t"rough newel.UIt., bull'tIN, .tc
• Lett.lltlon to be _lded to tCcc.odtt. two
tier berlllnl,. •••Inl.. conditione .t
IncUtry tRt ICt~l .t plent IMI
• 'roylde for 'lltlllPtlone for ..." IIIPlcryer.
• ,". ,""Int.nt of ..r• • 1111 led 1PtC111I.u "'"-
er, ltelNd to lebour -.t ec-.lc tr"
• Agre-tU a/Iould be .xtended to non·pert I.. If
council PIrtl" er. repr..enutlw to INure
IncUtry ,...,I.tlon
• btllPtlone a/Iould be controlled beuer IIIU.
..tlvttlone IIYtn for ."lUilone lIlth a l...Ill'" IIendId Inltlda In till. ,....td by council.
• ...... ,..lhtlc won... upteutlOlll
• Ln. ,......Ive ...loyer aUlt\IIII
• C«IItltutlOlll end .....-,t. to be -*",INd
end ~,.t111d
• ...Ia,retlon cwtllle_t.. IIltll definition of
Int.,..t, .,. end ICope of .,Itlon to be
..,. clOllly controlled
• Cilltly deflllld dlepute ,...lutlon proc......
• I"lbll"-', 0' dl.pute ea-IU... lilt" .""1
cClIIPlIltion end -.dlatory/.11OtY rola I
I
• Ntllcetlon of ..~ta IIlould be ....... up I Z
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Joo IUCII power wet. In tile It,t, to r.fUM
to Plobl 1all peru 01' all of III ..,.-.t,
often conchdld tllrouetl II,rd bI, .. t"t",
• It~tI of alftOt'hy ~Ione to pertlcljllto In
''fit. lllould be addr...od
I"",IIr III~ lewl ..t I"" end ,.cllenee of
vltlll IIltll otllor councIL., ell..,. of c_ret
end offlcl,I. of tllo Depart.,t of~
• Mor. IIId1r Il'bllchy on and ,ecognltlon of
IrcMtrl,I cCU'C1 I. In r..,I.tl". Itbour
.Utr.
• 1.1",,. to trode ~Ione to Iofldt,.tend th. rol.
of til. f," ent0rJl"I •• ''fIt.
• AI" t,.lnl". to Ilbour t.lde,. I" labour
rt"ttd _"er. to \rOdentend ~Ic. of
"bour II ORlO'od to ctvn-Ic. of pollttca
end .ocl.I 14l1l ft....t
• 1.1""1 to MMI_nt. (not only cOU1CI l 101'1)
on til. new ~ II otPlY to llbour IIII end new I.
dl.".lona
• A cCUlCll t • conetltutlone Ihould cOllPf'ohonalwly
cowr .ll tvtntualltl.. r...l'dl". It. oper.tlon
• Dtllt". ._ltIOUlly "Ittl ..-Ion
IIlPltc.ttone
• ObUlnl", ..,.-..t fre. partl. on.,Idtll,..
In rflPlCt of .....,_
• Mrd LRA prwl.lone ,......-dl", tilt crIterIa for
ttle tilt_Ion of ..~tI
• IntrocLco en IClP"I -.chnl....INt tM
refUilI of tlla "'nletat' to ..tend III ...._,t
to non-pertl..
• COINlIlore IIIoutd be top lewl dlel.l...un
and not IlblrdlnatM .... aIlould IIa¥t ilardi on
uperltneo ,t IMp floor lewl
• .~ tM powt' of tM lra-trl,I court In
t.,. of Itctlon 46(9) of tlla LU
• COINII ..~t. to be """"""II¥ an
4
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lreblrtal crlbu\al prtor to ~II"'I,.. wh" I
no ,Ie/lt to veto or .1 c.r '" ..,.-,t \oI\ln. I
In confllcI 11"" I~,.l.tlon Of' In ",f.lr I
labour prlCllc. In t.,... of Ilia LU I
I
lIaU.,. tncllded In • cOU'CII ..,.-,t to be I
'Acludld f,ca work. c~1I t.,. of rlf.rene" I
I
Sf91,.11 III••ocl.l. ec~lc and political I
Ir-I-. 111111 Itbour I.edtr. focuul". _Inly on
labour MU.,. w'thln til. econcalc Ir-t_ 4
2.2 Spaclflc InclIttrl.1 CCl\of\CIIl
s"tlfted IIllh cOU'CIl ard Ir-t•
•ot IAlllclbll
A. for 2.1
• Til. deflnltton of the .cope of In tnellltrl.l
COll'CtI ..t be cll.rly defined In t.,.. of
~m ratll.r than hluorlc conditiON
IntrOl1.c'MCh",t .. for 9r••t.r ~racy
anct participatIon by the rri and fill
....r•• pa,tlcul.rly ~IOV"'. to enabl.
9,..t.r Irwol.,...,t In til. CGUlCtI' ••".Ir.
• ''If.,.ntl.1 trltt.nC of clruln partIn
on til. CGUlCII "'ould be I'tClldid to r-.e.
nttatlve r'lCtlon fre. othlr partin. _I"ly
ral.tl". to alnant tredt union partIn
• IlIte detl,.lnttlona tlIould .llO cowr .r...
U'der till JII'lldlctlon of Irdatrl.1 cO\of\Clla
10 tlllt wort.,. could ntw accept til...
If dlu.tllfted w'th cOU'CIl condhlona
In an Irdatry '11th .,-,y _ll II1II10.,.'"
.atanallie tcllc.t Ion on LU .,., Itbour _uen
• All .,... of til. Itpbllc to be Incorpontld
Into lilt 1I,..."t
Itl" Intlrwntlon In ..,....,tI
tllat differ fre. tilt prnant tlllNI". of tilt
Deparl."t of~,. aIwluld be rtcllctd
• 'r....,ttd llIte nttOtl.tlon forwa It IW-
ce-IlIM level Ihould be 11I.lntltd lilt" •
retum to JolnU\oI\' t.ry ..... 1II,,,I,,t,,.
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Tfllnt". of cOU"ClI .uff tn tll.lr r.lpectlw
dhclpllnel 10 IlI1)rove ..rvlce It'd I....
Th. IAIOtnl8lne of peraone ..lth ..,......,.t
end olll.r rtcJ.llrtd lid lIa In 1.,lor poaltlON
Off.r r.-nr.elon PKk'e-a IIIlch ..Ill .nrece
end r.l.ln qJlll f Itd/eaperI encld cOlIlCII at.ff
Tile rlglle 10.ke c~ll dK.. lone blndl". on
.11 pertl .. In labour dl.put..
Conetltuelon Ihould cover .11 tvtntuelleln
• Merkttl". It'd ....r.hlp drl .... to Incr••••
In partlculu ~19'fer MlIIbtrllltp
The "r.-lt of ••et 0' guldel tntl on
....,elone ..lth tr. ~Ion pertl"
• ~1 .. lon of rtpr..tnUtlone to tovt~t
bodl" on til. utenalon of "r..-ntl to
non'pertl"
• lIlen brl,..,."lp prevalla tha Illnllt.r Ihould
Inttl'Vtl'lt by decl.rlng 'o,...r "r_ta •• weee
det'Mllnaelona ~tll auch tl. II /lttOtlltlON
UI concluded to Incl.ce pertl .. to ..ttl~t
• IlIIprov.-ne of rtpr..entlvlty of botll tW' .Ither
pertl"
• Th. conatltutlon 0' the ~10'fI" orpnlutlon
can ..,..... •• I guide to the dtwl~t 0' a
lCUlll Iru.
• Th. IGr...,t to be revl.... end --.dId
rtOUllIl., to keep abr...t ..Itll ...,..1 prectlce
• CrMtlf' ...,Ioyer ~Ity and thel,. cOlIPllanc.
..It" 'ttnel-' ' ..r_1I
3. Til. IdVtnt .... and dlucMnt.... of
Irclatrlll CClU'ClI partlclpetlon
4 ,
• '-' dtltl,.,.. conc~ and ~tunltl" 'rw
dtwlct)tne bitter ,,*raUrdlne, c~lcatlon,
• fONt to -*Ir..1 wider •••oclo·IC~lc IIiUltI
1
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cooptrltlen end r.IUloneIllpe bit"",, pertln Z 6
u•• lul In drl"l,. out dllPlt" It'd "tlbltllll".
c~ ,rOll'd
leclM:tt 1Il1.lr c~tttion by lint". of
c~ "I,•• end conditione of •• rvtce
II I,r.-II 1110 control OAlOIltton IIIPloyen J 4 9
'ende 10 r.-ewe thl burden of ....1".
lr'CUlrlll relltlone fre. -.nqen IiIo hlw
olher ICcOIIlllbll1 t I..
ColltCtlve blrgllnlne Illpirionelly It'd ••pertly
hlrtdlld by uper IencMf negot tlIon Z
COIIlCII tnlnl,. end ~Itlon IIIldI contrlbut.
to I.ov.-.nt of c~tlnci of IlIIPIGYe" , 3 5
- Of developing I IYlt_ of IIIf-governanc.
lIt th Ih. Iblll ty to d I rec t and centro I thl
Ilhlrl of Ih. I~t,.., J , 7
,
COIIlC II IItnU end I U If .-.ur. "r.-ttl
Ir. t",l_tld Z
(nabl" tht prO'llllon of IOCIII .ecurlty f\nfl
It'd I.ovtd beneflta for th.lr 1lIIP1GYe"
It 10000r COlt end In. edllnlllnllw .-orlliOld
for IndlvlctJtl IIIPloyer. Z 4 10
A,r.-tlU Clift be tlllor __ to tilt trede
or InctJttry cOYerl,. a vide rllftll of litun Z
Provldtt I collective be,....lnl". IYlt.
and ..nctloned fona for ,...otlltlont on
lIII" It'd condltlona of aenlce 4 4 , Z 3 14
- StU .Inl_ end U\1'otW ..... It'd bInIf I tI
for til. InctJtt,.., •• ~tI 'I"" frottlne
'
7 5 2 , 17
COIIlCII fAlI'tntlcnMp tralnl".~
provlclt "Itnt III 1111" I for tilt lneut,..,
Provldtt I dllC'Ut. resolution _1IIn1.
ullor -.cit 10 UI. Inclatry and r~
fr. lilt point of conflict • 5 Z Z Z
Alao provldtt I lnl coetly dltpJtt rnolutlon
prOC"' Z Z 5
Can prO'llcit oth.r ,.rvlc" and reuurcn Z
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Authorl..d body to control .tendlrcil and
rapuII"t lha lrd4try at hlghar level.
Provldtl Itcurlt.,. end atabllity to the Inclatry
.1 an lnatttutlonall.ed pt,.,..t body
Can '.ovt pr~tlvlt.,. In an IncUtry
.1.0 Iptel fI c. II.,. vlth pt'oca,ctlylty ber.. lnl ....
C~llanc. IIlth .gr•.-etlU I. Ittilly
en'orceabl. II th..,. ar••ututorlly binding
IUltlonel uptrlenca In gtnIral 'or pertl..
Conetructlw 'Orul vi th fact to fa" Intarectlon
th.t can poaltlvtl.,. Influenc. Ittltudtt
Provldtl • cantrlll.ed bergalnlng 'ONI
• II ptrc.IYId •• a neutral body
• Provldtl • Itandardlled Job grldlng I.,..t.
11Ipr0Ytl ~Ioyer .olldarlt.,. and Joint Itrlttt'(
• Opportunity to Influence the Il101. Induatry
• o.-xratlc proc..... are _1I1d
• workl,. heve I NY In det.,.lnl". condlttorw
• O~ not prlChde be.... tnl". .t plant lweI
Lone ta,.. Irciatry toela hew prlference fNtf'
Ulort t.,.. ItCtor.' toe'.
• 'rovld.- protactlw Mdtenl_ 'ot ...,loyMe
and ItC\If'lty of tIIIlI~t
• Sultabl. 'ot the dtte,.tnetlon of Job cat.,orlMI
I
• Introct..cM I.eaure of dllClplll'll In Inclatry I
I
• ContrlbutM to contll~t of IncUtrl.1 """..t I Z
I
can provlde enc I"Iry bentf ItI auch •• '""-- t". I
l... to~l~ I
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COU'CUI art tdllnluered by tptCltllU Itaff
Incourltel til. for.-tlon end rtt1nretlon of
.-pl~r or,enllatlone end trlda IIIlone
z
flley ,,",rei Iy opente "I til alnl.1 State
Interferenct
Conetltutlona eNure uability and operatlONI
tIU IcitII ntl
ItpI'"ent Ivity of COl.nC III er. rttul er Iy
~ltortd
Allr.-ltl cen be ..tended to non'pertl"
O"r" of protection provided Ittl",t plent
IIVII barOllnlng
• Cen 1110 forc.fully contend tllit ttr.-entl
Ihould not hi'" ..lIer ~Ioytre through the
Uetlpt Ion facility
• Overell lUI coetly end ~r. convenient IYlt.
• Cen barpln III th all ~Iana In I 1111 tlry fONl
• IIIIpI'CMd Ilulo.tlng of eoetl ttptCtllly In
contracting "'en all eontractora art MbJact
to tht t_ Ilbour coet ItNCturi
IIIIpI'CMd pllll\'". ...r.-,tI tAlly fOf'
IPIC IfIc pet IodI
z z
• _lIlIta In fOf'a'laU". IIIIPlorM pollcl" and
proc...." 1
• M.tlltlona orderly end ~. rttPlNlble ~ te]
oft., 10flI nandl". re'atlonlhipellltll \l\tona I
lito Irt convtraent "I ttl tM IC)tClflc Ird.atry I 4
I
• !lOr. openal~1 too of ptrtlclpantl than Itl
pl."t Itvtl bar.. lnlng I
I
• I",l~ra 1"1 ••poaed to ~Ion "HI"'t t". at I
plent Itvtl If they ~rlbt to an I~try I
IIr..."t I
. " .
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Mone If dell I,.. 1II1th • 'eNlbl, If. W\lon
Lack 0' fll.lblll ty to control Olin 1",1 ra
MtllMt 0' cc.petltora In ber..,,,I,. fOl'Ul
MHd to ad)ult to til. I_It c~ ~Inato,
"PlClllly tn r.,peet of ..... 11111,. ""Iell un
I,ad to plent lawl dlaPltH for Ic.a IIIIPloyera
CGetty II ..II IIIIPloyera ,ra 1Nb1, to ..t
III gIl.r councII lIIe9" end condI t Iant
lnefftetlvt In ..nine condItIone .. I,r..
...,Ioyer, Ire CCllllPlIt.ct to ber..ln tllie. at
plant ll¥tl II ...1I
Seopt can be too lillie If eOU'CIII ,r, not
lcalld dNl
• 'Orwlltlad etructur" pt'~tI , al ..tell btt"""
..eetI and proca,c t I v I ty
AIIM Intlr'trenc. In .-p1.r'l ctc.Ht Ic
'''Ilre
lur.urltlc IA)tlcatlon of dtctalone and
prOC"I" ,t Inc-.nlant tl..
III",er IIIpOMd~ lIIllUld pr,'er to
, • PlY I to 1...-0- profltlbllity
1I0t II~ 'tpreMntatlw of ttlt Illlt.atry
• ..,.,., IIIllooyen need to acc__te t~ tier
be,.. I"t". .Itll lee. of cla,lty on obll ..tlClN
..,.,., IIIlI000rt pr.'.r pllf'lt II¥tI btrtelnl,..
only
• CeNtllly blruucratlc bodl" In an 1ftI1.1~
lyet.
• ,lie prtnclpl. of elnl_ ..... and ccnSltlone
tapoeltlon t",t el"'t not be acCfotlbl, to a"
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• hrtl" haw co contribute co eOlrCU '\rdI
• 'otltltl,l ,.Inl 'Of' N1clonel Of I«torll
Incbtrlal ecclon
Oc.lNclon of c~ll netOclaclcn b'I l.r..r
IIIIlloyerl l0li0 leC condlclone for clla .lnof'lcy
IlIployerl ohlin h.ve to cOllP"c.l" on Chelr own
-.rdIC" to arrive .t • c-., MndIC.
hlllption IY't- noC .lwaY' aflectlw ..
IIIIllGYH percl .. ~llkely to Itr" to Ch...
M-e..."t dlllnclined Co partlclpeta acclvely
ca. to .cllIIC of c1_ end effort rlCJll red on
cOU'CII "Ct"'l and efhlra I
I
It. cOfllUllne WllIn not dl ractly IflecCed I a I
Coo eUltllrae.t and.llOW co IItllfy 10ClI nHdI I
I
~Ulnlne ItI ,greed IIIIployer ..s.CI I
I
_It bullnnl dtvtl~C hlllplrld b'I Inct..cry I
rlllUlatlon tllua noc conforelne IIltll dtr....l.Clonl
I
Incbtry conditione of ~Io.,.nt noC conelacenc
IIICll Ir" .rkat blrgel"l,.. eoncepu blaed on
a~lyand~
IICJ.IIr" r..facratlon IIhlell II lIlICetptiOla to
ae.t IIIployer pertl ..
IyIt_ elMOt dial III th _tUrt affectl". the
r,lattonlllip bit...." Indlvlcbl 1IIp10'fl" end
thalr IIIIllO)'l" I e ctc.ntlc falUll, therafore
IUractl two tlar be,...I"I",
• DIIPJt" ..., not be "U IIlttl • ",Iellly ..
rtq.llrld
· .0 tfflCtlw prowilion fOf' dlllI,. IIlcll dllPlt"1
It 10ClI/plltlt 'aw' I
I
I
I
It. taken b'I Dlpln."t of~ to p,bllall I
..r...."tI I
I
I
I
I
tamlt Hilly pl.., one ~Ion off ...Inac enotll«l
I
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•~trld to '.ce "" co Urenetll 0' cClIIOlned
....rll\lp
Agr...,.e tnnall"ulon Irwolm crlatnal
rltll.r tlllll cl..,11 pt'ocHdtnol
Ie. CCU'lCtll do noe ..ally provide 'JtlllPtlona
""tcII CIII II~r ell. flextblltty 0' II,...
(~IO'flr lolldlrlty la noe allllY' obulnebl.
u to tnttr~loyer ce-peeltton
Agr...,.tI 'OCUI on elI'IPloyee IIItltl~ta W'd
not 1110 on IIIPloyer ene ICl.-ntl
Mort llIptrtonll W'd fo,...1 nttOtllttone r.-oved
'r~ 11\09 floor 1Il1c" un uraln ~ erode plllllt
Itvtl rtlltlpnahlpa rod cc.ulICltlon
3.2 Trlde \ilIon .ctvenu9"1
Ciood ..perhnc. of thla ~ratlc prOCHa
In operulon, allo pt'ovldlno ..perllnc. co
nidi \ilIon official. rod future polltlcl ....
In governtnC. W'd po1I e Ica
SIr,.11 fONl to MlGe lac. on blntfltl,
conditione 0' u,..,lc. rod lIeIItI ~ rttUlae.
til". 'or I perclcular Incl,lCry
11Ia1Nt" til. 'llJ)lol cae Ion of IIbcu ..
.'n'_ uendlrda Ire Nt for tile IrGaery
eM obuln Ildauy aollearley ....1.Uy fOf'
uniON IIltll totally dlff.rtne cONelt'*'l:l"
Grtltlf' ecor.-I" of acal. If l,.,fflcltnC
r"ourc.. to ortenl .. aC pltnt Itvtl
Til. bellc r'IIItt (lla) of lIOttlre Irt IM8nC1d
by rtpr"tnutlon IlIcenwl to tile tnurprl ..
hctlltlt" til...cl,. of IIIPI0000r ~
IIIPloyH pertl" Ie a l.-wl ""'cIIllIllUld
otll.",I .. not be poatlbl. In. I.,.. lra.try
•
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(MUfIl continuity of bent'lu ~ IIf..,.rdI
.Inl_ lI.g11 end work Ing cendl tlCIII In en
IncUtry IIltll high ~loy" ~ IIIPloyer
_1I1ty
'rovhlon 0' ~flu. wltll colllCtlve .l_t
enabllne bln.r ~f1U It r..lonabl.
rlt...lpacl.lly 'or .-1I.r cOllPl"tn
CGUlCIl .,r~U Ir. 1"llIy en'orc.lOl.
"".rltly non'c~lyl", ~Ioyer. Cln be
prollCutld III til l'lf'lt ~ltorl", 0' tlln.
Tllroug/l t nde 11\ Ion cte-oc:rt tic prOcell"
IqlIOYHt h.ve I lIy In nttOtl.tlon outec.n
• conflict In the IlIPloyer·...,ICIY"
r.lttlonallip II to I llr" ••tent reo"cld.
III til lOr. pete,'ul M90t lit ICIII
• Alilit. In .1I.lnttl", e~tltlonbit"",,
unlCIII 'or til. ''4!POrt of work.rt
• Job cr.ltlon
• Til. reprllenutlve ehlreet.r 0' til. union
Cin bI .. Int.lned
'rovldtt I dllput. r..olutlon ..cIIenl.
• DI.put. rllolutlon proc.., Ilao III' eoeUy
• Control of Iklll, end .te.rlne 0' trllnl",
In en IncUtry
• Gr.tt.r control end InflUll'lCI In tile Inct..wtry
• Grllter llOt'kw hdIipM d ...el end control of CM\
1'''lre
• 'eclllutli rlPt'"enutlon end Joint dlcllion
_I", on blnlflt f~ end tr.lnl". botnll
for till I~try
• hUbll"," .1"1_ r.t" end blnlflu fM
.r... llMr. tiler. II no ....rallip
• Can •••rch. ,r.lter Influenc. 0'Itf'
.oclo'ecarmlc end 1110 political I.awe
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SUbtilty vd ucurltv provided bee...
111111 tut j 0lIl1 Iud end a pe~t bodr
Conlrltr.lt.. to general level of wei fire In en
lr4lelry
RtOJc.. Inl.tv'llon rlYalry I ..ocl.ttd with
plant levll blrgllnl",
CIOttd atlop provilione cen tit Inchldtd In
I,r..-ntl
'01'\11 through "" I ctl \onI on I,"*-crlpt lone
can be collected
Jlrovldtl lecurlty of \onIon Ince.t and ~ratllp
Can I.-ove Ce-Illcat lon, cooperttlon end
Ittltudel btt ..... partl .. M to facl to fece
Interaction In a constructlw fOl'\ll
Ctntrillyeducational to partlclpanll
Provldtl I ctntrell ..d bar,elnl". forua
• Cordltlone can be rel.ed to thl hl.t c~
~llIItor
• COl6lCti Secretlry u~ II I neutrll refer..
end hllrl"" lIenerelly I~rtlll trd f.lr
• JlI'OYIdti ~IUbl. repr..entatlon of partl..
• Are vol"'t.,., bod'.
• o~retlc proc..... ar. _lied
• lOtntrllly optru.. wit" .lnl.1 Itltl
Int.rwnt Ion
Can aclll"", an etr.-nt coverl,. I lIIol.
lr4letry tllrougfl one •• t of "'fOtlltlone
lOtntr.lly •• eccCIIIPI I ailed "'fOtlllort to r
Ittt. th.lr c... I
I
Jrlda ",Ion dll~IInU9"1 I
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~ST IOIIIIAI.I 111M
A ICtJOf'lty IIllon doel not I'oICnllrtly II.ve
control 0' til. tllPloy.. pertln
lIone, 11111 tgnor. c~1l elecllten If not In
lflP/'ovll It'd go on U"lkI, IIlell protlCtlone
provided In LIA
1~loyer pertl" find IC ...Ier to rlld!
lolldlrtty It c~ll. tllen trlde IIllone
etA to I IIOri 1Il1f11d .unc.
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) a
)
lyet. II rlllOt. frOll cll.lr ....rlllip
wIIlcll Cln f~t Idver.ely on .,-ditlng,
fNCbc:k to cone t I tuenu end percept lone
on Ull I"ICICY of til. prOCUI
• DIfficulty tn flndlno c~tent reprulnuclwa
to opereCi It c~11 level
• If nt9Otlltlona uk. too long Cln dllldvlnu91
IlOrk.re II ceruln ~loyere 11111 not
I~l..,t ntII condItione U\tll jllbllcltlon0' til. new egre--.c
• [~loyerl l1li0 Cln pey -ore tllin till CCU'C II
.Inl_ retn "Ill uHI tlnd to IdIIlre to tllue
• Incbtrlll ccu.:11 M90tlltlone ere ......".lly
on .Inl_ end noC ec:cual lII9II end IGlld
pre'er nevotlltlone to be on tile litter
• SOfII IIlPloyere ref\a. to bartll" It plent
lewl on ICtUlI ....... they do not
llotlecrlbe to two cIe,. be"..I"I".
IllCkllOrllere .,.. niH dlladvlnteged
on COl.nClll "*' CMy .,.. noc lIU1f1clently
np,nentld
• Ottenhltlon cen be ¥I~ cOIUy 'ot 'l\onMc·
IIllen tllit lICk eatemel flnenclll ~c
• lllnorlty or cone.rvacl_ U\lone cen be
pllCed \rider pr"aure fW dllldVlnllf'd
,II. lICk 0' CClllP'tency of cartlln COl.nCII
IlCrlttrll"
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blr,.1 n1/'4
'.r,.lnl/'4 I. of • IIOr. dllutlCl nature
Ilttotlatlonl hive to be coordinated IIlth other
\l\lcn end IIr....,t r.ac:tltd IIlth thllr I'llUC
COU'Ctl perfo,... che h,ncc ION of I tood crlde
\l\len end Cln .vencually ..Il. \l\lona oOtol.u
etl,. at "'09 floor bervalnl/'4 light be
blcur clII to Chreee 0' collecclve ectlon
I. c~ltlon and naCure of blr,atnt/'4 U
cOU'C111 Clld co IIOre ..,cually ICctpUbl.,
albeIt lowr ..CCl~U
Dlladvanu", unlona ..no are or,1II1I1CI vlchln
an IncUcry bue are ~le co btcat I percy
• TI. conlUlI/'4 lIIen not dl rICHy .ffecced I e
too CUItltrlat and Ilow eo IIcllfy nHdI ae
IC locil ltvll
• IItlIara c~lled co pey council levin
• lICit of fl •• tblllcy end burlaucratlc
• A,r.-ntl are .110 blndl". on ",tona and noc
onIy IlIIPloytra
• 1.~lIrn r"lacrlclon ..nIdi II IIlICctpuble CO
I~ ",ION
• IIIICMC of I IV-C. Chat CMy!lad no pert In
nubl II"'''
• lllnorteln IIY dlcenal". ctle cordlclone
fOf' tile Mlorlcy
• Illy lOM credlblllcy If a..oclltld IIltll CN
.-,.c.
• II"'t of wto In edllaalon of "'" pe,e1M
· 'ttl, If tnt. tlact .....u I.,.,. en cCUlC1l1
• DltpltH .., ulte coo lCl"l co 'Holw 4
2
2
2
• 22 •
2 2
2
2
2
7
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
aUUTlOI..IA..1 lUll
I I I
I IC I 10 I "
I I I
I
I II
I
I I I
I IU I AI loc
I I I
ror
I
, I
I
....................................................... ·····1·..·· .
• elueunce of __ .-ployert to bar..ln
It cOU'tC II level
fl. ut." by tile Depert."t of~r to
IUlllIll Igr..-ntt
lIey III". to cc.pf'e-Ia. on pllllt lewl~
In flvour of N1tlONI or I~try d.-r'de
CIII 100e -*"rat0 non-eCl'IlC II \II ION wf\o
telliew h1~tr ..at" end bantfltl It plent
Itwl
- IrOldlr Illun een be owr-,,111I1d vI til
Ideology ovartatlne ...o.r Intar"u
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4. Illy Clrlltn Inca-trial cOU'C1l1 h.w I
dlllOlvtdl I
I
ClmOt c~t I S
I
I~loyerl' fllr of \l\lon Itranetll ancl ~Inat Ion
.t centr.1 hid level
• DivIde and rull uetlc. of control b'I pertl ..
• IgnorWI of the benefl fa of Il'dlItrl.l cOll'CIl
...cerlllip
• Due to dllldvantlg.. of the Iytt.
• Th••entltlt of plant lewl blr..lnl".
z
z
2
2
· Ill.,. cOU'CIII hlw tended to bIe_ locl.l
r.th.r than collective berg.lnl",organl.atlona
and not foeI'II I". on labour Iliutl
Inltl.1 r.Jectlon of .~t. by lIact ~lonI
M to th.lr prevloua ••clUilon
[",loyer. who haw dlaedvantttld the .yu_
beelUl. of thl \I\r..olved III'" of IUltll...,.1
blrgllnl",. t",laclna on or praf.rr'",
dtcentrllhtd bargllnl".
IIcfll c~tltton on cou-cll. IIlth Ilack
~lanI adoptl". ~tructtw Ittltudtl and
thrtlunl".oth.r ractal gr«cll
• IgnorwI of npaclally .-ploye,. on the"",
lltlour dllpanutlon end r.luctw. to accept It
"
S
6
4
9
2
In I 1,,,,1. -.IQIYW,trada ~Ion cOU'Ct I "'-
the \ilIon ,.....ntlvtty In the .ttIbU......t
h.. bleat lnaufllctant
• b!plOytr organl.atlon dl~lty "
• 'r..tur. ancl dllClUt.. by tradt \Illona on
COU'C lit Iller..,., .-pI0')1" IIItfldtIII to
IIIMen th... ~lonI c.,.t". cOU'Ctlt to coll ....1
I • botll ~ICl"fIr and \1\ ton bIIIIl tIII I
I
• Inc~tlbillty bat,,"" .-ployer ancl tlllPlooyM I
partl .. enulll". dlvereent/ltlfhll Intlreate I 2
I
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lICk of c_lt-ent to r"olve dhllUt.. end
klfl) 1111 CCU'C II fll'C t Ion I,.. lutll •• bV
IlIIPloyere 1110 could hive loue'!t otll.r
r.-ell .. til'" Ult. th. hllll IItndtd Inltude of
"Ithdrwt,. fre. c~11I
Til. r"tuene. by cerUln \l\tON to Illow
otller IIltON to after. In dtchlON IIItch
whlcll I"tet th_. end obtlln ....raftlp
Decll". In r....ntlvlty frfa I"••tlltent
IIlION U to Indoctrlnetlon end Intt.ldlltlon
of ....re by the .,r• •tllt"'t ontt
Th. polltlctl Interferenc. end IIlddtn I,endel
of c.rtlln 1Il10f'l
Int.""lon COllPlt It Ion .. Ith IIM'f ......,.1 end
end otll.r non·~rty unlone recrultl,. ....,.
frfa the .... I~try. th.reb't' ",.kenl,.. thl
rtpl'"entlvlty of \l\lone perty to cCU'C11I
we.k or poorly orgenfeld tllployer orgenilltione
'lit conl.rvltl .. end uwthicil concb:t of
COIIlCtll
• 'r...tur. r..,onl,.. bv both or ,Itll.r ~rty
Gentrel lICk of r....ntlvlty 0' ccu.:111
• Too cUItlerarae dlaput•••nl~t prOCtO.lr"
• I_t_, end leelt of ICc..,lbtllty to
tllplO'J'"l
• Leck of clarity on the scope rd CS-rcltlon of
l/lIIlatrl..
• totll ~10'fI" end ~Ion pertl.. tardl,. to
focw"" on~tlc Of' plent lawl Ilawe
end fevour'" plent lewl bI,...'"I,.
110 loneer 'Illet Ione I .. did not ItItP pee...I tit
dlWl~t' In polltlcel. 1C~lctl end
brotdIf' InlUtrlll r.lltlone artnt
ht prtPIfed to~ to tlleN dI.,.l,.
clm-tene"~ to Infll.lbtllty arlll,..
frra vetted Inter..tl of III peftl"
LOll of vltbtllty of th. I~try pertly ~
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to tAc"alYe condltl_ btl~ "'fOtlated
lid cCU'C1l MnaO.-nC rd poor dlnlacrnlon
LICk 0' bllvc. In perc I.a' blr.alnl~ polIIer
LICk 0' ,Irda c1» to poor econoalc condl t Ioni
rtaultl~ In non perclclpetlon
(",Ioyer party re.1 on-c lone III til r«1lced
IIllltngnea. to ..r~ on ccu-.cll.
CCU'CII IIOrkloedt re.ulC Int In rtllt""'tat Ion
prl.rlly frc. laroar ~Ioytra IIltll perceived
blu ard IIltlldrewal by .-lIer or•."laatloni
CIOIId "'09 cllUl" In egr..-ntl proteccl".
lIV'tIltt..ntltl~ ",,1-
• Tile 1I1atorl"l dtvel~t 0' counclla "" Icll IIId
"tltld I Itatua ~~ to fall In til. "'"
SA
• Inc....tency end poor ItIQIltdII of ccu-.ctllort
on th.lr rolu, til. LIlA, ccu-.cll conatlcullon
and ..r~tI and leek 0' nttOtlnlon atlll.
'oor aUltudi. of cOU'CIlIora, •• thller
.Illt~, Indifference or pettmalt.
· 'oor I.ldtrahlp on el Cller .Ida
• Sytt.a~ afur Ke... optnad to Ilacta
IIltll ICclt)tld nor-. of ..,...Inlne ard dlaprt.
rllO Iut Ion a.cc.I". InedIcJa tI and IIIPIO"f'Irt
'tllrOllI~ In tile t«*el l
• f~loyera obJectl". to "lUll rahed b¥ til...
_,.tIIlt IIllone •• ~eMonllbII~
• 'Olt III"'. trade ",1_ not ...-lUted by
LIA conatralnu
• CIOIId ahop claue.. I~I", IIllon __rtlllp onl
IlIIPloyMI Il1o do noc "I til to btlone to tile ",,'onl
I
• Lick of flulblllt., In -.netl~ council .ffalra I
and tilt Ineb II I t., to ell.".. prlCtlc" I
I
LICk 0' aoltdlrlty beC-.n Ctlft and ttnI",l I
z
l
l
4
• l6 •
4
z
,
:s
...........................................................................................................
QUlSTlOIlMAIII "(II
I I I I
I IC I 10 I" I II
I I I I
I I I I
I IU I AI lOCI
I I I I
I I
'0' I 1 I
I I
7
··································..··············1····· .
~I~ I
I
Olffer',. ~Ion IcMoI01lln of lIOf'kerln vertUi I
popuilU I 4
I
CGUlCHI not ful f JllIng th.lr prCCllr rol .. In I
labour r.lItlona by edoptlne _I teillnlatr.tlve
f""tlona end not concrlbutl,. to I.., dlapuc.
rHolutlon It'd th. IIIIpt'~t of relnlone
btcwttn pertln
• Olaaolutlon of CClU'CII reth.r thlll ..1e
.tll tlllt ~'orw co the CCUlC II 2
Inu~lon rlv.lry on CClU'CJlI
• Gtntrll ltek of dhclpllnt
• Govt~c feqe of ot.cNCclvtnttl end leek of
btlilf In the I.,.C.
• 'lChnologlcll ch."... .1 urI,. tilt uruct"". end
oc~tlona IIlthln IrOJetrln IItl,. cCU'C1l1
fOf" thH' trldee end occuptclona obtal.t.
5. MOll th". dllloluclona could hive bttn
prtvtntlch
• ClmOtc~c
• Could not, peln nttdtd to be uplf'lanctd
• Could not, II II • YOh.,UI'Y ayat.
• .lltorlcll orillne "'I~ could hI\'t bHn
prtvtntld I IGIlI tl. 890 Iud! II aulUilon
of litetl, Job r...rvtt lon, .tClt.,1
• Ict..c.tlon of ...,10'fI'" In labour r.lltlone
• 'ecHlry In LlA for r ....terld ~Ion pat'tl ..
to VIto "'try of new pertl.. iMlld IIa¥I been
r.-wet
• Ca-Itllflt of boCh pert I.. to tilt c",trlUNd
colltetlve 1lI,..llnl". • .,.t. end tilt contlruld
f""tlonl,. of th. Ire-trIll couw:lI, lilt" '"
l..,roved Cltllt. for cOQCler.tlon
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• A 110'1 r...OMbI. lClCH'oectl to _r...,t IIltone
end .Inc.r. 1"..,IUtlon to ~h. ~o be pert of
of the prOCti.
Conatr.lnu on IIlWarrenud .lllttnCY of ""lonI
IIlth _. rtlponelbl. ber'llnt~ .uh\de z J
• Cemot be prtvtnttd ~ll. polltlc.l Idtolon
pervtdlt \ilIon -ov--.e
If th. Dtpert."t of "~r had Uk." I II,.
Itti'd to tnlutt thte lew end order II
.'"Ulned In vlrtoua InclIlItrt ..
Strong ICtton by .-ployer.' or,enlaUtone,
trtdt \IItona end Iter.urlte of the clU'Cll.
to corrlCt the .ltuetlon
• A btU.r undtr.tandlng on the ICope 'Of'
c~I"",UlItV between plent ltvtl
end ctntrallatd berg.lnl". InUtl "'Ich
llOUld h...... lpel to r.fortl r.th.r then dlllolutloni
. . I
• Iq)/'ovtd COlllU\Icat Ion and Irdtrattl'dl". be tween
pertl••• , 'rank dl.cua.lon on ' •• r. end
uptCUtlona Z
• POliti ..... ut' of ttChnology
• Th. provl.lon of mr. focua.td ..,...,Ic" audl ..
I. advlc. tI'd tr.lnlng eo IIIPl00000rt
• Th. tdoptlon of e greeeer _I.tory rol. In
dltplt.. by ClU'Ctl.
" Stlould be ._Itlw eo nttdI of tllPlover end
1IIP10'fM partl. In the Inct.atry II aurvlv.1
11111 be thrHtened If eheM are not Ittl.f1ed
I • .or. UItf' frIendly Z J
" If en lnatltutlon I, no 10ntI' vlllli. aMuld be
.110lltd to 10 to thl well end be dlaMlwd
JJI..,."
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
" Alt~ could not be prewnttd, no rMlGft ttIty
could not be """Ubl tlllld 1I1~1I11Ort
lui tllli. fOll'det Ione
" Gr..t.r tol.rene. of ot"" vlllll
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application 0' e~ end good lIN.
Stronger, In'o~ I.~ra/llp 0' pert!"
Grelt.r flulblllty aUowd In I~. operatIon 0'
cOU'C1l1 by DtplrtMnt 0' MlIllOWr
• Iy adoptl,.. • I'Nlel". r.ther t~." • pollcl".
1PPI'000h
CCllIIpttent cOIrICIl aca" to ICt .. Mdl.ton,
'1Clllutora end conelll.tora bltllHn pertl"
· I.ovtd Itt1llaclon
Difficult to e~t aa un rei II. to IPKlfle
c~ phIlOlQSlhI .. on collective blr,alnl".
A harnl". curve h•• been tllperlenced In the
poet·Vlthlhn er. which II•• r"ulted In ~Ique
"'" cClIlClfltlone _rolng which IIltll ICCeptenc.
1I111 r"ult In "'" c~1l1 btl,.. at""'tured
• Th. prtltnC. of ~re actIve tredltlONI ~Iona
on cOUlC1l1 to loot afur th.lr IIIlIIbIra/llp
• Vlch • .are cooperaclve end IYI'lIIII.t!c aAWOId'I
'roe th. Govt~t
• Gre.t.r flulbll Icy In ed8ptl,.. to change "tell
rell,..ula/l',.. of vntMf Inttr"tI
6. Th. ,'''ctl-,-.. of In&t.acrlll eOlrlClla
II ctntrall.ed collective bt,...lnl".
It ruct"".. I
C~I.t.ly InefflCtlw
lneffectl".
Modent.ly IfflCtlw
(ffeetl".
V.ry Iffectlve
7. AIt.rnetlw lnetltutlona to IneUtrlal
cOUlC1l1I
• Acentrel ...,Ioyer Ii'll t laUd ,~ IUd! ..
til. CIllltllr of MInH a.,st.
• Z9 •
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Inblry ,,.Inl,,, Io.rd aa a aprl~rd
self govtr_t In I~lry "'auld be left 10
Irdlvtul eq)loyera rod ""lone
Inblry rKognltlon .gr...."u followd by
ehh.r aKlonl or retllonal nttOllltlone
nol alblKt to provlalona of lU, coverl",
volll'ltary partie. only
1I001h.r aultable lnetltutlon lhlt could
fulf II the Ir4Ia t r 1.1 cou"c Il'a fll'lCt lone
_..I"" only of the body vlth the a_ be.lc
Mll.1
1I0t alt.rnatlve Inttltutlont but lltarnetive
..Iatant Inat~tI auc:h aa ..... deterwlnetlont
Alt.rnatlYII hMPIred by leck of~r
It Dtplrt-.nt of M~r
lnat.ad of IlterNtl.,.. vaY' "'auld be .ought
to atrengthtn the present I",al beall of
Inclatrlal CClU'CII.
contlrue prnent ..,Ioyer.' organllltlona
wIIlcll can Iial •• vlth ",Iont on a conaultatlft
beall at gow~t lewl
• 'otalbly dtcentralf •• collectIve be,...lnl",
but r.taln _Inlttratlve and other fl6lCtlone
centrilly
• Seplnle dlnlttratl_ and labcur r.latlone
fillet Iont of COl6lC Ila
• Certlln functlona of cOl6lCII. can nt thould be
perfOlWd by tlllPloyw1l' 0l'Il"1 ut Ione and ",Iont
• Could be 1I1der In lIClPl lcatlon IIltll different
foruat fot dlff.rent aeeton
• "ant II'vtI natOt lit Ione
• In Mllutlonery pIIa•• "lttl no I..y tolutlone
• lIant otll.r tllat could r.1dI ttr.-,u ..
_Icably Ird efficient ly vI til 1..1 dlll'\C't Ion
• Ccwlllltton botirdl fM' e.~I. ar. """,ltllble
a. an altlrnatlve .. not a ptlWl'olnt badY
1l
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I
1110 Ilttrflltt~ but c~1I1 "'auld be -odernlledl
wlt~ reltructUl'l", of their IIl1torlcll I
f~ttonl I
I
1110 Iltlrflltt~ but federatiON or .rOl.CJl of I
""In "'auld cClIClne to Itr.,..tllen tll..,I..,.. I Z
I
Corporetl blr.,lnlno uructUl'" I , CCllIPM'f Itvt
II ~ed to plent leve.
Incorporltt I fo,... rol. for IIISSA If pert I"
tn dlldlock
Only tnetltuttone 'Uebilihed voluntlrlly
bit,,"" Plrtt.1 will be '''lCtl~
Oerf9Ulltlon to 1.lve ..Ientlill for ..I.
bultnetl" l.I'dIr Dl9lrt~t of ~r, pl"'t
IIVtI ber•• tnlno for I.rger bull""'l" end
loP\l.tlClted Ilbour 1IIIIIItion In I~rt fro-I
centrll IOVIr..-nt I
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Vtry IIIpOI' t ent IS '0 Z
a.s "'''1 Ie"'" , IIOt IIIpOI' lent Z I
IIIpOI'I" S S
very IlIpOI't tnt 10 S
a.4 ,,.Inl,.. protr-. , lOt IlIpOI't tnt 4 I
IIIpOI' Ililt J
.0 IlIerl\lll"l for IrQlat/'i.1 ltelOn lilt" •
ler.. 1UItlt, of -.dj~ to 11 IIIIlloytr. but
for ltelOn ~iNlltd bY ler '~ plMt
lewl ~,.. tnl", lIQUid be I'" llIlmet lwe
COUlCIII .re only ,~I,..d .....,. II II dHl,td
10 ulend ",.-tI" to non'PI,IIN 011ltf'V1 ..
Ihey een nItOll.u C~ ..,.-,11 on eIY'f
011111' ~I"
StrU"I" 10 opt out of Ih. fo,.1 IIt)our
,.llliona lyel. end ttl. ,..,lIllwprotectlona
Ihll It prO'tldH ltlould be COUIIt,teltd .uc" II
III...,It"C' of Inc_pelldt"t eontrtelor. end
Itbour brott'l lIfIlc.. be.r II Inil of uplolettlon
"
, Willi tnt 0111.1' .l",natlwe 11'111 Ililt Ion 11"1
nlll ,~I,. l ....I.tlon to enforce ..r~U
S/lq) floor ~,••Inl", •• tn .lIlmellYe not
lulltbl. II 1111 I CIUI. C"IOI
, Ar'/'f lyet. Ihlt bot" pertl" lIInt end III" be
cc.lutd 10 lilt" only t"OI. perllclpetl", Ih.t
II"" 10 on • YOI~Ury belli
a. ,Ilt 11IIPO,ltne. of ttl. fll'CtlCll'il end rol"
of Ircbtrl.l c~1 III
a.' Collective ber..ln'"" IIOt IlIpOI'tent
a.l DlqlUU 'NOluclon ,lIOt IlIpOI'ltnt
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V.ry tllpOttlnC I '0 S 2 5 .. n 147,2
I I
11.5 (eLe.t Ion '4)11 f t-enc I 1I0t IlIpOttll'lC I .. S 2 10 1",9
I I
IlIpOttlllt 9 5 .. 21 ISt,6
I
V.ry tllpOttlnC 4 4 2 .. 2 17 IU,l
I
a.6 Soclll r..pone Iblll cy, 1I0t tllpOttlnC 7 4 16 ISO,2
I
IlIpOttlllt 5 6 2 2 16 ISO,2
I
V.ry IlIpOttlnC 5 2 1 5 2 16 ISO,2
I
a.7 Soclll chlll9' Igeney , 1I0t IlIpOrtll'lC a 5 J 19 In,l
I
IlIpOttlllt 5 4 J 12 m,6
I
Vlry IlIpOttlnC 4 2 2 .. 2 15 2a,S
a.a Oth.r,
NOla Ino prav:J II on t hrOUllf' binifit fll'dl VI 2 4 7,5
Job Crtlt Ion VI 1,9
.'Iolvlng pollticil dl ff.rtnC" (I • IlACTUI
COSAIU) ',9
H.Il th progr.... 0 AIDS VI Z Z J,I
• 11IV0Ye quality of ~tlon ltd ..rvlc.'
procLctlon beroalnlng VI 1,9
• c~ICltlon "Ithln I~try Vi 1,9
• SOCIII ICtlvlU.. VI Z Z .. 7,5
• LIbout ptIC' VI Z J,I
• Splellilit ••rvlc.. I,'
1t8llM1'd Itnl,.. Vi I,'
• JtdInolOfY d1.... VI ','
• UnIIiPloyed lIOtll.,.. VI I,'
• INrt tl. rflU,.tlon VI I,'
• l'lrtnC~t prOCH'" Vi ','
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9. A future lIOW~e" Ilene. tOlllrda th. I
Incbtrl.l c~ll IYlt.. I
I
elmOt c~t. bue I f forced to dillolve I
for"" hbour ~.,e••Icilition In 1I\I'••1Iulc
dIMrdI and • poor.r ec~
• 'Ivourlbl.
Potltlve If. _ to central control •• I.
CCllWhunt vlth IrOMerl.l ccuv:1l ICtlvlty
lIetltlve If toullurf." .. then. thr.u
lIet.tlve If PAC bl •••• will brllk down .yat.
Potltlve II Cln be perc.lved II • _thod to
rtdlltrllluU .... lth
'orttOlng vlll be ne;.elve to IIIPloyer, ••
vIII perc.lve •• Incr••• lng ~'fr" tnttrprh.
Potltlve btcaua. I~trl.l ccuv:ll.~r
the peopl. vlth -ell" CS-racy and Ihlfu th.
potentl.l conflIct fre- the IIIPloyeellttt.
to the ,..:lloyee/lllPloyer trent
• POIltlve II AIIC and COSATU ~t I centr.lIled
colllCtlve blrg.lnlng ,yat.
• wIll cItptnd on IIIPloyer .tt Itudlt Ifld ....
VOVI~t would be loath. to .-t I....
whIch could .#feet the ee~ too ad! U'ltll
IIIPloyer .ttltudH .re clarifIed
• IIltltlve If current gowl'MWlt r_l,.. 0.. to
dar.l.t Ion ••yat_ will peter out
• SIIould •• th.......,..tand ttlt vlea of ttle
'Ylt- II ~ In rulf ty ler. It eM to
nttItlve hlltorlc.l .aperltnC"
• WIll cItptnd on vtltth.r Itlt. or IOCI.ttl
corporltl_ vlll IA)ly .. In certlln It.t"
..U·IO¥eI'nlnC' cen be • tllr..t
• Will cItptnd too on the pt'optnIlty end 8bllltY
of the pertl" u .ll lewll to enter Into
tr. offl to _kt cClllllPf'CllII"
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COUlCIl. ,lIould be rept'...ntatl.,. to r_In
In ut'ttnce
hlllPtlona fre- c~1l .or..-nt. My not
be poa.lbl. If • alack govtrnMnt
\/1 II .1.0 depend on dqrM of Ntlonell ••t Ion
•• un Mt••.,..t. oe.ol.t.
hpecttd that ..tIllet will ulll h•.,. • roll
to pl.y tetlON .uch ., dl ..I...,. and
re tranc:hMntl .1 gh t bee Cllllt cod'ff td
""Iell will dlalnl'" dhput. r"olutlon role
NtII UA under conalder.tlon will I~t
Cin be vltvtd , ••lther , powrful .lly In
"oneal c pollcy .phtre or II • thrtU
• If COUTU ntv Depart.."t of lI~r til,"
will be inti tq)loytr end frM enttrprlae
• ~tdlctabl••• etructur.. and rul" ere
Irdtr conatlnt pr...ure ""enevtr locl.ty I,
Irdtrgolno f~t.l chlnge
• Til. lyetet I. '" I~rted IIttttrn FIrat World
Ideology and I, not ....tll.tlc to tilt Uric,"
trlbel lIf"tyle ..tIlctI confOfW to c~let
concept. and does not racoonl .. ~ power Ir~
tiler. for. council. _y nlll alit ""Ilat ~Ional
retlln tll.lr worktrllt • ."Iratlone and they end I
cOUlCII. tre not perce Iwei ... polltlc.l ttlrMtl
I
• \/Ill be ltft .lone If 'trClnl and .fftetlw end I
will Int.rvene If WUt Of' • alltur. 0' theM I
I
• \/111 conti,... to ..Inl,tar benlfltI If'd 1NUr. I
1",I.."tttlon of • netlenally Itt .Inl_ ..... I
I
• Interpr.tatlon 0' an AJfC/SAO lO'It~t I, tll'tl
Itronetr and etrletlr control 0' labour IJIMrt I
will tAlly Includll'll lnebul,l cOUlCIlI I
I
• ~Itl.,. If "ClPO"t fOf' futw• .,.,.,,_.t b'f I
IIOI'ttrl II trlde ~IOI'W Irt provld1na ar..ter I
~t to Irclatrlll CClU'l:Il. I S
I
• '0I1t1.,. If cOU"CIlI .re not Ittn to be I
......rlt1na .......,lo.,...nt end Itlfllna 1C~lc I
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,rowt~ throug/l \lVllllutCilly high~ end
oth,r bentf Iu
11111 be Il.ClClOrt~ but with '"t",," auch ..
proportional rtpr'tlentatlon 0' ",lone, natlONI
qr.-u to Include all 0' alA end oth."
lurr~lne Itlt'I, "II th .Inl_ ...... and
cot'd' t Ione Ina lac~ I4lOft and 'ull -ot Ivlt Ion
and ILqlOrt '0" 'll~t lone
Optl.fttlc In thlt 'uture 8O"t~t IIlll
conetn 0' 1IlOcIa"ltli and III11 not tnt''''''''
IIlt~ an I",tltutlon that \I '\l\Ctlonl". wall
11111 Il4)pOrt the Iylt_ but II , _tnt 0'
r..t~t lne and cont"olll", th, IIOrk'o"cI and
II an tnatr~t 0' poll t ICII patronaoa and
loclll chane' which will Incll~ ",.dl". th."eo'l
I
COUlCIII fulfil thl "oll 0' .tntllnt", orde" In
labour r,lnlON Which II I.ratlw 'or tI'rf
IOWr,."t
• 11111 dtptnd entlrlly on WhIch pollttcil
dllpentltlon CClllllI Into power end llllo gowma
II do not know It thl. lUte
• A ntII IOVtrl'llltnt IIlll naad a collectIve
ber,.lnlng '01'Ul to r~llta cot'dlttone 0'
"Nlet, III,.. and llIpOruntly relltlona 'II thIn
I~try end 11111 thar,'ora retlln IYlt. but
lIOdify to lult thllr fOnl 0' lCM~t
10. lIl'ther thl Inct.atrlal cOU'Cll l'fIt. will
aurvlw the 1990'11
,..
.0 rttplfM
IIotlv.tlon '''I
• ~Ione I" til. II a wtllcll for lllder Infl'*'CII
andcontrol I
I
• 'lilY p"c.tl thl rtdlatrltaltlon of lIMlth I
I
• .JIJIloytrt Ire -ara pt'ottettd br ...1"1 tM I
l~trl.1 cCU'C1l to __I • contrtlMlon to till I
IICro pollttCll tnVI,,~t I
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Th, I~t. lurvlved tho 1980'1 llIIen tho tllr..t I I I I I I I
of ,tllCi wu IIr.'t.r I I I I 1 I
I I I I
It fttl the r~lr.-.ntl of tueUII In • future I
South Afrle. c1It to -:)r. pertlelpetlon In tile I
."Ilra of en Irdlltry end locll'lat orientttion
loth pert I.. Ilav. l.arnt hC* to lurvl~ In til.
I~t. end hl~ e~ to Kettlt end I\4lClOrt It z
Inltlll lIaci trade union rllilune. Il.a
dl.lnlallld M to partlelpetlon hlvl,.. proved
th.t IrQlatrlll (OU'Clla 1" bentftel.l bodl ..
"peelilly In respect of btnIftU, llIte
rl9Ulltlon tnd dhp,lt. r"olutlon fl.nCtlone
th.rafore IYlt. l'lJa bec~ lCetptld z 4
- A new govtr~t lIQUid be relueunt to ~.t
IIIUIt th.t affect the econc-y too IUCf'I end
lIOUld ltlvt IV-t. IntKt ~I"I th. pertln
ther.to crllt. probl_
- Howvtr a new gover~t Ilbacrlblna to pollcl"1
lue" II the PAC'a will l.ad to th.lr ct.1 .. I 4 6
I
• Til. IIrC*t" In atrqth of til. COSATU ~Ione tllul
I~t IrdJltry cencral control I
I
- Should rethtr refer co poeC-C1ll Accord decade I
end will dtpInd on deYel~tl IIltll "'" I
,EDW. Wllon faderaC Ion f~tlon I
I
- 'OCW will etl... fr~ (ollectlw be,...lnl". I
to ICiIlnlatrnl.,. role I
I
- II en I.,-tant .l~ In a pillallnie aocl.eyl
I
- An ulnlna Infr.cructur,/lnat~tfor Ilacill
to acIllrtt tllelr pia I
I
- 'olltlcal Ird.p.uMlle. of cOU'C1l1 advInt..-out I
to III perel.... In Zilltlaibwa rewrted beck to I
council IMI bertalnl". .. .,.. fnourebl. I
I
- AI _rttnt ~Iona bec~ ~. lIOtt.,ln tM'( I
vIII aUy tile aylt. co tile cIltnIl"I altUitlonl
I
_ lotll ""Ioytrt end unlone vIII III'" to rotaln I
tll.lr respectl.,. conerola, tile forwtr tllelr I
rljltl Ind Influenc. and til. IItt., tllelr I
....r"'lp I
- J7 •
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Ic~'c Inltl.tl".. .. Ill deu,..tnt IUNlv.1
Til. ''(It. II.. ~Udly ltd to Iibout' p..c:e
end bett.r benef I tl for work.r.
• E~loy.r '\ClPOrt of the l'(It. will vary, end
trlde ",Ion .upport .. I II conti"", to grow
• Til. pertl" .r. going to nHd to IIOrk togeth.r
to Iddr... _lor pot ....tl.l .oclo·IC~lc
probl_ .utll .1 lIlIdlcel bentflu. lloutlng end
lIWIlPloywnt
cOU"CIl. will be IIbJect to .tronger pre..ur.
to .~It to ",Ion~
• cOU"CII••tlll fulfil us.ful flllCtlona end
will .urvlvt with edeptlon to cl\qed nHdI ] :s
• Specific cOlrCH .etl.fl.. needa of both pertl..1
I
• Provided etrqloyer. do not beca-e c~l.teW I
~rld with two tl.r bar,.Inl". I
I
• A new ''(It. would h• .,. to be developed In tll.lr
stud whlcll would be • -Jor te.k •• tiler...t
be • fONl for collect I.... bar..lnl". 6
· I. 1ft ntebilltled end good -.dl.tlon fotUl
wh.r. pertln cen Int.rect end .Ir their vi ...
for til. bett.,.."t of .11 In the IrdJitry Z
• IIIll dtptnd on .ttltudes end perceptlona of
pertln II cOU"Clla .... not I~I".·
InttitutlClN but lnet~ta to _Intaln
1-... pllCe, IIIPf'O\I'e re lit I0NIlIpe, ..tabU '"
..curilY for the Ird.atry end nlblll..
th.lC~
• IIIlI only .urvl .... If bec:c.H .eIr. receptl .... to
th. nHdI of thl Ird.atry tll.t It ..",..
• IIIlI .urvlvt not bee..1 of Irllfrlftt -ei'lt but
bee..e of trlde "'Ion ~t
Ilotlvetlon .01
• political. ttpeelall'l C~lat. Influenc. on
COIIlCIl. which II.. er••ttd tlIIPlO'flr r..hunce
• Til. propottd ....... ,tI to th. pr"ent LU
·31·
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..Ill flvour the -are redlc.l \I'Ilen to the
dltld>'lIIC1gt of the ... lItr -'tretl ~I_
• \/111 not lurvlv. In th.lr pr"tnt f~ end .. Itll
.c)tI CGUlCUI dlllol..,lne IIOvtr~t and
orgllliled ltboul' .. Ill nHd to tddr"1 the root
CIUI' of tht Ir'lltrtnt atructurt, agr.. to
chene" end r.· ..tlbll ah tht blrg,ln'", fOt'Ul
In , .c)rt IlOrklbl. fo,..t for tht future
• DUI to COSATU c~lgn of one \I'Ilon per
lr4atry there could evtntutlly only be _
\I'Ilon per lra-trl,1 cOU'oCIl ..Ith Itvtrel
tlIPlo.,.r bodl.., I... objectIvitY end • ,r.'ttr
peyc:holoele:tl dllttne. bet,,"" tht pert I..
OT"II CtMIINTII
• Tht .In tdvenug. of the I",tll It to
Mlntlln PlK. In the I~try, but COln:III
do not hive the powr to unit dltput.., only
to Mdlltt
• lr4atrlll court Ihould be rtv~ and
'c~tent' ...cert ~Inted
• An outce. of the role of CO\l'lCUI In ...Ittl".
..Ith the .Intenenc:. of InriJltrlll peec. I.
thtt It .r~lly 1.-pr0Wl tht grOllth of en
lr4atry
• Sinct Itt Inception th. InriJltrlll COln:ll
.ec:hlnery h.. conalderably l..ovId the llOrll,..
condltlen end ...... of .-plo.,.tt end Inltllted
loclll Mttur.. tudI .. blnlflt fll'dt fOf' the
benefl t of llOt'ten
• Glntrl""tlon I. not .1...,. lIAlf'OP"llt••
IdvInU"" dlud\t8nu..., efftctlvanee. end
f""tlone of ttNt Iyu_ Clft very by NetOf' and
IndlvlctJll COln:UI
• Tht concept of InltAtrl.1 CO\l'lCUI II aca.nd In
r"peet of tllO oppoelne pertl" \I'Iltl"l In I
fOlWI I!tUltlon and ber.. ln',.. on ..r.-ent
..Itll tile tdv."t... of Itltutary tInCtion
• TtII broad flnCtlon of CClU"C1l1 II perc,lwd II
tile r....latlon of I~trlll tI,.tlona betwlft
tlIPlo.,.rt' I..oclltlone and trldl \1'11_ "'Id!
If not tvlUabl, llOUld Ited to I coneldarable
~t of t.plolutlon fra III pertl .. In III
• 39 •
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rlllVlllt '~trl" I
I
I"erdl"ll lhl futurl of thl Iytl_, Itl I
coll.1 lIOUld hlVI _Jor COlt IIIPltCitione for I
II'I'f future 1000r~t In thl 'Ont 0' Iddtd I
loclll IlCurlty btntflta end tJlttnllVi I
Irdalrlll II'II'lit. I
I
• Conclrn end clUtlon r~trdl"llll'dlrlyl"'union I
ttrlltty en ptrtlclpetlon In tncUtrlll. I
COlIlCIII In ptrtlcut.,. thl COSATU unlone .1 tlleyl
Irl .IONlory through thllr 'tdlrltlon to an I
IntlrNt lentl Igr.-nt tllit tncludtt I
rlllCtlon 0' thl Irdlatrlll COlIlCII •.,.t_ end I
II thua vltwd II ..,.vlng currtnt purpoe.. only I 4
I
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